Consumer Rights

All consumer fees must be included in the advertised price; drip pricing is prohibited across all sectors with joint FTC/CFPB enforcement and private right of action

Every fee you are required to pay must be included in the price shown the first time you see it. Resort fees, service charges, and mandatory surcharges cannot be hidden until the end. Consumers can sue for triple the amount of any illegally hidden fee.

Any fee a consumer must pay to complete a standard transaction — including resort fees, airline seat selection fees, cable service fees, banking maintenance fees, and telecom surcharges — must be included in the advertised price at first display. Drip pricing — revealing mandatory fees only at checkout or after selection — is prohibited. The FTC and CFPB must have joint enforcement authority, each able to act independently. Consumers harmed by drip pricing must have a private right of action for damages not less than three times the unlawfully concealed fee amount, plus attorney's fees.

The FTC's 2022 Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on junk fees documented that consumers collectively pay billions annually in mandatory fees not disclosed at first price presentation. A statutory all-in pricing mandate with cross-sector scope and dual-agency enforcement closes the loophole that allows sector-specific regulatory patchwork. Airlines, hotels, cable providers, and financial institutions each currently operate under separate and inconsistently enforced disclosure regimes. Cross-reference: CNSR-FEES-0001 (hidden fee prohibition), CNSR-GENL-0002 (confusion-based business models), CNSR-CFPS-0005 (CFPB jurisdiction).

Free trials that convert to paid subscriptions must obtain explicit affirmative confirmation before initiating the first charge

If a free trial converts to a paid subscription, you must actively confirm you want to continue — after the trial ends. Charges made without that confirmation must be refunded within 5 business days.

Any product or service offered through a free trial period that converts to a paid subscription must obtain explicit affirmative confirmation from the consumer — separate from the original trial enrollment — before initiating the first charge. The confirmation must clearly state the price, billing frequency, and cancellation method. Charges initiated without explicit post-trial confirmation are unauthorized and must be refunded within 5 business days. Consumers harmed by unauthorized post-trial charges must have a private right of action for treble damages and attorney's fees.

The FTC's click-to-cancel rule (16 C.F.R. Part 425, effective 2025) addresses cancellation pathways but does not require affirmative re-confirmation at the moment of trial-to-paid conversion. Requiring a distinct affirmative confirmation — after the trial, before the charge — is the structural remedy that prevents the most common unauthorized charge mechanism. Cross-reference: CNSR-FEES-0004 (cancellation symmetry), CNSR-SUBS-0003 (automatic renewal requirements).

Service-dependent products must remain functional after service termination

If a product you bought relies on a company's online servers to work, those features must keep working even if the company shuts down its service or goes bankrupt.

When a product sold as a permanent purchase requires company-controlled servers, authentication services, or network infrastructure to function, the seller must — upon terminating those services — provide one of the following: a functional offline or standalone version, a patch removing the dependency, or the technical means (server software, protocols, cryptographic keys) for the product to continue operating independently. Failure to do so before service termination constitutes an unfair trade practice under 15 U.S.C. § 45.

Applies to all categories of connected consumer goods: video games, smart home devices, IoT appliances, vehicles, software, e-readers, and any product marketed as a "purchase" where core functionality depends on seller-operated infrastructure. Inspired by the Stop Killing Games campaign (stopkillinggames.com) and EU consumer rights discussions. Analogous obligations exist under EU Directive 2019/770 (digital content). No comparable U.S. statutory requirement currently exists.

Marketing a product as a purchase while retaining the ability to remotely destroy it is deceptive

Selling a product as a permanent purchase — using terms such as "buy," "own," or "yours forever" — while retaining technical or contractual authority to permanently render the product non-functional via server shutdown, license revocation, or remote kill switch constitutes a deceptive trade practice under the FTC Act. The FTC must promulgate rules requiring: (a) clear disclosure at point of sale if a purchase depends on ongoing seller services; (b) mandatory notice to purchasers no less than 24 months before any service termination that would impair core functionality; and (c) restitution or replacement to purchasers when service is terminated without a continuity remedy.

Current FTC guidance is insufficient — no rule explicitly addresses remote product destruction. This closes a gap that allows companies to profit from "permanent" sales while retaining effective ownership through technical control.

CPSC commissioners must be removable only for cause; statutory funding floor required; mandatory recall within 30 days of safety finding; criminal liability for knowing defect concealment

Printers, medical devices, and industrial equipment cannot use software or embedded chips to block you from using compatible, less expensive supplies — such as third-party ink cartridges or generic replacement parts.

Consumer Product Safety Commission commissioners must be removable only for cause — neglect of duty, malfeasance in office, or criminal conviction — and may not be removed based on policy disagreement or enforcement priorities. Congress must establish a statutory funding floor for the CPSC that may not be reduced by executive impoundment or continuing resolution. Upon a finding that a product presents a substantial product hazard under 15 U.S.C. § 2064, the CPSC must issue a mandatory recall order within 30 days. Knowing concealment of a product defect that poses a risk of death or serious bodily injury by a manufacturer, distributor, or retailer constitutes a federal felony. Consumers injured by a knowingly concealed defect must have a private right of action for punitive damages in addition to actual damages.

The CPSC has multi-member commission structure with for-cause removal protections under 15 U.S.C. § 2053(a); codifying those protections with explicit statutory language insulates them from administrative erosion analogous to what occurred at the CFPB. The criminal concealment provision is modeled on the pattern of delayed defect disclosure documented in the Takata airbag (2.5-year concealment of rupture risk)^[11] and GM ignition switch enforcement actions. Cross-reference: CNSR-CFPS-0004 (independent commission structure), CNSR-CFPS-0002 (agency dismantlement prohibition).

All consumer products must disclose chemical ingredients including fragrance compounds; no trade secret exemption for health-relevant chemicals; public federal database required

Using supply restrictions to create artificial shortages or inflate prices for consumables is prohibited as anticompetitive. Markets for supplies must remain open to competition.

Manufacturers of consumer products — including personal care products, cleaning products, household goods, and children's products — must disclose all chemical ingredients on product packaging and in a publicly accessible, searchable federal database administered by the EPA. No trade secret exemption may conceal any chemical whose presence is relevant to consumer health, including fragrance compound constituents and preservatives. The database must identify each chemical by name and CAS number and must be updated within 90 days of any formulation change. The EPA and CPSC must have joint enforcement authority. Consumers harmed by undisclosed chemical exposure must have a private right of action for actual damages.

The Fair Packaging and Labeling Act and Federal Hazardous Substances Act require some labeling but neither requires disclosure of fragrance compound constituents — a gap that allows hundreds of chemical identities to remain hidden behind the generic label "fragrance." The EU's Regulation (EC) No. 1223/2009 requires disclosure of fragrance allergens at prescribed concentrations. Children's products warrant prioritized implementation given developmental vulnerability to chemical exposure during critical periods. Cross-reference: CNSR-CNSS-0001, CNSR-CNSS-0002.

Software and firmware end-of-life must not strand working products

When a manufacturer or publisher ends support for software, firmware, or digital services that a sold product depends on, they must release — at minimum — all components necessary for the product to continue functioning under user or community control: this includes server software, cryptographic signing keys, authentication bypass patches, or equivalent technical means. Source code release is required when it is the only practical way to preserve continued functionality. This obligation applies regardless of commercial rationale or IP licensing concerns, and may not be waived by end-user license agreement.

Complements CNSR-OWNS-0003. Addresses the full lifecycle problem: not just at-termination notice, but a substantive technical obligation to leave products in a self-sufficient state. Analogous to the right of access to repair documentation — extended to the digital continuity context. No U.S. statutory equivalent currently exists. EU Digital Content Directive (2019/770) provides partial precedent.

Credit bureaus bear the burden of proof in consumer disputes; verified errors must be corrected within 30 days; private right of action for willful failures

When you dispute an error on your credit report, the credit bureau must prove the information is correct — it is not your job to prove it wrong. Verified errors must be fixed within 30 days.

When a consumer disputes the accuracy of information in their credit report, the credit reporting agency bears the burden of affirmatively verifying the accuracy of the disputed data with the original furnisher; the consumer does not bear the burden of disproving accuracy. Bureaus must conduct genuine, substantive investigations — not merely procedural forwarding of disputes to furnishers — and must correct or delete unverified information within 30 days. Consumers who suffer harm from a bureau's willful failure to investigate, correct, or delete inaccurate data must have a private right of action for actual damages, statutory damages of $1,000 to $5,000 per willful violation, and reasonable attorney's fees.

The Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. § 1681i) requires reinvestigation of disputed information but places the practical burden on consumers. The CFPB's Supervisory Highlights have repeatedly documented that bureau investigations are often procedural — forwarding disputes to furnishers and accepting their responses without independent verification. Shifting the burden of proof is the structural remedy: it makes accuracy the legal standard, not process compliance. Cross-reference: CNSR-CRDS-0001 (accuracy requirement baseline).

Credit scores and credit history may not be used in employment or housing decisions without a demonstrated specific nexus to the role or tenancy

Employers and landlords cannot use your credit score against you unless there is a specific, documented reason it is relevant to the job or rental. General credit checks for unrelated purposes are prohibited.

Consumer credit scores, credit reports, and credit history may not be used as a factor in hiring, promotion, or housing tenancy decisions unless the employer or landlord demonstrates a specific, documented nexus between the applicant's credit history and the duties or financial risks of the specific position or tenancy. General financial responsibility screening without documented nexus is prohibited. Employers and landlords who violate this prohibition are liable for actual damages, and the affected consumer must have a private right of action with a rebuttable presumption of disparate impact where credit use produces racially disparate outcomes.

Credit score use in employment and housing systematically disadvantages individuals who have experienced medical debt, job loss, or other structural economic disruptions, with disproportionate impact on communities of color. Multiple states including California, Colorado, and Washington already limit credit checks in employment. The nexus requirement is modeled on EEOC guidance applying the business-necessity standard from Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), to background screening. Cross-reference: CNSR-CRDS-0001, CNSR-ALGO-0001 (algorithmic discrimination).

Medical debt collection must be suspended while a patient's bill appeal or financial assistance application is pending

If you are appealing a medical bill or applying for financial assistance from a hospital, debt collection on that bill must pause while the process is underway.

No healthcare provider, hospital system, or medical debt collector may initiate or continue collection activity — including credit reporting, debt collection contacts, lawsuits, or wage garnishment — while the patient has a pending appeal of the underlying bill or a pending financial assistance (charity care) application with the provider. Suspension must continue until a final determination is issued and the patient has been notified of the outcome and applicable appeal rights. Violations constitute unfair debt collection practices under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.) and give rise to a private right of action for actual damages plus $1,000 statutory damages per violation.

Medical billing errors are pervasive, and collection during an active dispute or assistance application forces patients to choose between protecting their credit and contesting potentially erroneous charges. The CFPB's 2024 medical debt credit reporting rule addressed removal of medical debt from credit reports but did not establish a collection-suspension period during active dispute or assistance review. This fills that structural gap by statute. Cross-reference: CNSR-CRDS-0002 (medical debt credit reporting ban).

Medical debt must be fully dischargeable in bankruptcy without means testing or heightened burden

Medical debt can be eliminated through bankruptcy without extra hurdles or special requirements. Overwhelming medical bills should not be a permanent financial sentence.

Medical debt must be categorically dischargeable in bankruptcy and may not be subject to the means test under 11 U.S.C. § 707(b), any heightened evidentiary burden, or any presumption of non-dischargeability applicable to other consumer debt. Bankruptcy courts may not treat the incurrence of medical debt from necessary medical treatment as evidence of imprudent financial management for purposes of Chapter 7 discharge eligibility or Chapter 13 repayment plan assessment. Medical necessity is a complete defense to any non-dischargeability objection based on spending conduct.

Medical debt is among the leading causes of personal bankruptcy filings in the United States. Unlike discretionary consumer debt, medical debt is incurred under conditions of necessity with little price transparency at the point of service and is frequently the result of insurance coverage gaps the patient could not have anticipated. The current means test under § 707(b) does not distinguish voluntary from involuntary debt obligations. This rule aligns law with the equitable principle that discharge relief should not be harder to obtain for those who had the least control over their debts. Cross-reference: CNSR-CRDS-0002, CNSR-CRDS-0006.

The FTC must establish a one-stop federal data broker opt-out registry; brokers must honor requests within 72 hours; $1,000 minimum civil penalty per violation; private right of action

The FTC must create a single registry where you can opt out of all data broker activity at once. Brokers must comply within 72 hours, and violations cost at least $1,000 per occurrence — with a private right to sue.

The FTC must establish and operate a federal data broker opt-out registry through which consumers may, in a single online submission, exercise their right to opt out of the compilation, sale, and sharing of their personal data by all registered brokers. Registered data brokers must honor opt-out requests submitted through the registry within 72 hours of submission. Each failure to honor a timely registry opt-out constitutes a separate violation subject to civil penalties of not less than $1,000 per consumer per broker per day of non-compliance. Consumers must have a private right of action to enforce their registry opt-out rights, with the right to seek actual damages, statutory damages, and attorney's fees in federal court.

The current patchwork of state opt-out mechanisms requires consumers to submit individual opt-out requests to hundreds of registered data brokers, making meaningful opt-out practically inaccessible for most people. A centralized federal registry, analogous to the National Do Not Call Registry (15 U.S.C. § 6151 et seq.), makes the right to opt out genuinely exercisable rather than nominally available.^[2] Cross-reference: CNSR-DBRS-0001 (broker registration and disclosure), CNSR-DBRS-0002 (prohibited data uses).

Consumers subject to adverse algorithmic decisions must receive a human-reviewable explanation; adverse decisions based solely on opaque black-box outputs are prohibited

If an automated system makes a decision that harms you — like denying a loan or raising your rate — you must be able to get a human explanation of why. Purely opaque, unexplainable algorithmic decisions are prohibited.

When an algorithmic system — including machine learning models, automated underwriting systems, credit scoring models, employment screening tools, or insurance pricing algorithms — produces an adverse decision affecting a consumer's access to credit, insurance, employment, housing, or other significant consumer benefits, the consumer must receive a plain-language explanation of the principal factors that produced the adverse outcome, sufficient for a human reviewer to evaluate its accuracy and legitimacy. Adverse decisions based solely on algorithmic outputs that cannot be explained in human-reviewable terms are prohibited. The decision-maker must designate a process for human review of contested algorithmic adverse decisions. Violations constitute unfair or deceptive acts or practices under 15 U.S.C. § 45 and give rise to a private right of action for actual damages, statutory damages of $500 per violation, and attorney's fees.

The Equal Credit Opportunity Act (15 U.S.C. § 1691 et seq.) requires adverse action notices with "principal reasons" for credit denial, but this requirement was designed for human underwriters and is inadequately enforced against algorithmic systems operating on hundreds of simultaneous factors. The EU General Data Protection Regulation Article 22 establishes a right not to be subject to solely automated decisions of significant effect and a right to obtain human review. No equivalent U.S. statutory right exists with comparable specificity. Cross-reference: CNSR-ALGO-0001, CNSR-ALGO-0002, CNSR-CRDS-0004 (credit dispute burden of proof).

Pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clauses and class action waivers are banned in consumer contracts, employment agreements, civil rights claims, and antitrust claims

When you sign a contract with a company, they cannot bury a clause that strips your right to sue them or join a class action. Pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clauses in consumer contracts and employment agreements are banned.

Pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clauses and class action waivers are void and unenforceable in the following contexts: (1) consumer contracts for goods, services, or financial products; (2) employment agreements, including agreements with independent contractors; (3) civil rights claims arising under Title VII, the ADA, the ADEA, the Fair Housing Act, or comparable civil rights statutes; (4) federal antitrust claims. Parties may voluntarily agree to arbitrate after a dispute has arisen, with full knowledge of the specific claim. Federal Arbitration Act preemption of state laws restricting such clauses in these contexts is abrogated by statute. Criminal penalties apply to corporate officers who coerce workers into signing pre-dispute arbitration agreements as a condition of employment or continued employment.

AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) and American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 570 U.S. 228 (2013) interpreted the FAA to preempt state-law limits on class action waivers, even where individual arbitration was economically irrational. The Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act, Pub. L. No. 117-90 (2022), established that Congress can selectively abrogate FAA preemption for specified claim types — the model this proposal extends to consumer, employment, civil rights, and antitrust contexts. The CFPB's 2017 arbitration rule (82 Fed. Reg. 33,210) was overridden under the Congressional Review Act, confirming that statutory action rather than rulemaking is the durable vehicle. Cross-reference: CNSR-GENL-0004 (adhesion contracts), CNSR-GENL-0005 (arbitration restriction baseline), CNSR-ARBT-0002.

Arbitration awards in consumer and employment disputes must be publicly reported to the CFPB; win rates and repeat-player data must be disclosed

If a company uses arbitration to resolve disputes, it must be clearly explained, genuinely voluntary, and conducted by a neutral arbitrator — not one hand-picked by the company. Outcomes must be published.

Any arbitration proceeding arising from a consumer contract or employment agreement — regardless of any confidentiality provision in the arbitration agreement — must result in a case report filed with the CFPB containing: the identity of the business party, the outcome (consumer/employee prevailed, business prevailed, or settled), the damages amount if awarded, the arbitration provider, and whether the business was a repeat participant before the same arbitrator. The CFPB must publish aggregate and case-level data in a searchable public database updated quarterly. Confidentiality agreements may not prohibit consumers or employees from disclosing that arbitration occurred or its outcome to a government agency. Failure to file a required case report constitutes a civil violation subject to penalties of $10,000 per unreported case.

The CFPB's 2015 arbitration study (mandated by Dodd-Frank § 1028) found that repeat-player businesses had significantly higher win rates than first-time parties before the same arbitrators, suggesting that the repeat-player dynamic structurally advantages businesses that use the same arbitrators in multiple cases. California requires arbitration outcome reporting under Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.826; no federal equivalent exists. Mandatory public reporting exposes systemic bias, deters forum manipulation, and enables consumers to assess whether arbitration is genuinely neutral. Cross-reference: CNSR-ARBT-0001, CNSR-GENL-0005 (arbitration restriction baseline).

Loans with annual percentage rates above defined thresholds must be prohibited or rate-capped

Loans with interest rates above a set ceiling — including all fees — are prohibited or must be rate-capped. High-cost predatory loans that trap people in debt are banned.

Consumer loans with annual percentage rates exceeding defined usury thresholds must be prohibited or subject to rate caps that prevent predatory extraction. The calculation of APR must include all fees, charges, and roll-over costs to prevent structuring that obscures the true cost of credit.

Payday loans routinely carry APRs of 300–400%.^[14] Installment loans targeting subprime borrowers average 100%+ APR. The Military Lending Act (10 U.S.C. § 987) caps credit to active-duty service members at 36% APR, demonstrating that a federal rate cap is constitutionally and commercially viable. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has found that payday loan debt traps—where borrowers cannot repay the balloon principal and repeatedly roll over loans—are the intended business model, not a byproduct. States with 36% APR caps show lower rates of payday lending without significant reduction in credit availability for qualified borrowers. Cross-reference: CON-GEN-005 (exploitative terms), HOU-FIN-001 (mortgage predatory lending).

Repeated loan rollovers that trap borrowers in debt cycles are prohibited

Lenders cannot keep rolling a loan over repeatedly, trapping you in a cycle where you can never pay down what you owe. Debt traps through repeated rollovers are prohibited.

Lenders may not repeatedly refinance or roll over short-term high-cost loans in ways that extend indebtedness beyond a defined maximum period or result in the borrower paying more in fees and interest than the principal borrowed. Lenders must assess borrowers' ability to repay in full before issuing high-cost credit.

The debt trap model is structural: payday lenders profit when borrowers cannot repay the full balloon payment and must refinance, incurring a new fee. A $300 loan rolled over ten times generates $300 in fees on $300 in principal. The CFPB's 2017 payday lending rule required ability-to-repay assessments and rollovers limits; the rule was gutted in 2020 before taking effect and has been subject to ongoing litigation. The platform's position is that the ability-to-repay requirement and rollover limit must be enacted by statute to prevent regulatory erosion. Cross-reference: CON-PDL-001 (rate caps), CON-GEN-001 (exploitative practices).

Lenders targeting financially vulnerable communities face enhanced enforcement and mandatory restitution

When financial companies target economically vulnerable communities with predatory products, they face increased enforcement scrutiny and must pay back the consumers they harmed.

Lenders who demonstrably target marketing, product design, or distribution toward communities of color, low-income communities, or other financially vulnerable populations with high-cost or deceptive credit products must face enhanced enforcement scrutiny, and consumers harmed by predatory targeting must have a private right of action for restitution.

Predatory lending has historically been geographically and demographically targeted: payday lending storefronts are disproportionately concentrated in Black and Latino communities; subprime mortgage products were marketed to communities of color even when borrowers qualified for prime loans (documented extensively in litigation following the 2008 financial crisis). The disparate geographic and demographic concentration of harmful financial products is evidence of predatory targeting, and the legal framework must treat it as such. Cross-reference: CON-PDL-001, CON-PDL-002, CON-ENF (enforcement).

Federal 36% APR usury cap on all consumer loans; no bank partnership or rent-a-bank exemptions; state anti-usury laws preserved

Consumer loans are capped at 36% annual interest, including all fees. Lenders cannot use bank partnership arrangements to dodge this cap, and states can set stricter limits.

All consumer loans — regardless of lender charter type, licensing structure, or origination arrangement — are subject to a federal usury cap of 36% APR, calculated to include all fees, finance charges, points, and rollover costs. Bank partnership or "rent-a-bank" arrangements in which a non-bank lender uses a bank as nominal originator to claim federal preemption of state usury laws are prohibited; the entity that sets loan terms, bears credit risk, and receives the predominant economic interest is the effective lender subject to the rate cap. State usury laws that provide greater protection than the 36% cap are preserved and may not be preempted. Criminal penalties apply to entities that systematically exceed the cap. Borrowers who pay interest at rates in excess of the cap must have a private right of action for restitution of all amounts paid above the cap plus treble damages.

The Military Lending Act (10 U.S.C. § 987) already establishes a 36% rate cap for active-duty service members, demonstrating that a federal usury cap is constitutionally and commercially viable. The "rent-a-bank" evasion model exploits the interest-exportation doctrine of Marquette National Bank v. First of Omaha Service Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978). The Veterans and Consumers Fair Credit Act, introduced in multiple Congresses, addresses this evasion mechanism by applying the cap to all lenders regardless of nominal originator. Cross-reference: CNSR-PDLS-0001 (rate cap baseline), CNSR-PDLS-0002 (rollover prohibition).

Student loan servicers must meet statutory standards of care; mandatory income-driven repayment enrollment for distressed borrowers; servicer liable for misrouted payments and incorrect denials; private right of action

Companies that manage student loan repayment must follow legal standards to protect borrowers, including helping distressed borrowers enroll in income-driven repayment. Servicers who misroute payments or wrongly deny relief can be sued.

Student loan servicers must comply with statutory standards including: accurate allocation of payments to principal, interest, and fees as directed by the borrower; mandatory income-driven repayment enrollment for borrowers who contact the servicer during financial hardship and meet eligibility requirements; prompt certification of Public Service Loan Forgiveness qualifying payments; written notice of all available repayment options before placing a borrower in delinquency or default. Servicers that misroute payments, incorrectly deny income-driven repayment enrollment, or fail to correctly certify PSLF-qualifying payments are liable for resulting financial harm to the borrower, including increased principal, capitalized interest, and credit damage attributable to the error. Borrowers harmed by servicer violations must have a private right of action for actual damages, attorney's fees, and remediation of servicer-induced credit damage.

The CFPB's student loan servicing reports have documented systematic servicer failures including miscounting income-driven repayment qualifying payments, misrouting payments, and failing to inform borrowers of income-driven options during hardship contacts. Department of Education servicer contracts are administrative vehicles that do not provide borrowers enforceable rights as third-party beneficiaries; a statutory cause of action closes this enforcement gap. Cross-reference: CNSR-PDLS-0001, CNSR-CFPS-0003 (private right of action baseline).

Reverse mortgage borrowers must receive independent counseling before origination; steering to proprietary products is prohibited; non-recourse protection codified by statute

Before taking out a reverse mortgage — a loan that draws on your home's value — you must receive independent counseling. Lenders cannot steer you toward their own products, and your heirs are protected from owing more than the home is worth.

No lender may originate any reverse mortgage product — including proprietary products not insured by FHA — without first providing the prospective borrower with independent counseling from a HUD-approved housing counselor who has no financial relationship with the originating lender or any affiliated party. Steering a prospective reverse mortgage borrower toward a proprietary reverse mortgage when an FHA-insured Home Equity Conversion Mortgage would better serve the borrower's interests is prohibited and constitutes an unfair and deceptive act or practice. The non-recourse nature of reverse mortgages — under which neither the borrower nor their heirs may owe more than the home's fair market value at time of repayment — must be codified by statute and may not be modified by lender contract. Violations of the anti-steering requirement give rise to a private right of action.

FHA's HECM program requires HUD-approved counseling under 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-20(d), but proprietary reverse mortgage products outside FHA have proliferated without equivalent consumer protections. Reverse mortgages are disproportionately marketed to older homeowners with significant home equity — a profile that creates acute vulnerability to product misrepresentation. The non-recourse guarantee is fundamental to the product's value proposition; lenders who use contract terms to circumvent it are misrepresenting the product's core feature. Cross-reference: CNSR-PDLS-0001 (rate and term protections).

Buy-now-pay-later products are consumer credit subject to TILA and ECOA; mandatory APR disclosure required; no debt collection while a consumer dispute is pending

'Buy now, pay later' services are subject to the same consumer protection rules as credit cards — they must disclose the true cost in APR terms and cannot collect debt while a consumer dispute is pending.

Buy-now-pay-later products — including pay-in-four, deferred-payment, and point-of-sale installment credit products — constitute consumer credit subject to the Truth in Lending Act (15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq.) and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (15 U.S.C. § 1691 et seq.) without exception based on product structure, term length, or number of payments. BNPL lenders must disclose the effective annual percentage rate of the product — including all fees — in TILA-compliant format before the consumer completes the purchase transaction. No BNPL lender may initiate or continue debt collection activity on a disputed transaction while a consumer dispute is pending resolution. TILA and ECOA violations by BNPL lenders give rise to private rights of action under the applicable statutes, including class action rights.

BNPL products proliferated partly by structuring payments as installment loans to avoid TILA's open-end credit disclosure requirements. The CFPB's 2022 BNPL market monitoring report found that BNPL users skew toward younger, lower-income, and financially fragile populations. The CFPB issued interpretive guidance in 2024 indicating BNPL lenders are card issuers under TILA, but interpretive letters are less durable than statutory mandates and are easily reversed by a subsequent administration. Cross-reference: CNSR-PDLS-0001 (usury cap), CNSR-CFPS-0005 (CFPB jurisdiction expansion).

The CFPB must maintain independent funding and enforcement authority free of appropriations-based interference

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) — the agency that investigates banks and financial companies that harm consumers — must have independent funding so it cannot be defunded by Congress at industry's request.

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau must be funded by a mechanism that insulates it from congressional appropriations-based defunding, and its enforcement authority must not be subject to subordination to or override by other financial regulatory bodies whose institutional interests are aligned with the industries they regulate. The CFPB's funding structure, upheld in CFPB v. Community Financial Services Association (2024), must be preserved and may not be undermined through indirect administrative action.

The CFPB's funding via Federal Reserve earnings (rather than congressional appropriations) was specifically designed to prevent appropriations riders from defunding the agency. The Supreme Court upheld this structure in CFPB v. Community Financial Services Association of America, 601 U.S. 416 (2024). Administrative attempts to reduce CFPB staffing, defund operations, or transfer functions to less independent bodies circumvent the structural independence Congress intended. The platform's position is that the CFPB's independence must be protected by statute against administrative circumvention, not merely by favorable court precedent that could be distinguished in future litigation. Cross-reference: CON-ENF (enforcement), CON-GEN (general consumer protection).

Consumer financial protection enforcement may not be effectively dismantled through administrative action alone

The CFPB must be able to investigate any financial company, no matter what charter or label they use to describe themselves. No company should escape oversight by calling itself something other than a bank.

Significant reductions in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau enforcement capacity, including staff reductions, withdrawal of pending rulemaking, suspension of supervisory examinations, or voluntary dismissal of enforcement actions, that effectively eliminate the agency's statutory functions must require affirmative statutory authorization from Congress, not merely executive or administrative direction.

An agency's statutory mandate can be nullified in practice without formal abolition: firing staff, halting examinations, settling or dropping pending enforcement actions, and refusing to issue rules the statute commands. This rule establishes the principle that administrative action cannot effectively repeal statutory consumer protection obligations—that significant diminution of consumer financial protection capacity requires Congressional action. Cross-reference: CON-CFP-001, CON-ENF (enforcement authority).

Consumers must have a private right of action to enforce consumer financial protection rights when agencies fail to act

When the CFPB catches a company breaking the law, the people who were harmed must be paid back — not just the company fined. Enforcement must include real restitution to real consumers.

Consumers harmed by violations of federal consumer financial protection laws must have a private right of action to enforce those laws individually and through class actions, so that consumer protection does not depend entirely on agency enforcement resources or political will.

Federal consumer financial protection law is largely enforced by agencies, not by private litigants. When agency enforcement is reduced or suspended through political action, consumers have limited ability to enforce their own statutory rights. A private right of action for consumers—comparable to those in the Fair Housing Act, Equal Credit Opportunity Act, and Fair Debt Collection Practices Act—creates an enforcement floor that survives agency underfunding. Cross-reference: CON-CFP-001, CON-ENF (enforcement), CON-GEN-004 (right of action).

The CFPB must be restructured as a five-member bipartisan commission to eliminate the constitutional vulnerability created by Seila Law

The CFPB must supervise large nonbank financial companies — including app-based lenders, payday lenders, and buy-now-pay-later services. Being a tech company does not exempt you from financial consumer protection.

Seila Law LLC v. CFPB (591 U.S. 197, 2020) held that the CFPB's single-director structure with for-cause removal protection violated Article II's vesting of executive power in the President.^[1] The operative consequence is structural: a hostile President may remove the CFPB Director for any reason — or no reason — and install a replacement who suspends enforcement, freezes rulemaking, or staffs the agency into dysfunction. This is exactly what occurred in early 2025, when the Trump administration dismissed the sitting Director, installed a temporary replacement who halted enforcement actions, and initiated staff reductions that effectively suspended the agency's statutory consumer protection functions. No litigation strategy can reliably prevent recurrence while the single-director structure persists — the constitutional vulnerability is in the design, not the personnel.

Congress must restructure the CFPB as a five-member bipartisan commission. The constitutional basis is settled: Humphrey's Executor v. United States (295 U.S. 602, 1935) upheld for-cause removal protection for multi-member independent regulatory commissions, and Seila Law itself explicitly reaffirmed that Humphrey's Executor remains good law for such commissions.^[2] A five-member CFPB Commission — no more than three members from the same party, staggered five-year terms, Senate confirmation required for each member, removal only for neglect of duty, malfeasance in office, or conviction of a felony — provides both constitutional durability and operational resilience against politically motivated decapitation. The CFPB's Federal Reserve earnings funding mechanism — upheld in CFPB v. Community Financial Services Association of America (601 U.S. 416, 2024) as consistent with the Appropriations Clause^[3] — must be preserved in any restructuring legislation. Congressional legislation is the required vehicle; executive action cannot create the constitutional protection that only a statutory multi-member commission structure provides. Structural design, not executive restraint, is the durable protection for independent consumer financial enforcement.

1. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. 197 (2020). https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/591/197/ ↩
2. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/295/602/ ↩
3. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Community Financial Services Association of America, 601 U.S. 416 (2024). https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/601/416/ ↩

CFPB jurisdiction must be expanded to cover all consumer financial product providers regardless of charter type, and enforcement authority strengthened to match the modern marketplace

Consumer complaints filed with the CFPB must be publicly available and broken down by demographics, geography, and product type. Transparency about who is being harmed — and how — enables accountability.

The CFPB's current jurisdiction covers banks, credit unions, payday lenders, mortgage servicers, student loan servicers, and certain non-bank financial firms designated for supervision. Large categories of financial predation fall outside this perimeter: many fintech lenders, buy-now-pay-later platforms, crypto-asset financial products marketed to retail consumers, earned wage access products structured to evade usury limits, and data brokers selling consumer financial profiles operate with limited or no CFPB oversight. The consumer financial marketplace has migrated substantially beyond the charter-based regulatory perimeter the Dodd-Frank Act established in 2010.^[1] Jurisdiction that does not follow the market cannot protect the consumers in it.

Congress must enact four targeted expansions. First, expand CFPB jurisdiction to cover all entities offering consumer financial products or services regardless of charter type or business structure. Second, grant the CFPB direct civil money penalty authority against non-bank entities comparable to its existing authority against depository institutions — the current asymmetry incentivizes regulatory arbitrage by structuring financial products outside the bank charter. Third, restore full supervisory authority over payday lenders and other non-bank financial firms that was reduced through the 2018 Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, which weakened oversight of entities with documented records of predatory consumer conduct.^[2] Fourth, make the CFPB's authority to define and prohibit "unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices" (UDAAP) explicitly applicable to discriminatory conduct by financial firms — closing the gap between UDAAP authority and fair lending law that leaves some discriminatory practices without a clear federal enforcement hook. The CFPB is the primary federal agency with consumer-facing enforcement authority in financial markets; its jurisdiction must match the scope of the market it is charged with protecting.

1. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1011, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). https://www.congress.gov/bill/111th-congress/house-bill/4173/text ↩
2. Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 115-174, 132 Stat. 1296 (2018). https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/2155/text ↩

SEC and CFTC jurisdiction over digital assets must be resolved by statute with no regulatory gap

Right now it is unclear whether the SEC or the CFTC (two different federal regulators) oversees different types of digital assets. Congress must pass a clear law to close this regulatory gap and protect consumers.

Congress must resolve the security-vs-commodity classification of digital assets by statute. Digital assets are securities if they meet the Howey test regardless of the label applied by their issuer; the CFTC has jurisdiction over digital assets that are commodities; no digital asset may evade both regulators by claiming to be neither. A dual-regulator regime with clear statutory division and no regulatory gap must be established.

The SEC and CFTC have operated under conflicting and overlapping claims of jurisdiction over digital assets for years, creating regulatory arbitrage that harms investors and enables fraud. The Howey test (SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946)) determines whether an instrument is an investment contract subject to securities law regardless of what the issuer calls it. Congress must codify this principle, assign jurisdiction cleanly between the two agencies by asset type, and eliminate the regulatory gap that allows platforms to operate without meaningful oversight from either regulator.

Stablecoin issuers must maintain 1:1 reserves in cash or Treasuries, submit to monthly independent audit, and fund FDIC-style insurance for holders

Stablecoins — digital currencies pegged to the dollar — must be backed dollar-for-dollar by actual cash or Treasury securities, audited monthly, and insured like bank deposits so consumers don't lose their money.

Any entity issuing a stablecoin pegged to fiat currency must maintain 1:1 reserves in cash or short-term U.S. Treasuries. Reserves must be bankruptcy-remote from the issuer and subject to monthly independent audit published publicly. An FDIC-style insurance fund for stablecoin holders must cover losses up to $250,000 per holder. Algorithmic stablecoins operating without full proof of reserve are prohibited.

The May 2022 collapse of the TerraUSD algorithmic stablecoin wiped out tens of billions in market value within days, demonstrating that stablecoins without full backing pose systemic risks to retail investors. The FTX collapse further illustrated that customer funds held by crypto entities are not protected by FDIC insurance or equivalent safeguards. Bankruptcy-remote reserve requirements and FDIC-style insurance create structural protections analogous to those governing bank deposits, and monthly public audit eliminates the opacity that allows misrepresentation of reserves.

All cryptocurrency exchanges serving U.S. customers must register with SEC or CFTC and maintain strict segregation of customer funds

Any cryptocurrency exchange serving U.S. customers must register with federal regulators and keep customer funds strictly separate from company funds, so your crypto is protected if the exchange collapses.

All cryptocurrency exchanges operating for U.S. customers must register with the SEC or CFTC according to the asset types they trade. Exchanges must maintain mandatory segregation of customer funds from exchange operating funds with no commingling permitted. Exchanges are liable for customer losses caused by commingling or misappropriation of customer funds. Customers must have a private right of action to recover such losses.

The FTX collapse in November 2022, in which customer funds were misappropriated through commingling with the exchange's affiliated trading firm Alameda Research, is the paradigmatic example of the harm this rule prevents. Broker-dealer registration requirements under securities law already require fund segregation; the same structural protection must apply to crypto exchanges. Criminal liability for exchange operators who commingle funds must accompany the civil private right of action.

Rug pulls, pump-and-dump schemes, and wash trading in crypto markets are federal crimes; victims must have a private right of action for treble damages

Rug pulls, pump-and-dump schemes, and wash trading in crypto markets are federal crimes. Victims can sue for triple their losses to compensate for harm and deter future fraud.

Rug pulls, pump-and-dump schemes, and wash trading in cryptocurrency markets are federal crimes carrying criminal penalties of up to 20 years imprisonment. Victims must have a private right of action to recover treble damages from perpetrators. Influencers and promoters who promote crypto assets for undisclosed compensation face SEC enforcement and personal liability for investor losses attributable to their promotion.

Crypto market manipulation is structurally identical to securities fraud, but gaps in regulatory jurisdiction allow perpetrators to escape federal criminal liability that would clearly apply in traditional securities markets. The SEC has brought enforcement actions under existing securities laws against certain crypto fraud, but statutory gaps require explicit criminal penalties specific to digital asset markets. Influencer promotion of crypto assets for undisclosed compensation is already subject to SEC disclosure requirements in some contexts; explicit statutory liability closes the enforcement gap and ensures personal liability follows undisclosed promotional conduct regardless of the asset's regulatory classification.

No taxpayer funds may be used to bail out cryptocurrency exchanges, stablecoin issuers, or digital asset platforms

The government will not use taxpayer money to bail out cryptocurrency exchanges, stablecoin issuers, or crypto platforms. Investors who take on speculative risk bear that risk themselves.

The federal government may not use taxpayer funds to bail out any cryptocurrency exchange, stablecoin issuer, or digital asset platform. No FDIC insurance, Federal Reserve emergency lending facilities, or Treasury backstop may be extended to crypto entities. Losses from crypto enterprise failures must be borne by investors and creditors only, with no recourse to public funds.

The structural position of this platform is that cryptocurrency markets may operate under robust consumer protection rules, but without the public backstops extended to systemically important financial institutions. The systemic risk justification for bank bailouts — that bank failures threaten the payment system and the broader economy — does not apply to crypto entities whose assets are speculative by nature and whose operations are not essential to the payment infrastructure. Allowing crypto entities access to public bailout mechanisms socializes losses while privatizing gains, creating moral hazard that incentivizes reckless risk-taking at taxpayer expense.

Proof-of-work cryptocurrency miners above 1 MW must register with EPA and DOE, disclose energy consumption, and are ineligible for federal energy subsidies

Large cryptocurrency mining operations must register with the EPA and Department of Energy, disclose how much energy they consume, and are not eligible for federal energy subsidies.

Cryptocurrency miners consuming more than 1 MW annually must register with the EPA and DOE and publicly disclose annual energy consumption, source mix, and carbon footprint. Mining operations in regions experiencing grid stress are subject to curtailment orders from grid operators. Proof-of-work mining may not receive federal energy subsidies.

Bitcoin proof-of-work mining consumes electricity on the scale of medium-sized countries, with substantial environmental impacts from carbon-intensive generation. This consumption is not incidental — it is the fundamental mechanism of proof-of-work consensus. Grid stress effects have been documented in Texas and other states where mining operations expanded rapidly, displacing residential and industrial load. Mandatory registration and disclosure create the data foundation for energy and climate policy to account for this sector; curtailment authority allows grid operators to manage reliability without permanently prohibiting the activity.

Contracts on the outcome of elections are absolutely prohibited on any CFTC-regulated prediction market

Placing financial bets on the outcomes of elections is absolutely prohibited on any federally regulated prediction market. Election integrity cannot be subjected to financial speculation.

No CFTC-regulated prediction market may offer contracts on the outcome of any federal, state, or local election. Election outcome contracts create direct financial incentives to manipulate democratic processes and are banned absolutely. Offering or trading election outcome contracts on any U.S.-accessible platform, regardless of domicile, is a federal crime. No regulatory waiver, exemption, or no-action letter may authorize election outcome contracts.

The CFTC's 2023 consideration of Kalshi's election contracts illustrated that the agency's existing framework is insufficient to categorically prohibit instruments that directly commodify democratic outcomes. Financial incentives structured around election results create incentives for manipulation of those results through any means available. The absolute character of this prohibition is intentional: there is no version of election-outcome betting that is compatible with a democracy where the integrity of electoral processes cannot be influenced by financial gain. The ban applies regardless of platform domicile because U.S. democratic processes are the protected interest, not the location of the trading venue.

All event contract markets serving U.S. customers must register as Designated Contract Markets under CFTC with retail position limits and leverage caps

Online platforms where you bet on real-world events — like who will win an election or how a company will perform — must be regulated as financial products, with full consumer protections.

All event contract markets — including Polymarket, Kalshi, and similar platforms — operating for U.S. customers must register as Designated Contract Markets under the Commodity Exchange Act. Mandatory position limits must apply to retail traders. Leverage for retail traders may not exceed 2:1. Platforms must publicly disclose market concentration and large-trader position data.

Prediction markets have expanded rapidly into retail consumer contexts far removed from their original function as professional price-discovery mechanisms. Registration as a Designated Contract Market under CFTC oversight creates accountability for market integrity, manipulation prevention, and consumer protection analogous to requirements on traditional commodity exchanges. Position limits and leverage caps protect retail participants from the outsized losses that unregulated leverage enables, consistent with consumer protection standards applied to other retail financial products.

Coordinated manipulation of prediction market prices is a federal crime; harmed traders must have a private right of action

Platforms that run prediction markets must tell users that the platform itself sets the odds, what fees are charged, and what financial risks they are taking. Transparency is required.

Coordinated trading to manipulate prediction market prices for political, financial, or reputational gain is a federal crime. The CFTC must investigate manipulation cases and refer them to DOJ for criminal prosecution. Harmed traders must have a private right of action against manipulators with recovery of actual damages and attorneys' fees.

Prediction markets concentrated in a small number of hands are susceptible to manipulation by well-funded actors seeking to use price signals as propaganda tools — creating the false impression of consensus in markets that claim epistemic authority. The CFTC already has authority to prosecute manipulation in commodity markets; this rule extends that authority explicitly to event contract markets and ensures a private enforcement backstop, consistent with the platform's broader commitment to private rights of action on all enforcement positions.

Unregulated skill game terminals in non-licensed establishments are prohibited; permitting states must impose a minimum licensing and consumer protection floor

Slot-machine-style 'skill game' terminals cannot operate unlicensed in gas stations, bars, and convenience stores. States that allow them must set a minimum age, require problem gambling disclosures, and impose per-session loss limits.

Unregulated "skill game" terminals — including video poker, slots, and similar devices marketed as skill games to evade gaming regulations — in non-licensed gambling establishments are prohibited. Any state permitting such terminals must require: state gaming commission licensing, age verification with a minimum age of 21, mandatory per-session loss limits of no more than $50, addiction counseling disclosures on each terminal, and prohibition of terminal placement within 500 feet of schools or houses of worship.

So-called skill game terminals have proliferated in gas stations, convenience stores, bars, and other unlicensed venues in states with permissive or ambiguous gaming laws. These terminals are functionally indistinguishable from slot machines but are marketed as skill games to evade gaming regulations. Placement in everyday commercial settings normalizes gambling and provides access to vulnerable populations — including those in acute financial distress — without the consumer protections that licensed casinos are required to provide. The floor established here mirrors minimum standards already adopted in several state gaming frameworks and is narrowly tailored to address the specific harms of unlicensed placement.

Gaming terminals may not be placed in businesses that primarily serve minors; gambling advertising may not target persons under 21; loyalty programs may not reward gambling activity

Gambling terminals cannot be placed in businesses where minors are the primary customers. Gambling ads cannot target people under 21, and loyalty programs cannot reward gambling activity.

No gaming terminal of any kind may be placed in a business where minors are the primary customer base. No gambling advertising may target persons under 21. No loyalty program may offer benefits tied to gambling activity. Violations are subject to civil penalties and licensing revocation.

Placement of gambling infrastructure in environments that primarily serve minors — including arcades, movie theaters, and family entertainment venues — introduces gambling as a normalized activity at developmental stages when addiction vulnerability is highest. Loyalty programs that reward gambling frequency function as behavioral conditioning mechanisms that amplify addictive tendencies. This rule establishes structural placement and marketing limits rather than relying solely on age verification at the point of use, because structural remedies are more durable and less susceptible to circumvention than conduct-based controls.

All federally permitted online sports betting must include deposit limits, cooling-off periods, a national self-exclusion registry, and ban algorithmic targeting of problem gamblers; private right of action for violations

All legal online sports betting must offer deposit limits, cooling-off periods, and a national self-exclusion registry. Platforms that use algorithms to target known problem gamblers face civil and criminal liability.

All federally permitted online sports betting must include mandatory deposit limits set by the user at account creation, cooling-off periods before limit increases take effect, enrollment in a national self-exclusion registry, and addiction resource disclosure on every betting interface. Algorithmic personalization of gambling offers to individuals enrolled in the national self-exclusion registry or who have requested self-exclusion is prohibited. Sports betting operators that target personalized gambling offers to known problem gamblers must face civil liability. Individuals harmed by targeted offers made after self-exclusion must have a private right of action.

The rapid expansion of legal online sports betting following Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 584 U.S. 453 (2018), brought aggressive digital marketing and algorithmic personalization to gambling in ways that existing state consumer protection frameworks were not designed to address. Operators use behavioral data to identify individuals exhibiting problem gambling patterns and target them with intensified promotional offers — the structural opposite of responsible gambling policy. A national self-exclusion registry prevents the cross-jurisdiction arbitrage that defeats state-level self-exclusion programs. Private right of action for targeted offers after self-exclusion creates a meaningful enforcement mechanism that does not depend on underfunded state gaming commission resources.

Student Loans Must Be Dischargeable in Bankruptcy

Student loan debt can be eliminated through bankruptcy, just like credit card debt or medical bills. Current law makes student loans nearly impossible to discharge, trapping people in debt even after financial ruin.

Student loans — both federal and private — must be dischargeable in bankruptcy under the standard undue hardship showing; the burden of proof shifts to the lender to demonstrate that the borrower has adequate current and reasonably foreseeable income to repay the loan without undue hardship. Borrowers who have been in repayment for 7 or more years are entitled to a rebuttable presumption of undue hardship. The "certainty of hopelessness" standard from Brunner v. New York State Higher Education Services Corp. (1987) is hereby superseded; courts must apply a totality-of-circumstances analysis weighing current income, future earning capacity, and the borrower's good faith efforts to repay.

The 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act made private student loans nearly impossible to discharge. An estimated 45 million Americans hold $1.7 trillion in student debt.

Bankruptcy Filing Fees Waived for Low-Income Filers; Nonprofit Counseling Only

If medical bills have pushed you to financial collapse, you can wipe them out through bankruptcy without a waiting period or extra legal hurdles. Getting sick should not permanently destroy your financial future.

Federal bankruptcy court filing fees must be waived entirely for individuals with household income at or below 200% of the federal poverty level; for individuals between 200–300% FPL, fees must be reduced by 75%. The mandatory pre-filing credit counseling requirement may only be satisfied by nonprofit credit counseling agencies; for-profit credit counseling agencies are prohibited from offering bankruptcy counseling. All bankruptcy means test calculations must use actual documented living expenses rather than IRS national and local expense standards when actual expenses are higher.

The current Chapter 7 filing fee is $338. For a person in financial crisis, this creates a perverse barrier to the fresh start bankruptcy is designed to provide.

Ban on Steering Low-Income Borrowers to Higher-Cost Bankruptcy Chapters

Bankruptcy law must protect the things people need most: retirement savings, the home you live in, and the tools you use to earn a living. Dollar limits on these protections must be updated to reflect today's costs.

Bankruptcy attorneys and petition preparers may not steer clients to Chapter 13 (repayment plan) rather than Chapter 7 (discharge) on the basis of race, national origin, or zip code, where the client is eligible for Chapter 7. The DOJ Trustee Program must annually audit Chapter 13 filing rates by race and income; attorneys with statistically anomalous patterns of steering minority clients to Chapter 13 face referral for bar discipline. Clients who were improperly steered to Chapter 13 have a private right of action for damages equal to the excess fees and costs incurred.

Research shows Black filers are steered to Chapter 13 at significantly higher rates than white filers with comparable financial profiles.^[15]

Addiction Treatment Facilities Must Offer Evidence-Based Protocols

Addiction treatment centers must offer treatment approaches proven by scientific research to work, such as medication-assisted treatment. Centers cannot offer only ineffective or unproven methods.

All addiction treatment facilities that accept insurance reimbursement, including Medicaid and Medicare, must be licensed by the state and must offer at minimum one FDA-approved medication-assisted treatment (MAT) option for opioid and alcohol use disorder, or provide a documented referral to an accessible MAT provider within 24 hours of intake. Facilities may not represent themselves as providing "medically supervised" or "clinical" treatment unless a licensed physician or APRN is on staff or under contract and available within 4 hours. Facilities that operate solely on non-evidence-based modalities may not bill insurance for clinical treatment services.

Medication-assisted treatment is the evidence-based gold standard for opioid use disorder but remains unavailable at the majority of treatment facilities.

Federal Criminalization of Patient Brokering in Addiction Treatment

Paying or receiving payments to steer patients to a particular addiction treatment center — known as 'patient brokering' — is a federal crime. Profit cannot come before patient welfare.

It is a federal crime to pay or receive any remuneration — including cash, gifts, travel, or meals — in exchange for referring a patient to an addiction treatment facility, sober living home, or clinical laboratory. Violations are punishable by up to 10 years imprisonment and fines up to $200,000 per referral. Insurance fraud arising from patient brokering schemes triggers mandatory referral to federal law enforcement; the facility and the referring party are jointly and severally liable for all insurance payments made in connection with referred patients.

"Body brokering" — where recruiters earn kickbacks of $500–$2,000 per patient head — is endemic in some regional addiction treatment markets and has been linked to patient deaths from inadequate care.

Minimum Standards and Mandatory Registration for Sober Living Homes

All sober living homes — residences marketing themselves as substance-free recovery housing — must register annually with the state and meet minimum standards including: maximum occupancy of 10 unrelated residents without a group home license; functioning smoke and carbon monoxide detectors; no more than 4 residents per bedroom; written house rules provided to all residents at intake; and a non-retaliation policy for reporting health and safety concerns. Sober living homes may not condition residency on attendance at any specific 12-step or religious program. States that fail to establish registration and minimum standards lose access to SAMHSA block grant funds.