Ensure that public office is not held indefinitely or beyond reasonable capacity, preventing entrenchment of political power and maintaining effective, accountable leadership reflective of current society.
Ensure that public office is not held indefinitely or beyond reasonable capacity, preventing entrenchment of political power and maintaining effective, accountable leadership reflective of current society.
Public office should not be held indefinitely or beyond reasonable capacity. Power must circulate, and those who hold it must be demonstrably fit to serve.
Long-term incumbency creates several democratic pathologies: accumulation of power and influence that becomes self-perpetuating[1], institutional capture where officials serve donor and corporate interests over constituents, loss of connection to ordinary citizens' lives and concerns, increasing difficulty for challengers to compete regardless of merit[2], and the concentration of experience and relationships that makes individual officials effectively irreplaceable. Beyond entrenchment, the problem includes officials serving while demonstrably unable to perform their duties due to age, cognitive decline, or health issues, with no transparent mechanism to address fitness concerns. This pillar addresses both problems: it breaks the cycle of entrenchment through hard term limits and ensures fitness through objective standards and transparent processes.
House maximum 6 terms (12 years); Senate maximum 3 terms (18 years); combined maximum 8 terms or 20 years across all federal legislative offices
Two-year waiting period before seeking next federal office after term ends; prohibition on running for office while serving in another office; prevents perpetual office-seeking
Special elections and Senate appointments for vacancies respect waiting period rules with explicit exceptions to prevent democratic gaps
Age cap of 75 for re-election to federal office. Mechanisms for independent fitness review and health transparency are under active development; the framework must resist weaponization and age discrimination while providing voters with material information about officials' capacity to serve.
Term limits intersect with every structural reform — from electoral competition to executive succession and legislative entrenchment.
The term limits component uses a tiered approach: relatively generous individual chamber limits (House: 6 terms/12 years, Senate: 3 terms/18 years) combined with an aggregate cap (8 total terms or 20 years across all federal legislative offices) to prevent simple office-hopping to circumvent limits. The system also includes waiting periods between offices (2 years) and prohibitions on running while serving in another office, preventing officials from perpetually seeking the next position while neglecting current responsibilities. Vacancy rules respect these constraints while allowing special elections and appointments to fill emergency gaps.
The fitness component (TRM-FIT-001) establishes an age cap for re-election: no ballot appearance for an office held past age 75. This is the one fitness rule currently formalized. Mechanisms for independent fitness review — mandatory health disclosures, incapacity processes for non-presidential officials (the 25th Amendment gap), and the framework for balancing medical privacy against democratic accountability — remain under development. The design challenge is significant: any fitness standard must resist weaponization as a partisan removal tool while still giving voters material information about officials' capacity to serve.
Positions are organized by family: limits (LIM) for hard term caps, running (RUN) for requirements and restrictions while seeking office, vacating (VAC) for special rules when positions become vacant mid-term, and fitness (FIT) for age and fitness standards.
Every rule in this pillar, organized by policy area. Active rules are current platform commitments. Partial rules are in development. Proposed rules are planned for future inclusion.
TERM-LIMS-0001
Proposed
House max 6 terms
Members of the House of Representatives can serve a maximum of 6 terms, which is 12 years total. This prevents any one person from holding the same seat indefinitely, while still giving them enough time to learn the job and make a difference.
Maximum of 6 terms (12 years) in the House of Representatives. Prevents indefinite incumbency while allowing sufficient time to develop expertise, build effectiveness, and accomplish legislative goals. House terms are 2 years, designed for closer constituent connection.
TERM-LIMS-0002
Proposed
Senate max 3 terms
Senators can serve a maximum of 3 terms, which is 18 years total. Senate terms are longer than House terms because the Senate is designed to be more stable and provide continuity in government.
Maximum of 3 terms (18 years) in the Senate. Longer than House limit due to 6-year terms designed for stability and institutional memory. Balances experience against entrenchment of political power.
TERM-LIMS-0003
Proposed
Combined max 8 terms or 20 years
No person can serve more than 8 total terms or 20 years across all federal legislative offices combined, whichever limit comes first. This prevents someone from serving 6 terms in the House and then moving to the Senate to keep serving indefinitely.
Aggregate cap of 8 total terms or 20 years across all federal legislative offices, whichever comes first. Prevents office-hopping to circumvent individual chamber limits. Example: serving 6 terms (12 years) in House means only 2 more terms maximum in Senate before hitting either 8 total terms or 20 total years. Applies to combined service across House, Senate, and any other federal legislative positions.
TERM-LIMS-0004
Proposal
Congressional committee chairmanships limited to 6 consecutive years; chamber leadership positions limited to 4-year terms — enforceable by House and Senate rules, no constitutional amendment required
Committee chairs can serve a maximum of 6 consecutive years in that role, and leadership positions like Speaker or Majority Leader are limited to 4-year terms. This can be done through internal House and Senate rules without needing to amend the Constitution.
The Supreme Court's holding in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton (1995) establishes that service limits on members of Congress require a constitutional amendment because they add qualifications beyond those in Article I.[1] But committee chairmanship assignments and chamber leadership positions — Speaker, Majority and Minority Leader, Majority and Minority Whip, and party Conference and Caucus chairs — are governed entirely by internal chamber and party caucus rules. These rules can be changed by simple majority vote of the relevant body. No constitutional amendment is required to limit institutional power within Congress, as distinct from limiting congressional service itself. The seniority system for committee chairmanships concentrates decisive agenda-setting power — control over what legislation reaches the floor, what oversight investigations are launched, which witnesses are called — in members who hold the safest seats with the lowest democratic accountability pressure. A member chairing a major committee for 20 consecutive years exercises power far exceeding any individual democratic mandate. House Republicans imposed 6-year chairmanship term limits as part of the Contract with America reforms enacted in 1995; those limits were later allowed to lapse and were not reinstated by subsequent majorities.[2] The experience demonstrated that chairmanship term limits are operationally feasible and that institutional knowledge is maintained through professional staff and ranking member experience even as chairmanships rotate. This platform requires: (a) a 6-consecutive-year limit on any single member chairing any single committee, with a minimum 2-Congress gap before the same member may chair the same committee again; (b) a 4-year limit on service in any single chamber leadership position (Speaker, Majority/Minority Leader, Whip, Conference/Caucus Chair); (c) implementation through enforceable chamber rules binding the full chamber, not merely party caucus guidelines subject to waiver. Members may continue serving on committees indefinitely; only the chairmanship power rotates.
TERM-LIMS-0005
Proposal
This platform actively pursues a constitutional amendment establishing a 12-year maximum for combined congressional service in either or both chambers
This platform actively supports passing a constitutional amendment that would set a 12-year maximum for combined service in Congress, regardless of which chamber someone serves in.
Congressional service limits require a constitutional amendment — U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton (1995) foreclosed the statutory route by holding that states may not add qualifications beyond those in Article I, and the same logic applies to Congress acting by statute alone.[1] The constitutional amendment pathway is therefore not a fallback; it is the correct and only durable mechanism. This platform supports a constitutional amendment establishing a 12-year maximum for combined congressional service in either or both chambers: any combination of service totaling 12 years triggers the limit, regardless of which chamber the years were served in. The 12-year figure provides structural equity across chambers: it allows two full Senate terms or six full House terms — sufficient time to develop real expertise, accomplish substantial legislative goals, and exercise meaningful influence — while preventing multi-decade career incumbency. The combined-service structure forecloses evasion through chamber-switching: a member who serves 12 years in the House may not then serve in the Senate. Congressional term limits consistently poll at 60–75% public support across partisan lines.[2] Fifteen states have enacted state legislative term limits; the National Conference of State Legislatures tracks outcomes including legislative turnover and the composition of term-limited chambers.[3] A constitutional amendment requires two-thirds of both chambers of Congress and ratification by three-fourths of state legislatures — a threshold ensuring that enacted limits reflect genuine supermajoritarian consensus, not exploitation of a transient political majority. This platform commits to organizing, advocacy, and legislative effort toward this amendment as an active priority, not a passive aspiration deferred to some future political alignment.
TERM-RUNS-0001
Proposed
No running while in office
A person serving in one federal office cannot run for a different federal office while still in their current position. This ensures elected officials focus on doing their current job instead of constantly campaigning for their next job.
Prohibits running for a different federal office while currently serving in another federal office. Prevents divided attention, dual campaigns, and perpetual office-seeking behavior. Official must complete current term or resign before seeking next office. Ensures focus on current responsibilities rather than constant campaigning.
TERM-RUNS-0002
Proposed
Two-year wait before next office
After leaving one federal legislative office, a person must wait two full years before they can start serving in a different federal legislative office. This forces politicians to spend time as regular citizens again instead of jumping directly from one office to another.
Requires two-year waiting period between ending service in one federal legislative office and beginning service in another. Prevents immediate office-hopping and serial office-holding. Creates gap that forces official to return to private life and constituent perspective before seeking next position. Reinforces anti-entrenchment principle.
TERM-VACS-0001
Proposed
Vacancy rules respect wait periods
When a seat becomes vacant, the rules for filling it must still respect term limits and waiting periods. This prevents people from using special circumstances to get around the term limit rules.
Default rule: vacancy procedures and appointments respect term limits and waiting period requirements. Prevents using vacancies to circumvent anti-entrenchment rules. Ensures consistency of term limits enforcement across regular and special circumstances.
TERM-VACS-0002
Proposed
Special election exception
Special elections to fill vacant seats are exempt from the two-year waiting period. This ensures that vacant seats can be filled quickly so that citizens don't lose representation in Congress.
Special elections to fill vacancies are exempt from waiting period requirements. If a House member resigns mid-term (e.g., to comply with "no running while serving" rule), the special election to fill that seat is not bound by the two-year waiting period. Prevents unintended representation gaps while maintaining term limits intent. Applies only to special elections for vacant seats, not regular election cycles.
TERM-VACS-0003
Proposed
Senate appointment exception
When a governor appoints someone to fill a vacant Senate seat temporarily, that appointment is exempt from the two-year waiting period. This ensures states maintain their representation in the Senate until a special election can be held.
Senate appointments to fill vacancies (in states allowing gubernatorial appointment) are exempt from waiting period requirements. Allows immediate appointment to maintain Senate representation until special election. Prevents democratic representation gaps that would result from strict waiting period enforcement. Applies only to temporary appointments filling mid-term vacancies, not to appointed officials seeking reelection.
TERM-FITS-0001
Proposed
Age cap for re-election to federal office
No one can run for a federal office if they would be 75 or older when that term ends. This prevents officials from seeking terms they might not be able to complete due to age-related decline.
No person may appear on a federal election ballot for an office they would hold past their 75th birthday, absent extraordinary circumstances defined by statute.
An age ceiling for re-election — not service, but seeking a new term — provides a structural check against officials seeking terms they could not realistically complete. Extraordinary-circumstances clauses provide limited statutory relief while preserving the norm.
TERM-FITS-0002
Proposed
Independent medical and cognitive fitness review for federal officeholders over 70
Federal officeholders who turn 70 while in office must undergo annual medical and cognitive fitness assessments by an independent panel of doctors. The results must be made public in summary form so voters and colleagues can judge whether the official is still capable of doing the job.
Federal officeholders who reach age 70 while in office must submit to annual cognitive and medical fitness assessments conducted by an independent medical panel; assessment results must be disclosed to the public in sufficient summary form to allow voters and colleagues to evaluate fitness for continued service, while protecting non-relevant private medical information.
Age alone is not disqualifying — cognitive and physical capacity varies significantly among individuals, and many people over 70 are fully capable of demanding service. However, the risks of age-related cognitive decline increase substantially after 70, and the public has a legitimate interest in knowing whether their elected representatives are cognitively capable of performing the duties of their office. An independent medical panel — composed of physicians appointed through a bipartisan process analogous to the Federal Reserve's appointment structure — conducts standardized assessments and publishes summary findings. The assessment covers cognitive function, major medical conditions affecting judgment or stamina, and medication or treatment status relevant to capacity. Detailed private medical information not relevant to fitness for duty is protected. The assessment is a disclosure mechanism, not automatic disqualification; voters and Congress retain the authority to act on the findings.
TERM-FITS-0003
Proposed
Fitness assessment process must be insulated against political manipulation
The independent medical panel that conducts fitness assessments must be protected from political pressure. Panel members serve fixed terms, cannot be fired for their findings, and are appointed through a bipartisan process to ensure no political party can manipulate the results.
The independent medical fitness panel must be composed of physicians from multiple specialties — neurology, geriatrics, psychiatry, internal medicine — appointed for fixed nonrenewable terms through bipartisan confirmation; panel members may not be removed during their term except for cause adjudicated by an independent review board; no elected official or political appointee may direct the panel's medical findings.
A fitness assessment process controlled by partisan actors would quickly become a tool for political persecution rather than genuine accountability. The panel must mirror the structural independence of bodies like the Federal Reserve, the CBO, or federal Inspectors General: fixed terms preventing removal for inconvenient findings, bipartisan or nonpartisan appointment processes preventing capture by either party, and explicit prohibition on political direction of medical conclusions. The panel's role is strictly medical assessment of capacity; it makes no political judgments about policy fitness or ideological suitability. The panel's findings can be disputed by the officeholder through a formal process involving independent third-party review, ensuring due process against erroneous or politically motivated assessments.
TERM-FITS-0004
Proposed
Candidates age 65 and older must disclose results of independent medical evaluation as condition of ballot access
Candidates age 65 or older who want to run for President, Vice President, Senator, or Representative must publicly release results of an independent medical and cognitive evaluation. This gives voters the information they need to decide whether a candidate is physically and mentally capable of serving.
Candidates for President, Vice President, Senator, or Representative who are age 65 or older at the time of filing must publicly disclose the results of an independent medical and cognitive evaluation, conducted by qualified physicians within 120 days of filing, as a condition of ballot access; disclosure covers capacity-relevant findings in summary form; non-relevant private medical information is protected.
Voters cannot make informed choices about candidates for demanding, high-stakes federal office without knowing whether those candidates have the physical and cognitive capacity to serve the term they are seeking. The private medical review process for incumbents under TRM-FIT-002 is a government accountability mechanism; pre-candidacy disclosure for ballot access is a voter information mechanism — the same information serves a different constitutional purpose. The age threshold of 65 — lower than the 70-year threshold for incumbents' annual assessments — reflects that candidacy involves seeking a future term: the forward-looking capacity question is more significant for someone entering office than for someone already serving. The evaluation is conducted by independent physicians using the same standardized protocol as TRM-FIT-002; results are publicly disclosed in summary form sufficient for voters to assess fitness while protecting private medical information not relevant to capacity for the duties of the office sought. This rule does not exclude candidates from the ballot based on medical findings; it requires disclosure. Voters retain the authority to evaluate the disclosed information and vote accordingly. Cross-reference: TRM-FIT-001 (age cap for re-election), TRM-FIT-002 (incumbent assessment), TRM-FIT-003 (panel independence protections).
TERM-FITS-0005
Proposal
Congress must enact legislation codifying 14th Amendment Section 3 disqualification enforcement — a federal cause of action, state certification requirements, and expedited court review
Congress must pass legislation that creates a clear enforcement process for the 14th Amendment's ban on insurrectionists holding office. This would establish federal lawsuits, state certification requirements, and fast-track court review to enforce the constitutional disqualification.
The Fourteenth Amendment, Section 3 — the Insurrection Clause — provides that no person who "having previously taken an oath...to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof" may hold federal office. Congress may remove this disqualification by two-thirds vote of each chamber.[1] The constitutional text is unambiguous. The enforcement mechanism was left undefined — a gap the Supreme Court exposed in Trump v. Anderson, 601 U.S. 100 (2024).[2] There, a unanimous Court on the operative holding ruled that states may not individually enforce Section 3 against federal candidates absent congressional legislation establishing the enforcement framework. The Court explicitly left open — and, on this reading, explicitly invited — congressional action under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which grants Congress the power to enforce the Amendment by appropriate legislation. Congress has not acted. The failure to legislate before the 2024 election cycle, in the documented wake of January 6, 2021, allowed the constitutional disqualification question to proceed to the Supreme Court without a statutory framework — producing an outcome that effectively immunized the candidate from a disqualification provision plainly applicable to the conduct in question. Congress must pass legislation providing: (1) a federal cause of action in federal district court, available to the Department of Justice, any State Attorney General, or any qualified voter in the relevant jurisdiction, to challenge a candidate's eligibility under Section 3 at least 120 days before any federal election; (2) a requirement that each state's chief election officer certify that every candidate for federal office has not been finally adjudicated to have engaged in insurrection against the United States; (3) an expedited federal court track for Section 3 challenges, with mandatory district court decisions within 60 days of filing, automatic appeal to the relevant circuit, and discretionary Supreme Court review on an accelerated schedule; (4) a federal statutory definition of "engaged in insurrection or rebellion" drawing on Reconstruction-era application by Congress and the courts, encompassing participation in coordinated efforts to prevent the lawful transfer of executive power or the certification of presidential election results through force, fraud, or unlawful pressure on election officials. Scholars Baude and Paulsen established in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review that Section 3 is self-executing and of broader scope than commonly assumed, providing the scholarly foundation for congressional action that remains legally sound and democratically necessary.[3]
TERM-PRES-0001
Proposed
Constitutional enforcement of the 22nd Amendment — no workarounds through VP, acting positions, or term-counting manipulation
A President who has already served two terms cannot serve again in any position that would let them exercise presidential power, including Vice President or any appointed role in the line of succession. This closes loopholes that could allow a former two-term President to effectively serve a third term.
A person who has served two terms as President, or the equivalent in time, may not serve in any capacity — including Vice President, Acting President, or any appointed position that would place them in the presidential line of succession — in a manner designed to circumvent the 22nd Amendment's term limit; the 22nd Amendment's purpose bars any mechanism by which a twice-elected President could exercise presidential power for a third term.
The 22nd Amendment, ratified 1951,[3] states that "no person shall be elected to the office of the President more than twice." The text addresses election, not service; it has been suggested that a former two-term President could serve as Vice President (potentially resuming the presidency), or that creative constitutional readings might permit a third term under unusual circumstances. JUD-PRE-001 codifies the clear purpose of the 22nd Amendment as a two-term ceiling on presidential power in any form, not merely on election. This rule forecloses creative workarounds by establishing the purposive reading: the amendment was enacted to prevent the consolidation of executive power in one individual beyond two terms, and that purpose applies regardless of the formal title under which presidential power is exercised.
TERM-PRES-0002
Proposed
Presidential term counting must include partial terms served following succession
If someone becomes President by succession and serves more than half of the previous President's term, that partial term counts as a full term toward the two-term limit. This prevents someone from serving more than 10 years total as President.
For purposes of the 22nd Amendment's two-term limit, any person who serves more than half of a presidential term after succeeding to the presidency — through the death, resignation, or removal of the elected President — shall have that period of service counted as one full term.
The 22nd Amendment provides that a person who serves more than two years of another president's term and is then elected twice may serve only one additional elected term (effectively up to 10 years). The term-counting rule is explicit in the text. JUD-PRE-002 addresses the implementation: "more than half" of a term (more than 2 years) counts as a full term for the two-term limit; "half or less" (2 years or fewer) does not count against the limit. This is the existing constitutional standard; this rule codifies it in statute to ensure consistent application and prevent creative reinterpretation. It also establishes that service as Acting President for prolonged periods does not constitute a separate presidency for counting purposes, preventing manufactured legal ambiguity.
TERM-RVDS-0001
Proposed
Expanded cooling-off period — five years before lobbying Congress or federal agencies for former senior officials
Former Members of Congress, senior government officials, and federal judges cannot work as lobbyists for five years after leaving office. This extended cooling-off period prevents them from immediately cashing in on their government connections and insider knowledge.
Former Members of Congress, senior executive branch officials (GS-15 and above, Schedule C, and equivalent), and former federal judges may not engage in lobbying — direct advocacy to Congress or federal agencies on behalf of any client for compensation — for five years following the end of their federal service; the prohibition covers any registered lobbyist activity, whether or not they personally contact their former colleagues.
Current law imposes a one-year cooling-off period for former Members of Congress and a two-year period for senior executive officials — both of which have proven insufficient to prevent the revolving door from becoming a direct pipeline from public service to private lobbying. Extending the cooling-off period to five years significantly increases the practical value of public service norms over financial incentives to leverage government access for private clients. The five-year period is calibrated to outlast most individual policy cycles and government programs that former officials might otherwise immediately seek to influence for clients. The prohibition covers any client-compensated advocacy regardless of whether the former official personally contacts their former colleagues — covering behind-the-scenes strategy, document preparation, and client coaching that circumvents the literal text of existing prohibitions.
TERM-RVDS-0002
Proposed
Lifetime ban on foreign government lobbying for former senior intelligence, national security, and foreign policy officials
Senior officials who had access to classified national security information can never register as foreign agents or lobby for foreign governments. Their knowledge of U.S. secrets and strategy is too valuable and dangerous to ever allow them to work for foreign governments.
Former senior officials with access to classified information, national security strategy, foreign policy decisions, or intelligence sources and methods may not register as a foreign agent or lobby on behalf of foreign governments at any time following the end of their service; no waiver may be granted for lobbying on behalf of governments of adversarial or competing states.
The Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) requires disclosure of lobbying on behalf of foreign governments but does not prohibit former senior officials from doing so after a cooling-off period. Former officials with deep knowledge of classified programs, U.S. negotiating positions, intelligence capabilities, and national security vulnerabilities should never be available as foreign government advisors — no cooling-off period is sufficient for this class of conflicts because the knowledge does not expire. The lifetime prohibition is narrowly targeted: it applies to foreign government principals (not foreign private companies), is limited to senior officials with access to classified national security materials, and does not prevent all business activity with foreign entities — only registered lobbying for foreign governments. The FARA enforcement framework provides the disclosure and enforcement mechanism.
TERM-DSCS-0001
Proposed
Real-time financial disclosure for federal officeholders and senior officials
Federal officeholders must report any financial transaction over $5,000 within 48 hours, and must file complete annual financial disclosures within 30 days of year-end. This real-time reporting lets the public and watchdogs catch conflicts of interest as they happen, not months later.
Members of Congress, the President, Vice President, Cabinet secretaries, and senior White House officials must file real-time financial disclosure updates within 48 hours of any transaction in excess of $5,000 involving publicly traded securities, real property, or business interests in industries regulated by the officeholder's duties; annual comprehensive disclosures must also be filed and published within 30 days of the close of each calendar year.
Current financial disclosure requirements for Members of Congress under the STOCK Act require reporting of securities transactions over $1,000 within 45 days — a window long enough for significant insider-trading-adjacent advantages and too slow for public scrutiny. Multiple Congressional Research Service and academic studies have documented that Members of Congress trade individual stocks at rates that significantly outperform market averages,[4] consistent with use of material non-public information acquired in official capacity. Real-time disclosure — 48-hour reporting — converts the disclosure regime from a historical record to a live accountability mechanism that allows the public, journalists, and regulators to identify conflicts of interest contemporaneously with official decision-making rather than months later. Disclosure of transactions in industries regulated by the officeholder's specific committee assignments and responsibilities is particularly critical.
TERM-DSCS-0002
Proposed
Federal officeholders may not hold individual stocks in industries they directly regulate; blind trusts required for all non-diversified assets
Members of Congress and Cabinet officials cannot own individual stocks in industries they regulate or oversee. They must either sell those stocks or put all their non-diversified assets into a truly blind trust that keeps them uninformed about what the trust owns.
Members of Congress, the President, and Cabinet officials must divest individual stocks in industries under their direct regulatory oversight or legislative jurisdiction within 180 days of assuming office; assets not divested must be placed in a genuinely blind trust — one managed by an independent trustee with no obligation to inform the officeholder of the trust's holdings or transactions — for the duration of service.
The fundamental conflict of interest between individual stock ownership and regulatory or legislative responsibility is well-established in ethics law for executive branch employees, who are generally prohibited from participating in matters affecting their financial interests. Congress has exempted itself from the most stringent versions of these rules. The result is that legislators who write healthcare law hold pharmaceutical stocks, legislators who regulate the financial industry hold bank stocks, and legislators who oversee defense appropriations hold defense contractor stocks. Divestiture within 180 days of assuming office — with tax-free rollover treatment to avoid penalizing public service — eliminates the direct conflict. For assets that genuinely cannot be easily liquidated (family businesses, real property), truly blind trust arrangements that deny the officeholder access to information about holdings and transactions achieve the same conflict-elimination purpose.
TERM-DSCS-0003
Proposed
Mandatory disclosure and resolution of foreign financial relationships and debts
Federal officeholders must publicly disclose all financial relationships with foreign governments, foreign companies, and foreign individuals. Any debts over $10,000 owed to foreign persons or entities must be disclosed and either paid off or placed under independent management within 180 days.
Federal officeholders and senior appointed officials must disclose all financial relationships with foreign governments, foreign state-owned enterprises, and foreign nationals within 60 days of assuming office and within 30 days of any new such relationship arising; outstanding debts above $10,000 owed to any foreign person or entity must be publicly disclosed and resolved or placed under independent management within 180 days.
The emoluments clauses of the Constitution (Article I § 9 cl. 8 and Article II § 1 cl. 7) prohibit the President and federal officeholders from accepting things of value from foreign states without Congressional consent — but existing disclosure regimes do not systematically require disclosure of debt relationships, ongoing financial entanglements, or dependencies on foreign states or nationals that could create leverage or conflict of interest.[5] Foreign financial relationships present the most serious conflict-of-interest concerns in federal service: an official who owes substantial debt to a foreign state-owned bank, receives ongoing payments from a foreign government-connected entity, or holds significant business investments in a foreign country is structurally susceptible to influence. Unlike domestic conflicts — which are significant but can be monitored through domestic legal systems — foreign financial leverage operates outside U.S. enforcement reach and may involve state-level counterintelligence objectives. Disclosure and mandatory resolution or independent management within a defined period creates both transparency and structural remediation, ensuring financial relationships that could compromise national security or foreign policy decision-making are identified and addressed before or immediately upon assuming office. Cross-reference: TRM-DSC-001 (real-time financial disclosure for domestic transactions), TRM-DSC-002 (blind trusts for non-diversified assets).
TERM-DSCS-0004
Proposal
Close the blind trust loophole: "blind trusts" used by federal officeholders must satisfy strict federal standards or forfeit the conflict-of-interest exemption — independent fiduciaries, mandatory diversification, information barriers, annual public audit
Blind trusts used by federal officeholders must meet strict federal standards to qualify as conflict-of-interest protections. They must use independent managers, diversify holdings, maintain information barriers, and undergo annual public audits to prove they are genuinely preventing conflicts.
The Ethics in Government Act of 1978 provides that a "qualified blind trust" — one meeting the Act's requirements for independent management and information barriers — is treated as eliminating a federal officeholder's financial conflict of interest for purposes of federal ethics law.[1] In practice, the qualified blind trust standard has proved insufficient to achieve its purpose. Reported deficiencies in arrangements described as blind trusts have included: trustees with prior family relationships to the officeholder; trustees employed by institutions with active regulatory relationships with the officeholder's agency; officeholders who retained constructive knowledge of initial holdings because no asset-conversion requirement applies; and concentrated industry positions that persisted for years in trusts purportedly managed without officeholder direction. The Office of Government Ethics reviews qualified blind trust agreements for compliance with the Act but has limited enforcement authority when deficiencies emerge after the trust is already operational.[2] The conflict-of-interest exemption is valuable — it allows affected officeholders to exercise official duties without routine recusal requirements. That value is only justified when the exemption is real. A blind trust that does not actually blind the officeholder to their financial interests provides a legal shield while doing nothing to eliminate the underlying conflict. This platform requires five conditions for any arrangement to qualify for the conflict-of-interest exemption: (a) Independent fiduciary: the trustee must be a licensed fiduciary institution with no direct personal, professional, or financial relationship with the officeholder or immediate family within the preceding 10 years; (b) Mandatory diversification: all assets transferred to the trust must be converted to broadly diversified instruments — index funds, exchange-traded funds, or U.S. Treasury instruments — within 180 days of trust establishment; no concentrated single-company or single-industry positions may remain beyond that period; (c) Absolute information barrier: the trustee is prohibited from communicating the identity, quantity, or value of any holding or transaction to the officeholder, immediate family, or any agent of the officeholder, without exception; (d) Annual independent audit: an independent auditor must certify annually that the trust remains in compliance with (a)–(c) and file the certification publicly with the Office of Government Ethics within 60 days of each fiscal year end; (e) Criminal penalty: any communication by the trustee to the officeholder about specific holdings or transactions in violation of (c) is a federal criminal offense; the officeholder's knowing receipt of such communication is an independent offense.
The term limits pillar emerged from the observation that long-term incumbency has transformed Congress from a body of citizen legislators into a professional political class increasingly disconnected from ordinary Americans. The anti-entrenchment principle holds that power should circulate, that extended tenure creates conflicts between institutional self-preservation and public service, and that democracy requires regular infusion of new perspectives and accountability to current constituents rather than accumulated networks.
The specific limits proposed—6 House terms, 3 Senate terms, 8 combined terms or 20 years total—represent a balance between several considerations. House terms are shorter (2 years) and designed for closer connection to constituents, so 6 terms (12 years) provides substantial time to learn the institution, develop expertise, and accomplish legislative goals while preventing decades-long career entrenchment. Senate terms are longer (6 years) and designed for more stability and institutional memory, so 3 terms (18 years) similarly balances experience against entrenchment. The combined cap of 8 terms or 20 years prevents office-hopping: officials cannot serve 12 years in the House, then switch to Senate for another 18 years, totaling 30 years. Either total would trigger the limit.
The anti-office-hopping rules address a specific evasion tactic: officials running for the next office while still serving in their current position, creating dual campaigns, divided attention, and perpetual office-seeking behavior. The two-year waiting period between offices forces a gap, ensuring officials complete their terms focused on current responsibilities rather than already campaigning for the next position. The prohibition on running while serving reinforces this: you cannot simultaneously be a House member and run for Senate.
The vacancy rules create exceptions to prevent democratic representation gaps. If a House member resigns mid-term to comply with the "no running while serving" rule and pursue another office, a special election fills that seat without the two-year wait applying to the special election winner. Similarly, Senate appointments to fill vacancies until special elections aren't bound by the waiting periods. These exceptions prevent the term limits and waiting period rules from creating unintended vacancies or representation gaps while still maintaining the anti-entrenchment intent.
The fitness for office component reflects ongoing and unresolved debates about age limits, cognitive testing, health transparency, and the fundamental tension between respecting voters' choices and ensuring officials can actually perform their duties. Recent examples include officials with clear cognitive decline continuing to serve, questions about presidential fitness during campaigns, debates about age caps (proposals around 75 years discussed), and lack of standardized, non-political processes for assessing capacity.
The core challenge is designing fitness standards that are: (1) objective and medical rather than political, (2) administered by independent entities not subject to partisan manipulation, (3) transparent enough to inform voters but respectful of medical privacy, (4) applicable equally across age, party, and position, (5) not discriminatory based on age alone, and (6) enforceable without creating constitutional crises when results are disputed. Cognitive assessment requirements for officials above certain ages have been discussed, but implementation details remain contentious: who administers tests, what thresholds trigger concern, who reviews results, how appeals work, whether results are public or reviewed by independent boards, and whether standards apply to candidates or only sitting officials.
The health transparency component requires balancing public right to know about officials' capacity against medical privacy. Current practice relies on voluntary disclosure, which predictably results in selective or misleading information. Proposals for mandatory disclosure of medical examinations, cognitive assessments, and fitness certifications encounter resistance based on privacy rights, potential for political abuse, and questions about what specific information must be disclosed versus summarized by independent medical reviewers.
Age cap proposals, such as a maximum age of 75 for running for federal office, address the statistical reality that cognitive decline accelerates with age, but raise discrimination concerns and constitutional questions about adding qualifications for office beyond those in the Constitution. Proponents argue that age-based requirements (minimums) already exist, that capacity concerns are legitimate, and that voters need protection from officials who cannot perform duties. Opponents argue this is age discrimination, that voters should decide, that chronological age doesn't determine individual capacity, and that such rules could exclude highly capable older officials while including incapable younger ones. Research on age-related cognitive change notes that while individual variation is wide, processing speed, working memory, and executive function show measurable population-level decline after age 70, with steeper acceleration after 80; the assessment framework targets this range specifically rather than imposing a universal cap.
The 25th Amendment gap is a structural problem the fitness rules directly address. The 25th Amendment provides a mechanism for removing a president who is unable to discharge their duties — but no equivalent process exists for senators, representatives, federal judges, or other officials. When a legislator or judge becomes cognitively unable to perform their duties, there is no structured process: the body may expel a member, but expulsion requires a two-thirds vote and is designed for misconduct, not incapacity. The fitness rules create an information and process layer — assessment results flow to voters and ethics/oversight bodies — that could support either voluntary resignation, expulsion proceedings, or at minimum informed electoral challenge, without requiring a new constitutional removal mechanism.
Documented cases of officials serving while impaired — including multiple prominent senators and representatives in recent years — demonstrate that the current voluntary system fails. The failure mode is consistent: staff, colleagues, and family conceal declining capacity; the media underreports out of deference or lack of access; primary opponents lack the standing to force disclosure; voters make decisions without material information. Mandatory assessment with summary disclosure changes this dynamic by making capacity information structurally available rather than voluntarily withheld.
The tension between age discrimination law and fitness standards is real but navigable. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) generally prohibits age-based employment decisions — but does not apply to elected officials, and courts have long recognized that Congress may set qualifications for federal office that differ from general employment standards. The age minimums in the Constitution (25 for House, 30 for Senate, 35 for president) establish the precedent that age is a legitimate qualification criterion for office. The distinction between a blanket exclusion (age alone determines fitness) and an assessment regime (age triggers a standardized, individualized evaluation) maps onto the distinction between discriminatory and non-discriminatory approaches: TRM-FIT-001 through -004 use age only to trigger mandatory assessment, not as a standalone disqualifier, and TRM-FIT-004 explicitly prohibits automatic removal based solely on assessment results.
The tension remains unresolved in the formal policy corpus: the fitness concerns are legitimate and increasingly urgent, but the solutions must carefully navigate discrimination, political weaponization, constitutional constraints, and the fundamental question of who decides fitness when voters have chosen someone. The pillar acknowledges the problem space—cognitive assessment, independent medical review, transparency requirements, protections against abuse—but hasn't formalized specific rules, reflecting the genuine difficulty of the issue.
One approach discussed but not formalized: independent medical review boards with mandatory assessment at defined intervals (e.g., every 2 years after age 70), conducted by non-partisan medical professionals, with results either made public or reviewed by a separate independent panel that can recommend fitness concerns to voters or trigger additional constitutional processes (like the 25th Amendment for presidents). The goal would be information and process, not automatic disqualification, letting voters make informed decisions while having objective medical input rather than partisan speculation.
Another consideration: the difference between candidates (seeking office) and incumbents (currently serving). Fitness standards might apply differently: candidates could be required to release medical and cognitive assessments before ballot access (voters then decide with full information), while incumbents might face different processes including potential removal mechanisms for demonstrable incapacity. This preserves voter choice (for candidates) while protecting the functioning of government (for those already serving).
The pillar also intersects with term limits for judges (currently in the courts pillar, particularly Supreme Court term limits), recognition that lifetime appointment plus increasing life expectancy has created judicial gerontocracy concerns similar to those in elected branches. The proposal for 18-year staggered terms for Supreme Court justices addresses both entrenchment and age-related fitness concerns by creating regular turnover without relying on death or voluntary retirement.
The vacancy-related rules also connect to succession planning and incapacity procedures: if an official becomes unable to serve mid-term due to health or cognitive decline, the vacancy procedures must work smoothly without partisan manipulation or prolonged gaps. The rules respecting waiting periods while allowing special election exceptions ensure that fitness-related vacancies don't create representation crises.
Throughout this pillar, the design challenge is balancing democratic principles (voter choice, equal treatment, avoiding discrimination) with pragmatic governance needs (officials must be able to perform duties, power must circulate, entrenchment must be prevented). The term limits component has more developed rules because the trade-offs are clearer and the legal framework more established. The fitness component remains more conceptual because the trade-offs are harder: medical privacy versus transparency, age limits versus discrimination, political abuse versus legitimate capacity concerns, voter autonomy versus protection from demonstrable incapacity.
The pressure-test lessons that inform this pillar include: incumbency advantage is overwhelming and self-perpetuating without hard limits; voluntary retirement and self-limitation have proven ineffective; good-faith expectations about stepping down when unable to serve have failed repeatedly; fitness concerns will be politicized unless assessed by genuinely independent, medically qualified, non-partisan processes; transparency must be mandatory because voluntary disclosure produces selective information; and any fitness standards must apply equally regardless of party, position, or political popularity to avoid weaponization.