Courts & Judicial System

Supreme Court term limits

This position requires a constitutional amendment to establish term limits for Supreme Court justices. Term limits would prevent justices from serving for 30 or 40 years and ensure regular, predictable turnover on the Court.

Establish term limits for Supreme Court justices through constitutional amendment — the intended vehicle, not a workaround. A constitutional amendment is the right approach for the same structural reason the Sixteenth Amendment was needed to authorize income taxation: it settles the question permanently, beyond legal challenge and beyond simple-majority statutory reversal. This is a feature of the platform, not a gap to be explained away. Multiple specific term lengths have been seriously proposed and have scholarly and legislative support: 12-year terms (advocated by some as sufficient for regular turnover without sacrificing continuity), 15-year terms (proposed as a middle ground), and 18-year staggered terms (the most widely circulated proposal, providing two appointments per presidential term). The 18-year figure is not uniquely established as correct — it reflects a judgment that two appointments per term creates predictable rotation without churn so rapid that continuity suffers. Scholars Steven Calabresi and James Lindgren's empirical study concluded that average Supreme Court tenure had grown dramatically over the 20th century and that staggered 18-year terms would produce a well-functioning, regularly renewed court.^[5] The Supreme Court Tenure Establishment and Retirement Modernization Act (TERM Act), introduced in multiple Congresses with broad co-sponsorship, proposes 18-year terms with senior-status rotation to other federal courts thereafter. Fix the Court, the judicial reform advocacy organization, has documented the escalating confirmation stakes of lifetime appointments and actively advocates for term limits as a structural fix.^[7] Each presidential term would include two Supreme Court appointments, creating predictable and regular turnover. This eliminates strategic retirement timing, reduces confirmation stakes, ensures court composition gradually reflects democratic change, and addresses age-related decline without relying on voluntary retirement. Appointments remain secure (18 years exceeds most legal careers) while preventing single presidents from dominating the court for generations. May extend to lower federal court judges with different term lengths appropriate to those positions.

Judicial ethics code

This position creates a binding ethics code for all federal judges, including Supreme Court justices. The code would cover financial conflicts, gifts, political activities, and recusal requirements, with real enforcement mechanisms to hold judges accountable for ethical violations.

Establish binding, enforceable code of ethics applicable to all federal judges including Supreme Court justices. Must cover: financial conflicts and mandatory disclosure, gifts and outside income from interested parties, political activities and public statements, recusal requirements for conflicts, spouse and family involvement in cases, transparency of financial arrangements, and enforcement mechanisms with real consequences. Currently Supreme Court operates under voluntary guidance without enforcement, resulting in undisclosed gifts, financial conflicts, family member political activity in related cases, and refusal to recuse without consequence^[1]. Binding code establishes baseline ethical standards comparable to those governing all other public officials and federal judges, with enforcement through ethics investigations, public censure, removal from specific cases, and potential impeachment for egregious violations.

Require intent-based interpretation

This position requires courts to consider what Congress intended when it passed a law, not just the dictionary definition of the words. It prevents judges from ignoring obvious legislative purpose to reach outcomes they prefer.

Courts must consider legislative intent, context, and purpose alongside statutory text when interpreting laws. Prohibits using strict textualism to ignore obvious legislative intent or reach absurd results. Does not ban consideration of text or require ignoring plain language, but prevents weaponization of selective literalism to subvert clear meaning. Particularly important for rights-related laws where narrow textualism has been used to dismantle protections. Courts should interpret statutes honestly to serve their purpose, not use interpretive methodology as tool to impose ideological outcomes.

Limit strict textualism

This position limits the use of strict textualism, a method where judges claim to read only the text of a law while ignoring its purpose or context. In practice, strict textualism is often used selectively to justify predetermined outcomes.

Strict textualism claims to interpret only statutory text while ignoring context, purpose, legislative history, or consequences. In practice this becomes tool for results-oriented judging: selectively reading text narrowly to reach preferred outcomes, using dictionary definitions from different eras to support conclusions, and claiming consideration of purpose is "activism." This rule limits use of strict textualism to undermine clear legislative intent. Requires courts to use multiple interpretive tools: text, intent, context, purpose, consequences, and common sense. When text and obvious intent conflict due to drafting imperfection, courts should not weaponize the gap to subvert the law's purpose. Goal is honest interpretation serving justice.

Require plain-language intent in laws

This position encourages Congress to include plain-language statements in every law explaining what problem it solves and what it is supposed to achieve. These statements make it harder for judges to distort the law's meaning through selective interpretation.

Encourage or require Congress to include plain-language intent statements in legislation explaining: what problem the law addresses, what outcome it seeks to achieve, how provisions should be interpreted to accomplish purpose, and what interpretations would subvert the law's intent. Creates explicit interpretive record making bad-faith distortion harder. Does not bind courts to follow Congress's preferred interpretation (separation of powers) but provides authoritative statement of legislative purpose rather than forcing courts to reconstruct intent from scattered sources. Makes honest interpretation easier and dishonest interpretation more visible.

Judicial oversight mechanisms

This position establishes independent oversight of judicial conduct, including conflicts of interest and ethical violations. Oversight focuses on unethical behavior, not legal decisions, preserving judicial independence while ensuring accountability.

Establish independent oversight for judicial conduct without undermining judicial independence on legal decisions. Key distinction: judges cannot be punished for legal decisions (even unpopular or wrong ones, reversible on appeal); but judges must be accountable for unethical conduct, conflicts of interest, bias, or abuse of office. Mechanisms include: independent inspector general or ethics office to investigate conduct complaints, transparent process for reviewing ethics concerns with public documentation, power to recommend sanctions (censure, fine, removal from specific cases), and clear distinction between reviewable conduct (ethics, conflicts, bias) versus protected judicial decisions (legal interpretations, rulings). Preserves judicial independence while ending ethical impunity.

Strong recusal standards

This position establishes mandatory and enforceable rules requiring judges to recuse themselves when they have a financial interest in a case, when close family members are involved, or when they have made public statements showing bias. Self-enforcement of recusal is prohibited.

Establish mandatory, enforceable recusal standards for all federal judges including Supreme Court justices. Clear triggers requiring recusal: direct financial interest in outcome, immediate family member with financial or professional interest, prior participation in case (as attorney, consultant, lower court judge), public statements indicating prejudgment on specific legal issue, receipt of substantial gifts or payments from parties or their representatives, or reasonable appearance that impartiality is compromised. Independent review mechanism to assess contested recusal decisions with public documentation of basis for recusing or declining. Consequences for inappropriate refusal to recuse include reversal on appeal, public censure, and potential disciplinary action for repeated violations. Ends current system where justices decide their own conflicts with no review or consequence, resulting in judges hearing cases involving their financial interests, their family members' political activities, or issues where they've publicly prejudged the outcome.

Prevent judge and venue shopping

This position prevents plaintiffs from shopping for friendly judges by filing lawsuits in distant districts with minimal connection to the case. It requires plaintiffs to demonstrate a real local connection to the venue they choose.

Reform venue rules to prevent forum shopping for sympathetic judges who issue nationwide injunctions. Current practice allows plaintiffs to file in any district with minimal connection, enabling strategic selection of single ideologically aligned judges who then block national policies through nationwide injunctions. Reform would: require plaintiffs to demonstrate substantial local connection to chosen venue (actual localized harm or substantial local operations, not just theoretical possibility of harm); limit geographic scope of district court injunctions to the affected district or circuit (not nationwide from single judge); or require multi-judge panels for cases seeking nationwide relief. Preserves access to courts for genuine local claims while preventing strategic judge shopping for nationwide policy blockades. Addresses immigration, environmental, healthcare, and election law cases being blocked nationwide by single district judges in carefully chosen venues.

Mandatory random case assignment; forum shopping prohibited

This position requires federal courts to randomly assign judges to cases, eliminating the ability to predict or target a specific judge. If a case violates random assignment rules, it is automatically transferred to a different judge.

Random case assignment must be mandatory for all federal courts; judge selection by forum shopping is prohibited and enforceable by automatic reassignment.

Extends venue reform from the question of where to file to the question of which judge is assigned. Mandatory random assignment eliminates the ability to predict or target a specific judge within a district by manipulating filing timing or location. Automatic reassignment as the enforcement remedy ensures the rule has teeth: a case filed in violation of random-assignment requirements is transferred rather than dismissed, preventing plaintiffs from benefiting from strategic filing while preserving their underlying right to litigate.

Supreme Court size set by constitutional amendment or supermajority statute

This position requires any change to the size of the Supreme Court to be approved either by constitutional amendment or by a two-thirds supermajority vote in Congress. This prevents a simple majority from packing the Court for partisan advantage.

Supreme Court size must be set by constitutional amendment or supermajority statute to prevent partisan court-packing by simple majority.

The Constitution does not specify the number of Supreme Court justices; Congress has changed it seven times. A simple-majority Congress can pack the court, and the only deterrent is political cost. Requiring a constitutional amendment or supermajority statute to change court size raises the threshold above what any single governing coalition can achieve unilaterally, protecting the court's structural legitimacy from the most extreme form of partisan manipulation while preserving the democratic ability to adjust court structure through genuine consensus.

18-year staggered terms for Supreme Court justices

This position establishes 18-year terms for Supreme Court justices, with each president appointing one justice every two years. Staggered terms ensure regular turnover and prevent random vacancies from turning into generational political battles.

Supreme Court justices serve 18-year staggered terms, with each president appointing one justice per 2-year presidential term.

Lifetime appointment plus modern life expectancy creates 30-40 year judicial careers, turning each vacancy into a generational stakes event and incentivizing the appointment of the youngest possible ideologues. Staggered 18-year terms ensure regular, predictable turnover; each president makes two appointments per term regardless of vacancy timing; no single president can dominate the court for a generation; and strategic retirement timing becomes significantly less important. The court still evolves slowly — a feature, not a bug — but the ideology of any given appointment cohort cannot lock in outcomes for 40 years.

Lower federal court expansion to address case backlog

This position expands the number of federal district and circuit court judges to address massive case backlogs and reduce the power of individual judges to shape national policy. More judges means faster access to justice and less concentrated power.

Lower federal courts must be expanded to address case backlog and reduce dependence on a small number of judges for nationwide policy decisions.

Chronic understaffing of federal district and circuit courts produces years-long case backlogs, forces judges to handle unmanageable dockets, and concentrates policy-shaping power in a small number of individual judges whose assignment is effectively random. Expansion reduces the impact any single judge can have on national policy, speeds access to justice, and distributes judicial power more broadly. Expansion should be paired with random case assignment (JUD-VEN-002) to prevent strategic filing targeting newly created seats.

Senate must act on judicial nominees within 90 days

This position requires the Senate to hold hearings and vote on judicial nominees within 90 days. If the Senate refuses to act, the nominee is automatically confirmed, preventing obstruction tactics like those used against Merrick Garland.

The Senate must hold confirmation hearings and vote on judicial nominees within 90 days; failure to act results in automatic confirmation.

The Merrick Garland precedent — in which the Senate refused to hold hearings on a Supreme Court nominee for nearly a year — demonstrated that the existing process has no enforcement mechanism: a Senate majority can simply refuse to act indefinitely. An automatic confirmation default after 90 days inverts the incentive: obstruction now has a cost (automatic confirmation of a nominee the majority dislikes), whereas holding hearings and voting preserves the majority's ability to reject. The rule restores the Senate's advice-and-consent role as an active check rather than a veto by inaction.

Merit-based judicial selection commissions

This position creates merit-based commissions to screen judicial nominees before Senate confirmation. These commissions evaluate qualifications, temperament, and ethics, providing public recommendations that inform the confirmation process.

Merit-based judicial selection commissions must screen nominees and provide public recommendations before Senate confirmation.

Introduces a professional pre-screening layer between the president's nomination choice and Senate confirmation. Commissions evaluate candidates on qualifications, temperament, legal reasoning quality, and ethical history — providing public recommendations that create a record against which the confirmation process can be measured. Commissions do not replace presidential nomination or Senate confirmation, but interpose an independent professional assessment that raises the cost of nominating demonstrably unqualified or ethically compromised candidates. Modeled on bar association rating systems and state merit selection commissions, which have a strong track record of improving judicial quality.

Pre-confirmation financial and relationship disclosure

This position requires judicial nominees to publicly disclose all financial interests, prior legal positions, and relationships with parties who might appear before them before confirmation. This ensures conflicts of interest are identified early, when they can still be addressed.

Judicial nominees must publicly disclose financial interests, prior legal positions, and relationships with parties likely to appear before them.

Front-loads the disclosure requirements that currently apply (incompletely) to sitting judges onto the confirmation process, when public scrutiny is highest and the Senate has maximum leverage. Nominees who would face automatic recusal from a substantial portion of cases due to conflicts should be identified before, not after, confirmation. Prior legal positions — briefs, opinions, public statements — provide the factual record for senators and the public to assess judicial philosophy. Disclosure of relationships with parties likely to appear before the court addresses the pattern of undisclosed financial ties that have become a recurring ethics issue for sitting justices.

President must nominate to fill judicial and executive vacancies within 90 days

This position requires the President to nominate candidates to fill vacant judicial and executive positions within 90 days. Leaving positions empty indefinitely as a way to disable agencies or courts is not a legitimate governing tool.

The President must submit nominations to fill vacant judicial and Senate-confirmed executive positions within 90 days of a vacancy arising; refusal to nominate is not a constitutional option.

The Constitution grants the President the power to nominate and, with Senate advice and consent, appoint judges and other principal officers. It does not grant the power to leave positions vacant indefinitely as a governing tool. Yet the presidential refusal to fill vacancies has become a distinct form of constitutional abuse: leaving agency positions unfilled to disable the agency's function (without needing Congressional action to eliminate it), leaving judicial vacancies open to prevent the opposing party's nominees from taking seats, and leaving courts understaffed to delay or avoid disfavored outcomes. This problem is general — it applies to the judiciary but equally to independent agencies, cabinet departments, and any Senate-confirmed position. An obligation to nominate within 90 days of a vacancy — with mandamus remedies available to compel nomination — addresses the structural gap. The 90-day obligation mirrors the Senate's corresponding JUD-NOM-001 obligation to hold confirmation hearings. Together they create a two-sided system: both branches have affirmative duties to keep government functioning, and obstruction by either branch has a cost. Congress's legitimate response if the President refuses to govern is appropriations pressure, oversight, and ultimately the impeachment power — not permanent vacancy. The constitutional framework assumes a President who will exercise the appointment power, not one who uses non-exercise as a weapon against institutions they wish to disable.

Shadow docket orders require supermajority and written justification

This position requires the Supreme Court to reach a supermajority vote and provide written reasons for emergency orders issued without full briefing or oral arguments. The shadow docket has been used to make major policy changes with no transparency or explanation.

Emergency or shadow docket orders issued without full briefing and argument must require a supermajority of the court and must include written justification.

The Supreme Court's shadow docket — emergency applications decided without full briefing, oral argument, or signed opinions — has expanded dramatically, with major policy consequences decided by unsigned orders that provide no reasoning and bind lower courts with no explanation.^[6] The supermajority requirement raises the threshold for consequential action taken without full process; the written justification requirement ensures the court provides at minimum a public account of its reasoning. Together these reforms constrain the shadow docket to genuine emergencies rather than a parallel track for preferred outcomes achieved without scrutiny.

Nationwide injunctions from single district judges subject to expedited appellate review

This position requires any nationwide injunction issued by a single district judge to receive expedited review by an appeals court within 30 days. This prevents one judge from freezing national policy for months or years with no higher court oversight.

Nationwide injunctions issued by single district court judges must be subject to expedited appellate review within 30 days.

Complements JUD-VEN-001 and JUD-VEN-002. Even after venue reform, single judges will retain the ability to issue significant orders. Expedited appellate review — a 30-day circuit review of any nationwide injunction — ensures that no single district judge's order freezes national policy for months or years while the parties brief the circuit at normal pace. The rule does not prohibit nationwide injunctions; it requires prompt appellate consideration when a single judge's order has national scope.

Congressional supermajority override of SCOTUS decisions invalidating federal statutes

This position allows Congress to override a Supreme Court decision striking down a federal law by passing the law again with a two-thirds supermajority within ten years. The override does not apply to cases protecting individual rights against the government.

Congress may reinstate a federal statute invalidated by the Supreme Court on constitutional grounds by passing it again with a two-thirds majority in both chambers within ten years of the decision; the override does not apply to rulings enforcing individual rights against the government.

The counter-majoritarian problem — an unelected court of nine permanently striking down laws enacted by democratic majorities — is real and structural. Canada's Section 33 "notwithstanding clause" provides a working model of legislative override with democratic accountability: legislatures may override certain judicial rulings for renewable five-year periods. Constitutional scholar Mark Tushnet has documented how popular constitutionalism supports mechanisms for democratic correction of judicial veto.^[3] The two-thirds threshold ensures genuine supermajoritarian consensus — not a partisan reversal — before democratic will prevails over judicial invalidation. The carve-out for rulings enforcing individual rights against the government prevents the override from becoming a tool to strip rights; it applies only when courts invalidate affirmative legislation addressing structural or economic questions. This models mechanisms in Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom and addresses the structural problem of courts acting as an unreviewable veto on democratic legislation.

Jurisdiction stripping authority with procedural safeguards

This position allows Congress to remove the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over specific subject areas by a two-thirds vote, with the jurisdiction-stripping authority expiring after ten years unless renewed. This preserves congressional power to check judicial overreach.

Congress retains explicit authority under Article III to remove Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over specific statutory subject matters, exercisable only by a two-thirds majority and subject to a mandatory ten-year sunset requiring affirmative renewal.

Article III grants Congress the power to make exceptions to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. Ex parte McCardle (1869) confirmed this power during Reconstruction, when Congress stripped the Court's jurisdiction to prevent invalidation of Reconstruction laws protecting newly freed people; the Court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, explicitly acknowledging Congress's authority.^[4] JUD-LGO-002 affirms this constitutional tool while constraining its use: a two-thirds threshold prevents bare majorities from stripping jurisdiction opportunistically; the sunset clause ensures periodic democratic reaffirmation rather than permanent removal of review; and the rule does not apply to Congress's own structural or procedural legislation (which would create a conflict of interest). This is not a tool to harm minorities — it is a structural check available to democratic supermajorities to prevent judicial lock-in on contested structural questions where prolonged judicial veto undermines democratic self-governance.

Supermajority requirement to overturn Supreme Court precedent

This position requires the Supreme Court to have at least six justices voting to overturn an established precedent. A bare five-to-four majority is insufficient to throw out settled law that people have relied on for years or decades.

The Supreme Court may not overturn an established precedent by fewer than six votes; a five-to-four decision is insufficient to overrule prior holdings.

Stare decisis — respect for settled prior decisions — is the foundation of legal stability and the protection of reliance interests across all areas of law. The current Court has overturned established precedent at historically high rates with bare five-to-four majorities: Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization (overturning Roe and Casey), Janus v. AFSCME (overturning Abood), Knick v. Township of Scott (overturning San Remo Hotel), and others. A six-to-three minimum for overruling precedent raises the threshold for doctrinal reversal, requiring genuine judicial consensus rather than a single-appointment majority to eliminate settled law. This does not prevent the Court from narrowing, distinguishing, or developing doctrine through the normal case-by-case process — it prevents wholesale reversal of longstanding precedent by a bare majority constituted by a single strategic appointment. The comparative norm from peer constitutional democracies is that fundamental doctrinal reversals require broad judicial consensus, not bare majorities.

Independent enforcement office for judicial recusal and financial disclosure

This position creates an independent Office of Judicial Accountability to review financial disclosures from all federal judges, investigate recusal violations, and publish findings. Supreme Court justices can no longer decide for themselves whether to recuse from cases where they have conflicts.

An independent Office of Judicial Accountability must receive and review annual financial disclosures from all Article III judges, investigate recusal violations, and publish findings; self-enforcement of recusal decisions is prohibited for the Supreme Court.

JUD-REC-001 and JUD-ETH-002 establish the standards; JUD-LGO-004 establishes the enforcement infrastructure those rules require. Investigative journalism by ProPublica documented undisclosed gifts, travel, and outside income in the hundreds of thousands of dollars for multiple current Supreme Court justices with no enforcement consequence. An independent accountability office — analogous to Inspectors General in the executive branch — would receive annual disclosures, investigate complaints, compel recusal in cases where unreported financial relationships exist, refer disclosure violations to the Judicial Conference or Congress, and publish findings publicly. Without an enforcement office, disclosure requirements and recusal standards are unenforced aspirations. The office must be structurally independent from the courts it oversees, with appointments that do not give any single political actor control.

Amicus curiae funding and coordination disclosure

This position requires amicus briefs filed in federal courts to disclose all funding sources and any coordination with parties or repeat-filer networks. This transparency reveals when well-funded advocacy groups are manufacturing the appearance of independent expert consensus.

Amicus curiae briefs filed before any federal court must disclose all funding sources, any coordination with a party whose position the brief supports, and membership in any repeat-filer network coordinating across multiple cases before the same court.

The amicus curiae system has been systematically captured by well-funded advocacy networks that coordinate filings to simulate independent expert agreement where none exists. Empirical research on Supreme Court amicus practice has documented that a small number of repeat-filer organizations — many funded by overlapping donor networks — dominate the amicus docket, creating the appearance of broad independent endorsement for ideologically driven positions. Supreme Court Rule 37 requires disclosure of any party's counsel who authored an amicus brief, but does not require disclosure of funding from non-counsel sources or coordination with parties' legal teams. The transparency gap allows interested parties to amplify their legal arguments through nominally independent third-party filings without the court or public knowing the source. This rule extends disclosure requirements to all funding sources (not merely authoring counsel), any communication or coordination with the party being supported, and organizational membership in networks with coordinated docket strategies.

Federal judiciary demographic diversity requirements

This position requires Congress to establish a merit-based screening process for judicial nominees that actively considers demographic diversity as part of judicial legitimacy. Annual public reports on federal court demographics by circuit hold the system accountable.

Congress must establish a merit-based screening process for all Article III judicial nominations that actively evaluates demographic diversity as a component of judicial legitimacy; annual reports on the demographic composition of all federal courts disaggregated by circuit must be published.

Federal courts interpret the rights of all Americans, but their composition has historically failed to reflect the population they serve. As of 2024, women and racial minorities remain significantly underrepresented at all levels of the federal judiciary relative to their share of the legal profession and the general population. Judicial diversity is not merely symbolic: empirical research has found that judicial panel composition affects outcomes in discrimination, civil rights, and employment cases, and that diverse panels produce reasoning that accounts for a wider range of lived experience. A merit-based screening process that affirmatively considers diversity alongside credentials, experience, and judicial temperament does not reduce quality — it expands the pool of qualified candidates and addresses structural barriers (geographic networks, law school ties, clerkship pipelines) that have historically excluded talented jurists from consideration. Annual public reporting creates accountability for progress without mandating specific quotas.

Administrative law judges — independence protections against politically motivated removal

This position protects administrative law judges from being fired, reassigned, or punished by the executive branch as retaliation for their decisions. ALJs decide millions of cases affecting Social Security, immigration, and benefits, and their independence is essential to fair outcomes.

Administrative law judges may not be removed except for good cause shown before an independent review body; executive branch agencies may not remove, reassign, or salary-reduce ALJs as a tool to influence adjudication outcomes; ALJ independence is a statutory right enforceable by judicial review.

Administrative law judges decide millions of cases each year — Social Security disability claims, immigration hearings, securities enforcement proceedings, and agency benefits disputes. They exercise quasi-judicial authority and their impartiality is fundamental to fair administrative adjudication. The Supreme Court's decision in SEC v. Jarkesy (2024) disrupted ALJ structures, while executive orders have asserted authority to reclassify ALJs as at-will employees subject to presidential removal without cause. These converging pressures threaten to eliminate the independence of the administrative judiciary, making ALJ decisions responsive to political pressure from agency heads and the White House rather than law and evidence. JUD-LGO-007 establishes ALJ independence as a non-negotiable statutory floor: removal only for specific good cause adjudicated by an independent review body, and explicit prohibition on using removal, reassignment, or pay reduction to pressure adjudicative outcomes in pending or future cases.

Independent bipartisan commission for court structural reform

This position creates an independent bipartisan commission to evaluate Supreme Court structure and recommend reforms to Congress. Any structural reform based on commission recommendations requires a two-thirds supermajority vote, ensuring broad consensus for major changes.

An independent bipartisan commission must evaluate Supreme Court structure, composition, size, and tenure and report reform recommendations to Congress; any structural reform enacted based on commission recommendations requires a ⅔ supermajority vote in both chambers.

Court-packing — expanding court size for partisan advantage — is one of the most serious threats to judicial legitimacy. No structured deliberative process exists for evaluating structural reforms across partisan lines before crisis forces improvised action. An independent commission — modeled on the Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States (convened 2021) — provides a bipartisan deliberative foundation: commissioners drawn from legal academia, the bar, prior judicial service, and civil society; formal public hearings; published findings; and formal recommendations to Congress. The commission does not implement changes; it develops reform proposals with broad public legitimacy. The ⅔ supermajority requirement in JUD-SIZ-001 governs any structural change the commission recommends, ensuring that even commission-endorsed reforms reflect genuine democratic consensus rather than exploitation of a fleeting partisan majority. This is the procedural complement to JUD-SIZ-001: the commission provides the process; the supermajority provides the threshold. Together they make structural court reform available through democratic deliberation while foreclosing unilateral partisan manipulation. Cross-reference: JUD-SIZ-001 (supermajority requirement for court size changes); JUD-ETH-001 (term limits); JUD-LGO-001 through JUD-LGO-007 (legislative checks on the court).