Define the constitutional foundation, accountability mechanisms, and operational boundaries of federal administrative agencies to prevent both regulatory capture and executive overreach while preserving effective governa
Define the constitutional foundation, accountability mechanisms, and operational boundaries of federal administrative agencies to prevent both regulatory capture and executive overreach while preserving effective governance.
Administrative agencies must operate within clear constitutional limits, remain structurally insulated from industry capture, and maintain accountability to Congress and the public while exercising necessary delegated authority to implement federal law.
Modern governance requires specialized regulatory bodies to implement complex federal law across domains like communications (FCC), food and drug safety (FDA), environmental protection (EPA), and education policy (DOE). However, the administrative state faces three critical dangers:
Without structural reforms, agencies either become captured tools of corporate interests or are weakened into ineffectiveness, leaving critical public protections unenforced. The goal is not to expand or contract agency power arbitrarily, but to establish sustainable, accountable, and capture-resistant regulatory structures.
The administrative state sits at the intersection of all three branches — executive direction, legislative delegation, and judicial oversight all shape how agencies function.
This pillar addresses three structural weaknesses in how administrative agencies currently function:
Constitutional enshrinement — By explicitly granting Congress the power to create agencies and by constitutionally enshrining core departments (Labor, Education, Justice, Defense), we prevent arbitrary dismantlement based on ideology or corporate pressure. These departments serve foundational functions: Labor protects workers from exploitation, Education ensures baseline educational access and standards, Justice enforces the rule of law, and Defense provides national security. Making them constitutional prevents cycles where each administration attempts to abolish or defund critical protections.
Chevron restoration — Restoring Chevron deference means that courts defer to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes within their domain of expertise, rather than substituting judicial judgment for technical regulatory decisions. This does not mean blind deference — agencies must still act within statutory bounds, follow administrative procedures, and avoid arbitrary or capricious decisions. But it prevents endless litigation designed to paralyze regulation by forcing agencies to relitigate technical determinations in every circuit. Chevron deference respects the institutional competence of expert agencies while preserving judicial review for genuine overreach.
Anti-capture design — Rules structure must prevent regulated industries from controlling agencies through financial influence, revolving-door hiring, or advisory board dominance. This requires conflict-of-interest rules, transparency in rulemaking processes, limits on industry representation in standard-setting bodies, and structural insulation of agency decision-making from short-term political or financial pressure.
The system assumes that expertise matters but that expertise can be corrupted. It balances the need for technical regulatory capacity with robust accountability mechanisms to prevent agencies from becoming either captured or authoritarian.
Every rule in this pillar, organized by policy area. Active rules are current platform commitments. Partial rules are in development. Proposed rules are planned for future inclusion.
ADMN-AGYS-0001
Proposed
Congress explicitly empowered to create agencies
This position confirms that Congress has the constitutional power to create federal agencies like the EPA, FDA, and Department of Education. It protects these agencies from claims that their existence is unconstitutional.
This rule constitutionally clarifies that Congress has the power to establish administrative agencies like the FCC (Federal Communications Commission), FDA (Food and Drug Administration), EPA (Environmental Protection Agency), and Department of Education. Current constitutional ambiguity has allowed legal challenges arguing that agencies represent an unconstitutional "fourth branch" of government. By explicitly granting this authority, we prevent arbitrary legal attacks designed to dismantle regulatory capacity and create stable institutional foundations for modern governance. This does not grant unlimited power — agencies remain bound by statutory authority, administrative procedures, and judicial review. But it affirms that Congress can create specialized bodies to implement federal law rather than requiring impossibly detailed legislation that anticipates every technical determination.
ADMN-CHVS-0001
Proposed
Restore Chevron deference
This position restores Chevron deference, which requires courts to respect agency expertise when laws are unclear. It prevents judges from overriding agency decisions in areas where agencies have specialized knowledge.
Chevron deference requires courts to defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory language within their regulatory domain[3]. The Supreme Court's 2024 decision overturning Chevron in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo[4] empowered courts to substitute judicial judgment for agency expertise, destabilizing regulatory enforcement and enabling endless litigation designed to paralyze agencies. Restoring Chevron does not grant agencies unlimited power. They remain bound by statutory text, must follow administrative procedures, and are subject to judicial review for arbitrary or capricious actions. But it restores the principle that agencies — not courts — are the proper institutions to resolve technical ambiguities within their domain of expertise. Without Chevron, every technical determination becomes subject to judicial reinterpretation. Industry actors can forum-shop for friendly judges and relitigate settled regulatory standards across circuits, creating inconsistent enforcement and regulatory paralysis. Restoring Chevron stabilizes agency authority while preserving meaningful judicial review for genuine overreach. This rule is critical to preventing regulatory capture through litigation. Industries have discovered that they can use courts to block enforcement even when they cannot change the underlying statute, simply by forcing agencies to relitigate technical determinations in every circuit until they find a sympathetic judge. Chevron restores institutional competence as a guiding principle and prevents this weaponization of courts against public protections.
ADMN-CONS-0001
Proposed
Enshrine core federal departments in the Constitution
This position protects core federal departments—Labor, Education, Justice, and Defense—by writing them into the Constitution. It prevents politicians from abolishing these essential agencies that protect workers, students, civil rights, and national security.
Enshrine core federal departments (Labor Education Justice Defense) in the Constitution
This rule constitutionally protects the Department of Labor, Department of Education, Department of Justice, and Department of Defense from arbitrary elimination or defunding. These departments serve foundational functions that should not be subject to political cycles: - Department of Labor — Enforces worker protections including minimum wage, overtime rules, workplace safety standards, and anti-exploitation regulations. Without constitutional protection, administrations hostile to labor rights can simply defund enforcement, effectively nullifying worker protections. - Department of Education — Ensures baseline educational standards, protections against discrimination in education, and federal support for schools. Conservative movements have repeatedly called for abolishing this department, viewing federal education policy as overreach. Constitutional enshrinement prevents cycles where educational protections are dismantled based on ideology. - Department of Justice — Enforces the rule of law, including civil rights protections, antitrust enforcement, and prosecution of federal crimes. While less politically vulnerable than Labor or Education, constitutional protection prevents administrations from defunding enforcement of laws they oppose. - Department of Defense — Provides national security and military capacity. This is the least controversial inclusion but is included for completeness to prevent future arguments that defense can be privatized or arbitrarily restructured. Constitutional enshrinement does not mean these departments cannot be reformed, restructured, or held accountable. It means they cannot be arbitrarily abolished to eliminate the protections they enforce. Congress retains appropriations authority, oversight capacity, and the power to restructure operations — but the core mission and existence of these departments becomes constitutionally protected. This addresses a critical vulnerability where corporate or ideological interests can simply eliminate regulatory enforcement by defunding the agencies that implement it. By making these departments constitutional, we prevent cycles where worker protections, educational standards, and rule-of-law enforcement are dismantled every time a hostile administration takes power.
ADMN-SYSR-0001
Included
agencies are legitimate constitutional instruments of democratic governance
This position establishes that federal agencies are legitimate and necessary parts of democratic government. Agencies exist to enforce laws in areas that require technical expertise, like environmental protection and workplace safety.
Administrative agencies are legitimate constitutional instruments of democratic governance and must exist to implement, enforce, and adapt public-interest law in areas requiring expertise, continuity, and active oversight.
Core rule in the ADM-SYS family establishing: Administrative agencies are legitimate constitutional instruments of democratic governance and must exist to implement, enforce, and adapt public-interest law in areas requiring ex.
ADMN-SYSR-0002
Included
must be strong enough to regulate complex modern
This position requires agencies to be strong enough to regulate complex modern industries effectively, while also requiring transparency and accountability. It balances power with oversight.
Agencies must be strong enough to regulate complex modern systems effectively, but constrained by transparency, accountability, review, and anti-capture protections.
Core rule in the ADM-SYS family establishing: Agencies must be strong enough to regulate complex modern systems effectively, but constrained by transparency, accountability, review, and anti-capture protections.
ADMN-SYSR-0003
Included
design must prevent both political sabotage and unaccountable
This position requires that agencies be designed to prevent both political interference and bureaucratic overreach. Agencies must be protected from sabotage but also held accountable to the public.
Agency design must prevent both political sabotage and unaccountable bureaucratic abuse.
Core rule in the ADM-SYS family establishing: Agency design must prevent both political sabotage and unaccountable bureaucratic abuse.
ADMN-ENFL-0001
Included
must have sufficient investigatory powers, subpoena authority, audit
This position ensures agencies have the legal tools they need to investigate violations, including subpoena power and audit authority. Without these powers, agencies cannot effectively enforce laws that protect workers and consumers.
Agencies must have sufficient investigatory powers, subpoena authority, audit authority, and access to records necessary to enforce the law effectively.
Core rule in the ADM-ENF family establishing: Agencies must have sufficient investigatory powers, subpoena authority, audit authority, and access to records necessary to enforce the law effectively.
ADMN-ENFL-0002
Included
must be able to impose meaningful civil penalties
This position allows agencies to impose meaningful penalties when companies break the law, including fines, corrective orders, and license revocations. Penalties must be strong enough to change corporate behavior.
Agencies must be able to impose meaningful civil penalties, corrective orders, licensing consequences, and structural remedies where authorized by law.
Core rule in the ADM-ENF family establishing: Agencies must be able to impose meaningful civil penalties, corrective orders, licensing consequences, and structural remedies where authorized by law.
ADMN-ENFL-0003
Included
Repeated or systemic violations must trigger escalated review
This position requires that companies who repeatedly break the law face escalating consequences, not just routine fines. When violations are systemic, agencies must use stronger enforcement tools.
Repeated or systemic violations must trigger escalated review and stronger remedies rather than routine settlement or symbolic penalties alone.
Core rule in the ADM-ENF family establishing: Repeated or systemic violations must trigger escalated review and stronger remedies rather than routine settlement or symbolic penalties alone.
ADMN-ENFL-0004
Included
Enforcement systems may not rely solely on fines
This position prohibits agencies from relying solely on fines when ongoing violations require structural changes. When fines alone don't stop harmful behavior, agencies must have authority to require operational or leadership changes.
Enforcement systems may not rely solely on fines where ongoing behavior requires operational, structural, or leadership remedies.
Core rule in the ADM-ENF family establishing: Enforcement systems may not rely solely on fines where ongoing behavior requires operational, structural, or leadership remedies.
ADMN-TRAN-0001
Included
must publish clear public information about mission, rules
This position requires agencies to publish clear information about their rules, enforcement actions, and decisions. Transparency allows the public to understand how agencies work and hold them accountable.
Agencies must publish clear public information about mission, rules, enforcement priorities, audits, major actions, and outcome data.
Core rule in the ADM-TRN family establishing: Agencies must publish clear public information about mission, rules, enforcement priorities, audits, major actions, and outcome data.
ADMN-TRAN-0002
Included
must maintain public registries of major enforcement actions
This position requires agencies to maintain public records of major enforcement actions and settlements. These registries help the public identify repeat violators and track agency effectiveness.
Agencies must maintain public registries of major enforcement actions, settlements, rule changes, and repeat violators where consistent with law and safety.
Core rule in the ADM-TRN family establishing: Agencies must maintain public registries of major enforcement actions, settlements, rule changes, and repeat violators where consistent with law and safety.
ADMN-TRAN-0003
Included
Regulated entities may not use secrecy claims
This position prohibits companies from using trade secret claims to hide information about public health or safety risks. Protecting business confidentiality cannot come at the expense of protecting people from harm.
Regulated entities may not use secrecy claims or trade-secret arguments to block public accountability where rights, health, safety, or major public-interest concerns are at stake.
Core rule in the ADM-TRN family establishing: Regulated entities may not use secrecy claims or trade-secret arguments to block public accountability where rights, health, safety, or major public-interest concerns are at stake.
ADMN-OVRG-0001
Included
Major agencies must have independent internal oversight functions
This position requires major agencies to have independent inspectors general who can investigate waste, fraud, and abuse. Internal oversight helps prevent corruption and mismanagement.
Major agencies must have independent internal oversight functions, including inspectors general or equivalent bodies with access to records and investigatory authority.
Core rule in the ADM-OVR family establishing: Major agencies must have independent internal oversight functions, including inspectors general or equivalent bodies with access to records and investigatory authority.
ADMN-OVRG-0002
Included
Internal oversight bodies must be protected from retaliation
This position protects inspectors general and internal oversight staff from retaliation and political interference. Oversight only works if investigators can do their jobs without fear.
Internal oversight bodies must be protected from retaliation, interference, and politically motivated removal.
Core rule in the ADM-OVR family establishing: Internal oversight bodies must be protected from retaliation, interference, and politically motivated removal.
ADMN-OVRG-0003
Included
Findings of systemic agency failure, capture, abuse
This position requires that when oversight reveals systemic problems like agency capture or chronic non-enforcement, mandatory corrective action must follow. Identifying problems is not enough—agencies must fix them.
Findings of systemic agency failure, capture, abuse, or chronic non-enforcement must trigger mandatory corrective review.
Core rule in the ADM-OVR family establishing: Findings of systemic agency failure, capture, abuse, or chronic non-enforcement must trigger mandatory corrective review.
ADMN-CAPS-0001
Included
must be structurally insulated from regulated-industry capture, including
This position requires agencies to be protected from industry capture through conflict-of-interest rules and revolving door restrictions. Agencies must serve the public, not the industries they regulate.
Agencies must be structurally insulated from regulated-industry capture, including through conflict-of-interest rules, transparency requirements, and limits on revolving-door influence.
Core rule in the ADM-CAP family establishing: Agencies must be structurally insulated from regulated-industry capture, including through conflict-of-interest rules, transparency requirements, and limits on revolving-door influ.
ADMN-CAPS-0002
Included
Regulated entities may not dominate advisory boards, rulemaking
This position prohibits regulated industries from dominating advisory boards and rulemaking processes. When agencies make rules, they must hear from workers, consumers, and communities—not just corporate lobbyists.
Regulated entities may not dominate advisory boards, rulemaking processes, standard-setting bodies, or enforcement-priority structures in their own sectors.
Core rule in the ADM-CAP family establishing: Regulated entities may not dominate advisory boards, rulemaking processes, standard-setting bodies, or enforcement-priority structures in their own sectors.
ADMN-CAPS-0003
Included
staff, appointees, and senior leadership must be subject
This position requires strong financial disclosure and conflict-of-interest rules for agency officials. The public has a right to know if officials have financial ties to the industries they regulate.
Agency staff, appointees, and senior leadership must be subject to strong financial-disclosure, recusal, and conflict-of-interest requirements.
Core rule in the ADM-CAP family establishing: Agency staff, appointees, and senior leadership must be subject to strong financial-disclosure, recusal, and conflict-of-interest requirements.
ADMN-CAPS-0004
Included
Revolving-door restrictions must apply before and after senior
This position restricts the revolving door between agencies and the industries they regulate. Officials should not be able to move seamlessly between regulating companies and working for them.
Revolving-door restrictions must apply before and after senior service in regulatory, enforcement, and adjudicatory roles.
Core rule in the ADM-CAP family establishing: Revolving-door restrictions must apply before and after senior service in regulatory, enforcement, and adjudicatory roles.
ADMN-CAPS-0005
Included
Patterned agency deference to large regulated actors over
This position requires independent review when agencies consistently favor large corporations over the public interest. Patterns of industry-friendly decisions indicate possible capture.
Patterned agency deference to large regulated actors over the public interest must trigger independent review and corrective action.
Core rule in the ADM-CAP family establishing: Patterned agency deference to large regulated actors over the public interest must trigger independent review and corrective action.
ADMN-ADJS-0001
Included
adjudication systems must provide clear notice, records access
This position ensures people facing agency enforcement or benefit denials get clear notice, access to records, written explanations, and the right to appeal. Fair process requires these basic procedural rights.
Agency adjudication systems must provide clear notice, records access, explanation of decisions, and meaningful appeal rights.
Core rule in the ADM-ADJ family establishing: Agency adjudication systems must provide clear notice, records access, explanation of decisions, and meaningful appeal rights.
ADMN-ADJS-0002
Included
may not rely on opaque procedures, hidden guidance
This position prohibits agencies from using hidden procedures or secret guidance to make decisions. When agencies decide important matters, the rules and process must be clear and accessible.
Agencies may not rely on opaque procedures, hidden guidance, or inaccessible process design to determine rights, obligations, or penalties.
Core rule in the ADM-ADJ family establishing: Agencies may not rely on opaque procedures, hidden guidance, or inaccessible process design to determine rights, obligations, or penalties.
ADMN-ADJS-0003
Included
High-consequence agency decisions must be reviewable internally
This position ensures that important agency decisions can be reviewed both within the agency and by courts. Review ensures decisions are legal, fair, and based on evidence.
High-consequence agency decisions must be reviewable internally and externally under standards that preserve legality, fairness, and accountability.
Core rule in the ADM-ADJ family establishing: High-consequence agency decisions must be reviewable internally and externally under standards that preserve legality, fairness, and accountability.
ADMN-COOS-0001
Included
with overlapping jurisdiction must coordinate enforcement, data sharing
This position requires agencies with overlapping authority to coordinate so they don't create gaps in protection or contradictory requirements. Coordination prevents companies from exploiting jurisdictional confusion.
Agencies with overlapping jurisdiction must coordinate enforcement, data sharing, and standards where necessary to prevent fragmentation, gaps, or contradictory obligations.
Core rule in the ADM-COO family establishing: Agencies with overlapping jurisdiction must coordinate enforcement, data sharing, and standards where necessary to prevent fragmentation, gaps, or contradictory obligations.
ADMN-COOS-0002
Included
Inter-agency coordination may not be used to evade
This position prohibits agencies from using coordination as an excuse for inaction. When multiple agencies have authority, coordination should strengthen enforcement, not weaken it.
Inter-agency coordination may not be used to evade responsibility, diffuse accountability, or create enforcement dead zones.
Core rule in the ADM-COO family establishing: Inter-agency coordination may not be used to evade responsibility, diffuse accountability, or create enforcement dead zones.
ADMN-FNDS-0001
Included
charged with protecting rights, public safety, markets, health
This position requires that agencies protecting rights, safety, health, and the environment receive stable and adequate funding. Underfunding is a backdoor way to prevent agencies from doing their jobs.
Agencies charged with protecting rights, public safety, markets, health, labor, environment, or democratic systems must receive stable and adequate funding sufficient to carry out their lawful mission.
Core rule in the ADM-FND family establishing: Agencies charged with protecting rights, public safety, markets, health, labor, environment, or democratic systems must receive stable and adequate funding sufficient to carry out .
ADMN-FNDS-0002
Included
Core regulatory and enforcement functions may not be
This position prohibits Congress from deliberately underfunding enforcement to create a de facto repeal of laws. If Congress wants to eliminate protections, it must change the law—not just starve the agency.
Core regulatory and enforcement functions may not be intentionally underfunded in ways that create de facto repeal of law.
Core rule in the ADM-FND family establishing: Core regulatory and enforcement functions may not be intentionally underfunded in ways that create de facto repeal of law.
ADMN-FNDS-0003
Included
with constitutionally or statutorily guaranteed public-interest duties
This position requires continuity funding mechanisms for agencies with critical public protection duties. Government shutdowns should not stop enforcement of laws protecting workers and consumers.
Agencies with constitutionally or statutorily guaranteed public-interest duties must have continuity funding mechanisms to prevent shutdown-driven non-enforcement.
Core rule in the ADM-FND family establishing: Agencies with constitutionally or statutorily guaranteed public-interest duties must have continuity funding mechanisms to prevent shutdown-driven non-enforcement.
ADMN-FNDS-0004
Included
Where appropriations fail, designated critical-protection agencies may receive
This position allows designated critical agencies to receive temporary emergency funding during appropriations failures. Essential protections cannot wait for political deadlock to resolve.
Where appropriations fail, designated critical-protection agencies may receive temporary continuity funding under predefined rules until regular funding is restored.
Core rule in the ADM-FND family establishing: Where appropriations fail, designated critical-protection agencies may receive temporary continuity funding under predefined rules until regular funding is restored.
ADMN-INDS-0001
Included
must be protected from arbitrary defunding, bad-faith understaffing
This position protects agency leadership from politically motivated firing without cause. Independence ensures agencies enforce the law based on evidence, not political pressure.
Agencies must be protected from arbitrary defunding, bad-faith understaffing, or politically motivated obstruction intended to disable lawful enforcement.
Core rule in the ADM-IND family establishing: Agencies must be protected from arbitrary defunding, bad-faith understaffing, or politically motivated obstruction intended to disable lawful enforcement.
ADMN-INDS-0002
Included
leaders may not be removed, overruled, or replaced
This position limits presidential power to remove agency heads to situations where there is good cause. This prevents presidents from firing officials who enforce laws the president dislikes.
Agency leaders may not be removed, overruled, or replaced for refusing unlawful political pressure or for carrying out lawful enforcement duties.
Core rule in the ADM-IND family establishing: Agency leaders may not be removed, overruled, or replaced for refusing unlawful political pressure or for carrying out lawful enforcement duties.
ADMN-INDS-0003
Included
must retain operational independence in investigations, rulemaking
This position requires that agency leaders be confirmed by the Senate, not appointed as acting officials indefinitely. Senate confirmation provides accountability and prevents presidents from bypassing oversight.
Agencies must retain operational independence in investigations, rulemaking, and enforcement within their lawful mandate.
Core rule in the ADM-IND family establishing: Agencies must retain operational independence in investigations, rulemaking, and enforcement within their lawful mandate.
ADMN-INDS-0004
Included
Political oversight of agencies must not become political
This position prohibits presidents from using Schedule F or similar systems to convert career civil servants into political appointees who can be fired at will. Career professionals must be protected from political retaliation.
Political oversight of agencies must not become political control over factual findings, scientific conclusions, or case-specific enforcement decisions.
Core rule in the ADM-IND family establishing: Political oversight of agencies must not become political control over factual findings, scientific conclusions, or case-specific enforcement decisions.
ADMN-PUBL-0001
Included
rulemaking and oversight processes must include meaningful public
This position requires agencies to provide meaningful opportunities for public comment on proposed rules. Public participation ensures rules reflect real-world needs and concerns, not just agency assumptions.
Agency rulemaking and oversight processes must include meaningful public participation, but may not be designed so that organized bad-faith obstruction can paralyze necessary regulation.
Core rule in the ADM-PUB family establishing: Agency rulemaking and oversight processes must include meaningful public participation, but may not be designed so that organized bad-faith obstruction can paralyze necessary regul.
ADMN-PUBL-0002
Included
should provide accessible notice, comment tools, and explanatory
This position requires agencies to respond to significant public comments with detailed explanations. When people participate, agencies must show they considered those views seriously.
Agencies should provide accessible notice, comment tools, and explanatory materials so ordinary people, not only large regulated actors, can participate.
Core rule in the ADM-PUB family establishing: Agencies should provide accessible notice, comment tools, and explanatory materials so ordinary people, not only large regulated actors, can participate.
ADMN-RGTS-0001
Included
authority may not be exercised through arbitrary, discriminatory
This position protects the right to petition agencies to create, modify, or remove rules. People should be able to ask agencies to address new problems or fix outdated regulations.
Agency authority may not be exercised through arbitrary, discriminatory, retaliatory, or legally unsupported action.
Core rule in the ADM-RGT family establishing: Agency authority may not be exercised through arbitrary, discriminatory, retaliatory, or legally unsupported action.
ADMN-RGTS-0002
Included
Regulated parties and affected individuals must have due
This position requires agencies to respond to petitions within a reasonable time with explanations. The right to petition is meaningless if agencies can ignore requests indefinitely.
Regulated parties and affected individuals must have due process protections, but due process may not be weaponized to make enforcement impossible.
Core rule in the ADM-RGT family establishing: Regulated parties and affected individuals must have due process protections, but due process may not be weaponized to make enforcement impossible.
ADMN-RGTS-0003
Included
process must distinguish between legitimate rights protection
This position ensures advisory committees include diverse perspectives from workers, communities, and advocacy groups—not just industry representatives. Decision-making must reflect all affected voices.
Agency process must distinguish between legitimate rights protection and bad-faith procedural obstruction.
Core rule in the ADM-RGT family establishing: Agency process must distinguish between legitimate rights protection and bad-faith procedural obstruction.
ADMN-RULS-0001
Included
must have authority to issue, revise, and clarify
This position ensures agencies can issue rules to implement and enforce laws. Without rulemaking authority, agencies cannot adapt laws to changing technology, industries, and threats.
Agencies must have authority to issue, revise, and clarify rules within their statutory mandate in response to technological, economic, scientific, and social change.
Core rule in the ADM-RUL family establishing: Agencies must have authority to issue, revise, and clarify rules within their statutory mandate in response to technological, economic, scientific, and social change.
ADMN-RULS-0002
Included
Rulemaking must be transparent, evidence-based, and publicly reviewable
This position requires agencies to update outdated regulations. Rules that made sense decades ago may be inadequate for current conditions and must be revised.
Rulemaking must be transparent, evidence-based, and publicly reviewable, but may not be rendered impossible through procedural sabotage or bad-faith delay.
Core rule in the ADM-RUL family establishing: Rulemaking must be transparent, evidence-based, and publicly reviewable, but may not be rendered impossible through procedural sabotage or bad-faith delay.
ADMN-RULS-0003
Included
must be able to issue interim, emergency
This position protects agencies' ability to issue emergency rules when immediate action is needed to protect health or safety. Some dangers cannot wait for lengthy comment periods.
Agencies must be able to issue interim, emergency, or rapidly adaptive rules under defined circumstances where delay would produce serious harm.
Core rule in the ADM-RUL family establishing: Agencies must be able to issue interim, emergency, or rapidly adaptive rules under defined circumstances where delay would produce serious harm.
ADMN-RULS-0004
Included
Adaptive rulemaking authority must include review, sunset
This position prohibits Congress from using the Congressional Review Act to permanently block agencies from addressing important problems. The CRA should overturn specific rules, not ban entire categories of protection.
Adaptive rulemaking authority must include review, sunset, and correction mechanisms so flexibility does not become unbounded discretion.
Core rule in the ADM-RUL family establishing: Adaptive rulemaking authority must include review, sunset, and correction mechanisms so flexibility does not become unbounded discretion.
ADMN-SCIS-0001
Included
relying on scientific, medical, technical, or economic evidence
This position protects scientific integrity by prohibiting political interference with agency research and scientific conclusions. Science must be based on evidence, not political convenience.
Agencies relying on scientific, medical, technical, or economic evidence must maintain scientific-integrity standards that protect findings from political or commercial distortion.
Core rule in the ADM-SCI family establishing: Agencies relying on scientific, medical, technical, or economic evidence must maintain scientific-integrity standards that protect findings from political or commercial distortion.
ADMN-SCIS-0002
Included
scientific and technical staff must be protected from
This position requires agencies to make scientific data publicly available, subject to privacy and security protections. Public access enables independent verification and builds trust.
Agency scientific and technical staff must be protected from retaliation for accurate analysis, lawful disclosure, or refusal to manipulate findings.
Core rule in the ADM-SCI family establishing: Agency scientific and technical staff must be protected from retaliation for accurate analysis, lawful disclosure, or refusal to manipulate findings.
ADMN-SCIS-0003
Included
must disclose the evidentiary basis for major rules
This position ensures scientific advisory committees are staffed by qualified experts without industry conflicts of interest. Science advice must serve the public, not corporate profits.
Agencies must disclose the evidentiary basis for major rules or findings in forms that allow meaningful challenge and review.
Core rule in the ADM-SCI family establishing: Agencies must disclose the evidentiary basis for major rules or findings in forms that allow meaningful challenge and review.
ADMN-VTLS-0001
Proposed
Vital records obtainable at any courthouse or records office, not only the issuing location
This position prohibits anti-regulatory riders in appropriations bills that block enforcement of specific laws. Budget bills should not be used to override laws Congress already passed.
States must make all vital records obtainable at any courthouse or vital records office within the state, not requiring residents to travel to the specific courthouse or office that issued the original record
Requiring residents to travel to the specific issuing courthouse to obtain a vital record — sometimes hundreds of miles from their current residence — is a pointless bureaucratic burden. In the digital era, there is no operational reason a record issued in one county cannot be certified and retrieved at any courthouse with records access. This restriction most severely impacts low-income residents, people with disabilities, and those who moved away from their place of birth or marriage. It also creates specific hardship in name-change and marriage-license processes, which are time-sensitive and have legal and economic downstream consequences if delayed.
ADMN-VTLS-0002
Proposed
No requirement to travel to the issuing courthouse to obtain vital records
This position requires that if Congress wants to change regulatory policy, it must do so through regular legislation subject to debate and presidential veto—not through budget riders.
No resident may be required to travel to the specific courthouse or office that issued a vital record in order to obtain a certified copy; all services must be available through any records office, by mail, or online
This rule enforces the principle established in CIV-VTL-001 by specifically prohibiting the common practice of directing residents back to the issuing jurisdiction. Agencies must build cross-system records access rather than maintaining siloed systems that require physical presence at a specific location. This is an administrative modernization requirement — governments with the capability to run a statewide driver's license system have the capability to run a statewide vital records access system.
ADMN-VTLS-0003
Proposed
Vital records access includes marriage licenses, name changes, birth certificates, death certificates, and related civil documents
This position prohibits presidents from using executive orders or administrative actions to effectively repeal laws Congress passed. Executive power does not include refusing to enforce the law.
Vital records access requirements apply to the full range of civil life documents including birth certificates, death certificates, marriage licenses and certificates, divorce decrees, name change orders, adoption records (where disclosure is legally permitted), and other civil status documents
The definition of "vital records" for purposes of this rule is broad because the downstream legal and practical consequences of inaccessibility are significant across all these document types. Name changes — often required for gender transition, divorce, marriage, or personal reasons — are legally consequential for employment, housing, identification, and travel. Marriage licenses and certificates are required for healthcare proxy decisions, insurance, tax filing, and inheritance. Death certificates are required to settle estates, file insurance claims, and claim survivor benefits. Adoption records have specific legal complexity but basic access rights should be preserved where disclosure is legally permissible.
ADMN-VTLS-0004
Proposed
Certified vital records must be easily obtainable online, by mail, and in person
This position prohibits agencies from creating policies that contradict statutory protections through guidance, enforcement discretion, or settlements. Agencies must enforce the law as written.
States must offer certified vital records through multiple channels — online request with secure delivery, mail-in request, and in-person pickup — with each channel providing legally valid certified copies with processing times that meet defined standards
Multi-channel access prevents any single channel failure from blocking record access. Online systems must produce legally recognized certified copies, not merely informational printouts. In-person access must be available at multiple locations (not a single central office). Mail-in options must have clear processing timelines. This is about administrative modernization and equity: people with limited mobility, inflexible work schedules, or unreliable internet access should not be disadvantaged by a system that works well only for those with full flexibility. Processing time standards should be defined and enforced — not left to agency discretion, which often prioritizes other work.
ADMN-VTLS-0005
Proposed
Mailed vital records must be sent by certified, trackable mail with delivery confirmation
This position requires that when agencies decline to enforce laws, they must document reasons and be subject to review. Systematic non-enforcement is a form of illegal policy-making.
Vital records sent by mail must use certified, trackable mail with delivery confirmation, so that residents can verify that legally important documents were delivered and are not at risk of loss in ordinary mail handling
Vital records mailed through standard first-class mail are at risk of loss, damage, or theft with no recourse for the recipient. Because these documents often have specific legal and timing requirements — filing deadlines, employment verification windows, benefits claim deadlines — losing a document in the mail is not merely inconvenient; it can result in legal, financial, or employment harm. Certified mail with tracking and delivery confirmation creates an audit trail and ensures accountability. The modest cost increase is justified by the legal significance of these documents. States should bear this cost as part of the service, not impose it on residents seeking basic administrative services.
ADMN-WBLS-0001
Proposed
Federal employees must be protected from retaliation for reporting illegal orders, scientific misconduct, or agency wrongdoing
This position protects whistleblowers who report waste, fraud, abuse, or violations from retaliation. Whistleblowers are essential to exposing misconduct that harms the public.
Federal employees who report illegal orders, scientific misconduct, regulatory capture, unlawful political interference with enforcement decisions, or other agency wrongdoing through lawful disclosure channels must be protected from termination, demotion, reassignment, harassment, or any other form of retaliation, with independent enforcement through the Merit Systems Protection Board or equivalent body insulated from political pressure.
Whistleblower protections for federal employees are a cornerstone of accountable government. Career civil servants are the most reliable source of information about illegal orders and agency wrongdoing — they have direct knowledge, ongoing relationships, and institutional memory that political appointees and outside observers lack. Effective whistleblower protection requires: a clear and accessible reporting process; independent adjudication insulated from the agency being reported; meaningful remedies including reinstatement and back pay; anti-retaliation protections that cover informal pressure, not only formal adverse actions; and protection of disclosures to Congress, inspectors general, and oversight bodies. Without these protections, the entire oversight ecosystem — inspectors general, congressional investigations, media accountability — is weakened because the primary witnesses cannot safely report what they know.
ADMN-WBLS-0002
Proposed
The Merit Systems Protection Board and Office of Special Counsel must be adequately funded and structurally independent
This position ensures whistleblower complaints are investigated promptly and thoroughly. Protection is meaningless if complaints are ignored or buried.
The Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) and the Office of Special Counsel (OSC), which adjudicate federal employee whistleblower claims and investigate prohibited personnel practices, must be adequately funded, free from executive interference in individual case adjudication, and staffed to resolve complaints within defined timelines, with leadership removable only for cause.
The effectiveness of federal whistleblower protections depends entirely on the institutions that enforce them. The MSPB has historically suffered from vacancies that leave the board unable to issue precedential decisions, creating backlogs of thousands of unresolved appeals. Political pressure on these bodies — through understaffing, budget cuts, or appointment of leaders hostile to employee rights — is a form of structural capture that undermines enforcement without requiring explicit rule changes. Leadership protections are essential: boards whose members can be removed at will by the executive branch they are meant to hold accountable cannot function independently. Adequate staffing with defined resolution timelines prevents backlogs from becoming a de facto denial of remedy.
ADMN-WBLS-0003
Proposal
Federal contractor employees who report violations of law or regulation on federal contracts must receive the same whistleblower protections as federal employees under the Whistleblower Protection Act
This position requires agencies to fix problems identified by whistleblowers with concrete action plans. Whistleblowing should lead to reform, not just documentation.
Employees of federal contractors, subcontractors, and grantees who report violations of federal law, regulation, or contract terms — including fraud, waste, abuse, safety violations, environmental violations, and regulatory noncompliance — must be protected from retaliation under the same standards, burden-shifting regime, and remedies as federal employees under the Whistleblower Protection Act, with: (a) a prohibition on retaliation including termination, demotion, reassignment, or harassment; (b) the same preponderance-of-evidence burden-shifting framework applied to WPA claims; (c) reinstatement as a presumptive remedy for unlawful retaliation; (d) mandatory attorneys' fees for prevailing complainants; and (e) a private right of action in federal district court with a three-year statute of limitations.
Federal contractors employ over four million workers performing functions alongside career civil servants — building weapons systems, operating detention facilities, administering benefits programs, and maintaining critical infrastructure. When contractor employees observe fraud, safety violations, or regulatory noncompliance, the public interest is served by their reporting. But the current patchwork of contractor whistleblower protections falls significantly short of the protections available to federal employees under the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 (5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)).[7] The False Claims Act (31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733) provides a qui tam mechanism for reporting fraud against the government with strong retaliation protections — but it covers only fraud, not the broader universe of safety, environmental, and regulatory violations that affect public welfare. The Government Accountability Office has found that existing contractor whistleblower protections are inadequately enforced and that many contractor employees neither know their rights nor believe reporting will lead to effective remedies.[8] Extending WPA-equivalent protections to contractor employees closes a structural gap that allows noncompliance and wrongdoing to remain unreported at the cost of taxpayer funds and public safety. The private right of action ensures enforcement does not depend solely on agency resources or political will — two commodities that are precisely most scarce when the most serious violations occur.
ADMN-CIVL-0001
Proposed
Career civil servants may not be reclassified as at-will employees to enable mass political dismissals
This position ensures agencies have sufficient career staff to fulfill their legal responsibilities. Chronic understaffing prevents agencies from protecting workers and consumers.
Career federal employees in competitive service positions may not be reclassified into at-will employment categories — whether through executive order, administrative action, or regulatory change — in a manner designed to remove civil service protections and enable dismissal based on political affiliation, policy disagreement, or perceived disloyalty rather than legitimate performance or conduct reasons.
The career civil service exists to provide expertise, continuity, and accountability between administrations. Career employees implement law regardless of which party controls the White House, maintain institutional knowledge across transitions, and resist pressure to implement unlawful orders precisely because they have job security. Executive mechanisms to reclassify career employees as political appointees — specifically "Schedule F" and similar designations — are direct attacks on this independence. A Schedule F–type reclassification allows an administration to dismiss thousands of employees and replace them with political loyalists, effectively converting the career civil service into an extension of the ruling party rather than an independent administrative body. This is the administrative-state playbook for democratic backsliding. This rule makes such reclassification a prohibited personnel practice subject to judicial challenge, with a private right of action for affected employees.
ADMN-CIVL-0002
Proposed
Core civil service protections must be established by statute, not executive order, and may not be unilaterally removed by the executive
This position protects career civil servants from political retaliation and requires merit-based hiring. Expertise and professionalism must be valued over political loyalty.
The competitive civil service system — including merit-based hiring and promotion, appeal rights against arbitrary dismissal, and protections against prohibited personnel practices — must be codified in statute with explicit congressional authorization required for any material reduction of those protections, so that civil service safeguards cannot be unilaterally removed by the same executive branch they constrain.
Civil service protections that exist only by executive order are structurally vulnerable: any administration can undo them with a stroke of a pen. Congressional codification of the core merit system — and a statutory bar on executive reclassification schemes — is necessary to prevent cycles where civil service protections are dismantled by administrations hostile to independent government. This is not about making federal employees impossible to discipline or fire for legitimate reasons; performance management, reduction in force procedures, and disciplinary processes remain available. It is about ensuring that the structural separation between political appointees and career civil servants is durable and not subject to executive nullification.
ADMN-CIVL-0003
Proposal
Congress must enact a statutory prohibition on Schedule F and equivalent at-will reclassification schemes, with reinstatement and back pay for any employee reclassified in violation
This position requires agencies to maintain institutional knowledge through stable staffing and documentation. High turnover and lost expertise weaken agencies' ability to function.
Congress must amend Chapter 75 of Title 5, U.S.C. to provide: (1) no executive order, presidential memorandum, or agency rule may reclassify career competitive-service employees into Schedule C or any at-will employment schedule based on the policy-advising character of their duties; (2) any reclassification of career employees to at-will status requires explicit statutory authorization from Congress, not executive action; (3) any employee reclassified in violation of this statute is entitled to automatic reinstatement, back pay, and attorneys' fees enforceable through a private right of action in federal district court, with a three-year statute of limitations running from the date of reclassification or discovery of the violation.
Executive Order 13957, issued October 21, 2020, created "Schedule F" — a new employment category designed to reclassify career civil servants in policy-related roles as at-will employees removable without cause, without appeal, and without the adverse-action protections of 5 U.S.C. §§ 7511–7514.[9] The order targeted an estimated 50,000 federal workers across agencies involved in policy development, regulatory analysis, and legal interpretation. The Biden administration rescinded Schedule F on January 20, 2021; the Trump administration reinstated a substantially equivalent order on January 20, 2025. This cycle — creation, rescission, reinstatement — demonstrates precisely why executive-order-level civil service protection is structurally inadequate. Career employees must be able to rely on permanent statutory protection that survives changes in administration. The Saving the Civil Service Act (H.R. 302/S. 155, 119th Congress) would codify this protection and must be enacted without delay.[10] Schedule F is not a management tool: it is an instrument of democratic backsliding. An administration that can replace 50,000 career officials with political loyalists has converted the executive branch into a party apparatus. No norm, no subsequent executive order, and no administrative policy is a durable substitute for statutory codification. The private right of action ensures courts — not the executive branch — adjudicate compliance, removing political officials from the enforcement chain entirely.
ADMN-CIVL-0004
Proposal
The nine merit system principles of Title 5 must be made individually enforceable by affected federal employees through a private right of action in federal district court
This position protects agency scientists' and experts' right to communicate findings publicly without political censorship. Scientific integrity requires that experts can speak honestly.
Congress must amend Title 5, U.S.C. § 2301 to: (1) make each of the nine merit system principles individually enforceable by affected employees in federal district court; (2) create a private right of action with a three-year statute of limitations and mandatory attorneys' fees for prevailing employees; (3) require reinstatement as the presumptive remedy for merit system violations, with the burden placed on the agency to demonstrate reinstatement is not appropriate; (4) create an independent career employee advocate within the Office of Special Counsel with authority to investigate systemic merit system violations and publish annual public reports on compliance across the federal workforce.
Title 5, U.S.C. § 2301 codifies nine merit system principles governing the federal civil service, including hiring and promotion based on merit, equal opportunity, fair and equitable treatment, protection of employees from arbitrary action, and protection from reprisals for lawful whistleblowing. These principles represent the statutory foundation enacted through the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978.[11] However, these principles are largely aspirational in practice — they are not individually enforceable by federal employees in court as independent causes of action. An employee passed over for promotion due to nepotism, a whistleblower fired for disclosures that fall outside the WPA's narrow protected-disclosure definition, or a career official retaliated against for resisting unlawful political pressure has limited direct judicial recourse under § 2301 itself. The Merit Systems Protection Board's own surveys have documented recurring patterns of merit principle violations — favoritism in hiring, retaliation for protected activity, and arbitrary dismissals — but the absence of a direct private right of action reduces compliance incentives and leaves systemic violations without an effective structural remedy.[12] Judicial enforceability converts aspirational principles into binding legal obligations and is consistent with the core platform principle that structural remedies are always preferred over behavioral guidelines. An independent career employee advocate within OSC provides systemic oversight that complements individual enforcement actions and generates the institutional knowledge necessary for Congress to enact further reforms.
ADMN-CIVL-0005
Proposal
Political appointees must be prohibited by statute from directing or overriding career employees on enforcement actions, consent decrees, and rulemaking matters with pending judicial challenges
This position prohibits politically motivated purges or mass firings of career civil servants. The civil service must be protected from political interference.
Congress must establish a statutory firewall prohibiting any political appointee — including Schedule C employees, presidential appointees subject to Senate confirmation (PAS), and presidential appointees not subject to Senate confirmation (PA) — from directing, instructing, reversing, or effectively vetoing a career official's decision on: (a) initiation or termination of any enforcement action; (b) approval, modification, or rejection of any consent decree to which the United States is a party; (c) settlement of any civil or administrative litigation to which the United States is a party; and (d) any rulemaking action affecting a pending judicial challenge to the same or a substantially related rule. Violations are subject to investigation by the relevant Inspector General and referral to the Office of Special Counsel, and career employees subjected to direction in violation of this statute have a private right of action in federal district court.
The integrity of federal enforcement and regulatory proceedings depends on insulating career officials' professional judgments from political interference on pending legal matters. Political appointees possess institutional loyalties to the appointing administration, not to the legal positions the United States has defended before courts, administrative bodies, and affected parties over time. When a political appointee directs a career attorney or regulatory official to drop an enforcement action, modify a consent decree favorable to a regulated party, or alter a rulemaking to benefit a litigant challenging the same regulation, the interference simultaneously compromises the judicial process — altering the legal position of the government based on factors extraneous to legal merit — and converts career officials' professional judgments into instruments of political will. The structural insulation that applies to individual prosecutorial decisions at the Department of Justice — where political appointees are formally constrained from directing specific case outcomes — should be extended to the full regulatory and enforcement apparatus of the executive branch. Voluntary norms and ethics guidelines have proven structurally inadequate: they provide no enforcement mechanism, no private right of action for the affected career employee, and no institutional accountability when violated. The firewall approach converts soft norms into binding law, with IG investigation and OSC referral providing graduated enforcement that does not require criminal prosecution in every instance.
ADMN-CIVL-0006
Proposal
The Hatch Act must be extended to the President and Vice President, with automatic civil penalties for senior White House officials and a private right of action for candidates and parties harmed by violations
This position requires that political appointees respect career staff expertise and follow proper procedures. Political leaders must work with professionals, not override them arbitrarily.
Congress must amend the Hatch Act (5 U.S.C. §§ 7321–7326) to: (1) extend Hatch Act restrictions on political activity while on duty or in an official capacity to the President and Vice President, with enforcement by an independent special counsel not subject to removal by the President; (2) make Hatch Act violations by Senior White House staff and political appointees subject to automatic civil penalties of not less than $50,000 per documented violation, assessed by the Office of Special Counsel without requiring White House approval or referral; (3) create a private right of action for opposing candidates, political parties, or voters harmed by Hatch Act violations by sitting officials, with a three-year statute of limitations and mandatory attorneys' fees for prevailing parties; (4) require all OSC Hatch Act referrals involving the President or Vice President to be transmitted simultaneously and unconditionally to the House and Senate Judiciary Committees.
The Hatch Act of 1939 (5 U.S.C. §§ 7321–7326) prohibits federal employees from engaging in political activity while on duty, in federal buildings, or using their official capacity for partisan electoral purposes.[13] However, the President and Vice President are explicitly exempted from the Act's restrictions. Senior White House officials and political appointees face materially lighter restrictions than career employees. During the Trump administration, Counselor to the President Kellyanne Conway committed at least 60 documented Hatch Act violations by using official White House platforms to endorse and oppose candidates in federal elections. The Office of Special Counsel found her conduct to be "egregious, notorious, and ongoing" and recommended her removal to the President — a referral the White House declined to act on with no legal consequence.[14] This episode revealed the fatal structural flaw in the Hatch Act enforcement regime: the enforcement body can only recommend action to the White House, and the White House retains complete discretion to ignore the recommendation. A law with no mechanism for independent enforcement against the highest-ranking officials is not a law — it is a norm, and norms are precisely the instruments that hostile administrations discard. Automatic penalties eliminate prosecutorial discretion that can be exercised in self-interest; the private right of action allows harmed candidates and parties to seek judicial remedy independent of executive branch cooperation; and simultaneous congressional notification ensures oversight even when enforcement is refused.
ADMN-MAJS-0001
Proposed
Congress must explicitly confirm agency authority for major regulatory actions through clear statutory language
This position rejects the major questions doctrine, which courts have used to block important agency actions. Agencies must be able to address major problems within their statutory authority.
Congress must affirmatively exercise its authority to confirm agency power for major regulatory actions — those with vast economic and political significance — through clear statutory language, so that agency authority does not depend solely on judicial interpretation of ambiguous statutes subject to invalidation under the major questions doctrine.
The Supreme Court’s "major questions doctrine," articulated in West Virginia v. EPA (2022) and subsequent decisions, holds that Congress must speak clearly when granting agencies authority over questions of major economic or political significance[2]. While this doctrine has legitimate anti-delegation concerns, in practice it has been weaponized by corporate interests to invalidate long-standing regulatory authority: the EPA’s authority to regulate power plant emissions, OSHA’s ability to require vaccination policies, and the FTC’s ability to issue trade regulation rules have all been challenged or struck down. The response is not to accept judicial neutering of agency authority — it is for Congress to exercise its legislative function clearly, explicitly delegating authority for major regulatory actions rather than leaving it to judicial interpretation of general statutory language. This rule requires Congress to act proactively and prevents the doctrine from becoming a backdoor mechanism for deregulation through judicial override.
ADMN-MAJS-0002
Proposed
Courts may not use the major questions doctrine to strike down regulations consistent with an agency’s general statutory mandate absent clear textual prohibition
This position requires courts to respect congressional intent when interpreting agency authority. If Congress gave an agency broad authority, courts should not invent restrictions.
Federal courts may not invoke the major questions doctrine to invalidate agency regulations where the regulation is consistent with the agency’s general statutory mandate and the statute does not contain a clear textual prohibition on the specific regulatory action, and must instead apply the standard arbitrary-and-capricious and statutory-construction review applicable to all agency actions.
The major questions doctrine, as currently applied, creates a perverse incentive: the more consequential a regulation in economic or political terms, the easier it becomes to strike down on the grounds that Congress did not speak with sufficient clarity. This inverts the logic of democratic governance — the most consequential regulatory actions should face rigorous scrutiny for arbitrary or capricious action, but should not be categorically invalidated simply because Congress used enabling language rather than explicit authorization for each specific rule. This rule does not immunize agencies from judicial review — arbitrary action, statutory excess, and failure to follow administrative procedure remain fully reviewable. It prevents courts from using the major questions doctrine as an extra-statutory deregulation tool in the absence of genuine statutory prohibition.
ADMN-MAJS-0003
Proposal
Congress must respond to the major questions doctrine by enacting explicit statutory authorization for all major regulatory actions and including a "major questions authorization" clause in all new legislation
This position prohibits courts from imposing extra scrutiny on rules protecting workers and the environment while accepting industry-friendly interpretations. Judicial review must be evenhanded.
Congress must: (1) enact explicit statutory authorization for EPA to set economy-wide greenhouse gas reduction standards under the Clean Air Act or successor climate legislation; (2) amend Dodd-Frank to explicitly authorize the CFPB to regulate financial products that pose systemic consumer harm, including novel financial instruments not yet in existence at the time of original enactment; (3) amend the Occupational Safety and Health Act to explicitly authorize emergency temporary standards for novel infectious disease threats affecting working populations, overriding the practical effect of NFIB v. OSHA (2022); (4) include in all major new regulatory statutes a "major questions authorization" clause reading: "This Act authorizes the [agency] to address major questions within the subject matter of this Act, including novel and unanticipated circumstances not specifically enumerated herein, consistent with the Act's purposes and subject to all applicable procedural requirements."
The Supreme Court's major questions doctrine, articulated in West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697 (2022), holds that courts must require "clear congressional authorization" before upholding agency action on questions of vast economic and political significance — and does so without reference to any textual prohibition in the relevant statute, applying instead a judicially invented clear-statement rule.[18] NFIB v. OSHA, 595 U.S. 109 (2022), extended the logic to invalidate OSHA's COVID-19 vaccination-or-test emergency standard by characterizing a pandemic workplace safety rule as a "broad, nationwide mandate" requiring more explicit congressional authorization than OSHA's general enabling statute provided.[19] The practical effect of the doctrine is to convert judicial policy skepticism about large-scale regulatory intervention into an interpretive constitutional-statutory mandate: the more consequential the regulation, the more easily a court can find insufficient authorization by demanding specificity Congress never anticipated needing to provide. The doctrine as currently applied treats absence of specific textual authorization as equivalent to prohibition — an interpretive stance that would have paralyzed the New Deal and has no legitimate basis in the statutory text or constitutional structure of the administrative state. The appropriate congressional response is to exercise the legislative function clearly: enacting affirmative, explicit authorization for major regulatory domains, and including prospective "major questions" authorization language in all new statutes to prevent litigants from weaponizing the inevitable ambiguity of general enabling statutes against regulations that carry out Congress's clearly stated purpose. This is the structural fix — not reliance on courts to correct themselves, not administrative creativity in framing regulations, but explicit legislative authorization that forecloses the interpretive gap the doctrine exploits.
ADMN-OIRS-0001
Proposed
OIRA review must not be used to indefinitely delay or block rules that meet statutory requirements and have completed required agency review
This position requires that when the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs reviews agency rules, it cannot block protections for political reasons. OIRA oversight must be transparent and evidence-based.
The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs may not use the regulatory review process to indefinitely delay, substantially weaken, or effectively block final rules that an agency has determined meet statutory requirements, completed mandatory notice-and-comment procedures, and have been subject to required cost-benefit analysis — and any rule held under OIRA review for more than 120 days without written return must automatically proceed to final publication unless Congress has enacted legislation blocking it.
OIRA review was established to ensure regulatory coordination and prevent duplicative or contradictory rules across agencies. In practice, however, it has become a mechanism through which politically opposed administrations delay, weaken, or effectively kill rules that have completed all required statutory and procedural requirements. Regulations protecting workers, the environment, and consumers have been held under OIRA review for years — effectively vetoed without formal action that could be challenged — because OIRA review is not subject to statutory deadlines with meaningful enforcement. The indefinite-delay mechanism allows executive administrations to nullify statutory mandates without repealing them, simply by refusing to complete regulatory implementation. Time limits on review, with automatic publication for unacted-upon rules, restore the principle that agencies must implement the laws Congress has passed.
ADMN-OIRS-0002
Proposed
OIRA cost-benefit analyses must incorporate distributional effects and must not systematically undervalue environmental, health, and safety protections through discount rate manipulation
This position prohibits OIRA from using cost-benefit analysis to kill worker, consumer, and environmental protections. The value of lives and health cannot be reduced to industry cost calculations.
Cost-benefit analyses required for major federal rules must incorporate distributional analysis identifying which populations bear regulatory costs and which receive benefits; must use discount rates that do not systematically devalue long-term environmental, health, and intergenerational benefits relative to near-term compliance costs; and must use the Value of a Statistical Life and other non-market valuation methodologies that reflect the full social value of prevented deaths, illness, and environmental harm rather than only monetizable economic impacts.
Cost-benefit analysis, as currently practiced in federal rulemaking, has a systematic bias toward undervaluing regulations that protect public health, safety, and the environment. The discount rate applied to future benefits disproportionately reduces the calculated value of rules protecting future generations from climate harm, long-term pollution exposure, or slow-accumulating health effects — making protective regulations appear less beneficial than they are. Similarly, the failure to analyze distributional effects conceals whether regulatory costs fall disproportionately on small businesses or low-income populations while benefits accrue primarily to large corporations and wealthy communities, or vice versa. Methodological reforms — including distributional analysis, appropriate discount rates for intergenerational effects, and consistent application of non-market valuation — are necessary to ensure that cost-benefit analysis serves its stated purpose of informing regulatory decisions rather than providing a technical veneer for predetermined deregulatory outcomes.
ADMN-CRAS-0001
Proposed
The Congressional Review Act must be reformed to require a supermajority for regulatory nullification, eliminate the retroactive lookback window, and prohibit use to nullify rules protecting public health and worker safety
This position reforms the Congressional Review Act to prevent it from being weaponized to block all agency action on important issues. The CRA should address specific rules, not entire policy areas.
The Congressional Review Act must be reformed to require a two-thirds supermajority in both chambers to nullify a final agency rule; to eliminate the provision allowing rules issued in the final months of a preceding administration to be nullified retroactively; to prohibit CRA resolutions of disapproval for rules protecting public health, worker safety, or environmental quality from clearly established statutory hazards; and to require that any CRA nullification be accompanied by a statement of the alternative protective standard Congress intends to adopt.
The Congressional Review Act, as originally enacted, provides a legitimate mechanism for congressional oversight of rulemaking — Congress should be able to reject agency rules that exceed statutory authority or reflect poor policy judgment. However, the CRA has been weaponized as a deregulatory tool: under a simple-majority procedure, Congress nullified 14 rules in the first months of the Trump administration in 2017, rolling back worker safety protections, environmental rules, and financial regulations that had completed full statutory and procedural requirements[6]. The retroactive lookback provision allows an incoming Congress to nullify rules finalized months earlier, effectively allowing partisan transitions to undo the completed regulatory work of prior administrations. The provision most in need of reform is the permanent prohibition on issuing substantially similar rules: once a rule is CRA-nullified, the agency cannot issue a similar rule without new legislative authorization, even if the underlying statutory hazard persists. Requiring a supermajority prevents weaponization for routine deregulation while preserving the CRA's legitimate oversight function.
ADMN-CRAS-0002
Proposed
When a rule is nullified through the Congressional Review Act, the agency must publish a notice identifying any statutory obligation the rule was designed to fulfill and the alternative means by which that obligation will be met
This position requires that CRA disapproval be subject to the same political accountability as regular legislation. Congress should not be able to block rules through fast-track procedures that avoid debate.
When Congress nullifies a final agency rule under the Congressional Review Act, the responsible agency must, within 90 days, publish a notice in the Federal Register identifying: the statutory obligation the nullified rule was designed to fulfill; whether the nullification leaves that obligation unmet; and, if so, the alternative means — whether legislative, regulatory under a different authority, or cooperative with other agencies — by which the statutory obligation will be addressed.
CRA nullification leaves a compliance gap: the statutory obligation that the rule was implementing does not disappear when the rule is rescinded, but the mechanism for fulfilling it is removed. Without a required notice, the public, regulated entities, and affected communities have no visibility into whether the nullification has created an enforcement vacuum or whether the underlying protection remains intact through another mechanism. This transparency requirement does not limit Congress's authority to nullify rules — it requires accountability for the consequences of that authority. It also creates a record that can be used to hold Congress and the executive accountable for whether statutory obligations are actually being fulfilled after regulatory nullification.
ADMN-IGSP-0001
Proposed
Inspectors General must have statutory independence from agency leadership and may not be removed except for cause, with cause reviewed by the Government Accountability Office
This position requires inspectors general to have sufficient independence, authority, and resources to investigate misconduct. Effective oversight prevents corruption and abuse.
Federal Inspectors General must be granted statutory independence from the agency head whose operations they oversee; may be removed only for cause — limited to neglect of duty, malfeasance, or incapacity — with the cause stated in writing and reviewed for sufficiency by the Government Accountability Office before removal takes effect; and must report directly and simultaneously to both agency leadership and Congress without agency editing, delay, or suppression of findings.
Inspectors General are the primary internal accountability mechanism within federal agencies — they investigate fraud, waste, and abuse, and their findings are often the first warning of systemic agency failure or corruption. Their effectiveness depends entirely on independence from the agency leadership they are monitoring. The Trump administration's mass firing of Inspectors General in 2020 — including the IGs for the State Department, Defense Department, Transportation, and other agencies, in many cases during active investigations of administration officials — demonstrated that current statutory protections are inadequate[5]. The Inspector General Empowerment Act and its successors require notification to Congress but do not actually prevent removal. This rule establishes genuine removal protection — "for cause only" with external review — that matches the protection given to members of independent regulatory commissions under Humphrey's Executor v. United States (1935) and ensures that the internal accountability function of the administrative state cannot be eliminated by the officials it is designed to oversee.
ADMN-IGSP-0002
Proposed
Inspector General reports must be transmitted simultaneously to Congress and published publicly, and agency heads may not delay, suppress, or require pre-publication review of IG findings
This position protects inspectors general from politically motivated removal. Oversight only works if investigators can do their jobs without fear of being fired.
Federal Inspector General reports, audit findings, and investigation results must be transmitted to the relevant congressional oversight committees simultaneously with transmission to agency leadership; must be published publicly within 30 days of transmission unless the IG certifies that specific information is classified or protected by ongoing criminal investigation; and may not be reviewed, edited, or withheld by agency heads, political appointees, or White House staff prior to transmission.
Inspector General independence is meaningless if IG reports can be filtered, delayed, or suppressed before reaching Congress and the public. The Inspector General system's value as an accountability mechanism depends on timely, unedited disclosure of findings. Current law requires IG reports to be transmitted to agency heads, who may then decide what to transmit to Congress and when — creating opportunities for political management of accountability findings. Simultaneous transmission to Congress eliminates the opportunity for agency leadership to manage or suppress findings before congressional oversight can begin. Public publication requirements ensure that taxpayers can access findings about how their government is functioning. The 30-day default publication window, with narrow exception for genuinely sensitive information certified by the IG rather than by political appointees, balances transparency with legitimate classification concerns.
ADMN-IGSP-0003
Proposal
Mass or simultaneous removal of Inspectors General must be prohibited — removal must require Senate confirmation of stated cause, with an automatic stay and a private right of action for unlawfully removed IGs
This position requires agencies to respond to inspector general findings with concrete corrective action plans. Identifying problems is not enough—agencies must fix them.
Congress must amend the Inspector General Act of 1978 to: (1) require Senate confirmation of the stated cause before any Inspector General removal takes effect, replacing the existing 30-day written-notice-to-Congress requirement; (2) impose an automatic stay on any IG removal pending completion of Senate review; (3) grant IGs a statutory private right of action to challenge their removal in federal district court, with expedited adjudication and reinstatement as the presumptive remedy; (4) prohibit the simultaneous removal of more than one IG within any 30-day period absent a national emergency declared under the National Emergencies Act with concurrent congressional approval; (5) require all IG reports and investigative communications to be transmitted simultaneously to the relevant congressional oversight committees without routing through agency leadership.
On January 20, 2025, President Trump fired 17 sitting Inspectors General in a single evening action, in apparent violation of the Inspector General Independence and Empowerment Act (Pub. L. 117-263, § 5901, enacted December 23, 2022), which requires 30 days advance written notice to Congress with stated reasons for removal.[15] The dismissed IGs oversaw the Departments of Defense, Transportation, State, Housing and Urban Development, Agriculture, Health and Human Services, Education, Veterans Affairs, Energy, Labor, and Interior, as well as EPA, NASA, USAID, the Social Security Administration, the Export-Import Bank, and the Postal Service — collectively the internal oversight apparatus of virtually the entire executive branch.[16] The 2022 law's notice requirement proved entirely ineffective as a structural protection: it requires notice but not justification, imposes no automatic stay, and provides no right of judicial challenge for fired IGs. A law that says "tell Congress first" without consequence for non-compliance, and without any mechanism for the affected IG to contest the removal in court, is not oversight protection — it is a procedural speed bump. Senate confirmation of cause transforms IG removal from a unilateral presidential act into a shared constitutional decision, consistent with the advice-and-consent authority Congress exercises over IG appointments. The automatic stay ensures IGs can continue oversight functions during review, preventing the use of removal to interrupt active investigations targeting administration officials. The private right of action ensures that courts, not the executive branch, are the final arbiter of whether statutory removal requirements have been met.
ADMN-IGSP-0004
Proposal
Inspectors General must be funded through an independent Treasury account rather than agency appropriations, and must have independent subpoena authority over agency employees and contractors without requiring agency head approval
This position ensures inspector general reports are made public so the public can hold agencies accountable. Transparency is essential for democratic oversight.
Congress must: (1) fund all Inspectors General through a dedicated IG Oversight Account within the Treasury, wholly independent of the appropriations accounts of the agencies they oversee; (2) set a minimum IG funding floor of one percent of the host agency's total discretionary budget, adjusted annually by the prior year's Consumer Price Index; (3) grant all IGs independent subpoena authority over agency employees, contractors, subcontractors, and grantees without requiring approval or concurrence from the agency head or any political appointee; (4) require any IG to notify the relevant congressional oversight committees within 30 days whenever an agency head or political appointee has attempted to alter, reduce, or redirect the IG's budget request; (5) prohibit agency heads from placing conditions on IG budget requests or from routing IG appropriations requests through agency budget officials prior to OMB submission.
Inspector General independence is structurally undermined by the current funding model, which routes IG appropriations through the agencies they oversee. An agency head who wishes to weaken oversight without the visibility of firing the IG — and thereby triggering congressional notification requirements — can do so by reducing the IG's budget in the annual submission to OMB, reallocating IG staff to non-investigative functions, or conditioning budget increases on reduced investigative aggressiveness. Several IGs documented before the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency that their budget requests were reduced or altered by agency leadership before reaching Congress — giving the overseen agency effective veto power over the oversight function it is supposed to dread.[17] Independent Treasury funding eliminates this structural vulnerability by removing the overseen agency entirely from the IG appropriations chain. The one-percent floor provides minimum viable oversight capacity regardless of the political environment; larger agencies with greater opportunity for fraud, waste, and abuse require proportionally more oversight capacity, which the percentage floor ensures scales with agency size. Independent subpoena authority is the operational corollary of removal protection: without it, the entities most likely to be subjects of IG investigation — contractors, grantees, and senior agency officials — can delay or impede access to records and witnesses through interposition of agency-head objections. Subpoena independence is not a technical detail; it is the procedural foundation on which effective investigation depends.
ADMN-SDST-0001
Proposal
Special District Elections Must Be Held on General Election Days
This position ensures federal agencies support state enforcement with funding, training, and technical help. Strong state enforcement protects people where they live and work.
All special district elections — including water, fire, mosquito control, hospital, utility, and other single-purpose districts — must be held on the same day as the primary or general election for federal or statewide offices. No special district may hold a standalone election on a non-election day. Districts that currently hold off-cycle elections must transition within 3 years. Turnout at special district elections must be disclosed publicly; elections held in violation of this rule are voidable upon petition of 5% of registered voters in the district.
The U.S. has more than 40,000 special districts , many of which hold elections on obscure dates with single-digit turnout. These entities collectively levy approximately $100 billion in taxes annually. Off-cycle elections are not a neutral administrative choice — they are a structural mechanism that suppresses participation and insulates special district boards from democratic accountability. Consolidating elections onto general election days restores meaningful voter oversight over entities that affect residents' water bills, fire protection, and hospital access. The voidability mechanism ensures that violations have a concrete legal remedy available to affected voters rather than relying solely on state enforcement discretion.
ADMN-SDST-0002
Proposal
Mandatory Public Disclosure of Special District Budgets and Tax Levies
This position prohibits federal preemption from blocking stronger state protections. States should be free to provide greater protections than federal minimums.
Every special district must publish its adopted annual budget, all tax levy rates, and audited financial statements on a publicly accessible state portal within 30 days of adoption. The state comptroller must maintain a searchable, downloadable database of all special district finances. Districts that fail to file are subject to a daily fine of $500 per day after the 30-day deadline, with the fine accruing to the state education fund. Residents have a private right of action to compel filing.
Many special districts have no public-facing website or disclosure mechanism. The absence of mandatory public financial disclosure means that residents paying special district levies on their property tax bills frequently cannot identify which district levied the charge, what that district does, or whether the levy is lawful. Centralizing disclosure through a state comptroller portal transforms accountability from a burden imposed on individual residents to a structural requirement on the entity receiving public funds. The private right of action ensures that enforcement does not depend solely on state agency capacity or political will — residents directly affected by non-disclosure can compel compliance in court.
ADMN-SDST-0003
Proposal
State Authority to Consolidate Inefficient Special Districts
This position requires federal enforcement to continue even in states with weak or hostile state agencies. Federal protection must exist regardless of state politics.
The governor, in consultation with the state legislature, must have statutory authority to consolidate special districts serving fewer than 1,000 residents into general-purpose county or municipal governments, unless residents petition to retain the district by a majority vote. Residents of any special district may petition for dissolution with signatures of 20% of registered voters; upon certification, a dissolution vote is held at the next general election. Dissolved district assets and liabilities transfer to the relevant county government.
Special district proliferation results in fragmented service delivery, duplicated administrative overhead, and overlapping governance structures that confuse accountability. Small special districts serving populations well below the threshold of viable self-governance often exist more to protect incumbent boards and contracted service relationships than to deliver services efficiently. Consolidation authority with a democratic check — residents may petition to retain their district — balances administrative rationalization with local democratic preference. The dissolution petition mechanism extends accountability further: residents who believe a district is unnecessary, captured, or wasteful have a direct democratic path to dissolve it rather than relying solely on elected officials to act.
ADMN-TANF-0001
Proposal
Mandatory 50% TANF Spending Floor on Direct Cash Assistance and Childcare
This position requires agencies to ensure federal contractors and grantees comply with labor, civil rights, and environmental laws. Public money should not subsidize lawbreakers.
States must spend a minimum of 50% of their TANF block grant allocation on direct cash assistance to families, childcare subsidies, or job training programs directly serving TANF-eligible households. Expenditures on administrative overhead, staff, non-profits that do not serve TANF families, and programs unrelated to economic self-sufficiency do not count toward the floor. States that fail to meet the floor must repay the diverted funds to the federal government with interest; repeat violations trigger reduced block grant authority.
In many states, less than 20% of TANF block grant funds reach families as cash assistance.[20] States have used TANF funds for items including private college scholarships, anti-abortion crisis pregnancy centers, and state government overhead. The TANF block grant structure gives states near-total spending discretion while retaining the branding and political legitimacy of a federal anti-poverty program — a structure that invites diversion because there is no structural floor preventing it. A binding 50% direct-assistance floor restores the fundamental relationship between the program's statutory purpose — supporting needy families — and the use of its funds. The repayment-with-interest mechanism makes diversion financially costly rather than merely a political embarrassment, and the escalating consequence of reduced block grant authority creates a structural deterrent against repeat violations.
ADMN-TANF-0002
Proposal
TANF Benefits Must Phase Out Gradually as Household Income Rises
This position allows agencies to bar contractors with serious violation records from receiving federal contracts. Repeat offenders should not profit from taxpayer dollars.
TANF cash assistance, childcare subsidies, and transitional services must phase out on a graduated schedule as household income increases; no state may terminate benefits entirely at a single income threshold that creates a "cliff" where a household is worse off earning more. The phase-out schedule must ensure a net income gain for every dollar of earnings up to 150% of the federal poverty level. HHS must review all state TANF plans for cliff effects and require remediation within 18 months.
Benefit cliffs in TANF and related programs create severe work disincentives that trap families in poverty. A household that loses $500 per month in benefits upon crossing a single income threshold must earn more than $500 per month above the threshold just to break even — meaning a raise or additional work hours can leave the family materially worse off. This is not a behavioral failure by individual families; it is a structural design defect that the platform consistently holds must be corrected at the structural level. The graduated phase-out requirement converts the cliff into a ramp: every additional dollar earned produces a net benefit to the household, which removes the structural trap and aligns the program's incentives with its stated goal of promoting economic self-sufficiency.
ADMN-TANF-0003
Proposal
Annual Independent Audit of TANF Expenditures
This position requires contract oversight to be proactive, not just reactive. Agencies must monitor compliance, not just investigate after complaints.
Every state must submit to an annual independent audit of TANF expenditures, conducted by a CPA firm or state auditor independent of the administering agency, with results published publicly within 90 days of the fiscal year end. The audit must identify all expenditures by category and whether each expenditure directly served TANF-eligible families. Audit findings of diversion or misuse must be referred to HHS OIG; sustained findings of diversion are grounds for a corrective action plan or reduced block grant.
Federal block grants without independent audit requirements are structurally exposed to diversion because they substitute political accountability — which is diffuse and operates on long electoral cycles — for financial accountability, which is direct and timely. An independent audit requirement, with results published on a 90-day cycle, creates a recurring structural accountability mechanism that operates continuously rather than only at election time. The referral requirement to HHS OIG ensures that diversion findings trigger a formal oversight response rather than being acknowledged and filed. The corrective action and block grant reduction escalator creates a graduated enforcement mechanism: states receive an opportunity to remediate before facing financial consequences, but repeat or sustained diversion results in reduced federal funding — the structural consequence most likely to produce genuine behavioral change in state administrations.
ADMN-MDRG-0001
Proposal
Medical Licensing Boards Must Include at Least 40% Non-Physician Consumer Members
This position requires agencies to adopt modern technology to improve service, reduce errors, and enhance security. Outdated systems make it harder for people to access benefits and services.
Every state medical licensing board must include at minimum 40% non-physician members representing patient and consumer interests; these members must be appointed through a process independent of medical professional associations. Non-physician members have full voting rights on all disciplinary matters. Boards that fail to meet this composition requirement lose authority to receive federal Medicare/Medicaid provider enrollment referrals until compliance is achieved.
Most state medical boards are dominated by physicians, creating structural conflicts of interest in disciplinary proceedings. A board composed predominantly of physicians investigating a physician colleague faces the same structural accountability failure as any other self-regulatory body: the regulated parties control the regulator. Consumer and patient representatives on boards do not dilute medical expertise — disciplinary proceedings are not primarily technical adjudications requiring medical judgment about standard-of-care questions, but accountability determinations requiring balanced assessment of patient harm. The Medicare/Medicaid enrollment referral sanction creates a concrete federal enforcement lever without requiring direct federal preemption of state licensing authority, which is consistent with preserving state regulatory jurisdiction while creating accountability for compliance with minimum composition standards.
ADMN-MDRG-0002
Proposal
90-Day Investigation Deadline for All Medical Board Complaints
This position ensures technology adoption does not reduce public access or accountability. Modernization must serve people, not just cut costs.
State medical licensing boards must complete an initial investigation and issue a written determination on all patient complaints within 90 days of receipt. Complaints alleging sexual misconduct, physical harm, or impairment must receive an expedited determination within 30 days. All disciplinary actions, including letters of reprimand, practice restrictions, license suspensions, and revocations, must be disclosed in a publicly searchable national database maintained by the Federation of State Medical Boards and accessible without charge.
Processing times for medical board complaints average 3+ years in many states. The National Practitioner Data Bank is not publicly accessible. Multi-year complaint processing timelines do not reflect careful deliberation — they reflect the structural consequence of inadequate resources, weak timeline enforcement, and the absence of procedural mandates. Delay is functionally equivalent to denial for the complainant, and allows physicians with sustained patterns of patient harm to continue practicing during years-long investigations. The 30-day expedited track for the most serious allegations — sexual misconduct, physical harm, and impairment — ensures that the most dangerous practitioners face the fastest response. Public national database disclosure without charge closes the information asymmetry that allows disciplined physicians to relocate to states where their records are not easily accessible to patients.
ADMN-MDRG-0003
Proposal
Publicly Accessible National Registry of Physician Disciplinary Actions
This position requires that digital services remain accessible to people with disabilities and those with limited internet access. Technology must not exclude vulnerable populations.
HHS must maintain and publish a publicly accessible, free-to-search national registry of all physician disciplinary actions, malpractice settlements above $30,000, and hospital privilege revocations. Physicians with 3 or more sustained disciplinary actions in a 10-year period are flagged in the registry and subject to enhanced supervision requirements before any state medical board may issue or renew licensure. Interstate license portability programs may not be used to circumvent disciplinary records from another state.
The current National Practitioner Data Bank is accessible only to hospitals, credentialing organizations, and other authorized entities — not to patients, who are the population most directly affected by physician disciplinary history and malpractice records. This structural information asymmetry serves the interests of the medical profession, not patients. A publicly accessible registry funded by HHS converts a gatekeeper system into a genuine public disclosure mechanism. The enhanced-supervision flag for repeat disciplinary action targets the specific failure mode that generates the most patient harm: the serial bad actor who accumulates disciplinary history across multiple states while continuing to receive licensure because no jurisdiction maintains comprehensive visibility into the full record. Interstate license portability may not be used to launder disciplinary history — the registry must follow the physician, not be left behind at the state border.
ADMN-DPAS-0001
Proposal
Deferred Prosecution Agreements Must Include Individual Officer Prosecutions
This position requires agencies to protect personal information and use data only for authorized purposes. Government must respect privacy rights.
No deferred prosecution agreement may be entered with a corporation for conduct involving fraud, consumer harm, environmental violation, or financial crime unless the DOJ has simultaneously charged, or demonstrates active ongoing prosecution of, at least one individual officer, director, or employee personally responsible for the underlying conduct. A DPA that fails to include individual accountability is voidable by the court; judges must approve all DPAs in open court proceedings.
The vast majority of corporate DPAs result in no individual prosecutions. Critics note that DPAs have become a mechanism for wealthy corporations to buy their way out of criminal liability that would land any individual in prison. The structural problem with corporate DPAs without individual prosecution is that they convert criminal misconduct into a cost of doing business: the corporation pays a fine, implements compliance programs, and continues operating — while the officers and employees who made the decisions that caused the harm face no personal accountability. This asymmetry is not an oversight in the legal framework; it is a structural feature that systematically insulates corporate decision-makers from the consequences of decisions that harm workers, consumers, and the public. Requiring simultaneous individual prosecution as a condition of DPA eligibility restores the core principle that criminal acts must produce criminal accountability for the humans who committed them, not only financial penalties for the legal entities they used to do it.
ADMN-DPAS-0002
Proposal
Full Public Disclosure and Judicial Approval of All Corporate DPAs
This position prohibits agencies from selling or sharing personal data with companies for commercial purposes. People's information is not a commodity.
All deferred prosecution agreements and non-prosecution agreements entered by any federal agency must be filed in federal court and made fully public, including all terms, compliance requirements, and monitor identities, within 10 days of execution. Independent monitors must be selected by the court from a panel free of financial ties to the corporation; monitor reports must be filed publicly. No DPA may be entered with a corporation that has violated a prior DPA or NPA within the preceding 10 years; such repeat offenders must face trial.
DPA terms are frequently not disclosed to the public or the court. The structural opacity of corporate DPAs creates two compounding accountability failures: the public cannot assess whether the resolution is adequate given the conduct, and the court cannot exercise meaningful oversight over compliance because monitor selection and reporting occur entirely within the executive branch's discretion. Judicial approval in open court converts DPA execution from a bilateral executive-corporate negotiation into a transparent judicial proceeding subject to public scrutiny and independent oversight. Court-selected monitors, drawn from a panel screened for conflicts of interest, remove the structural incentive for corporations to seek favorable monitors through relationships with DOJ officials. The 10-year prior-violation bar creates a structural escalation: corporations that have already demonstrated they will violate DPA terms must face the adversarial process that DPAs are designed to avoid, rather than receiving repeated opportunities to enter new agreements that delay accountability indefinitely.
ADMN-UNEM-0001
Proposal
States May Not Design Unemployment Systems to Suppress Claims
This position requires agencies to assess and address disparate impacts of their policies on marginalized communities. Neutral-seeming rules can have discriminatory effects.
States must not implement unemployment insurance application systems, verification processes, or administrative procedures designed to reduce claims throughput by increasing friction, confusion, or error rates for applicants. Federal minimum standards for UI system accessibility must include: a fully functional online application achieving a 90% successful submission rate in usability testing; a paper application alternative available in all languages spoken by 1% or more of the state's labor force; a telephone hotline staffed during business hours; and maximum 21-day processing time for initial determination. States whose UI approval rates fall below 40% of economically eligible claimants face federal administrative takeover of UI processing.
Several states — most notably Florida under Gov. Rick Scott — deliberately designed dysfunctional UI systems to reduce approval rates. Florida's CONNECT system had a 40% error rate in its early operation.
ADMN-UNEM-0002
Proposal
Federal Minimum Unemployment Benefit of 50% Wage Replacement for 26 Weeks
This position ensures enforcement prioritizes violations that harm vulnerable and marginalized communities. Agencies must address inequities, not ignore them.
Federal law must establish a minimum unemployment insurance benefit of 50% of the claimant's average weekly wage, for a minimum duration of 26 weeks, in all states. No state may impose a waiting week before benefits begin; benefits must commence on the first Monday following a valid claim determination. States may provide more generous benefits but may not fall below the federal floor; states in violation of the federal floor have their UI administrative grants reduced by 25% per year until compliance is achieved.
Many states provide UI benefits well below 50% wage replacement, with some providing as little as $235/week maximum regardless of prior wages.[21]
ADMN-LCAL-0001
Proposal
All Special Purpose Districts That Tax the Public Must Hold Public Elections, Publish Budgets Online, and Submit to Independent Audit
This position requires agencies to provide information and services in languages spoken by the communities they serve. Language barriers should not prevent people from accessing government.
Congress must condition federal Community Development Block Grant and infrastructure funding on states enacting special district transparency laws that: (1) require all special purpose districts — including water, fire, mosquito control, hospital, utility, school, and tax increment financing districts — to hold publicly noticed elections for all governing board positions on standard election days, with ballots available to all registered voters within district boundaries; (2) prohibit appointment-only or landowner-only voting for any district with authority to levy taxes, impose fees, or issue bonds; (3) require all special districts to publish their annual budgets, audited financial statements, meeting minutes, and compensation schedules online in a machine-readable format; (4) subject all special districts to mandatory state audit on a five-year cycle, with immediate referral to the state AG for any district with unexplained financial irregularities; and (5) require state governments to maintain a comprehensive public registry of all special districts within their borders, including taxing authority, boundaries, governing board members, and annual revenue.
The U.S. has more than 40,000 special purpose districts — more units of local government than any other type — collecting an estimated $100 billion in taxes annually.[22] Many special districts hold elections at obscure times with minimal notice, resulting in turnout of 1–2% or governing boards controlled by real estate developers.
ADMN-LCAL-0002
Proposal
Homeowners Associations May Not Foreclose on a Home for Minor Violations or Small Debts and Must Provide Meaningful Due Process Before Any Enforcement
This position ensures translation and interpretation services are accurate and culturally appropriate. Poor translation can cause serious harm and misunderstanding.
Congress must condition federal mortgage guarantee programs (FHA, VA, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac) on states enacting HOA reform laws that: (1) prohibit any HOA from initiating foreclosure proceedings for unpaid fines, fees, or assessments totaling less than $10,000 or less than 12 months of unpaid assessments, whichever is greater; (2) require all HOA enforcement actions — including fines, liens, and remediation demands — to be preceded by written notice of the alleged violation, a reasonable cure period of no less than 30 days, and an opportunity for the homeowner to contest the violation before a neutral hearing officer with no financial interest in the outcome; (3) cap all HOA fines for aesthetic violations (paint color, lawn length, decoration) at $500 per violation per year and prohibit compounding late fees that exceed the original fine; (4) require all HOA boards to be elected annually by all homeowners in the community, with no proxy voting by developers; (5) subject all HOAs with more than 50 units to mandatory state AG registration, annual financial disclosure, and complaint-driven investigation authority; and (6) provide a private right of action for homeowners subjected to due-process-deficient enforcement.
HOAs can legally foreclose on a home for as little as $3.24 in unpaid dues in some states.[23] An estimated 74 million Americans live in HOA-governed communities — more than one in five.[24]
ADMN-LCAL-0003
Proposal
The Government May Not Permanently Seize Property Without a Criminal Conviction, and the Federal Equitable Sharing Loophole Must Be Closed
This position requires agency facilities and services to be fully accessible to people with disabilities. ADA compliance is mandatory, not optional.
Congress must enact the FAIR Act framework by: (1) prohibiting any federal, state, or local law enforcement agency from permanently forfeiting any property — cash, vehicles, real estate, or other assets — without a criminal conviction of the property owner for an offense directly related to the property; (2) ending the federal "equitable sharing" program that allows state and local agencies to circumvent stronger state forfeiture laws by transferring seizures to federal jurisdiction in exchange for a percentage of the proceeds; (3) shifting the burden of proof in all forfeiture proceedings to the government — the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the property was used in or derived from a crime; (4) eliminating the profit motive — all forfeiture proceeds must be deposited into the general treasury fund, not retained by the seizing law enforcement agency; (5) providing automatic, court-appointed counsel for any property owner contesting a forfeiture; and (6) establishing a private right of action for any person whose property was seized without ultimate conviction, with recovery of the property plus damages equal to 150% of the property's value and attorney's fees.
Civil asset forfeiture allows police to seize property from people who have never been charged with a crime. The federal equitable sharing program has transferred billions of dollars in seized assets to state and local police departments, bypassing stronger state laws.
ADMN-LCAL-0004
Proposal
Local Governments May Not Use Traffic Tickets and Code Violations as Their Primary Revenue Source, and Fines Must Be Capped at Income-Adjusted Levels
This position requires agencies to provide reasonable accommodations for employees and members of the public with disabilities. Accommodations enable equal participation and are required by law.
Congress must condition federal law enforcement assistance funding on states enacting municipal fine reform laws that: (1) prohibit any municipality from deriving more than 5% of its general fund revenue from traffic fines, code enforcement fines, or court fees — municipalities above this cap must reduce fine revenue within two years or face loss of federal law enforcement grants; (2) prohibit driver's license suspension as a consequence of unpaid traffic fines or court fees unrelated to dangerous driving — suspensions for debt create a poverty trap that prevents people from working to pay fines; (3) require all courts assessing fines for traffic and code violations to offer income-based payment plans capped at 2% of monthly gross income per fine, with no additional fees for choosing a payment plan; (4) ban the use of private debt collectors for municipal court fines, who frequently charge collection fees exceeding the original fine; (5) require automatic waiver of all fines, fees, and surcharges for individuals with income below 125% of the federal poverty level; and (6) require annual public reporting of all municipal fine revenue by offense type, neighborhood, and demographic data.
The Department of Justice's Ferguson report documented how that city's police department operated as a revenue-generating machine, systematically targeting Black residents with fines and fees. An estimated 11 million Americans have suspended driver's licenses due to unpaid fines unrelated to driving safety.
The administrative state has been under sustained attack from multiple directions. Conservative legal movements have sought to dismantle Chevron deference and challenge the constitutional legitimacy of agency rulemaking, arguing that agencies represent an unconstitutional "fourth branch" of government. This approach is not merely about limiting government — it is about removing regulatory obstacles to corporate profit maximization by delegitimizing the institutional mechanisms through which public protections are enforced.
The Chevron doctrine, established in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (1984),[3] held that courts should defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory language within their regulatory domain. This doctrine was grounded in institutional competence — agencies possess specialized expertise, follow public rulemaking procedures, and are accountable to elected officials through executive oversight. When the Supreme Court overturned Chevron in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (2024),[4] it empowered courts to substitute their judgment for agency expertise, creating a flood of litigation designed to paralyze regulatory enforcement. Without Chevron, every technical determination becomes subject to judicial reinterpretation, allowing industry actors to forum-shop for friendly judges and relitigate settled regulatory standards across circuits. Restoring Chevron does not grant agencies unlimited power — they remain bound by statutory text, administrative procedures, and judicial review for genuine overreach. But it restores institutional competence as a guiding principle and prevents the weaponization of courts against regulatory enforcement.
The push to enshrine core departments in the Constitution addresses a different vulnerability. While some agencies (like the FTC or FCC) can be created or restructured by Congress, core departments have become political targets. Conservative movements have repeatedly called for abolishing the Department of Education, viewing federal education standards as overreach. Similarly, the Department of Labor is targeted for elimination by those who oppose worker protections like minimum wage enforcement, overtime rules, and workplace safety standards. By constitutionally enshrining Labor, Education, Justice, and Defense, we prevent cycles where each administration attempts to defund or dismantle departments that enforce protections unpopular with their political coalition. This does not mean these departments cannot be reformed, restructured, or held accountable — it means they cannot be arbitrarily abolished to eliminate the protections they enforce.
Regulatory capture is the systemic process by which industries dominate the agencies meant to regulate them. This occurs through multiple mechanisms: revolving-door employment where regulators move seamlessly between agency positions and high-paying industry jobs; advisory board dominance where industries control the committees that set standards and recommend enforcement priorities; lobbying expenditures that dwarf agency budgets and enable industries to outspend public-interest advocates in every rulemaking proceeding; and financial dependency where agencies rely on industry-funded research or industry cooperation for enforcement, creating incentives to avoid antagonizing regulated entities. Capture is not incidental — it is the systematic goal of industries that view regulation as a cost to be minimized[1]. Effective anti-capture design requires structural insulation, not merely ethical guidelines. This means strict cooling-off periods for revolving-door employment, limits on industry representation in standard-setting bodies, transparency requirements for lobbying contacts and influence, and independent funding mechanisms that prevent agencies from becoming financially dependent on the industries they regulate.
The balance this pillar seeks is between paralysis and capture. Without agencies, Congress would need to pass impossibly detailed legislation covering every technical determination — an unworkable model that would result in regulatory gaps and inability to respond to changing conditions. With captured agencies, regulations serve industry interests rather than public interests. With weak or delegitimized agencies, corporations operate without meaningful oversight. The goal is durable, expert, accountable regulatory capacity — agencies that have clear authority, institutional competence, structural insulation from capture, and democratic accountability through congressional oversight and public transparency.
One critical question this raises is the relationship between agency independence and democratic accountability. Agencies must be insulated from short-term political pressure (preventing administrations from simply defunding enforcement of laws they dislike) while remaining accountable to elected officials (preventing unaccountable bureaucratic empire-building). This is addressed through statutory clarity (Congress defines mission and scope), procedural transparency (rulemaking must be public and follow administrative procedures), judicial review for genuine overreach (courts can still strike down arbitrary or ultra vires agency actions), and congressional oversight (including funding appropriations and investigative authority). The goal is not to make agencies invulnerable, but to make them resistant to capture while maintaining democratic control.
Another critical consideration is the scope of agency discretion. Anti-delegation theories argue that Congress cannot delegate rulemaking authority to agencies because only Congress has legislative power. This is a selective reading of constitutional structure — Congress has always delegated implementation authority, and modern governance would be impossible without specialized regulatory bodies. The key is that delegation must be bounded — Congress must provide intelligible principles, clear statutory authority, and meaningful constraints. Agencies cannot simply invent powers Congress did not grant. But within their statutory mandate, they must have flexibility to respond to changing conditions, apply technical expertise, and enforce rules consistently. Restoring Chevron is part of this — it acknowledges that agencies, not courts, are the proper institutions to resolve technical ambiguities within their domain.
Finally, this pillar connects to broader anti-corruption and institutional-accountability structures. Agencies are vulnerable to the same pathologies as legislative or executive bodies — they can become self-serving, unresponsive, or captured. Effective oversight requires independent inspectors general, whistleblower protections, public transparency, and enforcement mechanisms that hold agency officials accountable for malfeasance. The goal is not to create an untouchable bureaucracy, but to create regulatory capacity that is structurally insulated from the specific forms of corruption and capture that have historically weakened public protections.
OIRA and the Regulatory Review Process: The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, established within OMB, serves as the centralized review point for significant federal regulations. While coordination review has legitimate value in preventing conflicting rules and ensuring cross-agency consistency, OIRA has also functioned as a mechanism for delaying or killing regulations through indefinite review — often at the instigation of regulated industries that lobby OMB directly. A 2011 GAO report found that rules subject to extended OIRA review were often weakened or withdrawn, with limited public transparency about who contacted OIRA and what changes were made. The Congressional Review Act has been similarly weaponized: its simple-majority procedure and permanent bar on substantially similar rules have made it a tool for permanent deregulation rather than targeted oversight.[6] Meaningful regulatory accountability requires that these procedural mechanisms serve their stated purposes of coordination and oversight, not deregulation by other means.
Inspector General Independence: The Inspector General system — established by the Inspector General Act of 1978 — created a network of independent watchdogs within federal agencies to detect fraud, waste, and abuse. The system's effectiveness depends on genuine independence: IGs who fear removal cannot effectively investigate agency leadership. The mass dismissal of multiple IGs in 2020 without adequate cause or congressional consultation demonstrated the fragility of existing protections and the need for statutory for-cause removal standards with external review.[5]