Reform the structural failures of Congress that allow minority rule, legislative gridlock, and unaccountable obstruction to override democratic majorities. This pillar addresses the filibuster, Senate representational im
Reform the structural failures of Congress that allow minority rule, legislative gridlock, and unaccountable obstruction to override democratic majorities. This pillar addresses the filibuster, Senate representational imbalance, House size, legislative procedure reforms, and the relationship between Congress and the executive—ensuring the legislature can actually govern and is held accountable when it fails to.
Legislative power must reflect democratic will and must be capable of functioning. A legislature that can be permanently gridlocked by a minority, that systematically over-represents low-population states, or that uses procedural mechanisms to avoid accountability has ceased to function as a democratic institution.
The filibuster is not a constitutional right—it is a Senate procedural rule that has been converted from a tool of extended debate into a silent, effortless minority veto. Any senator can now block legislation indefinitely without speaking a word, producing legislative paralysis rather than deliberation. The platform supports requiring actual speech and presence for extended consideration, restoring majority cloture for all legislation, and eliminating anonymous holds on nominees. The goal is not to eliminate deliberation but to ensure it ends in a vote, not a permanent veto by the minority.
The House of Representatives has been frozen at 435 members since 1929 despite the U.S. population tripling, leaving each representative covering an average of 761,000 constituents—the largest district size in the developed world.[3] The platform supports expanding the House toward the Wyoming Rule (where the smallest state's population sets the per-seat baseline) or the cube-root rule used by many peer democracies. Expansion restores a meaningful constituent relationship, reduces gerrymandering's distorting effects by creating more, smaller districts, and makes the Electoral College more proportional to the popular vote.
The current Senate produces a 67-to-1 representational imbalance between Wyoming and California[1]—the most extreme distortion of any national legislature in the developed world. A senator from Wyoming effectively represents 68 times fewer people than a senator from California, yet both cast identical votes on national policy. The platform supports restructuring the Senate through population-weighted voting, a hybrid chamber with both state-based and population-based seats, or redesigning the Senate as a review-and-delay body rather than a co-equal permanent veto chamber. Any viable path must reduce structural minority rule over the national majority. DC and Puerto Rico statehood—resolving the representation of approximately 4 million citizens with no voting congressional representation—is a necessary component of any serious representational reform.
Congress has systematically ceded its constitutional war-making power to the executive branch through open-ended Authorizations for Use of Military Force that have no sunset, no geographic limit, and no meaningful constraint. The platform requires that all new AUMFs be narrowly tailored to a specific threat and enemy, include a hard sunset requiring affirmative renewal, and prohibit the President from invoking them for conflicts not contemplated at enactment. Additionally, members of Congress, the President, and cabinet officials must forfeit pay during government shutdowns, with compensation permanently forfeited after 30 days of shutdown—removing the political incentive to weaponize the budget process as a hostage-taking tool.
Citizen-initiated ballot initiatives and referendums provide a critical safety valve when legislatures fail to act on broadly supported policy. The platform supports establishing a national baseline requiring all states to permit voter-initiated ballot initiatives and referendums, paired with strict anti-money rules limiting the role of large donors and out-of-state interests in qualifying or blocking initiatives. Politicians have repeatedly used procedural and constitutional changes to raise signature thresholds, shorten windows, and make voter initiatives harder to qualify precisely when public opinion is running against them. These tactics must be prohibited. Direct democracy mechanisms must be protected from both legislative interference and concentrated-money capture.
Archaic federal laws that have lain dormant for decades are being selectively revived to suppress rights, restrict healthcare, and authorize executive abuse. The Comstock Act—an 1873 law that has never been fully repealed—can be used to criminalize the mailing of reproductive healthcare materials and was explicitly cited as a potential tool for a national abortion ban. The Alien Enemies Act of 1798 has been used to summarily deport non-citizens using vague wartime emergency logic without individualized hearings. The platform calls for the full repeal of both, along with a permanent independent law review body that will systematically identify additional federal laws that are obsolete, contradictory, unenforceable, or actively dangerous and recommend them to Congress for repeal, consolidation, or modernization.
Legislative reform is foundational to all other reforms — how Congress is structured, funded, and elected determines whether any policy can pass.
Every rule in this pillar, organized by policy area. Active rules are current platform commitments. Partial rules are in development. Proposed rules are planned for future inclusion.
LEGL-SYSR-0001
Included
Legislature must reflect democracy with power safeguards
Congress must represent the people fairly while protecting against any one group gaining too much power or trampling on the rights of others.
Legislative power must reflect democratic representation while maintaining safeguards against concentration of power, instability, and majoritarian abuse.
Democratic representation is the foundational principle, but systems must also guard against concentration, instability, and majoritarian abuse. These twin requirements define the design space for legislative reform.
LEGL-SYSR-0002
Included
No persistent minority governance without democratic justification
A smaller group of people cannot be given permanent control over government just because of where they live or how districts are drawn.
Legislative structures may not grant disproportionate and persistent governing power to minority populations without sufficient democratic justification.
Structural minority rule—where a minority population consistently controls or blocks national policy—lacks democratic legitimacy. This rule requires that any such arrangement be specifically and currently justified rather than historically inherited.
LEGL-STRS-0001
Included
Bicameralism retained but each chamber needs distinct purpose
If Congress keeps both the House and Senate, each chamber must serve a clear and different democratic purpose, not just duplicate each other.
The legislature may retain a bicameral structure, but each chamber must have a clearly distinct democratic function and justification.
Maintaining two chambers is not inherently undemocratic, but each chamber must serve a clearly justified democratic function. Historical inertia is not sufficient justification for structural imbalance between chambers.
LEGL-HSES-0001
Included
House must represent population proportionally as primary body
The House of Representatives must be the main lawmaking body, with seats divided based on population so every American gets equal representation.
The House of Representatives must be the primary democratic legislative body, with representation proportional to population.
The House is designed to be the primary democratic legislative chamber with proportional representation. Affirming this principle establishes the baseline against which House reform should be measured.
LEGL-HSES-0002
Included
House must expand to restore representational accuracy
The House must grow to include more representatives so each district is smaller and members of Congress can better know and serve their communities.
House representation must be expanded or restructured to reduce district size and improve representational accuracy.
With 761,000 constituents per representative on average, the current House size makes meaningful representation structurally impossible. Expansion is necessary to restore the House to its democratic purpose.
LEGL-HSES-0003
Included
House is primary origin of fiscal and domestic legislation
The House of Representatives should be the primary chamber where bills about spending, taxes, and domestic policies are introduced and debated first.
The House must be the primary origin of fiscal legislation, domestic policy, and general lawmaking authority.
Affirming the House's primary role in fiscal legislation and general lawmaking authority establishes the constitutional logic for House expansion and filibuster reform. This clarifies the democratic hierarchy between the two chambers.
LEGL-HSES-0004
Proposal
Expand the House of Representatives to at least 600 members under the Wyoming Rule; repeal the 1929 apportionment cap; cap congressional districts at 575,000 constituents
The House must expand to at least 600 members under the Wyoming Rule, which ensures the smallest state gets one representative and all others get proportional seats based on their population.
The House of Representatives has been capped at 435 members since the Permanent Apportionment Act of 1929, Pub. L. No. 71-13, 46 Stat. 26, which froze House size as U.S. population grew and provided that subsequent censuses would simply reapportion existing seats without adding new ones.[1] When the cap was enacted, the U.S. population was approximately 106 million; the 2020 census recorded 331 million people. The average House district now contains approximately 761,000 constituents — a constituency size that makes meaningful individual representation structurally impossible and that exceeds the total population of several states at the time of the Founding.[2] Two principled expansion formulas have been developed: the Wyoming Rule, under which the smallest-state population sets the national district size standard, would yield approximately 573 seats under 2020 census data; the Cube Root Rule, under which the House contains the cube root of the total U.S. population, would yield approximately 693 seats. Both are superior to the arbitrary 1929 cap. This platform supports: (1) immediate expansion of the House to at least 600 members as a statutory floor; (2) repeal of the Permanent Apportionment Act of 1929 in its current form; (3) enactment of the Wyoming Rule as the governing sizing principle for all future apportionments; (4) a statutory trigger requiring automatic House expansion whenever any congressional district contains more than 575,000 constituents following a decennial census; and (5) a constitutional amendment establishing the Wyoming Rule as a minimum apportionment standard, preventing any future Congress from re-imposing an arbitrary seat cap. House expansion must not dilute minority voting strength and must be accompanied by proportional Voting Rights Act compliance review.
LEGL-SENS-0001
Included
Senate may use population-weighted voting to reduce imbalance
The Senate could give more voting power to senators from larger states so small-state residents don't have vastly more influence than big-state residents.
The Senate may be restructured to preserve state representation while incorporating population-weighted voting to reduce extreme representational imbalance.
Population-weighted voting within the Senate would preserve state representation while reducing the extreme democratic imbalance between states like Wyoming and California. This is among the less structurally disruptive reform paths.
LEGL-SENS-0002
Included
Senate may include both state-based and population-based seats
The Senate could be restructured to include some seats based on state equality and some based on population, balancing small-state representation with fairness to all voters.
The Senate may include both state-based representatives and population-based representatives to balance federal and democratic principles.
A hybrid model combining state-based representatives with population-based representatives could balance federal structure against democratic representation. This mirrors approaches used in upper chambers in some parliamentary systems.
LEGL-SENS-0003
Included
Senate may serve as review body rather than co-equal veto chamber
Instead of being an equal lawmaking partner, the Senate could become a review chamber that can delay or suggest changes to House bills but not permanently block them.
The Senate may serve as a review, delay, and revision body rather than a co-equal veto chamber for all legislation.
Redesigning the Senate as a review, delay, and revision body rather than a co-equal veto chamber would preserve deliberation while eliminating permanent minority blockade. This aligns the Senate with the role of upper chambers in most peer democracies.
LEGL-SENS-0004
Included
House may have final legislative authority after Senate review
The House could have the final say on legislation after the Senate has reviewed it, ensuring the chamber that best represents the American people makes the ultimate decision.
Final legislative authority may rest with the House in defined circumstances after Senate review or delay.
Giving the House final legislative authority after a Senate review period would allow the democratically representative chamber to ultimately decide national policy. This resolves the fundamental tension between state and popular sovereignty.
LEGL-SENS-0005
Proposal
Enact DC statehood and Puerto Rico statehood immediately; pursue structural Senate reform to reduce extreme population-to-representation imbalances through statehood, territorial representation, and constitutional amendment
Washington, D.C. and Puerto Rico must be admitted as states immediately, and structural reforms to the Senate must be pursued to reduce the unfair advantage small states have over large ones.
The Senate's two-senators-per-state allocation produces representational disparities with no parallel in any advanced democracy[11]: Wyoming's approximately 581,000 residents hold the same two Senate votes as California's 39 million — a per-capita representation ratio of approximately 67:1.[1] Article V of the Constitution renders this allocation formally unamendable without unanimous state consent, making direct reapportionment constitutionally precluded. Congress retains full authority under Article IV, Section 3 to admit new states, and DC and Puerto Rico statehood represents the most direct near-term path to reducing the Senate's anti-majoritarian character. Washington, DC has a population of approximately 700,000 — larger than Wyoming or Vermont — pays full federal taxes, subjects its residents to all federal laws and regulations, and has contributed military personnel to every American war, yet its residents possess no voting representation in either chamber of Congress and no Electoral College votes.[2] Puerto Rico has a population of approximately 3.2 million — larger than 21 states — all of whom are U.S. citizens by birth, fully subject to federal law and federal courts, with zero voting representation in Congress.[3] This platform supports: (1) immediate enactment of DC and Puerto Rico statehood as standalone legislation without preconditions, paired with full House and Senate representation for each new state; (2) full voting representation in Congress for all populated U.S. territories — Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands, American Samoa, and the Northern Mariana Islands — pending statehood; (3) a constitutional amendment commission tasked with developing proposals for population-weighted Senate voting, hybrid representation structures, or other mechanisms to reduce the per-capita representation disparity; and (4) a statutory annual Senate equity index, published by the Congressional Research Service, documenting per-capita Senate representation ratios by state and territory, to maintain democratic accountability for the structural deficit. Any resident of DC or a U.S. territory must have a private right of action to challenge any federal statute or regulation that discriminates against non-state jurisdictions in the allocation of federal benefits, obligations, or programs available to residents of the 50 states.
LEGL-PROS-0001
Included
Filibuster and indefinite minority obstruction must end
The Senate filibuster, which allows a small minority to block legislation indefinitely, must be abolished because it's undemocratic and prevents majority rule.
Legislative procedure may not allow indefinite minority obstruction of legislation through mechanisms such as unlimited debate without resolution.
Unlimited debate without resolution is not a constitutional requirement but a Senate procedural rule that has been transformed into a permanent minority veto. Eliminating or strictly limiting it restores the basic function of a deliberative body.
LEGL-PROS-0002
Included
Systems must resolve persistent deadlock between chambers
When the House and Senate can't agree on legislation, there must be a fair process to resolve the deadlock rather than letting bills die forever.
Legislative systems must include mechanisms to resolve persistent deadlock between chambers without indefinite paralysis.
Legislative systems that can deadlock indefinitely without resolution mechanisms fail at their basic function of producing law. Built-in resolution mechanisms are a prerequisite for functional governance.
LEGL-PROS-0003
Proposal
Discharge petition reform — lower threshold and automatic scheduling for bills with supermajority support
If a majority of House members sign a petition to vote on a bill, it must automatically be scheduled for a floor vote within a short time, preventing leaders from blocking popular legislation.
Any bill that obtains signatures from a majority of House members (218 of 435) on a discharge petition must be automatically scheduled for a floor vote within 10 legislative days, without the ability of the Speaker or Rules Committee to block or delay the vote. The current 218-signature threshold is retained, but the procedural barriers that have historically rendered discharge petitions ineffective — including the 30-legislative-day delay, closed petition rolls, and leadership scheduling control — must be eliminated. Any member may view the current signature count in real time through the House Clerk's public database.
The discharge petition is the constitutional mechanism for the majority to force a floor vote over the Speaker's objection, yet it has rarely succeeded in the modern House because leadership controls scheduling and can impose procedural costs on members who sign. Since 1935, fewer than 25 discharge petitions have succeeded in reaching a House floor vote. Discharge reform does not override the Speaker; it provides a backstop ensuring that a genuine floor majority cannot be indefinitely blocked by leadership gatekeeping.
LEGL-PROS-0004
Proposal
Proxy voting prohibited for floor votes; remote voting infrastructure mandated for public health and emergency continuity
Members of Congress cannot vote on behalf of absent colleagues on final floor votes, but secure remote voting technology must be available for emergencies like pandemics.
Members of Congress must be physically or remotely present and cast their own votes on all floor votes; proxy voting — allowing one member to cast another member's vote in their absence — is prohibited on final passage votes. Congress must invest in verified, secure remote voting infrastructure that enables members to vote from their home districts during declared national public health emergencies, natural disasters, or other circumstances that make physical travel to Washington genuinely dangerous. Remote voting must require biometric or multi-factor authentication and produce a verifiable vote record.
Congress authorized proxy voting during the COVID-19 pandemic (2020–2022) as a temporary measure, generating constitutional controversy and accountability concerns. Proxy voting for routine business undermines the democratic premise that members personally cast the votes they are accountable for. However, the pandemic revealed the urgent need for remote voting infrastructure as a continuity mechanism. The solution is to prohibit proxy voting while mandating the remote participation technology that makes physical absence unnecessary for representing one's constituents.
LEGL-PROS-0005
Proposal
Eliminate the Senate filibuster for all legislation by majority rule change; restore the talking filibuster as an immediate interim step; carve out voting rights and democracy legislation without delay
The Senate filibuster must be eliminated for all legislation through a majority-rule change to Senate procedures, allowing bills to pass with 51 votes instead of requiring 60.
The Senate filibuster — as it has operated since the early twentieth century — requires 60 votes to invoke cloture and end debate on any legislation, enabling 41 senators representing as few as 11% of the U.S. population to permanently block majority will indefinitely without holding the floor, speaking a word, or engaging with the substance of the legislation being blocked.[1] The filibuster is not mentioned in the Constitution; Article I, Section 5 provides that each chamber may determine its own rules of proceedings, which means the Senate may eliminate the filibuster by a simple majority vote at the start of any Congress. The Senate has already abolished the filibuster for executive and lower-court nominations (2013) and Supreme Court nominations (2017) by exactly this procedure. In its current form, the filibuster has been used to block the John R. Lewis Voting Rights Advancement Act, the Freedom to Vote Act, the Equality Act, gun safety legislation, immigration reform, and climate legislation — all of which passed the House with majority support. The filibuster as currently practiced requires no floor presence, no speech, and no engagement: a senator may block legislation by filing a single procedural notice. This platform supports: (1) full elimination of the legislative filibuster by majority rule change at the earliest available opportunity; (2) as an immediate interim step, restoration of the talking filibuster — requiring senators opposing legislation to hold the Senate floor continuously, standing and speaking without adjournments, proxies, or substitutes, for the full duration of any delay; (3) an immediate, unconditional filibuster carve-out for all voting rights and democracy legislation, effective in the current Congress; (4) additional carve-outs for constitutional amendment resolutions, statehood legislation, and Supreme Court structural reform legislation; and (5) a standing Senate rule requiring any future restoration of the filibuster to be approved by a 2/3 supermajority of the full Senate, not merely those present and voting.[2]
LEGL-PROS-0006
Proposal
Automatic continuing resolution rule — all agencies remain funded at prior-year levels if Congress fails to enact appropriations by the deadline; government shutdowns must be eliminated as a governing tool
If Congress hasn't passed a budget by the deadline, all government agencies automatically continue to be funded at their previous year's level, preventing shutdowns from being used as political weapons.
Government shutdowns — the result of Congress failing to enact appropriations legislation or a continuing resolution before existing funding expires — impose enormous costs, harm millions of Americans, and serve no legitimate governing purpose. The 2018–2019 partial government shutdown lasted 35 days and cost an estimated $11 billion, including $3 billion in permanent economic losses that were never recovered.[1] Federal employees were furloughed or required to work without pay; critical agency operations from food safety inspections to National Parks to IRS processing were suspended or degraded; and uncertainty about government funding pressured the national credit rating. Shutdowns exist solely because Congress has not enacted a statutory fallback mechanism — not because any constitutional principle requires them. Every parliamentary democracy with a separation-of-powers structure includes automatic funding continuity provisions; government shutdowns are uniquely American and uniquely unnecessary. A statutory fix must be enacted providing: (1) if Congress fails to enact new appropriations legislation or a conventional continuing resolution for any federal agency or program by the applicable fiscal year deadline, that agency or program is automatically funded at 100% of its prior-year enacted appropriations level on a pro-rated daily basis; (2) automatic continuing resolutions remain in effect until superseded by enacted appropriations legislation, with no expiration date and no additional legislative action required; (3) automatic CR funding levels are adjusted annually for inflation at the applicable CPI rate to prevent gradual real-dollar defunding through inaction; (4) the Office of Management and Budget must publish a publicly accessible, real-time dashboard showing every agency's appropriations status and the duration of any automatic CR; and (5) any federal employee or contractor who suffers demonstrable economic harm due to a shutdown caused by deliberate congressional inaction must have a private right of action for back pay, damages, and injunctive relief in federal court.
LEGL-PROS-0007
Proposal
Mandatory 72-hour reading rule — all legislation must be publicly available in final form for at least 72 hours before any floor vote; amendments require 24 hours; waiver requires a recorded 2/3 supermajority
Every bill must be posted online in its final form at least 72 hours before any vote, giving members of Congress and the public time to read it.
The 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act — a $1.5 trillion restructuring of the federal tax code affecting every American — was voted on by the Senate hours after handwritten changes appeared in the margins of circulated draft pages, with members, their staff, and the public given no meaningful time to evaluate the late-night amendments before the final vote was called.[1] Congress routinely passes legislation whose text members have not read — a structural failure that makes meaningful deliberation and public accountability impossible. Leadership routinely uses scheduling control as leverage, bringing major legislation to the floor on compressed timelines that prevent members from evaluating, amending, or publicly explaining what they are voting on. A statutory 72-hour reading rule that cannot be waived by unilateral leadership action must be enacted, providing: (1) no bill, joint resolution, or conference report may be called for a final vote in either chamber until its final, enrolled text has been continuously available in the official publicly accessible congressional document repository for at least 72 consecutive hours; (2) any amendment offered to a bill before either chamber must be published in the Congressional Record and in the public repository at least 24 consecutive hours before a vote on that amendment; (3) the 72-hour requirement may be waived only by a recorded vote of 2/3 of the full chamber membership — not merely a quorum present — declaring a specified emergency; (4) all committee reports, Congressional Budget Office cost estimates, and other formal analyses must be published simultaneously with and linked to the bill text in the public repository; (5) all documents must be available in open, machine-readable formats downloadable by any member of the public without charge, registration, or tracking; and (6) any member of the public must have standing in federal district court to seek declaratory and injunctive relief against a floor vote called in violation of this requirement, with courts authorized to enjoin certification of any bill passed in deliberate violation pending compliance.
LEGL-EXES-0001
Included
Legislature may select or remove head of government
Congress could have the power to select the head of government (like a prime minister) and remove them through a no-confidence vote, rather than having a separately elected president.
The legislature may play a role in selecting, confirming, or removing the head of government to ensure alignment between lawmaking and execution.
Legislative involvement in selecting or removing the executive ensures alignment between the lawmaking and executive functions. This addresses the structural separation that can produce divided-government paralysis.
LEGL-OVRG-0001
Included
Congress must have strong oversight and enforcement powers
Congress must have strong powers to investigate and check the executive branch, including the ability to demand documents and testimony with real enforcement mechanisms.
Congress must have strong investigatory, oversight, and enforcement powers over executive offices and agencies.
Strong investigatory, oversight, and enforcement authority over executive offices is the constitutional mechanism for preventing executive overreach. Without these powers, the separation of powers becomes functionally asymmetric.
LEGL-OVRG-0002
Included
Oversight cannot be blocked by executive privilege or partisanship
The president cannot use executive privilege or other excuses to block legitimate congressional oversight, and partisan politics cannot prevent investigations from happening.
Legislative oversight may not be weakened through procedural obstruction, executive privilege abuse, or partisan shielding.
Procedural obstruction, executive privilege abuse, and partisan shielding are the primary mechanisms by which oversight has been weakened in practice. This rule establishes that effective oversight is a right, not merely an aspiration.
LEGL-DMJS-0001
Included
Structural minority rule over national policy is prohibited
No system can be allowed where a minority of voters consistently controls national policy decisions, whether through the Senate, Electoral College, or gerrymandered districts.
Legislative systems must prevent structural minority rule where a minority of the population can consistently control or block national policy.
Where a minority population can consistently control or block national policy, the legislature has ceased to function as a democratic institution. This rule establishes that structural minority rule is a policy failure, not a design feature.
LEGL-DMJS-0002
Included
Representational systems require periodic democratic review
Systems for electing representatives and making laws must be regularly reviewed to ensure they still reflect democratic principles and don't give unfair advantages to any group.
Electoral and representational systems must be periodically reviewed and adjusted to maintain democratic legitimacy.
Democratic legitimacy cannot be established once and then frozen; population shifts and structural changes require periodic reassessment. Regular review ensures that representational systems maintain their democratic basis over time.
LEGL-DBAS-0001
Included
Establish searchable public federal law database
The federal government must create a free online database where anyone can search and read all federal laws in one place, not scattered across different websites.
Establish a public federal law database containing the full text, plain-language summaries, legislative context, amendment history, major legal interpretations, and enforcement status of federal laws.
A comprehensive, searchable public database of federal law with plain-language summaries and amendment history would dramatically improve legislative accountability and public understanding. This addresses the opacity that contributes to legislative dysfunction.
LEGL-DBAS-0002
Included
Database includes judicial opinions and agency interpretations
The law database must also include court decisions and government agency interpretations so people can understand what laws actually mean in practice.
The public law database should include major judicial opinions, agency interpretations, legislative history summaries, and public-facing explanatory material for each law.
Including major interpretive materials alongside statutory text gives the public a complete picture of what the law actually means in practice. Law divorced from its interpretations is incomplete and potentially misleading.
LEGL-DBAS-0003
Included
Database allows structured public comment and annotation
The database should let the public comment on laws and flag sections that are confusing or problematic, helping lawmakers identify what needs fixing.
The public law database should allow public comment, critique, and annotated public input, clearly separated from official legal materials.
Public comment and annotation capabilities transform a static repository into a living accountability mechanism. Clear separation from official materials ensures public input does not contaminate the authoritative legal record.
LEGL-DBAS-0004
Included
Law database must be free, searchable, and accessible
The federal law database must be completely free to access, easy to search, and work well on phones and computers so every American can look up the law.
The public law database must be free, searchable, versioned, and accessible to the public without subscription barriers.
Accessibility is prerequisite for the database's democratic function. Subscription barriers would recreate the access inequality the database is designed to address.
LEGL-DRFS-0001
Included
Binding drafting standards required for all new federal laws
Congress must follow mandatory writing standards when creating new laws to make them clearer, more consistent, and harder to exploit through loopholes.
A constitutional amendment or equivalent binding rule should establish drafting standards for all new federal laws.
Constitutional or equivalent binding drafting standards would ensure that laws are consistently structured, clear, and purposeful. Voluntary standards have proven insufficient to prevent the complexity and opacity that enables legal exploitation.
LEGL-DRFS-0002
Included
Each new law requires plain-language statement of purpose
Every new law must include a plain-language statement at the beginning explaining what problem it's trying to solve and what it's supposed to accomplish.
Every new law must include a plain-language statement of intent, purpose, and context.
Requiring a plain-language statement of intent for every new law creates both accountability and interpretive clarity. Ambiguous purpose statements are the primary source of exploit-enabling legal ambiguity.
LEGL-DRFS-0003
Included
Large sections require plain-language summaries
Complex sections of laws must include plain-language summaries so ordinary people can understand what the law does without needing a lawyer.
Large sections, subsections, and amendments must include plain-language summaries and stated intent.
Requiring plain-language summaries for major sections and amendments makes complex legislation accessible to those it governs. This reduces the information asymmetry between sophisticated legal actors and the general public.
LEGL-DRFS-0004
Included
Each provision must be relevant to the law's stated purpose
Every part of a law must be relevant to its stated purpose. Lawmakers cannot hide unrelated provisions in bills to sneak them through.
Each provision of a law must be clearly relevant to the purpose and scope of that law.
Limiting provisions to matters relevant to the law's stated purpose would eliminate legislative riders that attach unrelated policy to must-pass legislation. This is a basic coherence requirement that prevents policy laundering.
LEGL-DRFS-0005
Included
Laws reviewed for loopholes and exploit paths before passage
Before passing a new law, Congress must review it to identify and close loopholes that could be used to undermine its purpose.
Proposed laws must be reviewed for loopholes, gaps, conflicts with existing law, and likely exploit paths before passage.
Pre-passage review for loopholes, gaps, and exploit paths would catch many of the structural vulnerabilities that sophisticated actors exploit after enactment. This shifts the burden of anticipating misuse from courts and agencies to the legislature.
LEGL-DRFS-0006
Included
Conflicts with existing law reconciled before enactment
Before enacting a new law, Congress must identify any conflicts with existing laws and fix them, preventing contradictory rules that confuse people.
Conflicts between proposed laws and existing laws must be reconciled before enactment rather than left for courts or agencies to resolve later.
Requiring conflict reconciliation before enactment prevents the legal ambiguity that results when new laws contradict existing ones. Leaving such conflicts to courts and agencies creates expensive and unpredictable outcomes.
LEGL-REVS-0001
Included
Permanent body annually reviews federal laws for obsolescence
A permanent office must review federal laws every year to find outdated or unnecessary ones that should be repealed or updated.
Establish a permanent independent federal review body that annually reviews federal laws for outdated, unenforced, contradictory, obsolete, or practically unenforceable language.
An independent permanent review body with annual reporting requirements would provide systematic identification of outdated, contradictory, and unenforceable laws. The accumulation of dead-letter law creates complexity and the potential for selective enforcement.
LEGL-REVS-0002
Included
Review body recommends repeal, consolidation, or modernization
The law review office must recommend which obsolete laws should be repealed, which should be combined, and which should be modernized to match current needs.
The law-review body should recommend repeal, consolidation, modernization, or clarification of obsolete or nonfunctional federal laws.
Review without recommendation is insufficient; the body must produce actionable proposals for Congress to consider. Consolidation of redundant laws and repeal of obsolete ones would reduce complexity and improve enforceability.
LEGL-REVS-0003
Included
Review process includes public reporting and cleanup packages
The law review process must include public reports showing what was found, and Congress must vote on cleanup packages to remove or fix outdated laws.
The law-review process must include public reporting, prioritization criteria, and regular submission of recommended cleanup packages to Congress.
Public reporting on law review findings creates accountability and enables public participation. Regular submission of cleanup packages to Congress provides a structured mechanism for acting on review recommendations.
LEGL-RPLS-0001
Included
Repeal Alien Enemies Act and related emergency abuse frameworks
The Alien Enemies Act, which allows the president to detain or deport people based on nationality during wartime, must be repealed along with similar laws that enable emergency power abuse.
Repeal the Alien Enemies Act / Alien Insurrection Act framework and related emergency-authority structures that enable abuse against non-citizens through vague wartime or insurrection logic.
The Alien Enemies Act and related emergency-authority structures have enabled documented abuse against non-citizens through vague wartime logic. Repeal removes the legal infrastructure for this category of abuse before it can be further exploited.
LEGL-RPLS-0002
Included
Repeal Comstock Act and similar archaic morality laws
The Comstock Act, a 19th-century law that criminalized mailing birth control information, and similar outdated morality laws must be fully repealed.
Repeal the Comstock Act and any surviving federal provisions that can be used to suppress lawful healthcare, reproductive autonomy, or protected materials through archaic morality law.
The Comstock Act enables suppression of lawful healthcare and protected materials through nineteenth-century morality law that has been selectively revived. Repeal eliminates a documented vector for reproductive healthcare interference.
LEGL-BBAS-0001
Proposed
Oppose constitutional balanced budget amendment as economically harmful
A constitutional amendment requiring a balanced federal budget every year is a bad idea that would harm the economy during recessions and must be opposed.
Congress must not pass, and states must not ratify, a constitutional amendment requiring a balanced federal budget in any form that eliminates or severely constrains deficit spending. Balanced budget requirements in constitutional form are specifically rejected because they would force pro-cyclical fiscal policy — requiring spending cuts or tax increases precisely during recessions when the economy most needs countercyclical stimulus — structurally worsening economic downturns and producing outcomes worse than the problem they purport to solve.
Economic research across the mainstream spectrum — including from the Economic Policy Institute, the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, and mainstream academic economists — consistently concludes that a constitutional balanced budget amendment would be severely harmful.[5] During recessions, tax revenues fall and safety net spending rises automatically; a hard balanced budget requirement would force Congress to cut programs or raise taxes at the worst possible moment, deepening the recession. No major developed economy has a constitutional requirement that eliminates countercyclical flexibility. The goal of fiscal sustainability is legitimate; achieving it through a constitutional straitjacket is not.
LEGL-BBAS-0002
Proposed
Establish a statutory long-term fiscal sustainability framework — not a constitutional amendment
Congress should establish a regular law (not a constitutional amendment) that sets long-term fiscal goals and budget guidelines while allowing flexibility during economic downturns.
The correct approach to long-term fiscal sustainability is a statutory framework — not a constitutional amendment — that establishes debt-to-GDP targets, automatic stabilizer protections that exempt recession-period spending, transparent long-term budget projections, and a bipartisan joint committee with mandatory reporting on fiscal sustainability. Statutory frameworks can be adjusted as economic conditions change; constitutional constraints cannot. The framework must distinguish between capital investment spending and operating deficits.
The Congressional Budget Office already provides statutory-mandate long-term fiscal projections; expanding and improving that framework provides the transparency value of a balanced budget requirement without the economic harm. Countries that adopted rules-based fiscal frameworks after economic crises generally did so through statute rather than constitutional amendment, precisely because statutory rules can be adjusted in genuine emergencies while maintaining credibility through predictability and built-in enforcement mechanisms.
LEGL-CAPS-0001
Proposed
Substantially increase congressional staff salaries and total staff capacity
Congressional staff must be paid significantly more and Congress must hire more staff overall so members have the expertise needed to understand complex issues and write good laws.
Congress must substantially increase staff compensation and total staffing levels for member offices, committees, and the House and Senate as institutions. Staff salaries must be benchmarked against equivalent private-sector expertise, not capped at civil service grades that make congressional employment a temporary stepping stone to lobbying. Restoring the Office of Technology Assessment and expanding CRS, CBO, and GAO capacity must be funded as institutional priorities, not as discretionary line items subject to partisan political pressure.
Research by Lee Drutman and the Congressional Management Foundation documents that congressional staff resources have declined significantly in real terms since the 1970s while the complexity of the legislative environment has grown dramatically.[6] The result is a systematic expertise deficit: members and staff must rely on lobbyists and executive branch officials for technical knowledge Congress once generated internally. Low salaries create a revolving door into lobbying: staff leave for industry because industry can pay three to five times the congressional salary for the same expertise.
LEGL-CAPS-0002
Proposed
Restore the Office of Technology Assessment with independent mandate
The Office of Technology Assessment, which provided Congress with independent scientific and technical advice until it was closed in 1995, must be reopened with proper funding.
The Office of Technology Assessment, abolished in 1995, must be reestablished as a permanent nonpartisan office of Congress with a budget adequate to provide rigorous independent technical analysis of science, technology, and emerging policy issues. OTA must be governed by a bipartisan board, publish all major assessments publicly, and be insulated from political pressure by removing its budget from the annual appropriations process subject to majority vote.
OTA was abolished in 1995 as part of the "Contract with America" budget cuts. In its 23-year history it produced over 750 major assessments on issues from telecommunications to climate change that were authoritative precisely because they were independent of both partisan politics and industry lobbying. In its absence, Congress has become increasingly dependent on industry-funded analysis and advocacy group research with undisclosed funders. Multiple bipartisan legislative efforts have sought to restore OTA; the obstacle has been political resistance from those who benefit from the current information deficit.
LEGL-CAPS-0003
Proposed
Mandatory member schedule — minimum days in session with committee attendance requirements
Members of Congress must be required to spend a minimum number of days in session and attending committee meetings, ending the practice of constant fundraising trips.
The House and Senate must adopt rules requiring minimum days in session per year, minimum committee attendance requirements for members, and a schedule that concentrates legislative work in Washington rather than fragmenting it around fundraising travel. Members who fail to meet attendance thresholds without documented cause must have that absence entered in the public record as part of their official voting record. Congress must be in session long enough to conduct hearings, mark up legislation, and exercise oversight.
The congressional legislative calendar has contracted significantly over the past three decades. The House typically works a three-day legislative week to accommodate fundraising travel. Committee hearing days have fallen. Shortened schedules reduce time available for genuine deliberation, oversight hearings, and complex legislative drafting — creating more dependence on executive branch drafting assistance and lobbyists who effectively write legislation for members who lack staff capacity to draft it themselves.
LEGL-LOBS-0001
Proposed
Extend congressional revolving door cooling-off period to five years
Members of Congress and senior staff cannot become lobbyists until five years after leaving office, preventing them from immediately cashing in on their government connections.
Former members of Congress and senior congressional staff with meaningful access and influence may not register as lobbyists or engage in lobbying activity within five years of leaving congressional service. The current one- and two-year cooling-off periods are inadequate: relationships, access, and insider knowledge remain highly valuable well beyond two years. The prohibition must cover not only registered lobbying activity but shadow lobbying — consulting, advising, or facilitating lobbying contact — as well as work for foreign principals covered by FARA.
OpenSecrets tracks hundreds of former members and senior staff who move into lobbying or government affairs roles within months of leaving office.[7] The one-year ban for House members and two-year ban for Senators is routinely avoided by using "strategic advisor" periods before formal registration, or by advising clients on lobbying strategy without personally making direct lobbying contact. Five-year cooling-off periods create a gap wide enough to reduce the commercial value of former-member insider access as a marketable product.
LEGL-LOBS-0002
Proposed
Real-time lobbying disclosure — replace quarterly reports with continuous filing
When lobbyists meet with members of Congress, they must report it online within 24 hours instead of quarterly, so the public can see who's influencing lawmakers in real time.
The Lobbying Disclosure Act (2 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq.) must be amended to require real-time disclosure of lobbying contacts: within 48 hours of any in-person or direct communication with a covered official on behalf of a client. Quarterly LD-2 reports must be supplemented by real-time contact logs. Covered communication must include meetings, calls, emails, and written submissions by registered lobbyists and their clients. The database must be publicly searchable in real time.
Current quarterly LDA reporting provides a delayed, aggregated picture of lobbying activity. By the time a quarterly report is filed, the legislation it targeted may already have passed, been defeated, or been modified. Real-time disclosure — the standard already applied to direct campaign contributions — would allow journalists, competitors, and voters to see lobbying pressure as it is applied, creating accountability for both the lobbyist and the official being contacted. The technical infrastructure for real-time disclosure is already available.
LEGL-LOBS-0003
Proposed
Earmark transparency reform — full disclosure required; outright ban rejected as counterproductive
Earmarks (spending directed to specific projects) must be fully disclosed online, including who requested them and why, so voters can see if their representatives are serving special interests.
Congressional earmarks — directed spending provisions in appropriations bills — must be subject to full public disclosure including the requesting member's name, the recipient entity, the amount, the purpose, and any financial interests of the member in the recipient. Earmarks must be submitted at least 30 days before floor consideration to allow scrutiny. Earmarks to private for-profit entities are prohibited; earmarks to nonprofit and government entities are permitted with disclosure. The outright ban on all earmarks is rejected as counterproductive.
Political science research has documented that the 2011 earmark moratorium did not reduce overall spending; it shifted spending decisions to the executive branch and reduced the legislative leverage Congress can use to build coalitions for major legislation. Transparent, disclosed earmarks with conflict-of-interest requirements and public justification are less susceptible to corruption than the alternative: informal telephone calls to agency officials requesting the same spending as an undisclosed executive priority. The solution to earmark abuse is transparency and accountability, not abolition.
LEGL-LOBS-0004
Proposed
Revolving door extended to executive branch senior officials and independent agency heads
The five-year cooling-off period before becoming a lobbyist also applies to senior executive branch officials and independent agency heads, not just Congress members.
Senior executive branch officials — including cabinet secretaries, deputy secretaries, agency heads, and senior White House staff — must be subject to the same five-year cooling-off period from lobbying and foreign agent activity as senior congressional staff. Heads and commissioners of independent regulatory agencies (FCC, FTC, SEC, FERC, and others) must be subject to a five-year ban on working for entities they directly regulated in the two years before leaving office, including as a board member, paid advisor, or consultant.
The executive branch revolving door is in many respects more consequential than the congressional one, because agencies write rules with the force of law, and former agency officials can be extraordinarily valuable to regulated industries seeking to shape those rules. FCC commissioners who go on to represent telecommunications companies, SEC commissioners who go on to represent financial firms, and FDA officials who go on to represent pharmaceutical companies create conflicts between public service and private reward that the current two-year revolving door ban does not adequately address.
LEGL-STKS-0001
Proposed
Ban on individual stock trading by members of Congress, senior staff, and immediate family
Members of Congress, their senior staff, and their immediate families cannot own or trade individual stocks while in office, only broad index funds, to prevent insider trading.
Members of Congress, senior congressional staff with regular access to non-public legislative information, and their spouses and minor children may not purchase or sell individual securities, options, futures, or other financial instruments tied to single companies. All existing holdings must be placed in a qualified blind trust or divested within 180 days of enactment. Investments in broadly diversified index funds and U.S. Treasury securities are permitted. Violations carry criminal penalties under securities law and mandatory forfeiture of profits.
The STOCK Act (Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act), passed in 2012, requires disclosure of securities transactions within 45 days but does not ban trading. POGO, Business Insider, and multiple news outlets have documented hundreds of members who failed to disclose trades on time, often receiving nominal $200 fines, as well as patterns of members trading in industries they directly oversee through committee assignments. The disclosure requirement without a trading ban is insufficient because it creates the appearance of accountability without preventing the underlying conflict of interest.
LEGL-STKS-0002
Proposed
Strengthen STOCK Act enforcement — automatic civil penalties and an independent enforcer
The STOCK Act, which prohibits insider trading by Congress, must have automatic financial penalties for violations and an independent watchdog to enforce it aggressively.
STOCK Act disclosure violations must carry automatic civil penalties — not officer-assessed discretionary fines — calculated as a percentage of the undisclosed transaction value, with a minimum floor that creates genuine deterrence regardless of transaction size. Enforcement authority must be vested in the independent Office of Congressional Ethics (or its successor) rather than the House Ethics Committee, which has a documented history of failing to act on violations. The OCE must be able to refer willful violations directly to DOJ without requiring committee approval.
The existing $200 fine for late STOCK Act disclosure is widely recognized as inadequate — less than the cost of a parking ticket for members whose transactions regularly involve hundreds of thousands of dollars. News outlets including Business Insider and Quartz have documented that dozens of members file late disclosures routinely, treating the fine as an acceptable compliance cost. The House Ethics Committee's structural weakness — partisan composition and history of inaction — means that self-policing under the current system does not work.
LEGL-COMS-0001
Proposed
Replace seniority-only committee assignments with merit and expertise criteria
Congressional committee assignments should be based on members' expertise and qualifications, not just how long they've been in Congress.
Committee chair and ranking member positions must be determined through a process that weighs demonstrated subject matter expertise, attendance record, and peer review — not solely seniority. Seniority may be one factor but may not be the sole determining factor. Committee assignments for new members must consider relevant professional background and prior expertise. The goal is to ensure that committees overseeing technical areas — finance, healthcare, technology, environment, national security — include members with genuine knowledge of those fields.
The seniority system produces chairmanships based on longevity rather than competence, and has historically produced committees chaired by members with no substantive expertise in the area they oversee. This exacerbates the congressional capacity problem: if neither members nor staff have adequate subject-matter expertise, and the committee structure rewards attendance over knowledge, the informational advantage of well-funded lobbyists and executive branch agencies is maximized. Expertise-weighted assignment does not eliminate seniority; it adds competence as a required criterion alongside it.
LEGL-COMS-0002
Proposed
Restore committee markup authority — prohibit floor consideration of bills bypassing committee process
Bills must go through proper committee review and markup before reaching the floor. Leaders cannot bring bills to a vote that committees haven't reviewed.
No bill may be considered by the full House or Senate unless it has received at least one public committee hearing and been voted out of the relevant committee of jurisdiction, unless waived by a two-thirds supermajority vote. The practice of bypassing committee consideration through leadership-drafted omnibus bills, continuing resolutions embedding new law, and leadership-controlled floor scheduling that substitutes leadership preference for committee process undermines the deliberative function that committees were designed to serve.
Congressional scholars including Norman Ornstein have documented the steady decline of the committee system as a deliberative body over the past 30 years, replaced by increasingly centralized leadership control. This decline produces less member expertise development, less public deliberation, and reduced ability for minority members to amend or scrutinize legislation. Committee deliberation is not inefficiency; it is the process by which legislation is made to work, by which errors are found, and by which the public can see what is being proposed and why.
LEGL-COMS-0003
Proposal
Committee chair term limits — maximum six consecutive years in any single chairmanship
Committee chairs can serve a maximum of six consecutive years in that position, preventing them from building unchecked personal power over specific policy areas.
No member of Congress may serve as chair or ranking member of the same standing committee for more than six consecutive years (three two-year terms in the House; one six-year term in the Senate). After the term limit is reached, the member may serve on the committee in a non-leadership capacity but may not chair or rank that same committee again for at least one full Congress. Term limits apply to full committee chairs and ranking members but not to subcommittee chairs, which may be rotated more frequently at the chamber's discretion.
Committee chair seniority produces long-serving chairs with deeply entrenched relationships with the industries and agencies they oversee — relationships that can shade from expertise into capture. The Senate Republican Conference has imposed its own internal six-year term limit on committee chairs since 1995; House Republicans imposed a similar rule that was subsequently weakened through waivers. Codifying term limits as a standing rule eliminates the waiver problem and applies the same accountability standard to both parties and both chambers.
LEGL-FILB-0001
Proposal
Senators Must Speak Continuously to Maintain a Filibuster; Silent Filibuster Is Abolished
If senators want to filibuster a bill, they must actually stand and speak continuously on the Senate floor. Silent filibusters, where they just threaten to block without speaking, are prohibited.
The Senate must amend its rules to require that any senator seeking to delay or block a vote on legislation must speak continuously and remain present on the Senate floor for the duration of the delay; any pause in debate, absence from the floor, or failure to maintain continuous speech ends the filibuster and permits a majority vote to proceed. The silent or "gentlemen's agreement" filibuster — in which legislation is blocked by merely threatening a filibuster without any floor presence — is abolished. Cloture may be invoked by a simple majority after 24 hours of continuous debate. Senate rules changes may be adopted by a simple majority at the beginning of each new Congress.
The modern silent filibuster was not the original design — the talking filibuster was the historical norm until Senate rule changes in the 1970s made it possible to filibuster without holding the floor. The filibuster has been used over 300 times in recent Congresses.
LEGL-FILB-0002
Proposal
Voting Rights, Civil Rights, and Constitutional Amendment Legislation Are Not Subject to Filibuster
Bills that protect voting rights, civil rights, or propose constitutional amendments cannot be filibustered and require only a simple majority to pass.
The Senate must establish a categorical exception to cloture requirements for: legislation restoring or expanding voting rights; legislation implementing rights guaranteed by the Constitution or its amendments; anti-corruption and campaign finance legislation; and judicial or executive nominations. These categories of legislation may proceed to a vote by simple majority after a maximum of 20 hours of debate. The Vice President, as President of the Senate, has the authority to rule filibuster tactics out of order for these categories; such rulings may be sustained by a simple majority vote. Congress must codify these exceptions by statute to prevent reversal by Senate rule changes alone.
LEGL-ETHX-0001
Proposal
Members of Congress and Senior Staff May Not Trade Individual Stocks While in Office
Members of Congress and senior staff cannot trade individual stocks while in office. They can only hold diversified funds that they don't control.
Any Member of Congress, congressional leadership staff, or senior committee staff with access to non-public legislative information is prohibited from purchasing, selling, or holding individual corporate stocks, stock options, cryptocurrency, or commodity futures while holding office; permitted investments are limited to diversified mutual funds, index funds, U.S. Treasury securities, and real property not subject to federal regulation. Existing holdings must be divested within 180 days of taking office or placed in a qualified blind trust with an independent trustee. Violations are subject to: disgorgement of all profits; a civil penalty equal to three times the profit or avoided loss; referral to the DOJ for insider trading prosecution; and mandatory public disclosure. The STOCK Act must be strengthened to include these prohibitions and remove the "research exception." Any person harmed by insider trading on material non-public legislative information must have a private right of action in federal court for disgorgement and damages.
Members of Congress outperform the market by an average of 6–12% annually.[12] The STOCK Act passed in 2012 has been widely criticized as toothless due to weak penalties and poor enforcement. Over 50 members of Congress have been found to have violated even the weak existing STOCK Act disclosure requirements.
LEGL-ETHX-0002
Proposal
The Office of Congressional Ethics Must Be Independent, Fully Funded, and Have Subpoena Power
The Office of Congressional Ethics must be truly independent with guaranteed funding, subpoena power, and the authority to investigate and publicly report misconduct.
The Office of Congressional Ethics (OCE) must be codified in statute as an independent entity — not a House resolution subject to repeal by majority vote — with: a permanent budget not subject to annual appropriations riders; subpoena authority to compel document production and witness testimony in ethics investigations; authority to refer criminal matters to the DOJ; and publication of all investigation findings regardless of House Ethics Committee follow-up. The OCE board must be composed of non-partisan former judges and attorneys; no current or former Members of Congress may serve. House and Senate rules prohibiting Members from retaliating against OCE witnesses must be enforceable by private right of action in federal district court.
In January 2017, House Republicans voted to gut the OCE by making it subordinate to the Ethics Committee; they reversed course after public backlash. The OCE operates under constant threat of defunding and has no subpoena power.
LEGL-ETHX-0003
Proposal
Members of Congress Must Recuse From Votes in Which They Have a Direct Financial Interest
Members of Congress must not vote on bills where they have a direct financial interest that could personally benefit them or their immediate family.
Any Member of Congress must recuse from voting on any legislation in which they, their spouse, or their immediate family members have a direct personal financial interest exceeding $5,000; recusal decisions must be filed publicly with the Clerk of the House or Secretary of the Senate within 48 hours of the relevant vote. The House and Senate Ethics Committees must publish quarterly conflict-of-interest registries listing all members with identified financial interests in pending major legislation. Failure to recuse when required is an ethics violation subject to public censure; deliberate concealment of a conflict is grounds for expulsion proceedings and referral to the DOJ for criminal prosecution. Any affected constituent may bring a private right of action in federal court for declaratory relief against a vote cast in violation of this requirement. This requirement supplements, not replaces, financial disclosure requirements.
LEGL-ETHX-0004
Proposal
All Congressional Staff Must Be Paid No Less Than $65,000 Annually
Every person who works for Congress must be paid at least $65,000 per year to ensure decent pay and reduce vulnerability to corruption.
The minimum annual salary for any full-time congressional staff member — including staff in district offices, committee staff, personal office staff, and leadership office staff — must be no less than $65,000, indexed annually to the Washington D.C. cost of living index; unpaid internships in congressional offices are prohibited. Congressional staff must be covered by the same workplace anti-discrimination, anti-harassment, and whistleblower protection laws that apply to private sector employees; the Congressional Accountability Act must be amended to provide congressional employees with full federal court access for employment claims without mandatory mediation. Staff pay information must be published semi-annually on the public congressional salary database. Violation of the minimum pay requirement subjects the employing office to automatic civil penalty and referral to the OCE; congressional staff subject to pay violations must have a private right of action for back pay, penalties, and attorneys' fees in federal court.
Until 2022, some congressional staff earned as little as $20,000–$30,000 in Washington D.C. Low staff pay forces Members to rely on well-funded lobbyists and think tanks for policy expertise.
LEGL-LBBY-0001
Proposal
Senior Executive Branch Officials and Congressional Leaders Face a Lifetime Lobbying Ban on Their Agency or Committee
Senior executive branch officials and congressional leaders face a lifetime ban on lobbying on behalf of foreign governments after leaving office.
Any former Member of Congress who served in a leadership role (Speaker, Majority/Minority Leader, Committee Chair or Ranking Member), any former Cabinet Secretary or Deputy Secretary, and any former senior White House official (Assistant to the President or above) must be permanently banned from lobbying the specific agency, committee, or legislative body they led; the current two-year and one-year "cooling off" periods are replaced with a permanent sector-specific ban. Former officials may never lobby on behalf of foreign governments or foreign state-owned enterprises in any capacity. The DOJ must enforce these provisions; violations are a federal criminal offense carrying up to five years imprisonment. Any person or organization subject to lobbying in violation of this ban must have a private right of action to void agreements and recover fees paid.
Former Members of Congress currently face only a one-year (Senate) or two-year (House) lobbying ban before they can directly lobby their former colleagues. Over 400 former Members of Congress have become registered lobbyists.
LEGL-LBBY-0002
Proposal
All Lobbying Contacts With Members of Congress Must Be Disclosed Within 48 Hours
All meetings between lobbyists and members of Congress must be disclosed publicly within 24 hours, including who met, what was discussed, and what the lobbyist wanted.
Any registered lobbyist who makes a lobbying contact with a Member of Congress, congressional staff, or senior executive branch official must file a disclosure with the Clerk of the House or Secretary of the Senate within 48 hours identifying: the lobbyist, the client, the official contacted, the legislation or regulatory matter discussed, and the approximate duration of the contact. Disclosures must be searchable in real time on a public database. Bundled campaign contributions from lobbyists and their clients must be disclosed within 24 hours of delivery; contributions made within 30 days of a lobbying contact are presumptively disclosed as related unless the lobbyist certifies otherwise. Failure to disclose is subject to $25,000 per-contact civil penalties and referral to the DOJ for willful violations. Any member of the public must have a private right of action to compel disclosure and seek civil penalties for unreported contacts.
LEGL-RPLS-0001ProposalRepeal the Alien Enemies Act framework and related emergency-authority structures that enable abuse against non-citiz...
The Alien Enemies Act, which allows the president to detain or deport people based on nationality during wartime, must be repealed along with similar laws that enable emergency power abuse.
Repeal the Alien Enemies Act framework and related emergency-authority structures that enable abuse against non-citizens through vague wartime or insurrection logic
Source: DB entry LEG-RPL-001, status: PROPOSED. Pending editorial review.
The current Senate apportionment produces the most extreme democratic imbalance in American history. Research by political scientist Frances Lee and others documents that the Senate's small-state bias has grown dramatically as population has concentrated in large states. A 2021 study in Political Science Research and Methods found that the Senate systematically overrepresents white, rural, and Republican-leaning populations relative to their share of the national population — producing structural minority rule over national policy that has no equivalent in peer democracies.[8]
The filibuster was not originally designed for obstruction. As documented by historian Gregory Koger,[9] the modern filibuster—particularly the "silent filibuster" that requires no speech—became standard practice only in the 1970s. The rate of cloture filings (invoked to break filibusters) increased from near zero in the 1950s to over 300 per Congress in the 2010s.[2] Senate rules were changed multiple times to limit filibuster use for nominations; extending those changes to legislation would restore majority function without eliminating the Senate's deliberative role.
The 435-member cap on the House of Representatives is statutory, not constitutional, set by the Permanent Apportionment Act of 1929. At the founding, each representative covered roughly 30,000 constituents; today the average is 761,000—the largest in the developed world by far. Political scientists including Lee Drutman[4] and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences have documented that House expansion would improve representational accuracy, reduce gerrymandering's distorting effects, and make the Electoral College more proportional.
Congressional dysfunction and gridlock impose documented costs. The 2011 and 2023 debt ceiling crises each produced market volatility, credit rating implications, and real economic costs.[10] Government shutdowns—enabled by Congress's failure to pass timely appropriations—have caused billions in economic losses. Research by the Bipartisan Policy Center documents that constitutional design alone is insufficient without enforceable procedural mechanisms to compel legislative action.