Clarify government authority to regulate firearms and armed groups while balancing individual rights with public safety, preventing private militarization, and establishing accountability frameworks for lawful armed acti
Clarify government authority to regulate firearms and armed groups while balancing individual rights with public safety, preventing private militarization, and establishing accountability frameworks for lawful armed activity.
The state must retain control over organized violence while protecting lawful individual rights to firearm ownership. Private armies, unaccountable militias, and weapons of war in civilian hands represent threats to democratic order that must be regulated, while legitimate self-defense, sport, and lawful militia service remain protected under clear safety and accountability standards.
Gun policy in America suffers from three interrelated failures:
Without clear constitutional authority to regulate firearms, weaponry, and armed groups, we face two extremes: either arbitrary prohibition that violates legitimate self-defense rights, or unregulated proliferation that enables mass violence and private militarization. The goal is a framework that permits lawful gun ownership while preventing weapons-of-war proliferation, requires accountability for organized armed groups, and establishes safety-based regulations that reduce preventable deaths[2].
The Second Amendment's ambiguous text has been weaponized to challenge nearly every gun safety law. A targeted constitutional amendment explicitly affirming Congress's and states' authority to regulate firearms, weapons of war, and armed organizations would resolve this uncertainty — allowing background checks, safe storage mandates, training requirements, and militia accountability standards to stand on firm ground without requiring each law to survive an ever-shifting "history and tradition" test.
Gun policy intersects with civil rights, policing accountability, and the constitutional balance between private arms and state authority.
This pillar rests on three structural distinctions:
Individual rights vs weapons of war — There is a meaningful difference between firearms suitable for self-defense, hunting, and sport versus weapons designed for military combat. Automatic weapons and semi-automatic rifles designed to maximize casualties have no legitimate civilian use. Prohibiting these does not violate self-defense rights — it prevents mass-casualty attacks while preserving access to firearms that serve lawful purposes. The key is defining "weapons of war" clearly enough to prevent evasion (banning not just automatic weapons but "demilitarized semi-automatic civilian versions" designed to circumvent regulation) while not prohibiting all semi-automatic firearms (many common handguns and hunting rifles are semi-automatic without being designed for mass casualties).
Safety-based regulation vs categorical prohibition — Regulation should focus on reducing preventable harm through background checks, safety training, de-escalation training, secure storage requirements, and narrowly tailored dangerousness-based mental health evaluations. These measures do not prohibit gun ownership — they ensure that those who own firearms are trained, accountable, and not presenting immediate danger to themselves or others. Mental health evaluations must be narrowly tailored: they can determine whether someone is likely to harm themselves or others, but cannot categorically exclude groups based on diagnosis (e.g., ADHD or autism do not make someone dangerous). This prevents both arbitrary prohibition and discriminatory exclusion while addressing genuine risk.
Regulated militias vs private armies — The Second Amendment explicitly references "well regulated militia," but this term has never been clearly defined. Militias can serve legitimate functions (disaster relief, search and rescue, community emergency response) if properly regulated, transparent, and accountable. But private armies and mercenary groups — armed formations that refuse transparency, reject democratic accountability, and operate as parallel structures of violence — are incompatible with democratic order. The distinction is accountability: regulated militias must maintain membership records, disclose chains of command, carry insurance, submit to audits, follow approved safety standards, and coordinate with state and federal oversight. Private armies and mercenary groups that refuse these requirements must be prohibited.
The system assumes that gun ownership is legitimate but that proliferation of weapons of war and unaccountable armed groups are not. It seeks to reduce preventable deaths through safety-based regulation while preventing private militarization that threatens democratic stability.
Every rule in this pillar, organized by policy area. Active rules are current platform commitments. Partial rules are in development. Proposed rules are planned for future inclusion.
JUST-POLC-0006
Proposed
Ban police automatic weapons
This rule prohibits police departments from possessing or deploying automatic weapons in routine policing operations. Automatic weapons (machine guns, assault rifles capable of sustained automatic fire) are designed for military combat, not law enforcement. Their use escalates violence, undermines de-escalation principles, and militarizes police-community relations. Specialized tactical units may require access to specific weapons for high-risk situations (active shooter response, hostage rescue, counter-terrorism operations), but these should be strictly limited, subject to oversight, and not part of general patrol equipment. The militarization of routine policing has transformed police departments into occupying forces in many communities, particularly communities of color. Banning automatic weapons for police is part of a broader de-militarization and accountability framework. This rule does not disarm police — it limits them to weapons appropriate for law enforcement rather than military combat. Standard service pistols, shotguns, and precision rifles for specialized situations remain available. The goal is to prevent the arms-race dynamic where police militarization drives civilian armament and vice versa.
JUST-POLC-0007
Proposed
Ban police weapons of war
This rule extends beyond automatic weapons to prohibit police possession of any weapons designed for military combat rather than law enforcement. This includes: - Armored personnel carriers and military-grade vehicles (MRAPs, tanks) - Grenade launchers and explosive devices - Bayonets and other military combat weapons - Military-grade body armor and tactical gear designed for combat rather than protection - Surveillance and weapons systems designed for warfare (armed drones, military-grade surveillance equipment) The 1033 Program has transferred billions of dollars of surplus military equipment to local police departments, transforming law enforcement into a paramilitary force. This equipment is not designed for community policing, de-escalation, or public safety — it is designed for combat operations against enemy combatants. Its presence in policing escalates violence, undermines trust, and creates a mentality where communities are viewed as battlegrounds rather than neighborhoods to protect. Exceptions may be necessary for specialized federal units dealing with terrorism or organized crime, but these should be strictly limited, transparent, and subject to oversight. General municipal and county police departments should not possess weapons of war. This rule addresses the root cause of police violence: when police are equipped like soldiers, they act like soldiers. De-militarization is a prerequisite for accountability, de-escalation, and community trust.
GUNS-REGS-0001
Proposed
Constitutional authority to regulate firearms
A constitutional amendment must clarify that the Second Amendment does not prevent reasonable gun safety regulations. Without this, courts may continue striking down public safety laws based on increasingly narrow readings of the right to bear arms.
Amend the Constitution to explicitly affirm government authority to regulate firearms and weaponry
The Second Amendment's text has generated two centuries of interpretive conflict, most recently crystallized in Bruen (2022), which requires gun regulations to satisfy a "history and tradition" test that effectively immunizes modern safety laws from modern evidence. A targeted constitutional amendment explicitly affirming Congress's and states' authority to regulate firearms and weaponry would provide stable legal ground for the rest of this pillar — background checks, weapons-of-war bans, training requirements, and militia accountability — without requiring each rule to survive judicial second-guessing.
GUNS-REGS-0002
Proposal
Congress must respond legislatively to Bruen's "historical tradition" test to preserve the constitutional viability of modern gun safety regulations
A 2022 Supreme Court ruling said gun laws must match 'historical tradition' from 1791, making many modern safety measures vulnerable to legal challenge. Congress must pass a statutory foundation so public safety rules can withstand court review.
In New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), the Supreme Court discarded the two-step means-ends scrutiny framework that had governed Second Amendment challenges and replaced it with a requirement that modern gun regulations be consistent with the "historical tradition of firearm regulation" at the time of the founding.[1] This test is structurally incapable of addressing weapons and circumstances with no founding-era analog: there were no AR-15s, no semi-automatic pistols, no ghost guns, no background check systems, and no megacities in 1791. Courts applying Bruen have issued contradictory rulings on red-flag laws, assault weapons bans, domestic violence restrictions, and magazine limits — producing a circuit split on some of the most consequential public safety laws in the country. United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. ___ (2024), upheld a domestic violence firearms restriction under the Bruen framework, offering a modest clarification that historical analogues need not be precise — but the fundamental problem of forcing a 21st-century regulatory agenda through an 18th-century evidentiary standard remains.[2] Congress must respond on multiple tracks simultaneously: (a) enact gun safety legislation in the strongest, most unambiguous mandatory terms, eliminating the discretionary language that courts use as interpretive gaps through which regulations are voided; (b) include in every gun safety bill a detailed historical findings section documenting the founding-era tradition of firearm regulation — there was extensive colonial and early-republic regulation of storage, carry, and unsafe use, and Congress must compile and present this record to satisfy Bruen's evidentiary framework on its own terms rather than concede the historical field to gun industry litigation; (c) fund the compilation, digitization, and preservation of a comprehensive historical record of colonial and early-republic firearm regulation for use in federal judicial proceedings; (d) pursue a constitutional amendment explicitly clarifying that the Second Amendment permits reasonable public safety regulations enacted on the basis of contemporary evidence of harm, and that the constitutional test for such regulations is not limited to finding analogues in the regulatory practice of a pre-industrial slave-holding society. The Bruen test, if applied literally and rigidly, would constitutionalize willful ignorance of evidence: a government unable to regulate weapons that did not exist in 1791 cannot meet its basic obligation to protect public safety in the 21st century.
GUNS-BANS-0001
Proposed
Ban weapons of war from civilian ownership
Private citizens should not own weapons built for military combat — including both fully automatic firearms and semi-automatic versions engineered to work around bans. These weapons have no civilian hunting or self-defense purpose that justifies the risk.
Ban private ownership of weapons of war including automatic weapons and semi-automatic military analogues designed to evade regulation
Automatic weapons have been federally restricted since the National Firearms Act (1934) and effectively banned for new civilian manufacture since 1986. This rule extends that principle to semi-automatic military analogues — AR-15 and AK-47 variants — designed to maximize lethality in sustained combat. These weapons offer no legitimate civilian use that a standard semi-automatic hunting rifle or handgun cannot serve. Their defining characteristic is combat optimization: high-capacity magazines, rapid fire, and ergonomic design for sustained shooting.
GUNS-BANS-0002
Proposed
Evasion-resistant definition of weapons of war
Any ban on weapons of war must use a definition that gun manufacturers can't sidestep with small design tweaks. The law must cover the full category of military-style firearms, not just specific named models.
Definition of weapons of war must be evasion-resistant and cover both automatic weapons and demilitarized semi-automatic civilian versions
Without an evasion-resistant statutory definition, manufacturers can circumvent bans through minor mechanical modifications — removing a third-position selector, for example — while producing functionally equivalent weapons. The definition must address design intent and lethality optimization rather than mechanical configuration alone. A weapons-of-war definition that is not evasion-resistant is no definition at all; industry will exploit any gap.
GUNS-BANS-0003
Proposed
Ban high-capacity ammunition magazines
High-capacity magazines — attachments that let a shooter fire many rounds without reloading — must be banned above a set limit. Fewer shots before reloading means more chances for people to escape or for others to intervene.
Ban high-capacity ammunition magazines above a defined threshold
High-capacity magazines allow shooters to fire more rounds without reloading, directly increasing the body count in mass shootings. Research has found significant reductions in high-fatality mass shootings in states that enacted large-capacity magazine bans. The threshold — commonly set at 10 rounds — must be defined in statute. Existing magazines should be subject to grandfathering provisions tied to surrender or modification programs, with meaningful enforcement mechanisms rather than unenforceable paper bans.
GUNS-BANS-0004
Proposal
Enact a new federal assault weapons ban with a feature-based, evasion-resistant definition and a federally funded voluntary buyback for currently owned weapons
Congress must pass a new federal ban on assault-style weapons using a clear, feature-based definition that closes the loopholes in the 1994 law. A government-funded voluntary buyback would let people who already own these weapons sell them back.
The 1994 Federal Assault Weapons Ban (Public Safety and Recreational Firearms Use Protection Act, Pub. L. 103-322, §§ 110101–110106) expired in 2004 without renewal. Research published in the Journal of Trauma and Acute Care Surgery found that mass shooting fatalities were substantially lower during the ban period; following expiration, mass shooting deaths increased significantly.[1] A renewed ban must be drafted to survive post-Bruen litigation while closing the definitional evasions manufacturers exploited in the 1994 law — including the "California compliant" redesigns that removed cosmetic features while leaving the weapon functionally identical. The statute must: (a) define assault weapons by functional features, not named models: any semi-automatic centerfire rifle that accepts a detachable magazine and incorporates any one or more of the following — pistol grip, thumbhole stock, folding or telescoping stock, flash suppressor, or grenade or flare launcher; any semi-automatic pistol accepting a detachable magazine over 10 rounds; (b) define the prohibition in terms of design intent as well as features, with authority delegated to ATF to designate additional configurations that achieve functional equivalence through minor mechanical variation; (c) prohibit manufacture, importation, sale, transfer, and possession of newly manufactured qualifying assault weapons and magazines exceeding 10 rounds; (d) establish a federally funded voluntary buyback program at fair market value — not punitive nominal payment — for currently owned assault weapons and high-capacity magazines, funded through a dedicated excise tax surcharge on new firearms and ammunition; (e) grandfather existing lawfully owned weapons only upon completion of a federal registration and enhanced background check within 18 months of enactment — unregistered weapons are contraband after that deadline and subject to forfeiture. The buyback must be voluntary; mandatory confiscation of grandfathered weapons would face constitutional and practical barriers that would consume the program in litigation. The goal is to shrink the existing pool through economic incentive while ending new production and importation. Complementing GUNS-BANS-0001 and GUNS-BANS-0002 (weapons-of-war definitions), this creates an evasion-resistant legal framework that directly addresses the regulatory gap the 1994 ban's expiration created — and pairs production prohibition with a legitimate exit path for current owners who choose to participate.[2]
GUNS-ACQS-0001
Proposed
Universal background checks for all acquisitions
Before anyone can buy a gun, they must pass a background check — a screening process that flags people legally barred from owning firearms. This already applies to licensed dealers but must extend to every purchase.
Require background checks for all firearm acquisitions
Federal law currently requires background checks only for purchases from federally licensed dealers. Private sales, gun show transactions, and informal transfers between individuals are exempt in most states, creating an enforcement gap consistently exploited by prohibited buyers. Universal background checks are supported by large majorities of Americans across party lines and represent the most foundational element of any serious gun safety framework.
GUNS-ACQS-0002
Proposed
Background checks cover all transfers including private sales
Currently, private sellers and gun-show vendors don't have to run background checks the way licensed gun stores do. This closes that loophole so every firearm transfer — including private sales — goes through the same screening process.
Background check requirement applies to all transfers including private sales and gun shows
The private-sale exemption in the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act allows individuals to transfer firearms without any federal oversight. Extending the requirement to all transfers — gifts, loans, gun show sales, and online transactions — requires federal legislation and coordination with state-level enforcement. Without this extension, background checks remain only partially universal, and the gun show and private-sale loopholes remain open to exploitation.
GUNS-ACQS-0003
Proposed
Comprehensive and interoperable background check databases
Background checks are only as good as the records behind them. States and agencies must share complete, current data so that disqualifying records don't fall through the cracks.
Background check databases must be comprehensive, interoperable, and up to date
Multiple mass shooters passed background checks because prior disqualifying records — mental health adjudications, domestic violence convictions, felony charges — had not been properly submitted to the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS). Comprehensive database coverage and interoperability across all jurisdictions is a prerequisite for background checks to be effective. Record submission must be mandatory, not voluntary, for all disqualifying events.
GUNS-TRAN-0001
Proposed
Mandatory safety training for firearm ownership
Anyone who wants to own a firearm must first complete a certified safety course. Safety training teaches people how to handle, store, and operate guns properly, reducing accidents and unintentional shootings.
Require safety training as a condition of firearm ownership
Safety training requirements — analogous to driver's license requirements — reduce accidental discharges, improve handling under stress, and establish a baseline of competence. Training does not prohibit gun ownership; it ensures owners can safely handle and store the weapons they own. Federal minimum standards should define required curriculum, qualified instructors, and certification processes. States may impose higher standards but not lower.
GUNS-TRAN-0002
Proposed
Mandatory de-escalation training for ownership
Gun owners must also complete training in de-escalation — learning how to defuse tense situations without reaching for a weapon. Most conflicts don't require lethal force, and trained gun owners make better decisions under pressure.
Require de-escalation training as a condition of firearm ownership
The presence of a firearm in a confrontational situation frequently escalates rather than resolves the conflict. De-escalation training teaches firearm owners to recognize threatening dynamics before they become lethal, defuse tension, and avoid situations where a weapon is drawn unnecessarily. This training is particularly important given research showing that most defensive gun uses involve ambiguous situations where de-escalation was available but not employed.
GUNS-TRAN-0003
Proposed
Safe storage requirement
Federal law must require all gun owners to store their weapons securely when not in use. A national minimum standard ensures no state can opt out, and that children and unauthorized users everywhere face a locked barrier before reaching a firearm.
Require secure storage of firearms; safe storage law as federal minimum standard
Unsecured firearms in the home are a leading source of youth gun deaths, stolen weapons diverted to crime, and accidental discharges. Safe storage requirements — requiring firearms to be stored in locked containers or with trigger locks when not in active use — are associated with significant reductions in youth firearm injuries and gun theft. A federal minimum standard ensures baseline protection nationwide and removes the patchwork of inconsistent state requirements that currently allow unsafe storage practices to persist in much of the country.
GUNS-MHES-0001
Proposed
Dangerousness-based mental health evaluation
Any mental health screening for gun ownership must focus on whether someone poses a real danger — not simply whether they carry a diagnosis. Most people with mental illness are not violent, and broad exclusions would be both unfair and ineffective.
Mental health evaluations for gun ownership must be narrowly tailored to dangerousness, not diagnosis category
The existing federal prohibition on firearm ownership by persons "adjudicated as a mental defective" is both overbroad and underinclusive — excluding non-dangerous individuals while missing dangerous ones without formal adjudication. Evaluations must focus narrowly on the specific question of imminent risk of harm to self or others, using trained professionals applying evidence-based criteria. Dangerousness, not diagnosis category, is the constitutionally and ethically appropriate standard.
GUNS-MHES-0002
Proposed
No blanket exclusion based on diagnosis alone
Having a mental health diagnosis — like depression or anxiety — cannot by itself be the reason someone is barred from owning a firearm. The law must assess actual, evidence-based risk of violence rather than stigmatizing entire groups.
Prohibit blanket exclusion from firearm ownership based solely on a mental health diagnosis
Categorical exclusions based on diagnosis — ADHD, depression, autism, PTSD — are both discriminatory and counterproductive. The vast majority of individuals with mental health conditions pose no elevated risk of violence. Blanket diagnosis-based exclusions also discourage people from seeking mental health treatment, fearing loss of gun rights, which worsens population health outcomes without meaningfully improving safety. The criterion must be individual dangerousness assessment, not categorical diagnosis.
GUNS-RFLS-0001
Proposed
Federal minimum standards for red flag laws
A red flag law — formally called an Extreme Risk Protection Order — allows courts to temporarily remove guns from people who show clear warning signs of danger to themselves or others. Federal standards must ensure these orders are available everywhere and that affected people have a fair chance to challenge the removal in court.
Establish federal minimum standards for red flag / extreme risk protection orders with due process protections
Extreme risk protection orders (ERPOs) allow courts to temporarily remove firearms from individuals who present an imminent danger to themselves or others. States with red flag laws have seen significant reductions in firearm suicides. Federal minimum standards should ensure due process — notice, opportunity to be heard, judicial review, and time limits — while ensuring ERPOs are available in every state. The standard for removal must be clear evidence of imminent risk, not mere allegation; temporary removal must be time-limited and subject to prompt judicial review.
GUNS-MILS-0001
Proposed
Define "well regulated militia" in enforceable law
The Second Amendment references a 'well regulated militia,' but that phrase has never been clearly defined in law. Congress must establish a legal definition with real, enforceable standards.
Define 'well regulated militia' in enforceable constitutional and statutory terms
The Second Amendment's reference to "well regulated Militia" has never been given operational legal meaning. Without a statutory definition, the term cannot be enforced — either to protect legitimate community militias or to prohibit armed groups that claim constitutional protection while refusing accountability. A definition must specify what "well regulated" requires: transparency, safety training, state oversight, and accountability. Without this foundation, the other MIL rules lack clear legal anchoring.
GUNS-MILS-0002
Proposed
Ban private armies and mercenary groups
Private armed groups operating outside government oversight — sometimes called private militias or mercenaries — must be prohibited. Armed organizations that answer to no public authority are incompatible with democratic governance.
Ban private armies and mercenary groups
Private armies and mercenary groups — armed formations that operate outside democratic accountability, refuse state oversight, and function as parallel structures of organized violence — represent a direct threat to democratic order. Most states have statutes prohibiting private paramilitary organizations, but enforcement is inconsistent and federal authority is unclear. This rule establishes a federal floor and closes gaps where existing state laws have failed to prevent armed groups from training for anti-government violence while claiming militia status.
GUNS-MILS-0003
Proposed
Militia transparency and accountability requirements
Any organization calling itself a militia must operate transparently — registering members, disclosing its leadership, keeping audited finances, and carrying liability insurance. These requirements bring militias under basic public accountability.
Require militias to maintain membership records, financial transparency, audits, insurance, and disclosed chain of command
The line between a regulated community defense organization and an unaccountable armed group is accountability. Militias that wish to claim constitutional protection must demonstrate they are "well regulated" by maintaining public membership records, disclosing leadership and chain of command, carrying liability insurance, submitting to regular audits, and meeting safety training standards. These requirements parallel those placed on other organized bodies exercising constitutional rights — political parties, nonprofits, religious organizations — and are not extraordinary burdens.
GUNS-MILS-0004
Proposed
Government oversight of militia training
Governments must be able to review what private militias teach and require in their training. This oversight prevents extremist groups from operating under the cover of a militia designation.
Federal and state governments must have oversight authority over militia training materials and requirements
Without oversight of training content, militias can train for insurrection while claiming lawful status. Federal and state oversight authority enables review of training curricula, equipment, and operational procedures to ensure compliance with lawful militia standards. This does not prohibit militia training — it ensures that training prepares members for lawful activities (disaster relief, search and rescue, community emergency response) rather than anti-government violence. Oversight is the mechanism that distinguishes a "well regulated" militia from an armed insurgency.
GUNS-MILS-0005
Proposed
Regulated militias integrated into disaster relief
Properly vetted and regulated militias should be able to work alongside emergency responders in disasters like floods or wildfires. Channeling these groups into legitimate public-service roles reduces the risk of unaccountable armed groups acting on their own.
Provide mechanisms for regulated militias to train for disaster relief and search and rescue alongside first responders
Regulated militias can serve legitimate public purposes, particularly in under-resourced areas where disaster response capacity is limited. This rule creates a constructive channel: militias that meet accountability standards can be integrated into emergency management frameworks, training and operating alongside FEMA, the National Guard, fire departments, and local law enforcement. This transforms accountability compliance from a restriction into an opportunity for genuine public service — and establishes the model that distinguishes legitimate regulated militias from prohibited armed groups.
GUNS-LICS-0001
Proposed
Firearm purchaser licensing — permit required before purchase
Before buying any firearm, a person must obtain a license — completing a background check and safety training first, just like getting a driver's license before getting behind the wheel.
No person may purchase or acquire a firearm without first obtaining a state-issued firearm purchaser license, valid for five years, requiring completion of safety training, passage of a background check, and a 14-day processing period; the license system applies to all acquisition methods including private sales.
Purchaser licensing is distinct from and stronger than point-of-sale background checks. A background check at the time of purchase can be completed in minutes and provides no time for investigation of recent threats; a purchaser license requires an application process, identity verification, completion of training requirements, and a minimum waiting period before the license is issued. Research on Connecticut's 1995 purchaser licensing law found a 40% reduction in firearm homicides and a 15% reduction in firearm suicides in the years following enactment, compared to counterfactual trends;[4] a 2020 study in Annals of Internal Medicine confirmed the association between permitting laws and reduced firearm mortality. The analogy to motor vehicle licensing is direct: operating a car requires a license demonstrating minimum competence and satisfying legal prerequisites; there is no principled reason firearm acquisition should require less.
GUNS-LICS-0002
Proposed
Mandatory waiting period for all firearm purchases
After buying a gun, there must be a waiting period before taking possession of it. Waiting periods give background checks time to complete and reduce impulsive acts of violence, including suicide.
A mandatory minimum waiting period of 14 days must apply between the initiation of a firearm purchase transaction and delivery of the firearm; no purchaser license or background check clearance may waive the waiting period.
Waiting periods reduce impulsive firearm violence, particularly suicide and crimes of passion committed in moments of acute emotional distress. Research published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences found that waiting periods reduce gun homicides by roughly 17%.[5] The effect is particularly strong for suicides: firearms are lethal in over 85% of suicide attempts, compared to approximately 5% for other common methods; a waiting period provides an interval during which suicidal crises may resolve or intervention may occur. Current federal law does not require a waiting period — the Brady Act's three-day limit refers only to how long the government may delay a transaction before default-proceeding, not to a minimum delay for safety purposes. A non-waivable 14-day federal minimum ensures the cooling-off function is achieved regardless of whether a background check completes earlier.
GUNS-LICS-0003
Proposal
Congress must establish a federal firearms purchaser licensing system requiring safety training, a background check, and five-year renewal as a prerequisite for all firearm acquisitions
Federal law must create a national license for gun buyers that requires safety training, a background check, and renewal every five years. This ensures gun owners remain eligible and knowledgeable throughout their ownership.
The United States is one of the only developed democracies that does not require a license to purchase a firearm. A firearms purchaser license is categorically different from and structurally stronger than a point-of-sale background check: a license requires a minimum application and processing period that creates time for investigation of emerging threats, mandates completion of safety training before any acquisition rather than after, and establishes a renewable credential that can be suspended or revoked on an ongoing basis rather than only at the moment of a single transaction. Research published in the Journal of Urban Health found that permit-to-purchase laws — the closest existing U.S. analog to a purchaser licensing system — are associated with significantly lower firearm homicide rates in urban counties, controlling for other regulatory variables.[1] Connecticut's permit-to-purchase system, enacted in 1995, correlated with a 40% reduction in firearm homicides and a 15% reduction in firearm suicides in the years following enactment compared to counterfactual trends — reductions that reversed when Missouri repealed its analogous permit-to-purchase law in 2007, with homicide rates rising sharply. A federal licensing system must require: (a) completion of a state-certified safety course covering safe storage, safe handling, use, de-escalation techniques, and legal obligations before any license is issued; (b) passage of a written knowledge test administered by the licensing authority demonstrating understanding of firearm law, safe storage requirements, and prohibited-person rules; (c) a background check conducted during the application process, with a minimum 14-day processing period before any license is issued — the license itself serves as the background check clearance, eliminating the need for a separate check at point of sale; (d) license renewal every five years, with a current background check at each renewal to capture disqualifying events that postdate the original application; (e) mandatory liability insurance for any licensee who owns more than five firearms or any assault-style weapon, providing a private market mechanism for risk-rating concentrated ownership. The licensing requirement applies to any person acquiring a firearm by any method — purchase, gift, inheritance, or private transfer — not solely licensed dealer sales. Requiring a license at the point of acquisition rather than only at the point of sale prevents private transfers from bypassing safety requirements entirely, which is the mechanism through which the private-sale loophole undermines point-of-sale background check systems.
GUNS-LICS-0004
Proposal
A federal minimum 10-day waiting period must apply to all firearm purchases with no exception for existing owners or license holders
Every gun purchase must include at least a 10-day wait before the buyer can take the weapon home — no exceptions for people who already own guns or hold licenses. Research shows waiting periods save lives by reducing impulsive violence and suicide.
Waiting periods function as a structural intervention against impulsive gun violence — the category of firearm death most preventable precisely because it is, by definition, not premeditated. The mechanism is well-documented: a person in the acute phase of a suicidal crisis, a domestic dispute escalating to lethal threat, or rage following a perceived humiliation may decide to use a firearm in a way they would not sustain across any cooling-off period. Research published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences found that handgun waiting period laws reduce gun homicide rates by approximately 17%, with the effect concentrated in crimes of passion and domestic violence rather than premeditated killings — confirming that the waiting period does what it is designed to do.[1] The effect on suicide is equally significant: firearms are lethal in over 85% of attempts, compared to approximately 5% for the most common alternative methods, making the interval between impulse and access a life-or-death variable. As of 2024, nine states have waiting periods ranging from 3 to 14 days; federal law imposes none — the Brady Act's three-day provision sets a limit on how long the government may delay a sale before permitting default-proceed, not a minimum safety delay. Congress must establish a federal minimum 10-day waiting period for all firearm purchases, applicable regardless of whether the purchaser holds a license, has previously completed a background check, is purchasing a second or subsequent firearm, or is a current or former law enforcement officer purchasing for personal use. The no-exception rule is essential to the waiting period's function: an exception for existing owners or permit holders eliminates coverage for precisely the population whose crisis purchase is most plausibly enabled by prior ownership status. A person who already owns firearms is not the primary target of the waiting period policy — but an exception for prior owners creates an evasion pathway that would be exploited: a person who has allowed a license to lapse or who did not previously own firearms faces the full waiting period while someone with a prior purchase record faces none, regardless of the identical crisis dynamics at the time of purchase.
GUNS-AMOS-0001
Proposed
Background checks required for all ammunition purchases
A background check should be required before buying ammunition, not just firearms. This prevents people already barred from owning guns from simply buying the bullets instead.
Background checks equivalent to those required for firearm purchases must be conducted before the sale or transfer of centerfire rifle and pistol ammunition by any licensed or unlicensed seller; prohibited persons may not purchase ammunition in the same circumstances they may not purchase firearms.
Federal law requires background checks for firearm purchases from licensed dealers but imposes no equivalent requirement for ammunition. A person prohibited from purchasing a firearm faces no federal barrier to purchasing unlimited quantities of ammunition. California's ammunition background check law, enacted 2019, provides a functioning model: licensed ammunition vendors must conduct background checks before each sale, with a one-time "basic check" fee and an expedited system for existing registered gun owners. The logical gap is obvious: the same prohibited-person disqualification that applies to the weapon should apply to the ammunition. Without ammunition regulation, firearm safety measures are incomplete — prohibited persons can acquire weapons through illegal channels and arm them through legal ones.
GUNS-AMOS-0002
Proposed
Ammunition sales records and reporting for bulk purchases
Sellers must keep records of ammunition sales and report unusually large purchases to law enforcement. Bulk ammo stockpiles can be an early warning sign of planned violence.
Licensed firearms dealers and unlicensed bulk sellers must maintain records of ammunition sales exceeding a defined threshold (500 rounds or more in a single transaction) and report bulk purchases to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives for review.
Mass shooters and domestic terrorists have repeatedly purchased extremely large quantities of ammunition — sometimes tens of thousands of rounds — in the months or weeks preceding attacks, without triggering any law enforcement attention. Bulk ammunition purchase reporting provides a potential early-warning signal and allows ATF to assess whether unusual acquisition patterns indicate planned violence. The reporting threshold must be set at a level that captures genuinely anomalous purchases without sweeping in ordinary lawful activity by hunters and competitive shooters. Records must be maintained with standard privacy protections and subject to the same retention and oversight requirements as other ATF records. The reporting requirement does not prohibit the purchase; it creates a documented record that law enforcement can consult if the individual later becomes the subject of a threat investigation.
GUNS-STWS-0001
Proposed
Enhanced straw purchase penalties with mandatory minimum prosecution
A 'straw purchase' is when someone who can legally buy a gun buys it for someone who cannot. Penalties must be stronger and prosecutors must pursue these cases, since straw purchases are a major pipeline for illegal firearms.
Straw purchases of firearms — purchasing a gun on behalf of a prohibited person or any person who has not undergone required background checks — must be prosecuted as a federal felony with mandatory minimum sentencing, and dealers who fail to detect or report obvious straw purchase indicators must face license revocation and civil liability.
Straw purchases — where a legal buyer purchases a firearm on behalf of someone who cannot pass a background check — account for up to 50% of firearm trafficking investigations by ATF and are the most common channel through which prohibited persons obtain firearms.[3] Federal law prohibits straw purchases under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6), but enforcement is inconsistent and penalties are relatively modest. The Bipartisan Safer Communities Act (2022) strengthened trafficking and straw purchase provisions, but implementation gaps remain. Enhanced mandatory prosecution and dealer accountability — requiring dealers to exercise reasonable diligence in detecting straw purchase indicators and imposing license revocation for repeated failures — closes the gap between formal prohibition and functional enforcement.
GUNS-STWS-0002
Proposed
Firearms trafficking as a standalone federal felony with enhanced penalties
Buying guns in bulk to resell them illegally — called firearms trafficking — must be its own federal crime with serious penalties. No single law currently covers the full scope of this activity, which fuels violent crime across the country.
Firearms trafficking — the acquisition of multiple firearms for resale outside licensed dealer channels — must be a standalone federal felony with enhanced penalties, distinct from individual straw purchase charges and applicable regardless of whether the ultimate recipient is a prohibited person.
Prior to the Bipartisan Safer Communities Act (2022), there was no standalone federal statute criminalizing firearms trafficking — trafficking charges were assembled from predicate offenses. The 2022 Act created a trafficking offense but with modest maximum penalties. A standalone felony with enhanced sentencing — commensurate with the severity of crimes committed with trafficked weapons — establishes firearms trafficking as a serious federal criminal category, improves prosecution outcomes by simplifying charging decisions, and creates appropriate deterrence for the commercial gun trafficking networks that supply crime guns in cities with strict local regulations. The standalone statute complements, rather than replaces, predicate offense charges and allows prosecutors to pursue trafficking networks at both the distribution and acquisition ends.
GUNS-STWS-0003
Proposed
Firearm manufacturer civil liability for negligent distribution and foreseeable mass violence
Gun manufacturers must be legally responsible when their distribution choices — like supplying dealers known to funnel guns to the illegal market — lead to foreseeable violence. Victims of this negligence must be able to sue for damages.
The Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA) must be amended to allow civil suits against firearm manufacturers and distributors for negligent distribution practices that foreseeably channel weapons to prohibited persons or to mass-violence perpetrators through known trafficking networks, and for marketing practices that foreseeably encourage unlawful use.
The Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (2005) broadly immunizes firearm manufacturers from civil liability for crimes committed with their products. While manufacturers should not be liable for the independent criminal acts of third parties using legally sold products, the immunity extends to cases of negligent distribution — knowingly supplying dealers with documented histories of trafficking to prohibited buyers, or maintaining distribution practices that foreseeably channel weapons to high-crime markets. Courts have allowed narrow exceptions (the Sandy Hook families' suit against Remington succeeded on negligent marketing grounds); amending PLCAA to codify and clarify those exceptions restores normal tort accountability principles without eliminating all immunity. A firearm manufacturer that knows its distribution network is supplying gun traffickers and takes no action should bear civil responsibility for foreseeable consequences.
GUNS-STWS-0004
Proposal
The Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act must be repealed or substantially amended to restore civil tort accountability for gun manufacturer negligent design and negligent distribution
A federal law passed in 2005 gives gun manufacturers near-total immunity from lawsuits, even when their design or distribution choices put people at risk. That special protection must be repealed so the industry faces the same legal accountability as any other manufacturer.
The Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901–7903 (2005), grants firearm manufacturers and dealers a category of civil immunity from lawsuit that is unavailable to any other product industry in the United States.[1] No pharmaceutical company, automobile manufacturer, chemical producer, or consumer electronics firm enjoys equivalent protection from suits arising from negligent design or negligent distribution practices. This immunity has permitted manufacturers to: market military-style weapons to civilians using explicitly military combat imagery and to anti-government extremist audiences; continue supplying dealers with documented histories of diverting weapons to trafficking networks; and design products lacking basic passive safety features standard in the industry — without facing the civil liability that otherwise disciplines product design and distribution decisions across every other sector. The narrow exceptions created by subsequent litigation demonstrate that the mechanism works when the immunity is pierced: Remington's insurer paid $73 million in 2022 to settle the Sandy Hook families' negligent marketing claim — a settlement that produced the documentary disclosure showing how Remington had deliberately marketed the AR-15 to young men using combat imagery. Congress must: (a) repeal the PLCAA in its entirety, or at minimum amend it to allow negligent design claims where a firearm lacks safety features reasonable in light of the state of the industry; (b) allow negligent distribution claims where a manufacturer or distributor knowingly sold to dealers with documented patterns of trafficking-related trace requests or regulatory violations; (c) allow public nuisance claims by states and municipalities for the documented public health and public safety costs imposed on their jurisdictions by foreseeable negligent distribution; (d) allow negligence claims where the manufacturer's marketing practices foreseeably attracted purchasers intending unlawful violence, including marketing specifically targeting audiences with documented overlap with anti-government extremism or militia movements. Firearms kill approximately 45,000 Americans annually.[2] Civil liability does not prohibit manufacturing; it disciplines it. A manufacturer that takes reasonable precautions in design and distribution faces no greater litigation exposure than an automobile manufacturer that installs seatbelts and recalls defective vehicles. The PLCAA immunity is a legislative subsidy that transfers the costs of preventable harm from the industry that profits from the products to the communities that bear the deaths.
GUNS-STWS-0005
Proposal
Universal background check requirements must cover all firearm transfers, the Charleston loophole must be eliminated, and all dealers must maintain electronic records accessible to law enforcement within 24 hours
A gap in federal law — known as the Charleston loophole — allowed the 2015 church shooter to buy a gun because his background check wasn't completed in three business days. That loophole must be closed: no sale proceeds until the check is done, all private transfers must be checked, and dealers must maintain electronic records accessible to law enforcement within 24 hours.
The National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS), established under the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (18 U.S.C. § 922(t)), requires background checks for firearm sales by federally licensed dealers (FFL holders).[1] Private sales — at gun shows, through online classified advertisements, and between individuals — are not subject to federal background check requirements in most states. A person who fails or is denied a background check at a licensed dealer in the morning may legally purchase the same firearm from a private seller that afternoon. The Government Accountability Office has documented that this gap enables firearms to reach prohibited persons who would otherwise be screened out at the dealer level.[2] The "Charleston loophole" compounds the problem: the Brady Act permits the sale to proceed by default if NICS has not returned a denial within three business days. This is the mechanism through which Dylann Roof legally purchased the handgun he used in the 2015 Emanuel AME Church shooting — his prior drug arrest should have disqualified him, but the relevant record was not retrieved within the three-day window. Congress must: (a) require background checks for all firearm transfers without exception — private sales, gifts, trades, transfers at gun shows, and transactions facilitated through online platforms — eliminating the private-sale exemption entirely under all circumstances; (b) eliminate the three-day default proceed provision and replace it with a 10-day hold requirement before any default proceed is permitted, ensuring that slow record retrieval does not create a de facto exemption from background check coverage; (c) require all federally licensed dealers to maintain electronic point-of-sale records for all firearms transactions in a format accessible to ATF for trace requests within 24 hours without a judicial warrant, consistent with ATF's existing trace authority but extending the response-time requirement to all dealers rather than only those that comply voluntarily; (d) require all states, territories, and federal agencies to submit all disqualifying records — felony convictions, domestic violence findings, adjudications of mental incompetence, and court-issued protective orders — to NICS within 48 hours of the event creating the disqualification. A background check system is only as effective as the records it can access and the time it has to check them. Universal coverage without adequate records and adequate time is a paper requirement, not a safety system.
GUNS-SAFS-0001
Proposed
Prohibit manufacture, transfer, or possession of unserialized firearms (ghost guns)
'Ghost guns' are firearms with no serial number — often assembled at home from kits — that are untraceable by law enforcement. Manufacturing, selling, or possessing these weapons must be illegal.
No person may manufacture, transfer, or possess a firearm — including frames, receivers, and 3D-printed components — that does not bear a serial number traceable to a licensed manufacturer; all existing unserialized firearms must be serialized by a licensed gunsmith or surrendered within 12 months of enactment.
Ghost guns — unserialized firearms manufactured from parts kits or 3D-printed components — are specifically designed to evade background check requirements and law enforcement tracing systems. The ATF reported that ghost guns recovered at crime scenes increased by over 1,000% between 2016 and 2021.[6] The Biden administration's 2022 ATF rule (Final Rule 2021R-05F) closed some regulatory gaps by requiring manufacturers and dealers to serialize previously exempt kits and frames, but the rule faced legal challenges and enforcement remains uneven. Statutory serialization requirements eliminate the workaround: every functional firearm, regardless of how it was manufactured, must be traceable to a licensed manufacturer and subject to the same background check system that governs licensed dealer sales. Without universal traceability, background check systems, prohibited-person rules, and criminal investigation tools are all undermined at the level of enforcement. Cross-reference: GUN-ACQ-001 through GUN-ACQ-003 (background check requirements that depend on serialization to be effective).
GUNS-SAFS-0002
Proposed
Mandate microstamping technology on all new semi-automatic handguns manufactured for civilian sale
Microstamping stamps a tiny unique code on bullet casings when a gun fires, letting investigators link shell casings found at a crime scene to a specific weapon. All new civilian semi-automatic handguns must use this technology.
All new semi-automatic handguns manufactured for civilian sale in the United States must incorporate microstamping technology that imprints a unique identifying code on cartridge cases when fired; implementation must be phased in over five years with no manufacturer exemptions.
Microstamping is a forensic technology that laser-engraves a unique alpha-numeric code on the firing pin and/or breech face of a handgun, so that when the gun fires, the code is stamped on spent cartridge cases. This allows law enforcement to trace a spent cartridge case to the specific firearm that fired it without recovering the weapon itself — a significant advance in solving gun crimes where the weapon is not recovered. California enacted a microstamping law in 2007; implementation has faced delays due to manufacturer resistance and claimed patent limitations. Independent forensic researchers have found microstamping to be technically feasible; objections from gun manufacturers and their trade associations are disputed by peer-reviewed ballistics and forensic science research.[7] Mandatory federal implementation eliminates the problem of manufacturers refusing to adopt the technology voluntarily while retaining market presence. Cross-reference: GUN-SAF-001 (serialization as the ownership traceability complement to microstamping's fired-case traceability).
GUNS-SAFS-0003
Proposed
Fund smart gun technology research and remove legal barriers to smart gun market availability
'Smart guns' are firearms that can only be fired by their authorized user — using a fingerprint or RFID signal — reducing accidents and theft. The government must fund research and remove legal barriers that have kept smart guns off the market.
The federal government must fund research and development of smart gun safety technology including personalization locks, grip recognition, and biometric verification; existing state laws that inadvertently penalize retailers for stocking smart guns must be repealed; smart gun technology may not be mandated as the exclusive option but must be available to consumers choosing it.
Smart guns incorporate electronic or biometric safeguards ensuring only authorized users can fire them. The technology reduces gun theft utility (a stolen smart gun cannot be fired without authorization), child accidental discharge deaths, and suicide access among household members. New Jersey's 2002 Childproof Handgun Law — which mandated smart guns for all future handgun sales once they became available anywhere in the U.S. — inadvertently created a market barrier: dealers who stocked smart guns faced threats and boycotts from gun-rights groups opposed to triggering the New Jersey mandate. Federal R&D funding through the National Institute of Justice (NIJ Smart Technology programs) and repeal of mandatory-only state laws allow market development without triggering consumer backlash. Smart gun technology is not mandated for all purchasers; it is developed and made available as a consumer choice for those who prefer it. The market for authorized-user-only firearms is substantial among parents, domestic violence survivors, and households with at-risk members. Cross-reference: GUN-TRN-003 (safe storage, which smart technology complements); GUN-SAF-001 (serialization — traceability and technology as complementary safety frameworks).
GUNS-RSCH-0001
Proposal
Federal Agencies Must Conduct Ongoing Firearm Injury and Mortality Research
Federal agencies like the CDC and NIH must fund ongoing research into gun injuries and deaths. For decades, Congress blocked this work; restoring it is essential for understanding what gun safety policies actually work.
Congress must appropriate no less than $50 million annually to the CDC and NIH specifically for firearm injury and mortality research, including suicides, accidents, and homicides; the Dickey Amendment's prohibition on CDC gun research must be repealed by statute. Research must include effectiveness studies on all federal and state gun laws, demographic breakdowns of gun violence, and cost-of-care studies. Research results must be publicly published within 18 months of completion; no appropriations rider may be used to suppress, delay, or defund this research. Knowing suppression, delay, or defunding of required research by any federal official is a federal criminal offense; affected researchers and institutions have a private right of action to compel publication in federal court.
The Dickey Amendment (1996) effectively halted CDC gun research for over two decades. Congress appropriated $25 million for gun research in 2020 for the first time in 25 years.
GUNS-RSCH-0002
Proposal
Establish a Real-Time National Firearm Injury and Death Surveillance Database
A national, continuously updated database must track gun injuries and deaths across the country. Accurate, timely data is the foundation of any effective public health response to gun violence.
The CDC must establish and maintain a real-time national firearm injury surveillance system, modeled on the National Electronic Injury Surveillance System, receiving data from all hospital emergency departments, trauma centers, and medical examiners within 72 hours of a firearm-related injury or death. Data must be disaggregated by weapon type, location, circumstance (self-inflicted, assault, law enforcement, accident), demographics, and legal status of the firearm. Annual reports must be publicly published; data must be available to researchers under a qualified researcher access program. Failure by a covered reporting entity to submit required data is a federal civil offense subject to withholding of federal health funding; any researcher or institution denied access under the qualified researcher program has a private right of action to compel disclosure in federal court.
GUNS-RSCH-0003
Proposal
All Federal Gun Laws Must Include Mandatory Five-Year Effectiveness Evaluations
Every federal gun safety law must be reviewed every five years to measure whether it is actually reducing harm. Laws that aren't working should be strengthened or replaced based on evidence, not politics.
Every federal firearms law and significant federal regulation must include a sunset-with-renewal provision requiring: a five-year effectiveness evaluation by the CDC, NIH, and DOJ; public testimony on findings; and affirmative congressional reauthorization to continue. Evaluation criteria must include: reduction in firearm mortality rates, compliance rates, effects on lawful gun ownership, and equity impacts across demographic groups. Laws that demonstrably increase harm or have no measurable benefit may be suspended pending revision. Congressional failure to timely commission a required evaluation is a structural violation subject to mandamus in federal court on petition by any affected person or organization.
GUNS-SAFE-0001
Proposal
All Firearms Must Be Stored in Locked Storage When Not Under the Owner's Direct Control
When a gun is not in a person's hands, it must be stored in a locked container. Secure storage prevents stolen weapons from reaching criminal hands and keeps children from accessing loaded firearms.
Federal law must require that any firearm not in the immediate physical possession of its lawful owner be stored unloaded in a locked container, gun safe, or with a trigger lock installed; storage requirements apply in all residences where a minor under 18 is present or has access. Violation of storage requirements when a minor gains access resulting in injury or death is a federal criminal offense with mandatory minimum penalties. Manufacturers must include a certified gun lock or lockbox with every firearm sold. The ATF must publish minimum standards for certified locks and storage devices. Any person injured by a firearm accessed by a minor due to unlawful storage has a private right of action against the firearm owner for civil damages.
Approximately 4.6 million children in the U.S. live in homes with loaded, unlocked guns.[8] An estimated 380,000 firearms are stolen from homes annually.[9]
GUNS-SAFE-0002
Proposal
Federal Child Access Prevention Law — Criminal Liability for Negligent Storage
Gun owners who negligently leave firearms accessible to children must face criminal liability when that results in harm. These laws hold adults accountable and create a legal incentive to store weapons safely.
It is a federal criminal offense for any person to negligently store or leave a firearm in a manner that allows access by a minor who then uses the firearm to injure themselves or another person. Negligence is presumed when: no trigger lock is in place; the firearm is loaded; or no locked storage is used. Affirmative defenses include: the firearm was taken by force; or the minor accessed the storage through unauthorized means that were not foreseeable. Prosecution does not require that the minor actually fire the weapon — mere access while the underlying negligent storage occurred constitutes the offense. Any person injured as a result of a minor's access under negligent storage conditions has a private right of action for civil damages against the storing party.
GUNS-SAFE-0003
Proposal
Federal Tax Credit for Certified Firearm Storage Equipment
Gun owners should receive a federal tax credit when they buy certified gun safes or lock boxes. Making safe storage affordable encourages compliance and reduces the number of firearms accessible to children or thieves.
A refundable federal tax credit of up to $500 per household must be available for the purchase of certified firearm storage equipment (gun safes, lockboxes, quick-access safes certified to ATF standards). The credit is available once per three-year period per household; income phase-out begins at $100,000 AGI. Certified equipment must meet minimum theft-resistance and fire-resistance standards promulgated by the ATF. The ATF must maintain a publicly accessible list of certified equipment manufacturers; fraudulent certification of non-compliant equipment by a manufacturer is a federal criminal offense, and purchasers who relied on a fraudulent certification have a private right of action against the certifying manufacturer for damages.
GUNS-TRAF-0001
Proposal
Federal Law Limits Handgun Purchases to One Per Person Per Month
No person may buy more than one handgun per month under federal law. This limit disrupts bulk buying by traffickers who purchase many guns at once to resell illegally on the street.
Federal law must limit the purchase of handguns by a single person to one firearm per 30-day period from any combination of licensed dealers; the ATF must maintain a real-time database enabling dealers to verify whether a purchaser has made a handgun purchase in the prior 30 days. Straw purchasing — buying a firearm on behalf of another person who could not legally purchase it — must carry mandatory minimum sentences of three years with no probation eligible. The ATF must publish annual reports on one-gun-per-month limit violations and straw purchase prosecutions. Any person harmed by a firearm obtained through a straw purchase or in violation of purchase limits has a private right of action against the purchasing party and, where the dealer knew or recklessly disregarded the violation, against the dealer.
Virginia's one-handgun-per-month law was repealed in 2012 and reinstated in 2020. Research links the law's repeal to increased gun trafficking to northeastern states.
GUNS-TRAF-0002
Proposal
All Lost or Stolen Firearms Must Be Reported to Law Enforcement Within 48 Hours
If your gun is lost or stolen, you must report it to police within 48 hours. Quick reporting helps law enforcement recover weapons before they're used in crimes and helps track how guns move from legal to illegal hands.
Federal law must require any person who discovers that a firearm they own has been lost or stolen to report the loss or theft to local law enforcement and the ATF within 48 hours of discovery. Failure to report is a federal civil offense subject to a $1,000 fine per firearm for a first offense and $5,000 for subsequent offenses; knowing failure to report to conceal trafficking is a federal criminal offense. Licensed dealers must report inventory theft within 24 hours. The ATF must cross-reference the stolen gun database with all crime scene ballistics evidence. Any person harmed by a firearm not reported as stolen or lost in violation of this section has a private right of action against the non-reporting owner for civil damages arising from foreseeable subsequent criminal use.
GUNS-TRAF-0003
Proposal
All Firearms Must Bear Permanent Serial Numbers; Ghost Guns Are Prohibited
Every legally manufactured or sold firearm must have a permanent serial number that cannot be removed or defaced. Serial numbers let law enforcement trace guns used in crimes — firearms without them make investigations nearly impossible.
Federal law must require that all firearms — including those manufactured at home, printed with 3D printers, or assembled from kits — bear a permanent, machine-readable serial number registered with the ATF at the time of manufacture or completion. The ATF must establish a simplified registration process for home-manufactured firearms, with no transfer allowed until the firearm is registered and serialized. Sale, transfer, or possession of an unserialized firearm is a federal felony carrying a mandatory minimum of two years. The ATF's ghost gun rule must be codified in statute and not subject to reversal by executive action. Any person harmed by an unserialized firearm has a private right of action against any person who sold, transferred, or manufactured the firearm without the required serial number.
The ATF estimated 23,906 unserialized ghost guns were recovered at crime scenes between 2016 and 2020, representing a dramatic increase in untraceable firearms. Cross-reference: GUNS-SAFS-0001 (ghost gun prohibition in the SAF family).
GUNS-EXCL-0001
Proposal
Repeal Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act Immunity for Negligent Conduct
A 2005 law gives gun manufacturers broad protection from lawsuits, even when their negligent actions — like knowingly selling to distributors that supply illegal dealers — cause harm. That special immunity must be repealed so victims can hold manufacturers accountable in court.
The Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA) immunity from civil liability for gun manufacturers and dealers must be repealed as applied to: negligent entrustment, knowing or reckless sales to straw purchasers, failure to implement required inventory controls, defective product design, and deceptive marketing to minors or civilians of military-style weapons. Manufacturers and dealers retain protection from liability for unforeseeable criminal acts by purchasers. Any state law providing broader civil immunity than federal law for firearm manufacturers is preempted. Harmed individuals, survivors, and municipalities have a private right of action in federal court for damages arising from the above categories of negligent or reckless conduct; class actions are expressly permitted.
Sandy Hook families successfully sued Remington under a marketing exception to PLCAA, resulting in a $73 million settlement.
GUNS-EXCL-0002
Proposal
ATF Must Conduct Annual Inspections of All Licensed Firearms Dealers
The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) must inspect every licensed gun dealer every year. Regular inspections catch illegal sales, missing inventory, and record-keeping violations before they fuel more gun violence.
The ATF must conduct an annual compliance inspection of every federally licensed firearm dealer (FFL), including review of acquisition and disposition records, inventory reconciliation, and compliance with background check procedures. Dealers with three or more significant violations within five years must have their licenses revoked; revocation decisions are subject to administrative appeal but may not be stayed pending appeal when there is evidence of ongoing trafficking. The ATF must publish annual dealer compliance statistics by state, including violation rates, revocation rates, and the percentage of crime guns traced to each FFL in the prior year. Any person harmed by a firearm sold or transferred in violation of this section has a private right of action against the FFL for civil damages where ATF inspection records establish a pattern of uncorrected violations.
As of 2021, the ATF was only inspecting dealers approximately once every 11 years on average.
The Second Amendment states: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." This language has generated two centuries of interpretive conflict. Does "well regulated militia" mean that gun rights are collective (tied to militia service) or individual? What does "well regulated" mean — does it authorize government regulation or simply refer to militias being well-organized? Does "the right to keep and bear Arms" prohibit all regulation or only prohibit complete disarmament?
The Supreme Court's decision in District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) established an individual right to firearm ownership untethered from militia service, striking down D.C.'s handgun ban while acknowledging that this right is "not unlimited" and that "longstanding prohibitions" like bans on concealed carry or possession by felons remain constitutional. McDonald v. City of Chicago (2010) incorporated this right against the states. More recently, New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen (2022) invalidated New York's "proper cause" requirement for concealed-carry permits, holding that gun regulations must be consistent with "the Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation." This "history and tradition" test has been criticized for cherry-picking historical examples and making modern regulation difficult by requiring historical analogues to 18th-century laws.
The effect has been to create constitutional uncertainty where basic safety regulations (universal background checks, assault weapon bans, high-capacity magazine limits, red-flag laws) are challenged as unconstitutional, while also leaving undefined what "well regulated" means and whether organized armed groups can be required to maintain transparency and accountability. This pillar seeks to resolve this uncertainty by explicitly affirming government authority to regulate firearms while clarifying that this regulation must be safety-based (not arbitrary prohibition) and that militias can be required to meet "well regulated" standards.
The distinction between lawful firearms and weapons of war is critical. Automatic weapons have been heavily regulated since the National Firearms Act of 1934 and effectively banned for civilian manufacture since 1986. But the proliferation of semi-automatic rifles designed for military use — AR-15 variants, AK-47 variants, and comparable weapons — has enabled mass-casualty attacks while serving no legitimate civilian purpose. These weapons are designed to maximize lethality in combat: high-capacity magazines, rapid fire, and ergonomic features optimized for sustained shooting. They are not traditional hunting rifles or self-defense handguns. Banning "weapons of war" must include not just automatic weapons but semi-automatic civilian versions designed to circumvent regulation. This does not mean banning all semi-automatic firearms — many common handguns and hunting rifles are semi-automatic without being designed for mass casualties. The distinction is design intent and lethality optimization.
Mental health evaluations for gun ownership present difficult tradeoffs. On one hand, individuals experiencing acute mental health crises or expressing intent to harm themselves or others present genuine risk. On the other hand, categorical exclusions based on diagnosis (e.g., banning gun ownership for anyone ever diagnosed with depression, ADHD, autism, or other conditions) are both discriminatory and ineffective. Most people with mental health conditions are not dangerous, and most gun violence is not committed by people with diagnosed mental illness. The solution is narrowly tailored dangerousness-based evaluation: trained professionals can assess whether a specific individual presents imminent risk of harm to themselves or others, but cannot categorically exclude groups based on diagnosis. This prevents discrimination while addressing genuine risk.
Red-flag laws (extreme risk protection orders) allow family members or law enforcement to petition courts to temporarily remove firearms from individuals presenting immediate danger. These laws have been effective in preventing suicides and domestic violence homicides, but they require due process protections to prevent abuse. The standard must be clear evidence of imminent risk, not mere allegation or political targeting. Temporary removal must be time-limited and subject to judicial review.
The regulation of militias is perhaps the most underdeveloped area. The Second Amendment explicitly references "well regulated militia," but neither the Constitution nor federal law clearly defines what this means. Some militias operate as community disaster-response teams, providing legitimate services like search and rescue or emergency shelter coordination. Others are armed groups that reject government oversight, refuse transparency, and train for violent confrontation with federal authorities. The distinction is accountability: regulated militias must maintain membership records, disclose officers and chain of command, carry liability insurance, submit to regular audits, coordinate with state and federal oversight, and follow approved training standards. They can train for disaster relief and work alongside police, fire departments, and the National Guard under clear oversight structures. Private armies and mercenary groups — armed formations that refuse transparency and operate outside democratic accountability — must be explicitly prohibited.
This is not about disarming citizens or eliminating all militias. It is about defining "well regulated" in enforceable terms. A militia that maintains public records, carries insurance, follows safety standards, and coordinates with government authorities for disaster response is meaningfully different from an armed group that refuses all transparency and trains for insurrection. The former can be accommodated; the latter represents a threat to democratic order.
One critical question is the relationship between federal and state regulation. Gun policy has historically been a state-level issue, with federal law establishing minimum standards (background checks for federally licensed dealers, bans on automatic weapons) while states implement stricter or looser requirements. This creates fragmentation where guns purchased in states with weak regulations flow into states with strong regulations, undermining enforcement. Universal background checks, red-flag laws, and assault weapon bans must be national standards to prevent this arbitrage. At the same time, states should retain authority to implement additional protections (waiting periods, training requirements, licensing systems) provided they do not fall below the federal floor.
Another critical question is enforcement. Background checks are only effective if databases are comprehensive and interoperable. Many mass shooters passed background checks because prior offenses or mental health records were not properly reported to federal databases. Training requirements are only effective if training standards are meaningful (not just box-checking exercises). Red-flag laws are only effective if family members and law enforcement know they exist and courts process petitions quickly. Enforcement requires both legal authority and institutional capacity.
This pillar connects to broader policing and accountability reforms. Police should not possess weapons of war either — the militarization of police departments has escalated violence and undermined community trust. Rules JUS-POL-006 (ban police automatic weapons) and JUS-POL-007 (ban police weapons of war) address this. If these weapons are too dangerous for civilian streets, they are too dangerous for routine policing as well. Specialized units may require tactical weapons for specific high-risk situations, but general patrol should not involve military-grade armament.
Finally, this pillar must address the symbolic and political dimensions of gun policy. For many Americans, gun ownership is tied to self-reliance, individual freedom, and resistance to tyranny. For others, gun violence is a public health crisis that demands immediate action. Effective policy must acknowledge both perspectives: regulation is not confiscation, safety training is not infringement, and reducing preventable deaths does not require eliminating all firearms. The goal is a framework that respects legitimate gun ownership while preventing weapons-of-war proliferation, requiring accountability for armed groups, and reducing the tens of thousands of preventable deaths that occur annually from gun violence[2].