To establish progressive taxation, prevent wealth concentration from undermining democratic self-governance, support workers and small businesses, ensure economic opportunity regardless of class or circumstance, and stru
To establish progressive taxation, prevent wealth concentration from undermining democratic self-governance, support workers and small businesses, ensure economic opportunity regardless of class or circumstance, and structure the economy to distribute productivity gains broadly rather than concentrating them at the top.
Extreme wealth concentration is incompatible with democratic equality. When a small number of individuals or families control vast portions of national wealth, they gain power to shape policy, avoid accountability, and structure the economy in their favor. Taxation must be progressive, wealth-hoarding must be actively prevented, and economic policy must support labor and small enterprise rather than only large capital.
### Progressive Taxation and Anti-Hoarding - Constitutional authority for progressive taxation of wealth, inheritance, and concentrated income - Anti-wealth hoarding mechanisms (ECO-TAX-001) - Closure of tax avoidance structures and loopholes - Taxation of monopoly rents and unearned income - Land value taxation (Georgist principles) - Alignment between tax system and democratic stability
- AI worker tax / automated-labor tax for labor displacement (ECO-AUT-001)
- Subsidies and support for small business healthcare coverage (ECO-SMB-001)
- National manufacturing and industrial policy (ECO-IND-001)
- Prohibition on AI-based insurance denials without human review (ECO-INS-001)
Progressive tax reform is the fiscal backbone of healthcare, education, housing, and environmental investments — and corrects the wage/capital income imbalance.
This pillar treats progressive taxation not as a policy preference but as a constitutional-level structural requirement for democratic stability. Just as the Constitution establishes separation of powers to prevent political tyranny, it must establish progressive taxation and anti-hoarding mechanisms to prevent economic oligarchy.
The framework proposes a constitutional amendment expressly granting Congress authority to levy a direct wealth tax on extreme concentrations of accumulated assets — analogous to what the Sixteenth Amendment (1913) did for income tax, which resolved prior constitutional ambiguity by explicitly authorizing Congress to "lay and collect taxes on incomes." The recent Moore v. United States (2024) decision left the constitutional challenge to wealth taxation live and unresolved under existing doctrine. Rather than litigate around the edges of Article I's apportionment clause, this platform takes the direct path: amend the Constitution to settle the question permanently, just as the income tax question was settled in 1913. This amendment would not set specific rates — those remain statutory — but establishes beyond legal challenge that Congress has authority to tax accumulated wealth above defined thresholds at progressive rates.
This approach avoids the political pitfall of writing specific rates (like "70% for top 1%") into constitutional text, which would make the document unnecessarily rigid and politically explosive. Instead, it establishes durable norms that statutory politics can implement through specific rates and mechanisms.
The most serious mainstream economic critique of wealth taxation is associated with the work of economist George Zodrow and the broader capital mobility literature. The core argument: a direct wealth tax on accumulated assets — especially financial assets — creates strong incentives for high-wealth individuals to move assets or themselves to lower-tax jurisdictions. If capital is mobile, the effective revenue yield of a wealth tax may be substantially below the nominal rate, and the tax may cause economic distortions exceeding its fiscal benefit. Zodrow has argued that the efficiency costs of capital income taxation are high relative to alternatives, and that revenue would be better raised through consumption-based taxation. This platform takes Zodrow's work seriously while reaching a different policy conclusion for three reasons:
First, the capital flight concern, while real, is substantially overstated for the United States specifically. Unlike small open economies, the U.S. market is large enough that complete exit is rarely rational for business interests dependent on it. Second, the global minimum tax framework — the OECD/G20 Pillar Two agreement establishing a 15% global minimum corporate tax[19] — demonstrates that coordinated international action can reduce race-to-the-bottom tax competition. A robust U.S. wealth tax, paired with aggressive enforcement of expatriation taxes, exit levies on unrealized gains at renunciation of citizenship, and international information-sharing agreements, can substantially reduce the capital flight problem. The EU's directive on administrative cooperation in tax matters and the Common Reporting Standard provide existing infrastructure for this coordination. Third, the distributional and democratic harms of extreme wealth concentration — which Zodrow's efficiency framework does not fully weight — are themselves a structural economic problem. A system that cannot tax extreme wealth concentration because that wealth can evade taxation is a system that has ceded its democratic tax authority to private actors, which is unacceptable on structural governance grounds independent of revenue considerations.
The platform's capital flight countermeasures include: exit taxes on unrealized gains at renunciation of citizenship or long-term residency; mandatory disclosure of offshore accounts and beneficial ownership under strengthened FATCA rules; elimination of trust and entity structures that obscure beneficial ownership; aggressive use of the global minimum tax framework; and treaty provisions requiring partner nations to share asset ownership information. These are not perfect solutions — determined evasion at extreme wealth levels cannot be fully prevented. But the combination substantially raises the cost of evasion to the point where the revenue yield and distributional benefits outweigh the distortion costs Zodrow identifies.
As artificial intelligence and automation increasingly displace human labor, productivity gains flow primarily to capital owners rather than workers. This creates a structural problem: economic growth that once supported broad-based prosperity now concentrates wealth while eliminating jobs.
The automation tax addresses this by requiring companies that replace or materially displace human labor with AI or automation to pay a levy proportional to the displacement. Revenue from this tax supports affected workers, retraining programs, public goods, and broad-based social benefit rather than allowing productivity gains to concentrate privately.
The tax is designed to discourage labor displacement without social responsibility while encouraging automation that augments rather than replaces human work. Companies that use AI to make workers more productive without eliminating positions would not face the same tax burden as those that eliminate positions to maximize profit.
Small businesses face structural disadvantages in complying with requirements that large corporations can absorb easily—healthcare coverage, paid leave, benefits administration. This pillar establishes subsidies, carveouts, and public support to help small businesses meet social obligations without being crushed by compliance costs.
Similarly, labor rights protections can burden small employers disproportionately. The framework requires government to provide support systems—subsidized paid parental leave, healthcare coverage assistance, benefits administration help—so that social guarantees do not inadvertently privilege large corporations over small businesses.
AI systems in insurance and economic decision-making create systematic bias, deny coverage or benefits based on opaque algorithms, and remove human judgment from consequential decisions. This pillar prohibits use of AI to deny, restrict, or reduce insurance coverage without direct independent human review and accountability.
Human reviewers must exercise genuine independent judgment and cannot rubber-stamp AI recommendations. This prevents the "automation bias" where humans defer to algorithmic decisions without critical evaluation. The requirement applies across insurance domains—health, property, auto, disability—and extends to economic decisions affecting access to credit, housing, and opportunity.
Economic opportunity and compensation must not depend on protected class status. Equal pay for equal work is insufficient if hiring, promotion, and opportunity are discriminatory. This pillar requires equal economic opportunity regardless of race, gender, sexuality, religion, disability, or other protected characteristics.
This extends beyond employment discrimination law by addressing structural barriers—networking advantages, geographic concentration, cultural capital, educational access—that create de facto discrimination even when explicit discrimination is prohibited.
Every rule in this pillar, organized by policy area. Active rules are current platform commitments. Partial rules are in development. Proposed rules are planned for future inclusion.
TAXN-AUTS-0001
Proposed
Automation Tax on Labor Displacement
Companies that replace human workers with AI or automation should pay an 'AI worker tax' — a contribution to public systems that compensates for the payroll taxes and wages those workers would have paid.
Companies that replace or materially displace human labor with AI or automation should pay an AI worker tax or automated-labor tax.
Establishes taxation on labor displacement by artificial intelligence or automation systems. Tax should be proportional to the extent of displacement—not merely automation adoption, but actual reduction in human employment or hours. Applies to both AI systems (algorithms, machine learning, large language models) and physical automation (robotics, automated manufacturing). Does not tax automation that augments human productivity without displacing workers. Revenue supports affected workers, retraining, and public goods. - Measurement: Track headcount reduction, hours reduction, or wage bill reduction correlated with automation adoption - Exemptions: Automation that creates new positions or increases productivity without displacement - Phasing: Graduated implementation to allow adjustment and prevent shock - Gaming prevention: Close loopholes like offshoring automation or contractor reclassification
TAXN-AUTS-0002
Proposed
Automation Tax Revenue for Public Benefit
Revenue from AI and automation taxes should go toward supporting affected workers, funding public goods, and ensuring productivity gains are shared broadly — not just captured as corporate profit.
Revenue from AI or automated-labor taxation should be used to support workers, public goods, and broad-based social benefit rather than private concentration alone.
Directs automation tax revenue to public purposes aligned with addressing displacement effects. Specific uses must include: worker retraining and education programs, transition support for displaced workers, universal basic income or guaranteed income floor programs (see ECO-GBI), and broad-based social benefit distribution. Revenue from automation taxation is explicitly designated as a funding source for the guaranteed income floor established in ECO-GBI-001 and for the social dividend described in ECO-GBI-003. Prevents revenue from being captured by the general budget where it might subsidize further concentration rather than addressing displacement. Creates a direct, legally enforceable connection between productivity gains from automation and the public benefit obligations those gains create. Cross-reference: ECO-AUT-001 (automation tax), ECO-AUT-003 (tax structure), ECO-GBI-001 through ECO-GBI-003.
TAXN-AUTS-0003
Proposed
Structure Tax to Discourage Irresponsible Displacement
Automation taxes should be designed to discourage companies from eliminating jobs without social responsibility — and to ensure the gains from automation benefit everyone, not just shareholders.
AI or automated-labor taxation should be structured to discourage labor displacement without social responsibility and to share productivity gains broadly.
Tax design should create incentives for responsible automation practices. Companies that invest in worker retraining, create new positions, share productivity gains through higher wages, or gradually transition workers rather than abruptly eliminating positions should face lower tax burden. Companies that maximize short-term profit through mass layoffs and automation should face higher burden. Tax structure should encourage augmentation (making workers more productive) over replacement (eliminating workers). Recognizes that some automation is inevitable and beneficial but should not be subsidized or incentivized when it harms workers and communities without offsetting social benefit.
TAXN-EQTS-0001
Proposed
Equal Pay and Economic Opportunity
Equal pay and equal economic opportunity must be guaranteed regardless of race, gender, sexual orientation, disability, or other protected characteristics — pay discrimination is not just unfair, it's a tax policy issue too.
Guarantee equal pay and equal economic opportunity regardless of protected class.
Extends beyond "equal pay for equal work" to address structural barriers to economic opportunity. Requires not only non-discrimination in compensation but also in hiring, promotion, training, networking access, and opportunity. Addresses both explicit discrimination and structural disadvantages that create de facto discrimination. Protected classes include race, gender, sexuality, religion, disability, age, national origin, and other characteristics protected by law. Enforcement must address systemic patterns, not only individual complaints. - Requires affirmative measures to counteract historical discrimination and structural barriers - Regular auditing of pay equity and opportunity across protected classes - Transparency requirements for compensation and advancement - Addresses "cultural fit" and "networking" justifications that perpetuate discrimination
TAXN-INDS-0001
Proposed
National Industrial Strategy
The U.S. must develop a national manufacturing and industrial policy to strengthen domestic production and supply chains — leaving these entirely to market forces has created dangerous vulnerabilities.
The federal government must maintain and regularly update a national industrial strategy identifying strategic sectors, investment priorities, supply chain vulnerabilities, and workforce needs required for economic resilience, national security, and the clean energy transition.
A national industrial strategy is not central planning — it is affirmative government identification of market failures, externalities, and strategic interests that warrant public investment, coordination, and protective policy. The model is the CHIPS and Science Act (2022), the Inflation Reduction Act's domestic manufacturing provisions, South Korea's industrial development framework, Germany's Mittelstand industrial policy, and Japan's MITI framework. The strategy must be: updated every 4 years; publicly available and subject to democratic review; developed with input from labor, academia, and industry (but not captured by any single interest); evaluated against measurable outcomes including domestic production share, employment quality, supply chain resilience, and export capacity. Covered sectors must include at minimum: semiconductors and advanced electronics, pharmaceutical manufacturing and medical supply chains, renewable energy manufacturing (solar panels, wind turbines, batteries), electric vehicles and transportation infrastructure, steel and advanced materials, critical minerals and rare earths, precision agriculture and food processing, aerospace and defense manufacturing, biotechnology, and quantum computing.
TAXN-INDS-0002
Proposed
Strategic Sector Investment and Public Financing
Strategic industries vital to national security and economic resilience — like semiconductors, clean energy, and medical equipment — should receive targeted public investment and financing.
Federal financing mechanisms — including development banks, loan guarantees, direct grants, and tax incentives — must be deployed to build domestic capacity in strategically important sectors where private markets underinvest due to long time horizons, public good characteristics, or national security interests.
Private capital underinvests in sectors with: long payback periods (energy infrastructure, pharmaceutical R&D for neglected diseases); national security requirements that preclude market optimization (semiconductor fabs, defense-critical materials); first-mover disadvantages in emerging industries (early-stage clean energy technology); or public good characteristics (basic research, interoperability standards). Federal financing must fill these gaps without crowding out viable private investment. Mechanisms must include: a national development bank (analogous to Germany's KfW or Canada's BDC); expansion of the Department of Energy's Loan Programs Office; manufacturing tax credits tied to domestic production and worker quality standards; direct grants for R&D and pilot manufacturing facilities; and public-private partnership frameworks that may include government equity stakes where public financing creates substantial value. Worker and community benefit requirements must be attached to all public financing: prevailing wages, domestic sourcing requirements, the right to organize, environmental compliance, and community investment agreements.
TAXN-INDS-0003
Proposed
Critical Supply Chain Resilience
Critical supply chains must be diversified and resilient — the U.S. cannot be dependent on a single country or source for essential goods and materials.
The federal government must identify, map, and actively reduce dangerous dependencies in critical supply chains — including pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, rare earth minerals, food production, and energy systems.
U.S. supply chain vulnerabilities were documented catastrophically during COVID-19: the majority of active pharmaceutical ingredient manufacturing had moved offshore, and shortages of PPE, ventilators, and basic medical supplies caused preventable deaths. Similar structural vulnerabilities exist across the semiconductor sector, energy systems, and advanced electronics supply chains. These are not market failures in the conventional sense — they are the predictable result of 40 years of policy that treated offshoring as neutral economic optimization rather than strategic risk accumulation. Resilience policy must include: domestic production capacity requirements for goods designated as strategically critical; stockpile requirements for medical, energy, and defense materials; allied-nation supply chain diversification agreements; mandatory monitoring and public reporting of critical supply chain dependencies; and expanded authority (building on the Defense Production Act) to require domestic production where national security demands it. Supply chain resilience is not protectionism for its own sake — it is rational management of genuine strategic vulnerability that markets will not resolve on their own.
TAXN-INDS-0004
Proposed
Rare Earth and Critical Minerals Strategy
The U.S. must develop a strategy for securing domestic and allied sources of rare earth minerals and other critical materials needed for clean energy and advanced technology.
The United States must develop an integrated critical minerals strategy — covering domestic extraction, processing, recycling, and allied-nation supply chain partnerships — to reduce dangerous dependency on single-nation supply chains for minerals essential to defense, energy, and advanced manufacturing.
Critical minerals are the physical foundation of the clean energy transition (lithium, cobalt, nickel, and manganese for batteries), defense systems (rare earths for guidance systems, magnets, and electronics), and advanced manufacturing (titanium, tungsten, and gallium). The United States is heavily import-dependent across the critical minerals spectrum, with China controlling the dominant share of global rare earth processing capacity. This dependency is a structural vulnerability that cannot be resolved through market forces alone — it requires coordinated public strategy. That strategy must include: domestic permitting reform that enables responsible mining with rigorous environmental protections and community consent requirements; federal investment in domestic rare earth processing capacity; recycling infrastructure for battery and electronics mineral recovery; allied supply chain agreements with Canada, Australia, and European partners to reduce single-source dependency; strategic stockpile management; and sustained R&D investment in mineral substitution and advanced recycling technology. Environmental and Indigenous rights standards must not be sacrificed for speed — domestic critical mineral extraction must meet the highest applicable legal and ethical standards, and communities must have a meaningful voice in decisions affecting them.
TAXN-INDS-0005
Proposed
Buy America and Domestic Content Requirements
Federal spending and contracts should prioritize domestically produced goods and materials — 'Buy America' requirements must be strengthened and enforced.
Federal procurement and public investment programs must require domestic sourcing for goods where domestic capacity exists or can be developed, with requirements attached to worker quality standards — not merely to geographic origin.
Federal government procurement totaled approximately $755 billion in FY 2024 — one of the largest procurement systems in the world.[20] "Buy America" requirements transform that spending into active industrial policy. Requirements must be: genuine (not hollowed out through waivers, exceptions, and definitional manipulation); tied to labor standards (prevailing wages, right to organize, domestic worker safety standards — geographic origin alone is insufficient if production conditions are exploitative); graduated to allow time to build domestic capacity where it doesn't currently exist; and extended to all federal infrastructure spending, not only direct federal purchases. The Inflation Reduction Act's domestic content requirements for clean energy tax credits represent the right directional model — this approach must be extended across all major federal spending categories. Domestic content requirements must also apply to critical infrastructure: power grids, water systems, telecommunications networks, and defense systems. The goal is building genuine economic capacity through public spending power, not simple import exclusion.
TAXN-INDS-0006
Proposed
Regional Industrial Policy and Manufacturing Clusters
Industrial policy should support specific regions and manufacturing clusters — not just pour resources into already-thriving coastal cities — to spread economic opportunity more broadly.
Federal industrial policy must explicitly address the geographic concentration of economic growth and invest in manufacturing capacity in deindustrialized regions, rural communities, and communities economically dependent on declining industries.
U.S. economic growth has concentrated heavily in coastal metropolitan areas. Deindustrialized communities across the Midwest, Appalachia, the Gulf Coast, and rural regions lost manufacturing employment without adequate replacement investment — the opioid crisis, declining life expectancy, and profound political destabilization documented in these regions are in significant part consequences of managed deindustrialization without transition support. Regional industrial policy must include: federal investment in manufacturing clusters that connect research universities, community colleges, and industrial partners in specific regions; regional development authorities modeled on the Tennessee Valley Authority for areas requiring comprehensive economic redevelopment; priority investment for communities economically dependent on fossil fuels (coal, oil, natural gas) as an integral part of the just transition framework (cross-reference INF-ENR rules); place-based investment programs that tie economic development to specific communities rather than optimizing only for aggregate national efficiency; and community benefit agreements that require local hiring, local contracting, and genuine local economic development from any federally supported investment. The goal is shared prosperity across geography, not continued concentration of growth in already-advantaged regions.
TAXN-INDS-0007
Proposed
Worker Ownership and Democratic Enterprise in Industrial Policy
Industrial policy should include support for worker-owned businesses and democratic enterprises — models that share profits and decision-making more broadly.
Federal industrial strategy must actively support worker-owned cooperatives, employee stock ownership plans, and other democratic enterprise models as viable and preferred alternatives to concentrated private ownership in industrial sectors receiving public investment.
When public financing builds industrial capacity, the public interest is not served by transferring that capacity to private shareholders who extract profits while workers remain economically precarious. Worker ownership models — cooperatives, ESOPs, democratic enterprises — distribute both income and economic power more broadly and build the kind of stakeholder commitment that supports long-term industrial resilience. Policy mechanisms must include: technical assistance and financing programs for worker cooperative formation; preferential access to public financing for worker-owned enterprises in strategic sectors; right-of-first-refusal for workers to purchase businesses being sold or closed (preventing community-destroying plant closures when viable employee purchase is possible); ESOP conversion support for small and medium businesses; preference in federal procurement for worker-owned suppliers; and sustained investment in cooperative development infrastructure including education, legal support, and financing networks. This is not mandatory nationalization — it is using public resources to make worker ownership more accessible and economically viable in sectors where private capital would otherwise continue to consolidate ownership and extract value from workers and communities. Cross-reference: labor pillar worker ownership rules.
TAXN-INDS-0008
Proposed
Research and Development as Industrial Policy
Investment in research and development — basic science, applied research, and technology development — is itself a form of industrial policy that creates long-term economic strength.
Federal R&D investment must be sustained, strategic, and linked to domestic commercialization — ensuring that publicly funded research produces economic benefits captured domestically rather than transferred abroad through unconditioned patent licensing.
The United States built its technological leadership on public R&D investment: the internet (ARPANET), GPS, touchscreen technology, mRNA vaccine platforms, and virtually all foundational technologies in modern consumer and defense electronics have significant federal research origins. Federal R&D investment as a share of GDP has declined substantially from its mid-20th-century peaks, representing a structural disinvestment in long-term economic and technological capacity. R&D policy must: restore and sustain federal R&D investment at levels consistent with maintaining global leadership; coordinate basic research (NSF, NIH) with applied research (NIST, DOE national laboratories, DARPA, IARPA) and commercialization pathways (SBA, DOE Loan Programs Office); require domestic commercialization conditions for publicly funded research, including Bayh-Dole Act reforms to prevent unconstrained transfer of patents to foreign entities with no domestic manufacturing obligation; prioritize research aligned with the industrial strategy sectors identified under ECO-IND-001; support materials science, manufacturing process innovation, and applied engineering research — not only software and biotechnology; and fund STEM education and apprenticeship pipelines connecting research institutions to manufacturing workforce development. The core principle: public investment in knowledge should produce public benefit, not private offshore extraction of publicly created value.
TAXN-INDS-0009
Proposed
Trade Policy Aligned with Industrial Strategy
Trade policy must be aligned with industrial strategy — trade agreements should support domestic manufacturing and not undermine the industries the U.S. is trying to build.
Trade policy must be designed in alignment with industrial strategy — not as an independent domain optimized only for aggregate consumer prices or financial flows — and must require labor and environmental standards equivalent to domestic standards as conditions of market access.
Free trade orthodoxy, endorsed across both parties for approximately 40 years, optimized for aggregate economic efficiency while systematically ignoring distributional consequences, labor standards, industrial capacity, and strategic vulnerability. The consequences include sustained goods trade deficits, erosion of manufacturing employment across working-class communities, development of critical supply chain vulnerabilities, and extreme geographic concentration of trade benefits in financial services and technology sectors that predominantly benefit coastal metropolitan areas. Trade policy aligned with industrial strategy requires: labor rights standards equivalent to domestic U.S. law as a condition of market access (preventing competition through worker exploitation abroad); environmental production standards comparable to domestic standards (preventing the effective export of pollution through offshoring); sector carveouts for strategic industries under active development (targeted protection during transition, not permanent protectionism); rigorous rules of origin enforcement within trade agreements (preventing import substitution through minimal transformation); and WTO reform to permit industrial policy and supply chain resilience measures without triggering dispute mechanisms that were designed for an era before strategic economic competition became the dominant geopolitical framework. This is not blanket protectionism that raises consumer prices across all goods — it is strategic use of market access leverage to enforce standards, protect genuinely strategic sectors, and ensure trade serves workers and national resilience, not only financial capital.
TAXN-INDS-0010
Proposed
Industrial Workforce Pipeline — Apprenticeships, Vocational Training, and Manufacturing Education
Building a strong industrial workforce requires robust apprenticeship programs, vocational training, and manufacturing education pathways — these must be funded as part of industrial policy.
Industrial policy without a workforce strategy is incomplete — federal manufacturing and industrial investment must be paired with funded, accessible, high-quality vocational training, apprenticeship programs, and manufacturing education that connects workers to industrial sector jobs at living wages.
The skilled trades shortage is documented and severe across construction, manufacturing, and the emerging clean energy sector: manufacturing job vacancy rates have been at near-record highs, and the clean energy transition will require hundreds of thousands of electricians, HVAC technicians, solar installers, and wind turbine technicians who do not exist in the current credentialed workforce. Building domestic industrial capacity requires simultaneously building the workforce to staff it — capacity investment that outruns available skilled labor produces inflation, delays, and dependence on imported expertise rather than the domestic employment benefits that justify the public investment. Policy must include: Registered Apprenticeship program expansion with direct federal funding and industry partnerships; community college manufacturing and vocational program investment tied to regional employer partnerships; pre-apprenticeship programs accessible to workers without prior credentials; paid apprenticeships (eliminating the near-unpaid training model that excludes workers who cannot afford to forgo income); career and technical education (CTE) funding in K-12 that provides genuine pathways to industrial careers; workforce development boards with substantive labor representation; Pell Grant eligibility expansion to short-term vocational credentials; and priority workforce investment in communities displaced by industrial transition. Living wage and union representation requirements must apply to all apprenticeship and workforce pipeline programs receiving federal funds. The goal is not filling jobs at whatever wage the market bears — it is building industrial careers with genuine economic security and the long-term workforce depth that durable domestic industrial capacity requires.
TAXN-INDS-0001ProposalEstablish national manufacturing and industrial policy to strengthen domestic production and supply…
The U.S. must develop a national manufacturing and industrial policy to strengthen domestic production and supply chains — leaving these entirely to market forces has created dangerous vulnerabilities.
Establish national manufacturing and industrial policy to strengthen domestic production and supply chains
Source: DB entry ECO-IND-001, status: MISSING. Pending editorial review.
TAXN-INSS-0001
Proposed
AI Cannot Deny Insurance Without Human Review
AI systems cannot be used to deny, restrict, or reduce insurance coverage or claims without a real human reviewing and being accountable for the decision.
AI systems may not be used to deny restrict or reduce insurance coverage or claims without direct independent human review and accountability.
Prohibits use of artificial intelligence or algorithmic systems to deny, restrict, reduce, or delay insurance coverage or claims without direct review by an independent human decision-maker with genuine authority and accountability. Applies to all insurance types: health, property, auto, disability, life, and others. Human reviewer must have access to full information, time to consider the case, and authority to override algorithmic recommendation. Reviewer cannot be penalized for overriding the algorithm or incentivized to defer to it. Creates individual accountability: if human reviewer merely rubber-stamps algorithm without independent judgment, both reviewer and system are liable.
TAXN-INSS-0002
Proposed
Independent Human Judgment Required
Human reviewers in insurance decisions must make genuinely independent judgments — they cannot simply rubber-stamp whatever an AI system recommends.
Human reviewers in insurance decisions must exercise independent judgment and may not rely solely on AI-generated recommendations.
Reinforces ECO-INS-001 by specifying that human review must be substantive, not perfunctory. Reviewers must: examine the specific case facts, consider information beyond algorithmic inputs, document reasoning that is independent of AI recommendation, be held accountable for decision quality not processing speed. Organizational structures and incentives must support independent judgment—high caseloads, time pressure, or performance metrics based on agreement with algorithm violate this requirement.
LABR-LABS-0001
Proposed
Government Support for Small Business Parental Leave
Government must subsidize or support paid parental leave for small businesses.
Recognizes that mandating paid parental leave can burden small businesses disproportionately. Rather than exempting small businesses (which would leave their workers without protection) or imposing unsustainable costs, government provides subsidy, reimbursement, or direct provision. Models include: insurance fund paid through small payroll tax to which employers contribute and from which leave is paid, direct reimbursement to small businesses for wages paid during parental leave, government provision of leave benefits directly to workers with employer accommodation requirements but not wage payment requirements.
TAXN-SMBS-0001
Proposed
Small Business Healthcare Coverage Support
Small businesses should receive subsidies, carveouts, or public support to help them provide healthcare coverage to their employees — healthcare requirements should not be a crushing burden on small employers.
Provide subsidies carveouts or public support to help small businesses comply with healthcare coverage requirements.
Similar logic to ECO-LAB-004 for parental leave. If healthcare coverage is mandated (or strongly incentivized), small businesses need support to comply without being driven out by costs. Approaches include: subsidies for small business purchase of employee health coverage, public option or government-provided healthcare that reduces employer burden, graduated requirements where businesses below certain size have reduced obligations or receive offsetting support, carveouts that exempt very small businesses with alternative mechanisms to ensure workers still receive coverage.
TAXN-SSCI-0001
Proposed
Eliminate the Social Security Payroll Tax Wage Cap
The Social Security payroll tax currently stops applying to wages above about $168,000 — meaning wealthy earners pay a much lower percentage of their income into Social Security than everyone else. That cap must be eliminated.
All wages and self-employment income, with no upper limit, must be subject to Social Security payroll taxation; the wage cap — $176,100 in 2025 — is abolished.
The Social Security wage cap makes the effective Social Security tax rate deeply regressive: it falls toward zero on income above the cap, so a worker earning $5 million pays the same nominal Social Security taxes as a worker earning $176,100. Eliminating the cap would substantially improve Social Security solvency — the 2025 SSA Trustees Report projects the combined OASDI trust fund reserves will be depleted by 2034, after which scheduled benefits would be payable at approximately 81% of projected levels.[10] The cap elimination is a statutory change (26 U.S.C. § 3111 and related provisions) and does not require constitutional amendment. Implementation note: benefit formula adjustments for high earners must be addressed separately — the platform does not automatically award proportionally higher benefits to high earners on newly taxed income above the historical cap; that is a separate statutory decision. CBO has analyzed options for modifying or eliminating the taxable maximum in its periodic Social Security policy options analyses.[11] Cross-reference: ECO-SS-002 (AI-tax supplement), ECO-SS-003 (minimum benefit expansion).
TAXN-SSCI-0002
Proposed
Supplement Social Security Funding with Automation Tax Revenue
Revenue from taxes on AI and automation should supplement Social Security funding — as robots replace workers, the productivity gains should help sustain the retirement security those workers built.
Revenue from AI and automation displacement taxes (ECO-AUT-001 and ECO-AUT-002) must be directed in part to the Social Security trust funds to supplement payroll tax revenue as automation erodes the wage-based funding base.
Social Security is currently funded almost entirely through payroll taxes on wages. As AI and automation reduce employment or suppress wage growth, the payroll tax base shrinks — a structurally unsound dependency for a system whose fiscal viability depends on labor income. Dedicating a portion of automation tax revenue to Social Security creates a direct link between automation-driven productivity gains and the social insurance obligations those gains create. This rule does not prescribe the exact allocation percentage — that is a statutory matter — but establishes the principle: when machines replace workers, the machines should contribute to the social insurance that displaced workers lose. Cross-reference: ECO-AUT-001 (automation tax), ECO-AUT-002 (automation tax revenue for public benefit), ECO-SS-001 (cap elimination), ECO-GBI-003 (automation as social dividend).
TAXN-SSCI-0003
Proposed
Substantially Increase the Social Security Minimum Benefit
The Social Security minimum benefit — the guaranteed floor that protects the poorest retirees — must be substantially increased so that no one who worked their whole life retires in poverty.
The Special Minimum Primary Insurance Amount must be substantially increased so that full-career workers — those with 30 or more years in covered employment — never retire into poverty.
The Social Security Special Minimum PIA was designed to provide adequate benefits to long-service, low-wage workers, but has been eroded by inflation since the 1970s because it is indexed to prices rather than wages. By the mid-2020s, relatively few workers receive benefits based on the Special Minimum PIA because it has fallen below the regular benefit formula for most beneficiaries. The result: a worker who spent 30 or more years in covered employment at low wages — the eligibility threshold for the Special Minimum PIA, based on "years of coverage," which is a distinct formula from the regular benefit's 35-highest-earnings-years calculation — may retire with Social Security benefits below the federal poverty line. This is both an equity failure and a structural failure — a program that does not reliably prevent poverty for full-career low-wage workers has failed its core purpose. The platform commits to restoring and substantially increasing the minimum benefit to a genuine poverty-preventing floor, indexed to wages to prevent re-erosion. Cross-reference: ECO-SS-001 (cap elimination provides additional funding), RGT-POV-001 (poverty elimination as national goal).
TAXN-SSCI-0004
Proposed
Add Caregiver Credits to Social Security Benefit Calculation
Years spent caring for children, elderly relatives, or people with disabilities should count toward Social Security benefits — unpaid caregiving is real work that deserves retirement credit.
Years spent in unpaid caregiving — raising children, caring for disabled or elderly family members — must be credited toward Social Security benefit calculation at a defined benefit rate, regardless of whether the caregiver earned wages in covered employment during those years.
The Social Security benefit formula calculates benefits based on the 35 highest earning years of covered employment. Workers who take years out of the workforce for caregiving — disproportionately women — have earnings-record gaps that permanently reduce their Social Security benefits. A woman who spends five years caring for children or aging parents may retire with benefits thousands of dollars per year lower than a similarly situated worker who did not leave the workforce. Several peer nations have addressed this: Germany credits periods of child-rearing; Canada's CPP has provisions for low-earning caregiving years; the UK credits qualifying caregivers for National Insurance purposes. The National Academy of Social Insurance has published analysis of multiple caregiver credit design models.[12] Implementation considerations: eligible care period (child under 12; severely disabled adult); benefit amount credited (e.g., 50% of national average wage); maximum years eligible; integration with existing dropout-year provisions. This reform would meaningfully reduce the gender gap in Social Security benefits. Cross-reference: ECO-SS-001, ECO-SS-003.
TAXN-SSCI-0005
Proposed
Study and Address Occupational Inequity in Retirement Age
The retirement ages built into Social Security were not designed equally — workers in physically demanding jobs often cannot work as long as office workers. This inequity must be studied and addressed.
The Social Security Administration must commission and publicly release a study of differential life expectancy and disability rates by occupation; Congress must use this evidence to evaluate whether a uniform full retirement age creates inequitable outcomes for workers in physically demanding occupations.
The full retirement age for Social Security is 67 for workers born after 1960. Workers in physically demanding occupations — construction, agriculture, service work, cleaning and maintenance, logistics and warehousing — have significantly shorter life expectancy and higher rates of work-limiting disability than workers in cognitive or desk occupations. Requiring all workers to work until 67 to receive full benefits therefore systematically disadvantages manual workers: a construction worker and a software engineer nominally face the same retirement age, but the construction worker is more likely to be disabled, ill, or dead before reaching it. This platform commits to a research-first approach — mandate a rigorous study before prescribing specific policy changes — but names the equity concern directly: occupational differences in life expectancy are real and must be addressed. Possible responses include occupation-based flexible retirement ages, strengthened SSDI access for occupationally disabled workers, or early retirement options without penalty for verified occupational disability. Cross-reference: ECO-SS-001–ECO-SS-004, RGT-DIS-002 (SSDI reform), RGT-DIS-003 (SSDI earnings cliff).
TAXN-GBIS-0001
Proposed
Guaranteed Income Floor for All Residents
Every person living in the U.S. should have access to a guaranteed minimum income floor — a basic level of financial security below which no one falls, regardless of employment status.
The government must maintain a guaranteed income floor sufficient for basic survival, dignity, and participation in society; this floor must be set above bare subsistence and adjusted annually for inflation and cost-of-living.
This rule makes the guaranteed income floor a policy commitment, not an aspiration. "Basic survival, dignity, and participation" is deliberately set above bare subsistence: it includes the ability to participate in civic and social life, not merely to avoid starvation. Annual adjustment prevents the erosion that has already rendered many existing benefit floors inadequate — TANF cash assistance, for example, has lost the majority of its real value since 1997 in most states. FDR's January 1944 State of the Union address proposed a Second Bill of Rights including "the right of every family to a decent home" and "the right to earn enough to provide adequate food and clothing and recreation" — this platform fulfills that vision in concrete policy terms. This rule is a direct policy commitment, not a goal for future study. Cross-reference: ECO-GBI-002 through ECO-GBI-005 (implementation details); ECO-CTC (child allowance); ECO-SS-003 (Social Security minimum benefit); RGT-POV-001 (poverty elimination goal).
TAXN-GBIS-0002
Proposed
Universal Displacement-Triggered Income Support
People displaced from their jobs by automation, outsourcing, or economic disruption should automatically receive income support — not have to navigate a complex maze of applications.
As AI and automation displace workers at scale, displacement-triggered income support must be available universally, without means-testing conditions that create welfare cliffs or arbitrary cutoffs, and at levels adequate to maintain living standards during transition.
Means-testing income support for displaced workers creates structural paradoxes: the workers most in need of support are often those with the least documentation, fewest advocates, and most complex economic situations. Arbitrary income cutoffs create benefit cliffs — ranges of income where earning a dollar more causes a loss of more than a dollar in benefits — that punish exactly the behavior the policy is supposed to encourage. Universal support is both simpler to administer and more equitable. Evidence: Finland's 2017–2018 basic income experiment found that unconditional income support increased well-being and sense of security, reduced anxiety and depression, and did not reduce employment among recipients — treatment group members showed marginally higher employment rates than the control group, though this difference did not reach conventional statistical significance.[14] Cross-reference: ECO-GBI-005 (no welfare cliffs), ECO-AUT-001 and ECO-AUT-002 (automation tax revenue), ECO-GBI-004 (implementation pathway).
TAXN-GBIS-0003
Proposed
Automation Gains Must Fund a Social Dividend
The enormous productivity gains generated by automation and AI should fund a broad social dividend — shared benefits for everyone, not just increased profits for shareholders.
Revenue sources for the guaranteed income floor must include automation taxes, progressive wealth taxation, and other mechanisms that recapture productivity gains from capital-displacing technology and distribute them as a social dividend to the public.
Productivity gains from AI and automation depend not only on capital investment but on publicly funded research, public infrastructure, educated labor, the rule of law, and the accumulated knowledge of human civilization. When those gains are captured entirely by capital owners, the public that made them possible receives nothing. This rule establishes that a portion of automation-derived productivity gains must be returned to the public. The Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend — a universal annual payment to all Alaska residents, funded by oil royalties, in 2023 approximately $1,312 per person — provides a working model of a resource-based social dividend distributed unconditionally to all residents regardless of income.[13] The automation social dividend extends that logic to technology-driven productivity gains at the national level. Cross-reference: ECO-AUT-001, ECO-AUT-002, ECO-AUT-003; TAX-WTH-* (wealth taxation as additional revenue).
TAXN-GBIS-0004
Proposed
Phased Implementation: Strengthen Existing Programs Toward Universal Floor
Building toward a universal income floor should start by strengthening existing programs — unemployment insurance, SNAP, disability benefits — as stepping stones toward broader coverage.
The implementation pathway begins with expansion and strengthening of existing income support programs — EITC, CTC, SNAP, TANF — and moves toward a unified, unconditional, administratively simple income floor; the near-term goal is eliminating gaps in the existing safety net; the long-term goal is universal guaranteed income.
A fully universal guaranteed income requires phased implementation; the immediate priority is repairing existing safety net gaps. This means: expanding the Earned Income Tax Credit to cover childless adults adequately; making the Child Tax Credit fully refundable and monthly (ECO-CTC); ensuring SNAP benefits reflect actual food costs; restoring TANF as a genuine cash assistance program rather than a block grant used for non-assistance purposes. Evidence from the Stockton SEED pilot (2019–2021) — where low-income residents received $500/month unconditionally for two years — showed improved employment outcomes, physical and mental health, and financial stability compared to the control group.[15] Evidence from the 2021 ARPA expansion of the CTC confirms that near-universal, monthly income support for families with children substantially reduces poverty during the period of payment and that poverty rebounds immediately when payments end — demonstrating that the income support is the active ingredient. Cross-reference: ECO-CTC (child allowance); ECO-GBI-001 through ECO-GBI-003; ECO-GBI-005 (no welfare cliffs).
TAXN-GBIS-0005
Proposed
Prohibit Welfare Cliffs in All Means-Tested Programs
Means-tested programs — those that cut off benefits sharply as income rises — must be redesigned to eliminate the 'welfare cliff' where earning more money can actually leave a family worse off.
No means-testing condition may create a benefits cliff — a range of income in which earning more causes a net loss of total income due to benefit reduction — and all benefit phase-out schedules must be structured so that additional earned income always increases net total income.
Benefits cliffs are among the most damaging structural failures of the American safety net. They arise when a benefit — housing assistance, Medicaid, childcare subsidies, SNAP, TANF — phases out abruptly at an income threshold, such that a worker who earns one dollar more loses far more than a dollar in benefits. The effective marginal tax rate at the cliff can exceed 100%, creating a powerful financial disincentive to increase earnings. Many low-income workers report declining available work hours or refusing promotions specifically to avoid triggering benefit loss. The solution is gradual phase-out schedules with taper rates below 100% — any additional dollar earned must produce a net income gain even as benefits decline. Because multiple program phase-outs interact, this rule requires cross-program coordination: the combined effect of simultaneous SNAP, housing, and childcare phase-outs must not create a composite cliff even if individual programs are each individually compliant. Cross-reference: ECO-GBI-001 through ECO-GBI-004; ECO-CTC-001 (child allowance design); RGT-DIS-003 (SSDI earnings cliff as a specific application of this principle).
TAXN-CTCS-0001
Proposed
Fully Refundable, Universal Child Tax Credit
The Child Tax Credit must be made fully refundable and universal — meaning families who don't owe income taxes still receive the full benefit for every child.
The Child Tax Credit must be made fully refundable and universally available to all families with qualifying children regardless of earned income; no child may be excluded from the full credit value based on their parents' income level or tax liability.
Under current law, the Child Tax Credit is partially refundable: families must have at least $2,500 in earned income, and refundability phases in at 15 cents per dollar above that threshold. This means the poorest families — those with no or minimal earned income — receive little or nothing, while higher-earning families receive the full credit. The exclusion is arbitrary: the children of the lowest-income families are the most likely to be in poverty, the most likely to benefit from additional income, and the most excluded from the credit. The 2021 American Rescue Plan temporarily made the CTC fully refundable and expanded it to $3,000–$3,600 per child annually. Columbia University's Center on Poverty and Social Policy found that child poverty fell from approximately 15% to under 12% during the months the expanded monthly CTC was in effect, and rebounded to over 17% immediately after expiration in January 2022.[16] Cross-reference: ECO-CTC-002 (monthly payments); ECO-CTC-003 (benefit level); ECO-GBI-001 (income floor); RGT-POV-001 (poverty elimination).
TAXN-CTCS-0002
Proposed
Child Allowance Paid Monthly
Child allowance payments should be made monthly so families can count on regular support — not once a year at tax time when the money may already be needed.
The Child Tax Credit must be paid as a regular monthly benefit rather than a single annual lump sum; low-income families cannot smooth consumption from an annual payment, and child-rearing costs are monthly.
An annual lump-sum tax credit does not match the timing of actual household expenses — rent, groceries, childcare, utilities — which are monthly obligations. Low-income families that receive an annual lump sum often use it to pay down debt accrued over the year, meaning they have already gone without what the money was intended to provide. Monthly payment converts the child allowance into a functioning income support tool that matches the actual timing of need. Evidence from the 2021 ARPA monthly CTC payments confirmed that food insufficiency among families with children dropped measurably during months when monthly payments were received. International precedent: Canada's Canada Child Benefit (implemented July 2016) provides a fully refundable, monthly, inflation-adjusted child allowance — as of 2023, approximately CAD $6,997 annually per child under 6 and CAD $5,903 per child 6–17, paid in monthly installments.[17] Cross-reference: ECO-CTC-001 (full refundability); ECO-CTC-003 (benefit level); ECO-GBI-005 (monthly payments avoid lump-sum-induced cash flow cliffs).
TAXN-CTCS-0003
Proposed
Benefit Level Sufficient to Reduce Child Poverty; Indexed to Inflation
The child allowance must be set at a level high enough to meaningfully reduce child poverty, and it must automatically increase with inflation so its value doesn't erode over time.
The child allowance benefit level must be set at a minimum equal to the 2021 ARPA expansion amounts — $3,600 per year per child under 6, $3,000 per year for children 6–17 — and must be indexed to inflation so the real value is not eroded over time.
The 2021 ARPA expansion demonstrated that a child allowance at this level — approximately $250–$300/month per child — materially reduces child poverty when fully refundable and paid monthly. The goal is a child allowance that, combined with other income, means no child lives in poverty due to insufficient income support. Inflation indexing is required to prevent the passive erosion that has degraded TANF cash assistance, the Special Minimum PIA, and other benefit levels that were set in nominal terms and then allowed to erode in real terms. The specific amounts should be revisited and increased over time as economic conditions change; this rule establishes the floor, not the ceiling. International benchmark: Canada's Child Benefit provides a higher per-child benefit than the 2021 ARPA amounts and has been indexed since inception. Cross-reference: ECO-CTC-001 (full refundability); ECO-CTC-002 (monthly payment); ECO-GBI-001 (income floor).
TAXN-CTCS-0004
Proposed
No Tax Filing Barrier; Automatic Enrollment
Families should not have to file a complex tax return to receive child allowance payments — enrollment should be automatic so no eligible child is left out due to paperwork barriers.
No tax filing requirement may serve as a barrier to receiving the child allowance; automatic enrollment and simplified non-filer access must be available; undocumented parents with U.S. citizen or legal resident children may not be excluded from the child allowance for those qualifying children.
The poorest families — those with no income, irregular income, or income below the filing threshold — do not file tax returns, and are therefore hardest to reach through a tax-based credit system. During the 2021 ARPA expansion, the IRS created a Non-Filer portal for non-filing families, but uptake was incomplete and excluded the very poorest families. Automatic enrollment — where the government proactively identifies eligible families and enrolls them rather than requiring them to navigate a claims process — is the correct approach. The families with the most to gain from the child allowance are often those with the least administrative capacity to claim it. The exclusion of undocumented parents for their U.S. citizen children is particularly inequitable: the U.S. citizen children are eligible persons regardless of parental immigration status; denying them support harms them. Cross-reference: ECO-CTC-001 through ECO-CTC-003; ECO-GBI-004 (administrative simplicity as goal).
TAXN-CTCS-0005
Proposed
Child Allowance Through Age 17; Study Extension Through Age 21 for Students
Children should receive the full child allowance through age 17, and students who continue their education may be eligible for an extended benefit through age 21.
The child allowance must cover all children through age 17 inclusive; the government must study the feasibility and impact of extending the benefit through age 21 for young people enrolled in post-secondary education or vocational training.
The current CTC and 2021 ARPA expansion cover children through age 17. Many young people ages 18–21 are in post-secondary education or vocational training — situations of economic dependency — and their families face real costs associated with that dependency. The platform commits to studying extension through age 21 rather than mandating it, because: cost and distributional effects require analysis; interaction with the EITC for college-age dependents raises design questions; and whether extension should be conditioned on educational enrollment or unconditional is a legitimate policy question. International precedent: the UK Child Benefit covers through age 16, with extension through 19 if in qualifying education. Cross-reference: ECO-CTC-001 through ECO-CTC-004; ECO-GBI (income floor pathway — extension to young adults connects to broader GBI trajectory).
TAXN-EITC-0001
Proposal
Expand and Double the EITC; Extend to Childless Workers and All Eligible Ages
The Earned Income Tax Credit — a tax benefit for working people with lower incomes — must be expanded and doubled, and extended to workers without children and to all eligible age groups.
The maximum Earned Income Tax Credit benefit must be at least doubled from its current levels for all filer categories; the EITC must be fully extended to workers without qualifying children, including young adults aged 19–24 and workers above age 64 who are currently excluded; the EITC must be made fully refundable for all qualifying workers regardless of tax liability; income thresholds, phase-in rates, and phase-out schedules must be adjusted so that the expanded credit reaches the working poor without creating a benefits cliff; and automatic COLA indexing must be applied to all EITC thresholds and maximum amounts.
The EITC is the largest federal anti-poverty program for working adults and has strong evidence of reducing poverty, increasing labor force participation, and improving child outcomes. However, the childless worker credit is extremely limited: for tax year 2024, the maximum EITC for a worker with no qualifying children is approximately $632, compared to $7,830 for a family with three or more children. Young adults aged 19–24 and workers above 64 are entirely excluded from the childless EITC despite having low incomes and working. Doubling benefits and eliminating age exclusions substantially increases the credit's reach and anti-poverty impact for the millions of low-wage workers who do not have dependent children. Cross-reference: TAXN-GBIS-0001 (income floor); TAXN-CTCS-0001 (CTC for families with children); TAXN-GBIS-0005 (no cliff effects).
TAXN-EITC-0002
Proposal
Eliminate the EITC Marriage Penalty
The EITC's 'marriage penalty' — where two working people receive less credit after marrying than they did individually — must be eliminated.
The Earned Income Tax Credit must be structured so that no eligible individual loses EITC benefits solely as a result of marriage; married couples filing jointly must receive a combined EITC at least equal to the sum they would have received had they filed as single individuals; the joint income phase-out threshold must be set at no less than double the single filer phase-out threshold so that neither spouse is penalized for legal marriage; Treasury must publish proposed regulations implementing this rule within 180 days of enactment.
Under current EITC structure, two low-income earners eligible for significant EITC credits as single filers may see their combined EITC sharply reduced or eliminated when they marry, because the joint phase-out threshold is not double the single threshold. This "marriage penalty" creates a structural fiscal disincentive to legal marriage for low-income working couples — the opposite of what family stability policy should do. The marriage penalty disproportionately affects working-class families of color, who face it at higher rates due to income distribution patterns. Eliminating it is a matter of horizontal equity: equally-situated couples must not bear different tax burdens based solely on legal marital status. Cross-reference: TAXN-EITC-0001 (EITC expansion); TAXN-GBIS-0005 (no welfare cliffs); TAXN-CTCS-0001 (CTC marriage parity).
TAXN-TAXS-0001
Partial
Anti-Wealth Hoarding
Tax policy must actively prevent the hoarding of extreme wealth — allowing a small number of individuals to accumulate more wealth than they could spend in a thousand lifetimes concentrates power in ways that threaten democracy.
Anti-wealth hoarding.
Constitutional-level principle that extreme wealth concentration may be regulated and taxed to prevent threats to democratic self-governance. Does not specify exact mechanisms or rates (which remain statutory) but establishes authority for: progressive income taxation with high marginal rates on extreme income, wealth taxation on assets above defined thresholds, inheritance and estate taxation to prevent dynastic accumulation, land value taxation (Georgist principle) to capture unearned value, taxation of monopoly rents and unearned income at higher rates than labor income. The ECO pillar addresses economic structure while anti-corruption addresses translation of wealth into political power. Both are necessary: limit wealth concentration (ECO) and block channels through which remaining wealth buys influence (COR). Wealth taxation reduces resources available for political capture. Campaign finance limits prevent existing wealth from dominating politics. The ECO pillar structures the economy; Pillar 5 guarantees individual economic security. ECO creates conditions for broad prosperity (progressive taxation, automation revenue, small business support). Pillar 5 ensures individuals have healthcare, housing, livable wages regardless of economic structure. They work together: structure the economy for fairness, and guarantee security for individuals. Wealth concentration and market concentration are mutually reinforcing. Monopolies generate monopoly rents that concentrate wealth. Concentrated wealth funds lobbying and political influence that protects monopolies. Breaking market concentration (antitrust) reduces wealth concentration. Taxing wealth reduces resources for market manipulation. Both pillars attack the same problem from different angles. The SYS-AI rules in Pillar 13 establish overarching principles for AI in government decision-making. The ECO-INS rules are domain-specific implementation for insurance. Both prohibit AI-driven harm without human accountability. The system-level rules ensure consistency across domains; the economic rules provide specific enforcement in insurance and economic decisions.
TAXN-WTHS-0001
Included
Tax policy must more effectively reach concentrated wealth
Tax policy must more effectively reach concentrated wealth, investment gains, passive income, and other forms of non-labor wealth accumulation that current law taxes very lightly.
Tax policy must more effectively reach concentrated wealth, capital gains, passive income, and other forms of non-labor wealth accumulation.
The Federal Reserve's Distributional Financial Accounts document that the top 1% of U.S. households hold approximately 30% of all household wealth, while the bottom 50% hold less than 3% — a concentration ratio that has worsened since the 1980s.[22] The current tax system taxes labor income (wages) more effectively than capital income (dividends, capital gains) and does not directly reach accumulated wealth (stock, real estate, business interests held without realization). The platform's approach works through three reinforcing mechanisms: equalizing the effective tax rate on capital and labor income; closing the stepped-up basis loophole that eliminates capital gains tax at death; and for extreme concentrations, a constitutional amendment enabling a direct wealth tax that reaches accumulated assets above defined thresholds. A constitutional amendment is the intended path — a feature of the platform, not a concession — because the Article I apportionment clause creates legal uncertainty under current doctrine (Moore v. United States, 2024, left the constitutional question unresolved), and a constitutional resolution is permanently durable in the way statutory workarounds are not. This amendment would not specify rates — those remain statutory — but would settle beyond legal challenge that Congress has authority to tax extreme wealth concentration.
TAXN-WTHS-0002
Included
Tax rules may not systematically privilege wealth accumulation
Tax rules cannot systematically privilege people who accumulate wealth over people who earn wages — a tax system that taxes work more heavily than capital is both unfair and economically harmful.
Tax rules may not systematically privilege wealth accumulation through capital ownership over income earned through work.
The preferential treatment of capital income over labor income — long-term capital gains taxed at 0–20% for federal purposes while labor income faces rates up to 37% plus payroll taxes[23] — has no principled economic justification for extremely high incomes. The capital gains preference is justified in mainstream economics primarily as compensation for inflation erosion and as an incentive for productive investment. At extreme wealth levels, neither rationale holds: the investment decisions of billionaires are not meaningfully affected by moving from 20% to 37% on capital gains, and the inflation erosion rationale does not justify the enormous differential for assets held short periods. Capital gains at death — where the stepped-up basis rule eliminates all accumulated gains from taxation at transfer — is a particularly indefensible structural preference for dynastic wealth. Unrealized capital gains in this tax system count as income for purposes of wealth concentration analysis and are subject to anti-deferral mechanisms at extreme wealth levels. There is genuine disagreement among tax economists about how to design this: mark-to-market taxation on liquid assets is administratively straightforward; taxation on illiquid assets (private business interests, real estate) raises genuine valuation and liquidity challenges. The platform acknowledges these challenges and supports administrative solutions — including deferred payment with interest for illiquid assets — rather than using administrative complexity as grounds to exempt the largest concentrations of capital from any systematic taxation.
TAXN-WTHS-0003
Included
Extremely large accumulations of wealth may be subject
Extremely large accumulations of wealth may be subject to an annual wealth tax — a percentage of total net worth paid each year — to prevent runaway concentration of economic and political power.
Extremely large accumulations of wealth may be subject to enhanced reporting, anti-avoidance rules, and higher contribution obligations.
Core rule in the TAX-WTH family establishing: Extremely large accumulations of wealth may be subject to enhanced reporting, anti-avoidance rules, and higher contribution obligations.
TAXN-WTHS-0004
Included
Tax systems must prevent extreme concentration of wealth
Tax systems must actively work to prevent extreme concentration of wealth — not just tax income, but address the growing gap in total assets held by the wealthiest few versus everyone else.
Tax systems must prevent extreme concentration of wealth that undermines economic stability, democracy, and equal opportunity.
Core rule in the TAX-WTH family establishing: Tax systems must prevent extreme concentration of wealth that undermines economic stability, democracy, and equal opportunity.
TAXN-WTHS-0005
Included
Extremely large concentrations of wealth may be subject
Extremely large concentrations of wealth may be subject to additional tax mechanisms, beyond the income tax, designed specifically to address the destabilizing effects of oligarchic wealth.
Extremely large concentrations of wealth may be subject to direct wealth taxation, enhanced reporting, or equivalent mechanisms to prevent perpetual accumulation without contribution.
Core rule in the TAX-WTH family establishing: Extremely large concentrations of wealth may be subject to direct wealth taxation, enhanced reporting, or equivalent mechanisms to prevent perpetual accumulation without contributi.
TAXN-WTHS-0006
Included
Wealth-tax systems must include strong valuation, anti-evasion
Wealth tax systems must include strong rules for valuing assets, preventing evasion, and enforcing compliance — a wealth tax without enforcement is not a real wealth tax.
Wealth-tax systems must include strong valuation, anti-evasion, and anti-avoidance mechanisms.
Core rule in the TAX-WTH family establishing: Wealth-tax systems must include strong valuation, anti-evasion, and anti-avoidance mechanisms.
TAXN-WTHS-0007
Included
High-wealth individuals may not use trusts, pass-through entities
High-wealth individuals cannot use trusts, pass-through entities, or other legal structures to effectively escape wealth taxes while retaining control and benefit from their assets.
High-wealth individuals may not use trusts, pass-through entities, shell structures, valuation games, or jurisdictional fragmentation to materially reduce tax obligations without real economic substance.
Core rule in the TAX-WTH family establishing: High-wealth individuals may not use trusts, pass-through entities, shell structures, valuation games, or jurisdictional fragmentation to materially reduce tax obligations without r.
TAXN-WTHS-0008
Included
Tax systems must apply heightened reporting, audit
Tax systems must apply heightened reporting requirements, enhanced audit rates, and stricter enforcement to very large concentrations of wealth — the higher the wealth, the more scrutiny.
Tax systems must apply heightened reporting, audit, and anti-avoidance scrutiny to high-net-worth individuals and complex personal wealth structures.
Core rule in the TAX-WTH family establishing: Tax systems must apply heightened reporting, audit, and anti-avoidance scrutiny to high-net-worth individuals and complex personal wealth structures.
TAXN-WTHS-0009
Included
Artificial conversion of labor income into lower-taxed capital
Artificially converting labor income — money earned by working — into capital income to take advantage of lower tax rates is tax avoidance and must be treated as such.
Artificial conversion of labor income into lower-taxed capital, business, or deferred income must be restricted or recharacterized for tax purposes.
Core rule in the TAX-WTH family establishing: Artificial conversion of labor income into lower-taxed capital, business, or deferred income must be restricted or recharacterized for tax purposes.
TAXN-WTHS-0010
Included
Personal tax avoidance schemes that rely on entity
Personal tax avoidance schemes that use complex entity structures to make income appear to come from a lower-taxed source must be treated as the avoidance they are.
Personal tax avoidance schemes that rely on entity layering, asset concealment, or timing games must trigger enhanced penalties and corrective taxation.
Core rule in the TAX-WTH family establishing: Personal tax avoidance schemes that rely on entity layering, asset concealment, or timing games must trigger enhanced penalties and corrective taxation.
TAXN-WTHS-0011
Proposal
Limit Dynasty Trusts to a 50-Year Maximum Term
Dynasty trusts — legal structures that can hold wealth tax-free for many generations or even indefinitely — must be limited to a 50-year maximum term.
Dynasty trusts — perpetual or near-perpetual trusts used to transfer wealth across generations outside the estate and gift tax system — must be limited to a maximum term of 50 years; no trust may be established or maintained as a perpetual or indefinite-duration vehicle for tax-free intergenerational wealth transfer; assets remaining in trust at the 50-year mark must be distributed and subjected to applicable estate and income taxation; criminal penalties must apply to attorneys and trustees who structure trusts to evade this limit through sham terminations and re-establishment.
Many states have repealed the Rule Against Perpetuities to attract trust business, permitting trusts to run indefinitely and transfer wealth across many generations while avoiding estate tax at each generational transfer. This mechanism allows the ultra-wealthy to effectively eliminate estate tax through advance planning, converting what Congress intended as a one-time generational transfer tax into permanently sheltered dynastic capital. A 50-year maximum term forces eventual distribution and taxation while preserving legitimate long-horizon trust planning. Estimate: abolishing dynasty trust loopholes could recover tens of billions in estate tax revenue over a decade. Cross-reference: TAXN-WTHS-0007 (trust anti-avoidance principle); TAXN-PMTS-0003 (step-up basis elimination).
TAXN-WTHS-0012
Proposal
Require 10-Year Minimum GRAT Term and Reform Mortality Discount Rules
GRATs — a tax planning technique that lets wealthy people transfer investment gains to heirs tax-free — must be reformed by requiring a meaningful minimum term and fixing the mortality discount rules exploited to eliminate taxes.
Grantor Retained Annuity Trusts (GRATs) must have a minimum term of 10 years; "zeroed-out" GRATs that transfer expected appreciation entirely tax-free must be eliminated by requiring a minimum taxable remainder at establishment; mortality-risk discounts that allow terminally ill grantors to zero out GRATs must be prohibited; and the IRS must finalize regulations closing abusive GRAT serial-rolling strategies in which short-term GRATs are repeatedly re-established to eliminate mortality risk.
GRATs are used by the ultra-wealthy to transfer billions in asset appreciation to heirs entirely free of gift and estate tax. A grantor places assets in the GRAT, retains annuity payments that return the principal plus the §7520 statutory interest rate, and any appreciation above that rate passes to heirs gift-tax-free. "Zeroed-out" GRATs set the annuity at exactly the §7520 rate, meaning virtually no taxable gift occurs regardless of actual appreciation. Because ultra-short GRATs are "rolled" repeatedly to make mortality risk negligible, a 10-year minimum term eliminates the rolling strategy by making mortality risk real. Treasury has estimated GRATs transfer hundreds of billions in untaxed wealth annually. Criminal referral must be available where advisors knowingly structure GRATs to evade the intent of transfer tax law. Cross-reference: TAXN-WTHS-0007 (trust anti-avoidance); TAXN-WTHS-0011 (dynasty trust limit).
TAXN-WTHS-0013
Proposal
Require Annual Asset Disclosure for Households with Net Worth Above $50 Million
Households with a net worth above $50 million must file annual asset disclosures with the IRS — extreme wealth must be visible to tax authorities to be properly taxed.
Any individual or household with net worth estimated above $50 million must file an annual asset disclosure report with the IRS listing all assets by category, valuation method, and estimated fair market value; any individual or household with net worth above $500 million must submit to an independent third-party audit of the disclosure; willful failure to file or material misstatement in the disclosure must be treated as a felony with mandatory referral to DOJ for prosecution; private right of action must be available to the United States to recover understated wealth plus penalties.
Effective enforcement of a wealth tax, estate tax, and billionaire minimum tax depends on accurate valuation of assets that are not publicly traded — closely held businesses, real estate, art, private equity stakes, and offshore structures. Without mandatory disclosure, the IRS must rely on self-reported figures that filers have every incentive to minimize. An annual disclosure requirement creates an auditable record year over year, making large unexplained changes in reported wealth detectable and subject to challenge. Independent audit above $500 million ensures that the most consequential valuations are not self-certified. This rule directly supports enforcement of the platform's wealth tax (TAXN-WTHS-0001 through 0008), billionaire minimum tax (TAXN-CAPS-0005), and estate tax provisions. Cross-reference: TAXN-ENFL-0002 (IRS funding floor); TAXN-WTHS-0008 (heightened reporting requirement).
TAXN-CAPS-0001
Included
Income derived from capital, including dividends, capital gains
Money made from investments — like dividends, capital gains, and passive income — cannot be taxed at lower rates than money earned by working. A dollar of income is a dollar of income.
Income derived from capital, including dividends, capital gains, and passive income, may not be taxed at lower effective rates than income derived from labor.
Core rule in the TAX-CAP family establishing: Income derived from capital, including dividends, capital gains, and passive income, may not be taxed at lower effective rates than income derived from labor.
TAXN-CAPS-0002
Included
Preferential treatment of capital income that disproportionately benefits
Tax preferences for investment income that disproportionately benefit the wealthy — while people who work for wages pay higher rates — must be eliminated or reduced.
Preferential treatment of capital income that disproportionately benefits high-wealth individuals must be reduced or eliminated.
Core rule in the TAX-CAP family establishing: Preferential treatment of capital income that disproportionately benefits high-wealth individuals must be reduced or eliminated.
TAXN-CAPS-0003
Included
Long-term investment incentives may be preserved only where
Investment incentives that encourage genuinely productive long-term investment may be preserved — but only where they demonstrably serve a real public purpose.
Long-term investment incentives may be preserved only where they do not enable large-scale tax avoidance or wealth hoarding.
Core rule in the TAX-CAP family establishing: Long-term investment incentives may be preserved only where they do not enable large-scale tax avoidance or wealth hoarding.
TAXN-CAPS-0004
Included
Capital gains must be taxed in a manner
Capital gains — profits from selling investments — must be taxed in a way that does not allow the wealthy to systematically pay lower rates than people who earn wages.
Capital gains must be taxed in a manner that reflects real economic gain and may not allow indefinite deferral or avoidance through asset holding strategies.
Core rule in the TAX-CAP family establishing: Capital gains must be taxed in a manner that reflects real economic gain and may not allow indefinite deferral or avoidance through asset holding strategies.
TAXN-CAPS-0005
Included
Unrealized gains at extreme wealth levels may be
At extreme levels of wealth, gains on investments that haven't been sold yet — called 'unrealized gains' — may be subject to annual taxation, since waiting until sale allows decades of untaxed accumulation.
Unrealized gains at extreme wealth levels may be subject to periodic taxation or equivalent anti-deferral mechanisms.
This platform affirms that unrealized capital gains constitute economic income for wealth concentration purposes and may be taxed at extreme wealth levels. This is not the mainstream position in tax economics: prominent scholars including Alan Auerbach and Douglas Holtz-Eakin have raised administrative and constitutional concerns about mark-to-market taxation of unrealized gains, particularly for illiquid assets. The Moore v. United States (2024) majority opinion declined to rule on whether unrealized income could be taxed, but several concurrences and dissents indicate ongoing constitutional uncertainty. The platform acknowledges these concerns seriously — they are not pretextual. The platform's position nonetheless is that exempting unrealized gains from any systematic taxation is incompatible with an effective progressive tax system, for a straightforward reason: the wealthiest Americans hold the vast majority of their wealth in appreciated but unrealized form (stocks, real estate, private equity), and the "buy, borrow, die" strategy allows indefinite tax deferral on this wealth. Workable anti-deferral designs exist: mark-to-market for publicly traded securities (administratively simple); deferred realization with interest charges for illiquid assets (the Auerbach retrospective tax approach); and deemed realization at transfer. The platform does not specify a single mechanism — it establishes that indefinite deferral on extreme wealth concentrations is not acceptable and that anti-deferral mechanisms are constitutional under a properly amended framework.
TAXN-CAPS-0006
Included
Step-up in basis rules that eliminate tax
The 'stepped-up basis' rule allows inherited assets to pass between generations tax-free on gains that occurred during the original owner's lifetime — this loophole must be closed.
Step-up in basis rules that eliminate tax on large accumulated gains at death must be reformed or eliminated.
Core rule in the TAX-CAP family establishing: Step-up in basis rules that eliminate tax on large accumulated gains at death must be reformed or eliminated.
TAXN-CAPS-0007
Included
Compensation or value derived from personal labor
Compensation that is effectively payment for personal work and effort cannot be reclassified as investment income just to take advantage of lower capital gains tax rates.
Compensation or value derived from personal labor may not be reclassified into lower-taxed forms solely through contractual, corporate, or financial engineering.
Core rule in the TAX-CAP family establishing: Compensation or value derived from personal labor may not be reclassified into lower-taxed forms solely through contractual, corporate, or financial engineering.
TAXN-CAPS-0008
Included
Carried interest, performance allocation, and similar mechanisms that
Carried interest — a tax break that lets investment fund managers pay capital gains rates instead of income tax rates on their compensation — must be treated as ordinary income.
Carried interest, performance allocation, and similar mechanisms that function as compensation should be taxed in accordance with their economic substance.
Core rule in the TAX-CAP family establishing: Carried interest, performance allocation, and similar mechanisms that function as compensation should be taxed in accordance with their economic substance.
TAXN-ESTS-0001
Included
Large intergenerational wealth transfers must be taxed
When very large amounts of wealth pass from one generation to the next — through inheritance — those transfers must be taxed to prevent a small number of dynasties from accumulating permanent power over the economy.
Large intergenerational wealth transfers must be taxed to prevent permanent economic stratification and dynastic concentration of power.
Core rule in the TAX-EST family establishing: Large intergenerational wealth transfers must be taxed to prevent permanent economic stratification and dynastic concentration of power.
TAXN-ESTS-0002
Included
Estate and inheritance tax systems must be structured
Estate and inheritance tax systems must be designed with meaningful rates and coverage — not riddled with so many exemptions and loopholes that they apply only on paper.
Estate and inheritance tax systems must be structured to protect small estates while applying stronger obligations to very large transfers.
Core rule in the TAX-EST family establishing: Estate and inheritance tax systems must be structured to protect small estates while applying stronger obligations to very large transfers.
TAXN-ESTS-0003
Included
Trusts, foundations, and other structures may not be
Trusts, foundations, and other legal structures cannot be used to pass wealth between generations indefinitely while avoiding estate and inheritance taxes.
Trusts, foundations, and other structures may not be used to indefinitely defer or avoid inheritance taxation.
Core rule in the TAX-EST family establishing: Trusts, foundations, and other structures may not be used to indefinitely defer or avoid inheritance taxation.
TAXN-AINL-0001
Included
Economic value generated through automation and AI
When companies use AI or automation to generate economic value, that value should contribute to public systems — just like wages paid to human workers do through payroll taxes.
Economic value generated through automation and AI must contribute to public systems similarly to human labor and traditional economic activity.
Core rule in the TAX-AI family establishing: Economic value generated through automation and AI must contribute to public systems similarly to human labor and traditional economic activity.
TAXN-AINL-0002
Included
Organizations that replace or substantially displace human labor
Companies that replace large numbers of workers with machines or AI should pay into public systems to offset the cost their choices impose on those workers and their communities.
Organizations that replace or substantially displace human labor through AI or automation must contribute an AI labor-equivalent tax based on the economic value of displaced work.
Core rule in the TAX-AI family establishing: Organizations that replace or substantially displace human labor through AI or automation must contribute an AI labor-equivalent tax based on the economic value of displaced work.
TAXN-AINL-0003
Included
AI taxation applies where automation materially reduces labor
An AI tax applies when automation materially reduces the number of human workers at a company — it's not triggered by using automation for things humans weren't doing before.
AI taxation applies where automation materially reduces labor costs, replaces jobs, or shifts value from human labor to automated systems.
Core rule in the TAX-AI family establishing: AI taxation applies where automation materially reduces labor costs, replaces jobs, or shifts value from human labor to automated systems.
TAXN-AINL-0004
Included
AI tax obligations must be based on measurable
Any tax on AI-driven labor displacement must be based on measurable, verifiable data — not estimates or assumptions that companies can easily manipulate.
AI tax obligations must be based on measurable indicators including labor displacement, productivity gains, and cost savings attributable to automation.
Core rule in the TAX-AI family establishing: AI tax obligations must be based on measurable indicators including labor displacement, productivity gains, and cost savings attributable to automation.
TAXN-AINL-0005
Included
AI taxation systems must prevent avoidance through reclassification
Companies cannot escape AI labor taxes by reclassifying automated workers as contractors, outsourcing jobs, or restructuring on paper — the tax follows real economic displacement.
AI taxation systems must prevent avoidance through reclassification of labor, outsourcing, contractor substitution, or artificial restructuring.
Core rule in the TAX-AI family establishing: AI taxation systems must prevent avoidance through reclassification of labor, outsourcing, contractor substitution, or artificial restructuring.
TAXN-AINL-0006
Included
Companies may not evade AI taxation by shifting
Companies cannot shift operations to other countries or subsidiaries to avoid paying AI-related taxes on labor displacement that happens in the U.S.
Companies may not evade AI taxation by shifting labor to gig, contract, or offshore arrangements where AI is functionally replacing labor.
Core rule in the TAX-AI family establishing: Companies may not evade AI taxation by shifting labor to gig, contract, or offshore arrangements where AI is functionally replacing labor.
TAXN-AINL-0007
Included
Revenue from AI-related taxation should support workforce transition
Revenue collected from AI and automation taxes should be used to help displaced workers retrain, find new jobs, and maintain their standard of living during the transition.
Revenue from AI-related taxation should support workforce transition, education, public services, and economic stabilization in response to automation.
Core rule in the TAX-AI family establishing: Revenue from AI-related taxation should support workforce transition, education, public services, and economic stabilization in response to automation.
TAXN-AINL-0008
Included
AI tax systems must balance innovation incentives
AI tax policy must be carefully designed to discourage reckless labor displacement while still allowing beneficial uses of technology that create new value and opportunities.
AI tax systems must balance innovation incentives with prevention of large-scale labor displacement without societal contribution.
Core rule in the TAX-AI family establishing: AI tax systems must balance innovation incentives with prevention of large-scale labor displacement without societal contribution.
TAXN-AINL-0009
Included
Beneficial uses of AI that improve safety, accessibility
AI uses that genuinely improve safety, accessibility, or public benefit — like medical diagnostics or assistive technology — should be treated differently from AI used purely to cut labor costs.
Beneficial uses of AI that improve safety, accessibility, or public welfare without displacing labor may be treated differently under defined criteria.
Core rule in the TAX-AI family establishing: Beneficial uses of AI that improve safety, accessibility, or public welfare without displacing labor may be treated differently under defined criteria.
TAXN-AINL-0010
Included
Companies deriving disproportionate economic power from AI systems
Companies that have gained enormous market power or economic dominance through AI systems face additional obligations — their gains came partly from public infrastructure and should contribute back to it.
Companies deriving disproportionate economic power from AI systems may be subject to enhanced tax, reporting, and antitrust scrutiny.
Core rule in the TAX-AI family establishing: Companies deriving disproportionate economic power from AI systems may be subject to enhanced tax, reporting, and antitrust scrutiny.
TAXN-CORS-0001
Included
Corporations must pay meaningful taxes on real economic
Corporate tax rates must be high enough to prevent companies from effectively paying nothing by shuffling profits through subsidiaries in low-tax countries.
Corporations must pay meaningful taxes on real economic activity and may not reduce effective tax liability through paper restructuring or artificial profit shifting.
Core rule in the TAX-COR family establishing: Corporations must pay meaningful taxes on real economic activity and may not reduce effective tax liability through paper restructuring or artificial profit shifting.
TAXN-CORS-0002
Included
Corporate tax systems must be designed to prevent
Corporate tax systems must be designed to close the loopholes that allow profitable corporations to pay little or nothing in taxes.
Corporate tax systems must be designed to prevent base erosion, profit shifting, transfer-pricing abuse, and jurisdiction shopping.
Core rule in the TAX-COR family establishing: Corporate tax systems must be designed to prevent base erosion, profit shifting, transfer-pricing abuse, and jurisdiction shopping.
TAXN-CORS-0003
Included
Corporations may not use shell entities, internal royalty
Corporations cannot use shell companies, internal royalty payments, or other accounting arrangements to move profits out of the U.S. and avoid taxes on them.
Corporations may not use shell entities, internal royalty structures, debt loading, or affiliate gamesmanship to evade fair taxation.
Core rule in the TAX-COR family establishing: Corporations may not use shell entities, internal royalty structures, debt loading, or affiliate gamesmanship to evade fair taxation.
TAXN-CORS-0004
Included
Corporate tax systems must reflect real economic activity
Corporate taxes must be based on where companies actually do business and generate revenue — not on where they file paperwork.
Corporate tax systems must reflect real economic activity and may not be reduced through artificial accounting, legal structuring, or financial engineering.
Core rule in the TAX-COR family establishing: Corporate tax systems must reflect real economic activity and may not be reduced through artificial accounting, legal structuring, or financial engineering.
TAXN-CORS-0005
Included
Corporations must pay a minimum effective tax rate
All corporations must pay a minimum effective tax rate — a floor — so that no profitable company can use deductions and credits to pay nothing.
Corporations must pay a minimum effective tax rate based on real economic activity regardless of deductions, credits, or structural arrangements.
Core rule in the TAX-COR family establishing: Corporations must pay a minimum effective tax rate based on real economic activity regardless of deductions, credits, or structural arrangements.
TAXN-CORS-0006
Included
Effective tax rate calculations must account for global
When calculating whether a corporation has paid the minimum tax, the calculation must account for everything the company does globally — not just domestic operations.
Effective tax rate calculations must account for global income and may not be reduced through jurisdictional fragmentation.
Core rule in the TAX-COR family establishing: Effective tax rate calculations must account for global income and may not be reduced through jurisdictional fragmentation.
TAXN-LOPS-0001
Included
Tax provisions that primarily enable avoidance, deferral
Tax provisions whose primary purpose is enabling the wealthy and corporations to avoid, defer, or artificially reduce their taxes — without providing corresponding public benefit — must be eliminated.
Tax provisions that primarily enable avoidance, deferral, or artificial reduction of tax liability without corresponding public benefit must be eliminated.
Core rule in the TAX-LOP family establishing: Tax provisions that primarily enable avoidance, deferral, or artificial reduction of tax liability without corresponding public benefit must be eliminated.
TAXN-LOPS-0002
Included
Corporate tax law must be regularly reviewed
Corporate tax law must be regularly reviewed to identify and close new loopholes as they emerge — wealthy interests continuously find new ways to exploit the tax code.
Corporate tax law must be regularly reviewed to identify and remove emergent loopholes, avoidance schemes, and unintended gaps.
Core rule in the TAX-LOP family establishing: Corporate tax law must be regularly reviewed to identify and remove emergent loopholes, avoidance schemes, and unintended gaps.
TAXN-DEDS-0001
Included
Deductions must be directly tied to legitimate business
Business tax deductions must be tied to real, legitimate business expenses — they cannot be used to artificially reduce taxable income by claiming personal, inflated, or unrelated expenses.
Deductions must be directly tied to legitimate business activity and may not be used to artificially reduce taxable income through unrelated or inflated expenses.
Core rule in the TAX-DED family establishing: Deductions must be directly tied to legitimate business activity and may not be used to artificially reduce taxable income through unrelated or inflated expenses.
TAXN-DEDS-0002
Included
Excessive executive compensation, stock-based compensation, and similar mechanisms
Excessive executive pay packages — especially those structured to minimize taxes — cannot be written off as ordinary business expenses to the same extent they are now.
Excessive executive compensation, stock-based compensation, and similar mechanisms may be limited in deductibility where they function as tax avoidance tools.
Core rule in the TAX-DED family establishing: Excessive executive compensation, stock-based compensation, and similar mechanisms may be limited in deductibility where they function as tax avoidance tools.
TAXN-DEDS-0003
Included
Interest deductions may be limited where used
Corporations may not use excessive interest deductions from debt — especially debt taken on primarily to reduce taxes — to dramatically lower their taxable income.
Interest deductions may be limited where used to artificially shift profits or create internal debt structures for tax avoidance.
Core rule in the TAX-DED family establishing: Interest deductions may be limited where used to artificially shift profits or create internal debt structures for tax avoidance.
TAXN-DEDS-0004
Included
Internal financial arrangements, including intercompany loans, royalties
Internal transactions within a company — like loans or royalty payments between parent companies and subsidiaries — must be structured around real economic value, not used to move income to lower-tax entities.
Internal financial arrangements, including intercompany loans, royalties, and licensing structures, may not be used to shift profits or erode the tax base.
Core rule in the TAX-DED family establishing: Internal financial arrangements, including intercompany loans, royalties, and licensing structures, may not be used to shift profits or erode the tax base.
TAXN-DEDS-0005
Included
Transactions lacking economic substance beyond tax reduction
Business transactions that have no real economic purpose other than reducing taxes must not be treated as legitimate deductions — substance over form matters.
Transactions lacking economic substance beyond tax reduction must be disallowed.
Core rule in the TAX-DED family establishing: Transactions lacking economic substance beyond tax reduction must be disallowed.
TAXN-BEPS-0001
Included
Corporate income must be taxed based on real
Corporations must be taxed based on where they actually sell products, employ people, and operate — not just where their lawyers say they are 'headquartered' on paper.
Corporate income must be taxed based on real economic activity, including sales, workforce, and physical presence, rather than legal entity location alone.
Core rule in the TAX-BEP family establishing: Corporate income must be taxed based on real economic activity, including sales, workforce, and physical presence, rather than legal entity location alone.
TAXN-BEPS-0002
Included
Transfer pricing must reflect real market value
When companies charge their own subsidiaries for goods, services, or intellectual property, those prices must reflect actual market rates — not be inflated to shift profits to low-tax countries.
Transfer pricing must reflect real market value and may not be manipulated to shift profits across jurisdictions.
Core rule in the TAX-BEP family establishing: Transfer pricing must reflect real market value and may not be manipulated to shift profits across jurisdictions.
TAXN-BEPS-0003
Included
Artificial profit allocation to low-tax jurisdictions without corresponding
Artificially routing profits to low-tax countries when the company does little or no real business there is tax avoidance — and must be treated as such.
Artificial profit allocation to low-tax jurisdictions without corresponding real activity is prohibited.
Core rule in the TAX-BEP family establishing: Artificial profit allocation to low-tax jurisdictions without corresponding real activity is prohibited.
TAXN-EXTS-0001
Included
Stock buybacks and similar financial extraction mechanisms
When corporations use profits to buy back their own stock — enriching shareholders without creating jobs or new products — those buybacks may be taxed or limited since they don't contribute to the broader economy.
Stock buybacks and similar financial extraction mechanisms may be subject to taxation or limitation where they do not contribute to productive investment.
Core rule in the TAX-EXT family establishing: Stock buybacks and similar financial extraction mechanisms may be subject to taxation or limitation where they do not contribute to productive investment.
TAXN-EXTS-0002
Included
Tax policy may not incentivize financial engineering, short-term
Tax policy must not give preferential treatment to financial engineering and short-term extraction of corporate value over real productive investment.
Tax policy may not incentivize financial engineering, short-term shareholder extraction, or non-productive capital allocation.
Core rule in the TAX-EXT family establishing: Tax policy may not incentivize financial engineering, short-term shareholder extraction, or non-productive capital allocation.
TAXN-INCS-0001
Included
Tax incentives must be tied to measurable public-good
Tax incentives — special breaks given to encourage certain business behaviors — must be tied to measurable public benefits like affordable housing, fair wages, environmental performance, or durable investment.
Tax incentives must be tied to measurable public-good outcomes such as affordability, labor standards, environmental performance, durable investment, or public benefit.
Core rule in the TAX-INC family establishing: Tax incentives must be tied to measurable public-good outcomes such as affordability, labor standards, environmental performance, durable investment, or public benefit.
TAXN-INCS-0002
Included
Tax incentives may not reward stock buybacks, financial
Tax incentives cannot reward stock buybacks, financial manipulation, or short-term profit extraction — they exist to encourage behavior that benefits the public, not shareholders.
Tax incentives may not reward stock buybacks, financial engineering, offshoring, wage suppression, or purely extractive behavior.
Core rule in the TAX-INC family establishing: Tax incentives may not reward stock buybacks, financial engineering, offshoring, wage suppression, or purely extractive behavior.
TAXN-INCS-0003
Included
Public subsidies and tax advantages should favor durable
Public subsidies and tax advantages should favor businesses that create durable value, treat workers well, and invest in communities — not just those that maximize quarterly profits.
Public subsidies and tax advantages should favor durable productive investment, worker benefit, environmental responsibility, and public-interest innovation.
Core rule in the TAX-INC family establishing: Public subsidies and tax advantages should favor durable productive investment, worker benefit, environmental responsibility, and public-interest innovation.
TAXN-INCS-0004
Included
Corporate tax structures should reward long-term investment, worker
Corporate tax structures should reward genuine long-term investment and worker development — not financial engineering designed to extract value while minimizing tax.
Corporate tax structures should reward long-term investment, worker compensation, domestic reinvestment, and public-benefit outcomes.
Core rule in the TAX-INC family establishing: Corporate tax structures should reward long-term investment, worker compensation, domestic reinvestment, and public-benefit outcomes.
TAXN-INCS-0005
Included
Corporate tax incentives may not reward offshoring, wage
Corporate tax incentives cannot reward offshoring jobs, suppressing wages, or evading environmental obligations — these behaviors harm the public good rather than serve it.
Corporate tax incentives may not reward offshoring, wage suppression, or environmental harm.
Core rule in the TAX-INC family establishing: Corporate tax incentives may not reward offshoring, wage suppression, or environmental harm.
TAXN-TRAN-0001
Included
Beneficial ownership of companies, trusts, major asset-holding structures
The true owners of companies, trusts, and other asset-holding structures must be transparent to tax regulators — anonymous shell companies are a tool for hiding wealth and evading taxes.
Beneficial ownership of companies, trusts, major asset-holding structures, and tax-relevant entities must be transparent to regulators and enforceable through reporting rules.
Core rule in the TAX-TRN family establishing: Beneficial ownership of companies, trusts, major asset-holding structures, and tax-relevant entities must be transparent to regulators and enforceable through reporting rules.
TAXN-TRAN-0002
Included
High-risk tax structures and large offshore holdings
High-risk tax structures and large offshore holdings must be subject to enhanced disclosure requirements so regulators can identify and investigate potential evasion.
High-risk tax structures and large offshore holdings must be subject to enhanced public or regulatory reporting requirements.
Core rule in the TAX-TRN family establishing: High-risk tax structures and large offshore holdings must be subject to enhanced public or regulatory reporting requirements.
TAXN-TRAN-0003
Included
Secrecy structures designed to conceal effective control
Secrecy structures — like layered trusts and anonymous holding companies — that are designed primarily to hide who controls assets from tax authorities must be prohibited or sharply restricted.
Secrecy structures designed to conceal effective control or beneficial ownership are prohibited.
Core rule in the TAX-TRN family establishing: Secrecy structures designed to conceal effective control or beneficial ownership are prohibited.
TAXN-TRAN-0004
Included
Large corporations must publicly report revenue, profit, tax
Large corporations must publicly report their revenue, profits, and taxes paid in every country where they operate — country-by-country reporting should be available to the public, not just regulators.
Large corporations must publicly report revenue, profit, tax paid, workforce, and activity by jurisdiction.
Core rule in the TAX-TRN family establishing: Large corporations must publicly report revenue, profit, tax paid, workforce, and activity by jurisdiction.
TAXN-TRAN-0005
Included
Corporate structures, subsidiaries, and ownership chains must be
Corporate ownership chains — including subsidiaries and holding companies — must be clearly disclosed so that regulators and the public can understand who ultimately owns and controls major businesses.
Corporate structures, subsidiaries, and ownership chains must be fully disclosed for tax and regulatory purposes.
Core rule in the TAX-TRN family establishing: Corporate structures, subsidiaries, and ownership chains must be fully disclosed for tax and regulatory purposes.
TAXN-ENFL-0001
Included
Tax enforcement agencies must be well funded, technically
The IRS must be fully funded and staffed to audit high-income filers and corporations at the same rates as working-class filers — right now, wealthy taxpayers are audited far less than low-income ones.
Tax enforcement agencies must be well funded, technically capable, and protected from political sabotage or under-enforcement.
Core rule in the TAX-ENF family establishing: Tax enforcement agencies must be well funded, technically capable, and protected from political sabotage or under-enforcement.
TAXN-ENFL-0002
Included
Repeated, willful, or large-scale tax evasion must trigger
Repeated, willful, or large-scale tax evasion must trigger serious criminal penalties, not just fines — treating tax fraud as a cost of doing business sends the wrong message.
Repeated, willful, or large-scale tax evasion must trigger significant civil and criminal penalties for both entities and responsible individuals.
Core rule in the TAX-ENF family establishing: Repeated, willful, or large-scale tax evasion must trigger significant civil and criminal penalties for both entities and responsible individuals.
TAXN-ENFL-0003
Included
Tax audits and investigations must prioritize large-scale evasion
IRS audit resources and investigations must prioritize large-scale tax evasion, which costs the public hundreds of billions of dollars annually — not primarily target low-income filers.
Tax audits and investigations must prioritize large-scale evasion, abusive complexity, and concentrated avoidance structures rather than disproportionately focusing on easier low-income enforcement targets.
Core rule in the TAX-ENF family establishing: Tax audits and investigations must prioritize large-scale evasion, abusive complexity, and concentrated avoidance structures rather than disproportionately focusing on easier low-i.
TAXN-ENFL-0004
Included
Professional facilitators of tax fraud or abusive tax
Accountants, lawyers, and financial advisers who facilitate tax fraud or help design abusive tax schemes must face real consequences — not just their clients.
Professional facilitators of tax fraud or abusive tax concealment, including lawyers, accountants, consultants, and intermediaries, may be held civilly and criminally liable where they knowingly enable unlawful evasion.
Core rule in the TAX-ENF family establishing: Professional facilitators of tax fraud or abusive tax concealment, including lawyers, accountants, consultants, and intermediaries, may be held civilly and criminally liable where .
TAXN-ENFL-0005
Included
Tax enforcement must prioritize large corporations, complex structures
Tax enforcement must focus on large corporations and complex financial structures — not continue the current pattern of auditing working-class families at higher rates than the wealthy.
Tax enforcement must prioritize large corporations, complex structures, and high-risk avoidance behavior rather than low-risk individual taxpayers.
Core rule in the TAX-ENF family establishing: Tax enforcement must prioritize large corporations, complex structures, and high-risk avoidance behavior rather than low-risk individual taxpayers.
TAXN-ENFL-0006
Included
Professional enablers of corporate tax avoidance, including law
Law firms, accounting firms, and other professional enablers of corporate tax avoidance must face regulatory consequences for designing or marketing schemes that cross into illegality.
Professional enablers of corporate tax avoidance, including law firms, accounting firms, and consultants, may be held liable where they design or implement abusive schemes.
Core rule in the TAX-ENF family establishing: Professional enablers of corporate tax avoidance, including law firms, accounting firms, and consultants, may be held liable where they design or implement abusive schemes.
TAXN-ENFL-0007
Included
Repeated or large-scale corporate tax avoidance must trigger
Corporations that repeatedly or on a large scale avoid taxes must face escalating consequences — not just quiet settlements that make avoidance cheaper than compliance.
Repeated or large-scale corporate tax avoidance must trigger escalating penalties, including fines, back taxes, structural remedies, and potential criminal liability.
Core rule in the TAX-ENF family establishing: Repeated or large-scale corporate tax avoidance must trigger escalating penalties, including fines, back taxes, structural remedies, and potential criminal liability.
TAXN-ENFL-0008
Included
Corporations may not indefinitely delay tax enforcement through
Corporations cannot use litigation delays, procedural maneuvers, and appeals to indefinitely postpone tax enforcement — there must be reasonable limits on delay tactics.
Corporations may not indefinitely delay tax enforcement through litigation, procedural complexity, or jurisdictional fragmentation.
Core rule in the TAX-ENF family establishing: Corporations may not indefinitely delay tax enforcement through litigation, procedural complexity, or jurisdictional fragmentation.
TAXN-ENFL-0009
Included
Simplification for ordinary taxpayers must be paired
Simplifying taxes for ordinary people and rigorously enforcing taxes on the wealthy and corporations are not competing goals — they must both be pursued together.
Simplification for ordinary taxpayers must be paired with stronger enforcement against sophisticated avoidance by high-income and high-wealth individuals.
Core rule in the TAX-ENF family establishing: Simplification for ordinary taxpayers must be paired with stronger enforcement against sophisticated avoidance by high-income and high-wealth individuals.
TAXN-ENFL-0010
Included
Enforcement resources must be allocated according to risk
IRS enforcement resources must be allocated based on where the biggest tax gaps are — and the data consistently shows those gaps are at the top of the income scale, not the bottom.
Enforcement resources must be allocated according to risk, complexity, and revenue significance rather than ease of collection from less-resourced taxpayers.
Core rule in the TAX-ENF family establishing: Enforcement resources must be allocated according to risk, complexity, and revenue significance rather than ease of collection from less-resourced taxpayers.
TAXN-GOVN-0001
Included
Tax policy and enforcement agencies must be protected
The IRS and other tax agencies must be protected from regulatory capture — where industries or wealthy interests effectively take over the agencies meant to regulate them — as well as from political interference and deliberate underfunding.
Tax policy and enforcement agencies must be protected from regulatory capture, political interference, and deliberate underfunding.
Core rule in the TAX-GOV family establishing: Tax policy and enforcement agencies must be protected from regulatory capture, political interference, and deliberate underfunding.
TAXN-GOVN-0002
Included
Revolving-door practices between regulators and regulated entities
The revolving door between tax regulators and the industries they regulate — where officials leave government to work for the companies they once oversaw — must be restricted to prevent conflicts of interest.
Revolving-door practices between regulators and regulated entities must be restricted to prevent conflicts of interest in tax policy and enforcement.
Core rule in the TAX-GOV family establishing: Revolving-door practices between regulators and regulated entities must be restricted to prevent conflicts of interest in tax policy and enforcement.
TAXN-ENVS-0001
Included
Environmental tax policy must internalize environmental harms that
Tax policy must make companies pay for the environmental harm they cause — instead of letting them dump those costs onto the public, future generations, and nature.
Environmental tax policy must internalize environmental harms that are currently externalized onto the public, future generations, and ecosystems.
Core rule in the TAX-ENV family establishing: Environmental tax policy must internalize environmental harms that are currently externalized onto the public, future generations, and ecosystems.
TAXN-ENVS-0002
Included
Environmental taxation must be structured to reduce pollution
Environmental taxes must be designed to actually reduce pollution, not just generate revenue while allowing harm to continue unchecked.
Environmental taxation must be structured to reduce pollution, waste, emissions, ecosystem damage, and resource depletion while supporting a just transition.
Core rule in the TAX-ENV family establishing: Environmental taxation must be structured to reduce pollution, waste, emissions, ecosystem damage, and resource depletion while supporting a just transition.
TAXN-ENVS-0003
Included
Environmental taxes and fees may not be used
Environmental taxes and fees cannot be used as a license to pollute — paying a tax does not give a company the right to cause unlimited environmental damage.
Environmental taxes and fees may not be used as substitutes for direct regulation where direct regulation is necessary to prevent serious harm.
Core rule in the TAX-ENV family establishing: Environmental taxes and fees may not be used as substitutes for direct regulation where direct regulation is necessary to prevent serious harm.
TAXN-ENVS-0004
Included
Carbon-intensive activity may be subject to direct taxation
Carbon-intensive activities — like burning fossil fuels — may be subject to direct taxation based on the amount of carbon they emit.
Carbon-intensive activity may be subject to direct taxation or equivalent pricing mechanisms based on real, auditable emissions and lifecycle impact.
Core rule in the TAX-ENV family establishing: Carbon-intensive activity may be subject to direct taxation or equivalent pricing mechanisms based on real, auditable emissions and lifecycle impact.
TAXN-ENVS-0005
Included
Environmental tax systems must not rely on unverifiable
Environmental tax systems must rely on verified, independently audited emissions and pollution data — not company self-reporting that cannot be independently confirmed.
Environmental tax systems must not rely on unverifiable offsets, accounting games, or market abstractions that allow polluters to avoid real reductions.
Core rule in the TAX-ENV family establishing: Environmental tax systems must not rely on unverifiable offsets, accounting games, or market abstractions that allow polluters to avoid real reductions.
TAXN-ENVS-0006
Included
Carbon pricing or equivalent environmental taxation must be
Carbon pricing or equivalent environmental taxation must be comprehensive — it cannot be designed with so many exemptions that it fails to actually reduce emissions.
Carbon pricing or equivalent environmental taxation must be tied to measurable emissions, sectoral risk, and enforceable reduction obligations.
Core rule in the TAX-ENV family establishing: Carbon pricing or equivalent environmental taxation must be tied to measurable emissions, sectoral risk, and enforceable reduction obligations.
TAXN-ENVS-0007
Included
Environmental tax systems must distinguish between productive necessity
Environmental taxes must distinguish between pollution that is truly unavoidable versus pollution that comes from prioritizing profit over cleaner alternatives that already exist.
Environmental tax systems must distinguish between productive necessity and avoidable pollution while preserving a clear path toward decarbonization.
Core rule in the TAX-ENV family establishing: Environmental tax systems must distinguish between productive necessity and avoidable pollution while preserving a clear path toward decarbonization.
TAXN-ENVS-0008
Included
Water extraction and intensive water use may be
Large-scale extraction of water from rivers, aquifers, and other sources may be subject to taxation or fees to reflect the true cost of depleting shared public resources.
Water extraction and intensive water use may be subject to taxation, fees, or escalating charges where use patterns threaten sustainability, public access, or ecosystem health.
Core rule in the TAX-ENV family establishing: Water extraction and intensive water use may be subject to taxation, fees, or escalating charges where use patterns threaten sustainability, public access, or ecosystem health.
TAXN-ENVS-0009
Included
Water-related taxation and pricing must account for local
Water-related taxes and pricing policies must account for local conditions — drought-stricken areas and water-abundant areas require different approaches.
Water-related taxation and pricing must account for local scarcity, watershed stress, aquifer depletion, and downstream ecological impact.
Core rule in the TAX-ENV family establishing: Water-related taxation and pricing must account for local scarcity, watershed stress, aquifer depletion, and downstream ecological impact.
TAXN-ENVS-0010
Included
Large-scale industrial water use may be subject
Large-scale industrial water use — by factories, agricultural operations, or data centers — may be subject to fees that reflect its impact on water availability for communities.
Large-scale industrial water use may be subject to enhanced reporting, monitoring, and environmental contribution requirements.
Core rule in the TAX-ENV family establishing: Large-scale industrial water use may be subject to enhanced reporting, monitoring, and environmental contribution requirements.
TAXN-ENVS-0011
Included
Water taxation and fee systems must not undermine
Water taxation and fee systems must not undermine access to clean drinking water for households and communities — affordability and basic access must be protected.
Water taxation and fee systems must not undermine basic household access to safe water or create hardship for essential personal use.
Core rule in the TAX-ENV family establishing: Water taxation and fee systems must not undermine basic household access to safe water or create hardship for essential personal use.
TAXN-ENVS-0012
Included
Polluting activities and persistent pollutants may be subject
Polluting activities and the release of persistent toxic chemicals may be subject to taxes and fees that reflect the long-term cost of contamination.
Polluting activities and persistent pollutants may be subject to taxes, fees, or strict liability charges proportionate to the harm they create.
Core rule in the TAX-ENV family establishing: Polluting activities and persistent pollutants may be subject to taxes, fees, or strict liability charges proportionate to the harm they create.
TAXN-ENVS-0013
Included
Tax and fee systems may be used
Tax and fee systems may be used to discourage harmful pollution and encourage cleaner alternatives — making it more expensive to pollute than to clean up operations.
Tax and fee systems may be used to discourage plastics, toxic byproducts, non-recyclable packaging, persistent waste, and environmentally destructive production methods.
Core rule in the TAX-ENV family establishing: Tax and fee systems may be used to discourage plastics, toxic byproducts, non-recyclable packaging, persistent waste, and environmentally destructive production methods.
TAXN-ENVS-0014
Included
Environmental taxes must account for lifecycle harm, including
Environmental taxes must account for the full lifecycle harm of a product or activity — including how it is produced, used, and disposed of — not just its immediate emissions.
Environmental taxes must account for lifecycle harm, including extraction, production, use, disposal, and leakage into ecosystems.
Core rule in the TAX-ENV family establishing: Environmental taxes must account for lifecycle harm, including extraction, production, use, disposal, and leakage into ecosystems.
TAXN-ENVS-0015
Included
Environmental tax policy should incentivize durable products, repairability
Tax policy should incentivize making products that last longer, are easier to repair, and generate less waste — rewarding durability over disposability.
Environmental tax policy should incentivize durable products, repairability, recyclability, material recovery, and reduced waste generation.
Core rule in the TAX-ENV family establishing: Environmental tax policy should incentivize durable products, repairability, recyclability, material recovery, and reduced waste generation.
TAXN-ENVS-0016
Included
Tax advantages may be used to support repair
Tax advantages may be offered to support repair businesses, refurbishment services, and reuse industries as part of a strategy to reduce waste and extend product lifetimes.
Tax advantages may be used to support repair, remanufacturing, refurbishment, reuse systems, and circular-economy infrastructure.
Core rule in the TAX-ENV family establishing: Tax advantages may be used to support repair, remanufacturing, refurbishment, reuse systems, and circular-economy infrastructure.
TAXN-ENVS-0017
Included
Tax policy may disfavor disposable, non-repairable, short-lifecycle
Tax policy may impose higher costs on disposable, non-repairable, or short-lived products that generate excessive waste — making the true environmental cost visible in the price.
Tax policy may disfavor disposable, non-repairable, short-lifecycle, or environmentally persistent products where viable alternatives exist.
Core rule in the TAX-ENV family establishing: Tax policy may disfavor disposable, non-repairable, short-lifecycle, or environmentally persistent products where viable alternatives exist.
TAXN-ENVS-0018
Included
Environmental tax systems must include strong anti-evasion rules
Environmental tax systems must include strong anti-evasion rules — companies cannot use accounting tricks, legal structures, or offshore arrangements to avoid paying environmental obligations.
Environmental tax systems must include strong anti-evasion rules so firms may not avoid liability through offshoring, shell structures, accounting manipulation, or supply-chain opacity.
Core rule in the TAX-ENV family establishing: Environmental tax systems must include strong anti-evasion rules so firms may not avoid liability through offshoring, shell structures, accounting manipulation, or supply-chain opa.
TAXN-ENVS-0019
Included
Corporations may not reduce environmental tax obligations through
Corporations cannot use carbon credits, offsets, or other financial instruments to eliminate environmental tax obligations without actually reducing the pollution they cause.
Corporations may not reduce environmental tax obligations through paper relocation or outsourcing of pollution without corresponding real reductions in harm.
Core rule in the TAX-ENV family establishing: Corporations may not reduce environmental tax obligations through paper relocation or outsourcing of pollution without corresponding real reductions in harm.
TAXN-ENVS-0020
Included
Imports and cross-border supply chains may be subject
Imports and cross-border supply chains may be subject to environmental border adjustments — charges that reflect the environmental cost of production in countries with lower standards.
Imports and cross-border supply chains may be subject to border-adjustment or equivalent mechanisms where necessary to prevent pollution offshoring and regulatory arbitrage.
Core rule in the TAX-ENV family establishing: Imports and cross-border supply chains may be subject to border-adjustment or equivalent mechanisms where necessary to prevent pollution offshoring and regulatory arbitrage.
TAXN-ENVS-0021
Included
Revenue from environmental taxation should support environmental cleanup
Revenue from environmental taxes should fund environmental cleanup, remediation, and restoration — not disappear into general budgets disconnected from the harm it addresses.
Revenue from environmental taxation should support environmental cleanup, climate resilience, public health protection, ecosystem restoration, and just-transition programs.
Core rule in the TAX-ENV family establishing: Revenue from environmental taxation should support environmental cleanup, climate resilience, public health protection, ecosystem restoration, and just-transition programs.
TAXN-ENVS-0022
Included
Environmental tax revenue should also support household cost
Some environmental tax revenue should also be used to offset the cost impact on low- and middle-income households — making sure the burden of environmental policy doesn't fall hardest on those who can least afford it.
Environmental tax revenue should also support household cost relief, public transportation, energy transition, and adaptation for communities most affected by environmental harm.
Core rule in the TAX-ENV family establishing: Environmental tax revenue should also support household cost relief, public transportation, energy transition, and adaptation for communities most affected by environmental harm.
TAXN-ENVS-0023
Included
Environmental tax systems must be designed so that
Environmental tax systems must be designed so that lower-income households are not disproportionately burdened — progressive design or rebates must be built in.
Environmental tax systems must be designed so that working households and low-income communities are not unfairly burdened relative to major industrial polluters and concentrated private gain.
Core rule in the TAX-ENV family establishing: Environmental tax systems must be designed so that working households and low-income communities are not unfairly burdened relative to major industrial polluters and concentrated p.
TAXN-ENVS-0024
Included
Environmental tax systems must be transparent, publicly understandable
Environmental tax systems must be transparent and publicly understandable — people should be able to see what is being taxed, at what rate, and why.
Environmental tax systems must be transparent, publicly understandable, and based on standardized reporting, measurable criteria, and auditable data.
Core rule in the TAX-ENV family establishing: Environmental tax systems must be transparent, publicly understandable, and based on standardized reporting, measurable criteria, and auditable data.
TAXN-ENVS-0025
Included
Entities subject to environmental taxes or fees
Companies subject to environmental taxes must keep detailed, verifiable records and provide them to regulators — not just self-report and hope no one checks.
Entities subject to environmental taxes or fees must file standardized environmental tax disclosures using defined forms, metrics, and reporting periods.
Core rule in the TAX-ENV family establishing: Entities subject to environmental taxes or fees must file standardized environmental tax disclosures using defined forms, metrics, and reporting periods.
TAXN-ENVS-0026
Included
Environmental tax enforcement must coordinate with environmental regulators
Environmental tax enforcement must coordinate with environmental regulators so that tax obligations and environmental rules reinforce each other rather than operating in silos.
Environmental tax enforcement must coordinate with environmental regulators, public auditors, and enforcement agencies to detect fraud, underreporting, and collusion.
Core rule in the TAX-ENV family establishing: Environmental tax enforcement must coordinate with environmental regulators, public auditors, and enforcement agencies to detect fraud, underreporting, and collusion.
TAXN-ENVS-0027
Included
Fraud, concealment, collusion, or knowing misreporting in environmental
Deliberate fraud, concealment, or knowing misreporting in environmental tax filings must be treated as serious violations — not just technical errors subject to minor penalties.
Fraud, concealment, collusion, or knowing misreporting in environmental tax filings or environmental impact disclosures must trigger significant civil and criminal penalties.
Core rule in the TAX-ENV family establishing: Fraud, concealment, collusion, or knowing misreporting in environmental tax filings or environmental impact disclosures must trigger significant civil and criminal penalties.
TAXN-ENVS-0028
Included
Auditors, executives, officers, and responsible individuals may be
Executives, auditors, and responsible individuals within companies that commit environmental tax fraud may be held personally liable — not just the company itself.
Auditors, executives, officers, and responsible individuals may be held civilly and criminally liable for fraudulent environmental tax reporting, concealment, or conspiracy.
Core rule in the TAX-ENV family establishing: Auditors, executives, officers, and responsible individuals may be held civilly and criminally liable for fraudulent environmental tax reporting, concealment, or conspiracy.
TAXN-ENVS-0029
Included
Repeated or systemic environmental tax violations must trigger
Repeated or systematic environmental tax violations must trigger escalating penalties, heightened oversight, and if necessary, loss of operating permits or other business licenses.
Repeated or systemic environmental tax violations must trigger escalating penalties, corrective orders, audit expansion, and structural remedies where necessary.
Core rule in the TAX-ENV family establishing: Repeated or systemic environmental tax violations must trigger escalating penalties, corrective orders, audit expansion, and structural remedies where necessary.
TAXN-ENVS-0030
Included
Environmental taxation must be integrated with direct environmental
Environmental taxation must work alongside — not replace — direct environmental regulation. Both tools are needed, and one cannot substitute for the other.
Environmental taxation must be integrated with direct environmental regulation, cleanup obligations, anti-waste policy, and public-interest industrial standards rather than treated as a stand-alone market tool.
Core rule in the TAX-ENV family establishing: Environmental taxation must be integrated with direct environmental regulation, cleanup obligations, anti-waste policy, and public-interest industrial standards rather than treated.
TAXN-ENVS-0031
Included
Environmental taxes, fees, and incentives must be reviewed
Environmental taxes, fees, and incentives must be regularly reviewed and updated to reflect changes in technology, emissions data, and environmental conditions.
Environmental taxes, fees, and incentives must be reviewed periodically to confirm that they are reducing harm, not merely pricing it in or legitimizing continued abuse.
Core rule in the TAX-ENV family establishing: Environmental taxes, fees, and incentives must be reviewed periodically to confirm that they are reducing harm, not merely pricing it in or legitimizing continued abuse.
TAXN-ENVS-0032
Included
Small-business carveouts or proportional treatment may be used
Small businesses may receive proportional treatment or carveouts in environmental tax systems to avoid creating compliance burdens that fall disproportionately on smaller operators.
Small-business carveouts or proportional treatment may be used where necessary, but may not undermine baseline environmental protections or create loopholes for larger actors.
Core rule in the TAX-ENV family establishing: Small-business carveouts or proportional treatment may be used where necessary, but may not undermine baseline environmental protections or create loopholes for larger actors.
TAXN-HVNS-0001
Included
Individuals and corporations may not evade tax obligations
Individuals and corporations cannot escape U.S. tax obligations by moving money, profits, or assets to tax havens — places with very low tax rates — when there is no real economic activity there.
Individuals and corporations may not evade tax obligations by shifting residence, profits, assets, or ownership structures to tax havens without corresponding real economic substance.
Core rule in the TAX-HVN family establishing: Individuals and corporations may not evade tax obligations by shifting residence, profits, assets, or ownership structures to tax havens without corresponding real economic substan.
TAXN-HVNS-0002
Included
United States should impose strong anti-haven rules
The U.S. should impose strong rules to prevent corporations and wealthy individuals from using tax havens to avoid contributing to the public systems that support their wealth creation.
The United States should impose strong anti-haven rules on offshore entities, trusts, shell companies, and beneficial ownership structures used to conceal wealth or avoid taxes.
Core rule in the TAX-HVN family establishing: The United States should impose strong anti-haven rules on offshore entities, trusts, shell companies, and beneficial ownership structures used to conceal wealth or avoid taxes.
TAXN-HVNS-0003
Included
Tax liability must follow beneficial ownership, effective control
Tax liability must follow who actually owns and controls assets and profits — not just whoever's name appears on a shell company or trust registered in a tax haven.
Tax liability must follow beneficial ownership, effective control, and real economic activity rather than nominal paper location alone.
Core rule in the TAX-HVN family establishing: Tax liability must follow beneficial ownership, effective control, and real economic activity rather than nominal paper location alone.
TAXN-HVNS-0004
Included
Corporations claiming offshore residence or foreign profit allocation
Corporations that claim to be based offshore or report profits in low-tax countries must demonstrate genuine economic substance there — not just a mailbox address and a handful of employees.
Corporations claiming offshore residence or foreign profit allocation must demonstrate real operational substance, not merely legal or accounting formality.
Core rule in the TAX-HVN family establishing: Corporations claiming offshore residence or foreign profit allocation must demonstrate real operational substance, not merely legal or accounting formality.
TAXN-HVNS-0005
Included
Ultra-wealthy individuals who move assets, tax domicile
Extremely wealthy people who move their assets or legal residency to tax havens to avoid U.S. taxes must still pay taxes on the gains and income they accumulated while benefiting from U.S. systems.
Ultra-wealthy individuals who move assets, tax domicile, or formal residence primarily to evade tax should be subject to anti-avoidance penalties, exit-tax structures, and ongoing anti-evasion review.
Core rule in the TAX-HVN family establishing: Ultra-wealthy individuals who move assets, tax domicile, or formal residence primarily to evade tax should be subject to anti-avoidance penalties, exit-tax structures, and ongoing .
TAXN-HVNS-0006
Included
Anti-tax-haven rules must distinguish ordinary expatriates and legitimate
Anti-tax-haven rules must be targeted at abusive arrangements — they should not create burdens for ordinary people who live or work abroad or for legitimate international businesses.
Anti-tax-haven rules must distinguish ordinary expatriates and legitimate international workers from high-wealth tax-evasion structures.
Core rule in the TAX-HVN family establishing: Anti-tax-haven rules must distinguish ordinary expatriates and legitimate international workers from high-wealth tax-evasion structures.
TAXN-HVNS-0007
Proposal
Strengthen FATCA with Escalating Penalties and No Allied-Country Carve-Outs
FATCA — the law requiring foreign banks to report American accounts — must be strengthened with escalating penalties and no exemptions for banks in allied countries.
The Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) must be strengthened with escalating penalties for non-compliant foreign financial institutions, including correspondent banking restrictions and withholding tax rate increases; no carve-outs or compliance exemptions may be granted to foreign financial institutions based on bilateral ally relationships or political pressure; Treasury must report annually to Congress on FATCA non-compliance by country and institution; DOJ must be required to prosecute willful facilitation of FATCA evasion by foreign institutions operating in U.S. markets; civil and criminal private rights of action must be available to the United States against enabling institutions.
FATCA requires foreign financial institutions to report accounts held by U.S. taxpayers to the IRS or face a 30% withholding tax on U.S.-source income. However, enforcement has been uneven: intergovernmental agreements have created bilateral carve-outs, and penalties for non-compliance have been inconsistently applied. Financial institutions in countries with strong political ties to the U.S. have at times received more lenient treatment, undermining the universality that makes FATCA effective as a deterrent. The annual offshore tax gap is estimated in the hundreds of billions of dollars. Eliminating ally-relationship carve-outs is essential — tax evasion is not more acceptable because it routes through a NATO partner's bank. Cross-reference: TAXN-HVNS-0001 through 0006 (anti-haven framework); TAXN-INTL-0001 (international enforcement coordination); TAXN-ENFL-0003 (criminal referral requirement).
TAXN-INTL-0001
Included
United States should pursue international agreements and coordinated
The U.S. should work with other countries to coordinate enforcement against tax havens, secrecy jurisdictions, and cross-border tax evasion — no country can solve this problem alone.
The United States should pursue international agreements and coordinated enforcement against tax havens, secrecy jurisdictions, and cross-border tax evasion.
Core rule in the TAX-INT family establishing: The United States should pursue international agreements and coordinated enforcement against tax havens, secrecy jurisdictions, and cross-border tax evasion.
TAXN-INTL-0002
Included
Trade, banking, sanctions, and diplomatic tools may be
Trade relationships, banking access, sanctions, and diplomatic tools may be used to pressure countries that enable tax evasion by providing secrecy and minimal taxation.
Trade, banking, sanctions, and diplomatic tools may be used against jurisdictions or institutions that systematically facilitate tax evasion, concealment, or illicit financial secrecy.
Core rule in the TAX-INT family establishing: Trade, banking, sanctions, and diplomatic tools may be used against jurisdictions or institutions that systematically facilitate tax evasion, concealment, or illicit financial secr.
TAXN-INTL-0003
Included
Foreign-policy and treaty tools should support transparency
Foreign policy and international treaty negotiations should support global tax transparency — making it harder for wealth to hide offshore.
Foreign-policy and treaty tools should support transparency of beneficial ownership, cross-border reporting, and anti-money-laundering enforcement related to tax abuse.
Core rule in the TAX-INT family establishing: Foreign-policy and treaty tools should support transparency of beneficial ownership, cross-border reporting, and anti-money-laundering enforcement related to tax abuse.
TAXN-INTL-0004
Proposal
Implement OECD 15% Global Minimum Corporate Tax with Unilateral BEAT Backstop
The U.S. must implement the OECD global minimum corporate tax of 15%, and use a backstop mechanism to ensure U.S. companies pay that minimum even if other countries don't.
The United States must fully implement the OECD Pillar Two 15% global minimum corporate tax through domestic legislation and treaty ratification; domestic GILTI rules must be reformed to align with the Pillar Two income inclusion rule on a country-by-country basis; where OECD-partner countries fail to implement equivalent minimum tax rules within a defined compliance window, the U.S. must apply an expanded Base Erosion and Anti-Abuse Tax (BEAT) at a rate sufficient to deter profit-shifting to non-compliant jurisdictions; the BEAT expansion must close existing exclusions for cost-sharing arrangements, services payments, and treaty-based reductions that allow the current BEAT to be avoided by sophisticated multinationals.
The OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework reached agreement in 2021 on a 15% global minimum corporate tax targeting multinational corporations with revenues above €750 million, covering approximately 90% of global multinational corporate income. U.S. implementation requires domestic GILTI reform aligned with Pillar Two and a domestic minimum top-up tax. Without full implementation, U.S. multinationals remain at a disadvantage relative to European competitors already subject to Pillar Two, and U.S. revenue from offshore profits is at risk of being collected by other countries instead. The BEAT backstop ensures that even if major economies delay, U.S. tax base erosion through payments to low-tax jurisdictions remains costly. Cross-reference: TAXN-CORS-0002 (GILTI expansion); TAXN-HVNS-0001 (substance requirement); TAXN-INTL-0001 (coordination framework).
TAXN-ADML-0001
Included
Tax administration systems should use automation, data matching
The IRS should use modern technology to make filing taxes simpler for ordinary people — while also using that technology to better catch complex tax cheating by corporations and the wealthy.
Tax administration systems should use automation, data matching, and modern technology to simplify filing for ordinary taxpayers and improve enforcement against complex evasion.
Core rule in the TAX-ADM family establishing: Tax administration systems should use automation, data matching, and modern technology to simplify filing for ordinary taxpayers and improve enforcement against complex evasion.
TAXN-ADML-0002
Included
Automated tax-administration systems must be transparent, reviewable
Automated IRS systems must be transparent and subject to human review — people must be able to see how they work and challenge decisions made by algorithms.
Automated tax-administration systems must be transparent, reviewable, and subject to human appeal where they materially affect taxpayer obligations or enforcement outcomes.
Core rule in the TAX-ADM family establishing: Automated tax-administration systems must be transparent, reviewable, and subject to human appeal where they materially affect taxpayer obligations or enforcement outcomes.
TAXN-ADML-0003
Included
IRS modernization must prioritize public usability, fraud detection
Modernizing the IRS must prioritize making filing easier for regular taxpayers and improving fraud detection — not just upgrading internal systems.
IRS modernization must prioritize public usability, fraud detection, high-end enforcement, and reduction of filing burden on ordinary people.
Core rule in the TAX-ADM family establishing: IRS modernization must prioritize public usability, fraud detection, high-end enforcement, and reduction of filing burden on ordinary people.
TAXN-ADML-0004
Proposal
Make IRS Direct File Permanent and Expand to All 50 States
IRS Direct File — the free government tax filing tool — must be made permanent and expanded to all 50 states so every taxpayer can file for free directly with the IRS.
IRS Direct File — the federal government's free, direct online tax filing tool — must be made permanent by statute and expanded to all 50 states and the District of Columbia; the IRS must be prohibited by statute from entering or renewing any agreement with commercial tax preparation companies that restricts, delays, or conditions the development or expansion of a free direct federal filing option; adequate dedicated funding for Direct File development, maintenance, and promotion must be included in the statutory IRS funding floor; and the IRS must conduct annual outreach campaigns to notify eligible filers of the free option.
The IRS Free File program, nominally providing free filing, was structured through agreements with commercial tax software companies that actively steered eligible filers toward paid products. Intuit and H&R Block have lobbied extensively and successfully to prevent government-run direct filing, including supporting the Taxpayer First Act provision that later constrained IRS action. IRS Direct File, piloted for the 2024 tax year in 12 states, received strong user satisfaction scores and successfully processed returns for hundreds of thousands of filers at zero cost. Making it permanent and nationwide eliminates a compliance cost borne almost entirely by low-to-middle-income filers who cannot afford professional preparation but face complexity from the EITC and refundable credit system. Cross-reference: TAXN-ADML-0003 (IRS modernization); TAXN-ADML-0005 (pre-populated returns); TAXN-DMJS-0004 (simplicity as co-equal goal).
TAXN-ADML-0005
Proposal
Require Pre-Populated Returns for All W-2 Wage-Only Filers
For workers who only receive a W-2 wage, the IRS should pre-fill their return using data it already has — so filing taxes becomes as simple as checking and confirming, not starting from scratch.
The IRS must provide all filers whose income consists solely of W-2 wages, standard interest, and dividend income with a pre-populated tax return using information already in IRS possession — W-2 data from employers, 1099-INT and 1099-DIV data from financial institutions, and prior-year filing data — allowing taxpayers to review, correct, and submit with a single confirmation; taxpayers must retain the right to amend or reject the pre-populated return; submission of the pre-populated return must be free; and the IRS must develop a mobile-friendly interface for pre-populated return review and submission.
More than 40 countries, including Sweden, Denmark, Estonia, and the UK, provide pre-populated or "return-free" tax filing for wage earners. The IRS already receives W-2, 1099-INT, 1099-DIV, and many other information returns before taxpayers file. A pre-populated return requires only that the agency use the data it already holds to assemble the form before sending it to the taxpayer for verification — a straightforward technical step that benefits ordinary filers enormously. California's ReadyReturn pilot demonstrated pre-populated returns work at scale with high accuracy. Commercial tax preparation companies oppose this reform because it eliminates their market among simple filers; that opposition must not determine public policy. Cross-reference: TAXN-ADML-0004 (Direct File permanent); TAXN-DMJS-0004 (simplicity goal).
TAXN-DMJS-0001
Included
Tax policy must be written and administered so
Tax policy must be written and enforced so that no wealthy individual, corporation, or politically connected actor can routinely get a better effective tax rate than ordinary working people.
Tax policy must be written and administered so that no class of wealth holder, corporation, or politically connected actor can routinely buy more favorable effective treatment than ordinary people.
Core rule in the TAX-DMJ family establishing: Tax policy must be written and administered so that no class of wealth holder, corporation, or politically connected actor can routinely buy more favorable effective treatment than.
TAXN-DMJS-0002
Included
legitimacy of the tax system depends on visible
The legitimacy of the tax system depends on people being able to see that it works fairly — a system where the rich clearly pay less than they should breeds justified cynicism.
The legitimacy of the tax system depends on visible fairness, consistent enforcement, and the absence of special carveouts for powerful interests.
Core rule in the TAX-DMJ family establishing: The legitimacy of the tax system depends on visible fairness, consistent enforcement, and the absence of special carveouts for powerful interests.
TAXN-DMJS-0003
Included
tax system must be visibly fair in practice
The tax system must be visibly fair in practice — not just theoretically fair on paper while systematically delivering different outcomes for the well-connected versus everyone else.
The tax system must be visibly fair in practice so that ordinary taxpayers are not asked to comply with burdens from which wealthy actors routinely escape.
Core rule in the TAX-DMJ family establishing: The tax system must be visibly fair in practice so that ordinary taxpayers are not asked to comply with burdens from which wealthy actors routinely escape.
TAXN-DMJS-0004
Included
Simplicity, fairness, and enforceability are co-equal design goals
Simplicity, fairness, and enforceability are equally important goals for tax policy — a system that is simple but unfair, or fair but unenforceable, fails the public.
Simplicity, fairness, and enforceability are co-equal design goals of the tax system and may not be traded away in favor of complexity that benefits powerful interests.
Core rule in the TAX-DMJ family establishing: Simplicity, fairness, and enforceability are co-equal design goals of the tax system and may not be traded away in favor of complexity that benefits powerful interests.
TAXN-LVTS-0001
Proposed
Land value taxation may capture publicly created land value
Land value taxation — a tax on the value of land itself, separate from buildings or improvements — can capture value created by public investment and community development, rather than rewarding landowners who simply sit on valuable property.
Tax policy may employ land value taxation to capture the unearned appreciation of land created by public investment, community development, and natural scarcity rather than by the landowner’s effort.
TAXN-LVTS-0002
Proposed
Land value tax must exempt improvements to encourage productive use
A land value tax must exempt buildings and improvements on land — so that investing in and developing property is not penalized, only passive land speculation is.
Land value taxation must be assessed on land value alone, not on improvements or structures, so that building, renovating, and developing land is not penalized relative to speculation and vacancy.
TAXN-LVTS-0003
Proposed
Speculative land holding without productive use must bear higher tax burden
Holding land idle — sitting on vacant lots or undeveloped parcels in high-demand areas — should carry a higher tax burden since it withholds useful land from productive use.
Tax policy must distinguish between land held for productive use and land held speculatively vacant, and may impose higher effective rates on long-term unproductive holdings to discourage speculation.
TAXN-FTTS-0001
Proposed
Securities and derivatives transactions may be subject to a small speculative tax
A small tax on financial transactions — like stock trades, bond trades, and derivatives — can discourage high-speed speculation that destabilizes markets while having minimal impact on ordinary long-term investors.
Financial transactions in stocks, bonds, and derivatives markets may be subject to a small transaction tax that discourages high-frequency speculation while leaving long-term investment largely unaffected.
TAXN-FTTS-0002
Proposed
FTT proceeds must fund public investment, social insurance, or deficit reduction
Revenue from a financial transaction tax must be used for public investment, social insurance programs, or reducing the deficit — not simply offset other tax cuts for the wealthy.
Revenue from a financial transaction tax must be dedicated to public purposes including infrastructure investment, social insurance programs, educational access, or deficit reduction—not returned to financial sector actors.
TAXN-FTTS-0003
Proposed
FTT design must protect retail investors and pension funds from undue burden
A financial transaction tax must be designed carefully so that it doesn't create undue burdens for ordinary retirement savers, pension funds, or small investors.
Any financial transaction tax must be designed with thresholds, exemptions, or rebates that prevent disproportionate burden on ordinary retail investors, retirement savers, and pension funds compared to high-volume speculative traders.
TAXN-CDRS-0001
Proposed
Candidates for federal office must publicly disclose tax returns
Presidential, vice-presidential, and federal candidates must publicly release at least five years of their federal tax returns as a condition of appearing on the ballot or taking office.
Candidates for President, Vice President, and federal elected offices must publicly disclose their federal income tax returns for a minimum of five recent years as a condition of ballot access or confirmation.
TAXN-CDRS-0002
Proposed
Senior executive branch officials must disclose tax returns annually during service
Senior executive branch officials must disclose their tax returns annually while they serve in government — public office requires public financial transparency.
The President, Vice President, Cabinet members, and senior executive branch officials must publicly disclose their federal tax returns annually during their service, and such returns must be reviewed by Congress for conflicts of interest.
TAXN-CDRS-0003
Proposed
Large corporations must publicly disclose country-by-country tax reporting
Large corporations must publicly disclose how much profit they report and how much tax they pay in each country where they operate — so the public can see whether they're paying their fair share.
Corporations above defined size thresholds must publicly disclose country-by-country tax reporting showing where profits are earned, where taxes are paid, and the gap between the two, enabling detection of profit-shifting and base erosion.
TAXN-CDRS-0004
Proposal
Require Dark Money Donor Disclosure for Electoral Activity by 501(c)(4) and 501(c)(6) Organizations
Organizations that spend money to influence elections — often called 'dark money' groups — must disclose who their donors are when they engage in electoral activity.
Any 501(c)(4) social welfare organization or 501(c)(6) trade association that spends more than $10,000 on electoral activity — including issue ads, voter contact, get-out-the-vote activity, or any communication referencing a federal candidate within 60 days of a general election or 30 days of a primary — must disclose to the IRS all donors who contributed $10,000 or more in the relevant reporting year; such disclosures must be made publicly available within 30 days of the electoral expenditure; willful failure to disclose must be a criminal offense subject to mandatory DOJ referral; private right of action must be available to enforce disclosure requirements against non-compliant organizations and their responsible officers.
The Citizens United (2010) decision did not prohibit disclosure requirements — the Court explicitly noted that disclosure can be constitutionally compelled for electoral spending. "Dark money" spent through 501(c)(4) organizations reached record levels in recent election cycles, with hundreds of millions of dollars in electoral spending completely untraceable to individual donors. This rule operates through the tax code: IRS reporting requirements are a legitimate condition of tax-exempt status, independent of campaign finance law, and disclosure as a condition of maintaining exempt status has strong constitutional footing. The $10,000 donor threshold targets significant contributors while protecting small donors from disclosure burdens. Cross-reference: TAXN-CDRS-0001 through 0003 (candidate and corporate disclosure framework).
TAXN-PMTS-0001
Proposal
Federal income tax must apply steeply progressive marginal rates on extreme income
Federal income tax must apply steeply increasing rates on extreme income — people making tens of millions of dollars a year should pay a significantly higher marginal rate than the middle class.
Federal income tax must apply steeply progressive marginal rates so that income above defined extreme thresholds—where tax preferences, consumption-smoothing rationale, and incentive effects are minimal—faces substantially higher effective rates than middle-income labor income. Rate schedules must be set by statute and may not be reduced by administrative rule.
The top federal marginal income tax rate was 91% from 1950 to 1963 and 70% from 1965 to 1980. The current 37% top marginal rate applies at a threshold ($609,350 for single filers in 2024) that has not kept pace with the extreme income concentration at the very top. This rule establishes the principle that top marginal rates must be meaningfully progressive at the upper extreme—not that any specific historical rate is mandated—while leaving rate schedules to statutory process. Cross-reference: TAX-CAP (capital income parity), TAX-WTH (wealth tax), TAX-EST (estate tax).
TAXN-PMTS-0002
Proposal
Alternative minimum tax mechanisms must prevent high-income earners from reducing effective rates below floors
An alternative minimum tax must be maintained to prevent high-income earners from using deductions and credits to reduce their effective tax rate below a floor.
Alternative minimum tax mechanisms must be structured and enforced so that very high earners—regardless of deductions, credits, pass-through structures, or timing arrangements—pay an effective federal income tax rate that reflects their true economic capacity, with the floor rising with income level.
The original Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) was designed to prevent high earners from eliminating tax liability through preferences and deductions. Congressional adjustments eroded its effectiveness for the wealthiest taxpayers. The Inflation Reduction Act's 15% corporate AMT (book minimum tax) demonstrates the principle at the corporate level; an individual equivalent targeting the highest earners—particularly those whose income consists primarily of pass-through, capital gain, or deferred compensation—is necessary to close the parallel gap at the individual level. Cross-reference: TAX-COR-005 (corporate minimum), TAX-CAP (capital gains rates), TAX-WTH (wealth tax).
TAXN-PMTS-0003
Proposal
Stepped-up basis at death must be eliminated or replaced with deemed realization
The 'stepped-up basis' rule — which wipes out the tax owed on investment gains when someone dies and their heirs inherit the assets — must be eliminated or replaced.
The income tax provision that resets the cost basis of inherited assets to market value at death—eliminating all accumulated capital gains from income taxation at transfer—must be eliminated or replaced with deemed realization at death or transfer, subject to appropriate exclusions for small estates and family-operated farms and businesses.
The stepped-up basis rule (26 U.S.C. § 1014) effectively exempts all unrealized capital gains from income tax when assets are inherited, enabling multi-generational wealth accumulation entirely free of income tax on the gains. Treasury and administration estimates indicate that eliminating stepped-up basis would raise approximately $18 billion per year in additional revenue, with broader capital gains at death proposals generating similar estimates.[21] Elimination paired with appropriate small-estate exclusions and payment deferral for illiquid assets (family farms, closely held businesses) addresses the legitimate concerns about forced asset sales. Cross-reference: TAX-EST-001 (estate tax), TAX-CAP (capital gains parity), TAX-WTH-002 (anti-avoidance).
ANTR-ANTS-0009ProposalStrengthen federal antitrust enforcement to prevent and break up market concentration that harms…
Strengthen federal antitrust enforcement to prevent and break up market concentration that harms consumers workers or democratic governance
Source: DB entry ECO-ANT-001, status: MISSING. Pending editorial review.
CNSR-ANTS-0001ProposalRequire consumer goods to be designed for durability repairability and right to repair rather than…
Require consumer goods to be designed for durability repairability and right to repair rather than planned obsolescence
Source: DB entry ECO-ANT-002, status: PROPOSED. Pending editorial review.
ANTR-ANTS-0010ProposalAlgorithmic price coordination between competing market participants is prohibited as a form of per…
Algorithmic price coordination between competing market participants is prohibited as a form of per se antitrust violation
Source: DB entry ECO-ANT-003, status: PROPOSED. Pending editorial review.
TAXN-CORS-0001ProposalCorporate tax rates must be sufficient to prevent profit-shifting, tax avoidance through subsidiary…
Corporate tax rates must be high enough to prevent companies from effectively paying nothing by shuffling profits through subsidiaries in low-tax countries.
Corporate tax rates must be sufficient to prevent profit-shifting, tax avoidance through subsidiary structures, and the effective zero-rating of domestic income through offshore arrangements
Source: DB entry TAX-COR-001, status: PROPOSED. Pending editorial review.
TAXN-CORS-0002ProposalSet 21% Minimum Corporate Tax and Expand GILTI Country-by-Country to Close Profit-Shifting
Corporate tax systems must be designed to close the loopholes that allow profitable corporations to pay little or nothing in taxes.
The U.S. corporate minimum tax on domestic income must be set at no less than 21%; the Global Intangible Low-Taxed Income (GILTI) regime must be reformed to apply on a country-by-country basis at a 21% effective minimum rate, eliminating blending that allows profits in tax havens to be offset by high-tax-country income; all GILTI exclusions for routine returns on tangible assets must be phased down to zero; and the Inflation Reduction Act's 15% corporate book minimum tax must be maintained and applied to all covered corporations without exception or carve-out.
The 2017 TCJA reduced the corporate rate to 21% and introduced GILTI as an anti-base-erosion tool, but the GILTI effective rate of approximately 10.5%–13.125% remains far below the statutory corporate rate and allows substantial profit-shifting. Country blending means that high taxes paid in Germany can offset zero taxes paid in Bermuda, eliminating the anti-haven incentive. Country-by-country GILTI at 21% aligns with OECD Pillar Two at the U.S. statutory rate and closes the primary profit-shifting mechanism used by technology and pharmaceutical multinationals. JCT has estimated GILTI reforms generate substantial additional revenue over ten years. Cross-reference: TAXN-INTL-0004 (OECD minimum tax); TAXN-CORS-0001 (corporate rate principle); TAXN-HVNS-0004 (substance requirement).
TAXN-CORS-0003ProposalExpand Stock Buyback Excise Tax from 1% to 4%; Dedicate Proceeds to Public Investment
Corporations cannot use shell companies, internal royalty payments, or other accounting arrangements to move profits out of the U.S. and avoid taxes on them.
The stock repurchase excise tax enacted in the Inflation Reduction Act must be increased from 1% to 4% of the fair market value of repurchased shares; proceeds from the expanded excise tax must be dedicated to a public investment fund supporting infrastructure, clean energy, research and development, and worker retraining programs; the excise tax must apply to all publicly traded domestic corporations and any surrogate foreign corporation for U.S. tax purposes; no exception may be available for buybacks structured as tender offers or exchange offers.
U.S. corporations spent over $1 trillion on stock buybacks in both 2022 and 2023, returning cash to shareholders in a form taxed at preferential capital gains rates rather than as dividends, with no productive investment required. The 1% IRA rate is widely regarded as too low to meaningfully deter buybacks relative to dividends. A 4% rate creates a stronger incentive to reinvest in productive capacity, worker compensation, or R&D rather than financial engineering. Dedicating proceeds to public investment closes a structural feedback loop: corporations that financialize rather than invest return a portion of that choice to the public systems that support their market position. Cross-reference: TAXN-CORS-0001 (corporate tax principle); TAXN-CAPS-0001 (capital income parity).
TAXN-CORS-0004ProposalCap Corporate Tax Deduction for Executive Compensation at 50× Median Worker Pay
Corporate taxes must be based on where companies actually do business and generate revenue — not on where they file paperwork.
No corporation may claim a federal income tax deduction for compensation paid to any executive, officer, or highly compensated employee that exceeds 50 times the median annual compensation of the corporation's full-time domestic workforce; all forms of compensation must be included in calculating the cap — salary, bonus, equity grants, deferred compensation, and the value of perquisites; the IRS must publish annual median-worker-pay ratios for all publicly traded corporations subject to this cap; criminal penalties and clawback authority must apply to schemes that disguise executive compensation as nondeductible consulting, partnership income, or other re-characterized payments.
The average CEO-to-median-worker pay ratio at S&P 500 companies was approximately 272:1 in 2023. The current deduction cap under 26 U.S.C. § 162(m) limits deductibility of performance-based executive compensation to $1 million for covered employees at public companies, with significant exceptions. A 50× median-worker standard directly links deductibility to workforce treatment: a corporation with a median wage of $40,000 may deduct up to $2 million per executive; one with a median of $80,000 may deduct up to $4 million. This creates a fiscal incentive — not a mandate — to raise worker pay. Cross-reference: TAXN-CORS-0001 (corporate rate structure); TAXN-WTHS-0009 (labor-to-capital income conversion).
TAXN-CORS-0005ProposalBan Corporate Tax Inversions; Treat Inverted Entities as U.S. Domestic Corporations
All corporations must pay a minimum effective tax rate — a floor — so that no profitable company can use deductions and credits to pay nothing.
Any corporate inversion — a transaction in which a U.S. corporation nominally reincorporates in a foreign jurisdiction primarily to reduce U.S. tax obligations — must be treated as having no effect for U.S. tax purposes; the post-inversion foreign entity must be treated as a U.S. domestic corporation for all federal tax purposes; earnings stripping through intercompany debt to a foreign parent following an inversion must be subject to full recharacterization as equity; Treasury must be granted automatic statutory authority — not dependent on rulemaking — to disregard inversion transactions lacking genuine business substance beyond tax reduction; criminal penalties must apply to tax professionals who facilitate sham inversions.
Corporate inversions accelerated in the 2010s, with major U.S. companies reincorporating in Ireland, Canada, and other lower-tax jurisdictions while retaining their U.S. management, operations, and markets. Treasury administrative action in 2016 halted the Pfizer-Allergan merger but demonstrated the limits of regulatory action without statutory backing. The TCJA reduced some inversion incentives by lowering the corporate rate, but a 21% U.S. rate remains above many inversion destinations and GILTI blending still rewards offshore reincorporation. Treating the inverted entity as a U.S. corporation eliminates the benefit entirely without requiring case-by-case Treasury action. Cross-reference: TAXN-CORS-0002 (GILTI); TAXN-HVNS-0004 (substance requirement); TAXN-INTL-0004 (global minimum).
TAXN-CORS-0006ProposalClose the Section 199A Pass-Through Deduction for High-Income Filers and Real Estate
When calculating whether a corporation has paid the minimum tax, the calculation must account for everything the company does globally — not just domestic operations.
The Section 199A qualified business income deduction must be eliminated for taxpayers with taxable income above $400,000; the deduction must not be extended beyond its current 2025 statutory expiration for high-income filers; real estate income passed through qualified REITs and rental activities must not qualify for the deduction regardless of income level; professional service firms — including law, finance, consulting, and accounting firms — must not receive the deduction at any income level; Treasury must issue final regulations closing partnership and S-corporation restructuring schemes used to access the deduction above the income limit.
The Section 199A deduction was enacted in the 2017 TCJA primarily as a tax cut for wealthy real estate developers, hedge fund managers, and high-income professionals who organize their businesses as pass-through entities to avoid the corporate tax. Tax Policy Center analysis found approximately 60% of the deduction's benefit flows to the top 1% of income earners. The deduction creates an incentive to re-characterize employee compensation as pass-through business income, undermining income tax progressivity. Eliminating it for high earners while preserving it for genuine small-business pass-throughs below $400,000 targets the abuse without harming small businesses. Cross-reference: TAXN-WTHS-0009 (labor-to-capital conversion); TAXN-PMTS-0001 (progressive rate structure).
TAXN-ENFL-0001ProposalThe IRS must be funded and staffed to enforce tax law equitably across income levels, with audit…
The IRS must be fully funded and staffed to audit high-income filers and corporations at the same rates as working-class filers — right now, wealthy taxpayers are audited far less than low-income ones.
The IRS must be funded and staffed to enforce tax law equitably across income levels, with audit rates for high-income and corporate filers not systematically lower than for working-class filers
Source: DB entry TAX-ENF-001, status: PROPOSED. Pending editorial review.
TAXN-ENFL-0002ProposalEstablish a Statutory Minimum IRS Funding Floor Tied to Compliance-Gap Closure
Repeated, willful, or large-scale tax evasion must trigger serious criminal penalties, not just fines — treating tax fraud as a cost of doing business sends the wrong message.
Congress must establish by statute a minimum annual funding floor for IRS enforcement, operations, and technology that cannot be reduced below the level the Congressional Budget Office certifies is necessary to close the annual tax compliance gap by at least 10% within 10 years; any appropriations measure that would reduce IRS funding below this floor must be subject to a 60-vote Senate point of order; the IRS Commissioner must be an independent position removable only for cause, not at Presidential discretion; and annual IRS budget requests must include a CBO-certified compliance-gap projection and a funding adequacy certification.
The IRS was systematically defunded over the past decade, with enforcement staffing reaching a 50-year low before the Inflation Reduction Act's $80 billion investment — a portion of which was subsequently rescinded by Congress. The annual U.S. tax compliance gap is estimated by the IRS at over $700 billion — the difference between taxes legally owed and taxes voluntarily and timely paid. Adequate, stable IRS funding is not merely an administrative matter: a tax system that cannot enforce the law on wealthy filers while auditing working-class EITC claimants at higher rates lacks legitimacy. A statutory floor insulated from annual appropriations battles ensures enforcement capacity cannot be weaponized through targeted budget cuts. Cross-reference: TAXN-ENFL-0001 (audit equity principle); TAXN-ENFL-0003 (criminal referral); TAXN-ENFL-0004 (audit rate floor); TAXN-DMJS-0002 (legitimacy principle).
TAXN-ENFL-0003ProposalRequire Mandatory DOJ Referral for All Willful Tax Evasion Above $1 Million
IRS audit resources and investigations must prioritize large-scale tax evasion, which costs the public hundreds of billions of dollars annually — not primarily target low-income filers.
IRS Criminal Investigation must refer all cases involving credible evidence of willful federal tax evasion or fraud exceeding $1 million in evaded taxes to the Department of Justice for prosecution; IRS Criminal Investigation may not enter non-prosecution agreements, deferred prosecution agreements, or informal settlements in lieu of DOJ referral for cases exceeding this threshold without written approval of the Attorney General and notification to the relevant Congressional oversight committees; annual statistics on referrals, prosecution decisions, and case outcomes broken down by taxpayer income bracket must be published publicly; whistleblowers who report willful evasion above $1 million must receive a mandatory award of 15–30% of recovered taxes, penalties, and interest.
Willful tax evasion is a federal crime under 26 U.S.C. § 7201, punishable by up to 5 years imprisonment. However, criminal enforcement has historically been discretionary, and large-scale tax fraud by wealthy individuals and corporations is disproportionately resolved through civil settlements representing a fraction of the evaded amount. Mandatory referral eliminates the discretionary option for significant evasion cases and ensures the criminal justice system — not IRS administrative discretion — determines whether prosecution is warranted. The $1 million threshold targets significant, willful evasion rather than good-faith errors by ordinary filers. Robust whistleblower awards are essential because the IRS cannot independently detect sophisticated offshore and pass-through evasion schemes without inside knowledge. Cross-reference: TAXN-ENFL-0001 (audit equity); TAXN-ENFL-0002 (funding floor); TAXN-HVNS-0002 (haven enforcement).
TAXN-ENFL-0004ProposalRequire Statutory Audit Rate Floors for High-Income Filers and Public Tax Gap Reporting by Bracket
Accountants, lawyers, and financial advisers who facilitate tax fraud or help design abusive tax schemes must face real consequences — not just their clients.
The IRS must maintain a minimum annual audit rate of at least 30% for returns reporting income above $10 million and at least 10% for returns reporting income above $1 million; these floors may not be reduced by administrative discretion or appropriations pressure without an affirmative Congressional vote; the IRS must publish annually a tax gap estimate broken down by income decile, income source type, and evasion method; audit rates by income bracket must be published quarterly; and any year in which the audit rate for filers above $1 million falls below the audit rate for EITC claimants must trigger a mandatory joint Congressional oversight hearing within 90 days.
IRS audit data show that audit rates for millionaire filers fell by more than 70% between 2010 and 2019 due to budget cuts, while audit rates for EITC claimants — who receive relatively small credits and make good-faith errors on complex forms — remained comparatively high because automated matching is inexpensive to execute. This inversion of enforcement resources effectively means the tax code is enforced more aggressively against the working poor than against the wealthy. Statutory audit rate floors for high-income filers protect enforcement from budget pressure. Public tax gap reporting by income bracket creates accountability and informs Congressional oversight. The 30% audit rate floor at $10M+ income is calibrated to the complexity and evasion risk of returns at that level. Cross-reference: TAXN-ENFL-0001 (audit equity principle); TAXN-ENFL-0002 (funding floor); TAXN-DMJS-0003 (visible fairness).
TAXN-SYSR-0001ProposalTax policy must raise revenue fairly, sustain public goods, reduce destabilizing inequality, and…
Tax policy must accomplish four things: raise revenue fairly, fund public goods, reduce dangerous inequality, and prevent the extraction of wealth from the society that made it possible.
Tax policy must raise revenue fairly, sustain public goods, reduce destabilizing inequality, and prevent extraction of wealth from the social systems that made it possible
Source: DB entry TAX-SYS-001, status: PROPOSED. Pending editorial review.
TAXN-SUBS-0001
Proposal
Corporate Tax Incentives Must Include Enforceable Job-Creation Clawbacks
When corporations receive tax incentives tied to job creation promises, those incentives must include real clawback provisions — if the jobs don't materialize, the subsidy must be returned.
Any state or local tax incentive, abatement, or grant provided to a corporation for relocation, expansion, or retention — with a total public value above $1 million — must include a statutory clawback provision requiring the corporation to repay a proportional share of the incentive if promised employment, wage, or investment commitments are not met within 5 years at 90% of the stated commitment. Clawback provisions must be recorded as a lien on corporate property in the jurisdiction; failure to honor clawbacks is grounds for debarment from future state and local contracting for 10 years.
A Good Jobs First analysis found that corporations routinely fail to meet job creation commitments attached to tax incentives. States and localities provide an estimated $90 billion annually in corporate incentives.
TAXN-SUBS-0002
Proposal
Independent Cost-Benefit Analysis Required Before Approving Economic Development Incentives
Before approving major economic development subsidies, independent cost-benefit analysis must be required — taxpayers deserve to know whether the promised benefits are realistic.
All economic development tax deals with a public cost above $500,000 must be reviewed by the state comptroller or an independent fiscal office before approval; the analysis must project net fiscal impact over 20 years, including infrastructure costs, public service demands, and displacement of existing businesses. The analysis must be publicly disclosed at least 30 days before the approving body votes; citizens have standing to challenge approval decisions where the required analysis was not completed. Projected versus actual job creation and public cost must be published annually for every active incentive agreement.
TAXN-SUBS-0003
Proposal
Federal Economic Development Funds May Not Be Used in Corporate Location Bidding Wars
Federal economic development funds cannot be used to fuel bidding wars between states and cities competing to attract the same corporation — this raises corporate welfare costs without improving outcomes.
Federal economic development funds — including ARPA, EDA grants, CDBG, and New Markets Tax Credits — may not be used as components of competitive location incentive packages designed to attract corporations away from other U.S. jurisdictions. Federal funds may support genuine community economic development but may not subsidize interstate bidding wars that transfer economic activity without creating net national employment. Jurisdictions that use federal funds in violation of this section must repay the federal share with interest; repeat violations trigger suspension of economic development grant eligibility for 5 years.
TAXN-SUBS-0004
Proposal
No Federal Tax-Exempt Financing for Professional Sports Stadiums
Federal tax-exempt financing — a form of government subsidy — must not be used to fund professional sports stadiums that primarily benefit wealthy team owners.
Federal tax-exempt bond financing may not be used for the construction, renovation, or improvement of facilities primarily used by professional sports franchises. The federal income tax deduction for state and local taxes paid in connection with stadium subsidies is eliminated for taxes attributable to stadium financing. Professional sports franchises that receive public subsidies above $10 million must disclose full audited financial statements publicly for the duration of the subsidy period; refusal to disclose voids the subsidy agreement and triggers clawback of all public funds received.
Between 2000 and 2020, U.S. taxpayers contributed an estimated $4.3 billion to professional sports stadium construction through tax-exempt bonds. The NFL and NBA are among the most profitable sports leagues in the world yet routinely secure public stadium financing.
TAXN-SUBS-0005
Proposal
Mandatory Federal Registry of All State and Local Corporate Subsidies
A mandatory federal registry of all state and local corporate subsidies must be created so that the public, researchers, and policymakers can see the true scale of corporate welfare.
The Department of Treasury must maintain a publicly accessible, searchable federal registry of all state and local corporate tax incentives, abatements, grants, and subsidies with a public cost above $100,000; states must report all such incentives within 60 days of approval. The registry must include: the corporation name, location, public cost, stated commitments, actual jobs created annually, and clawback status. States that fail to report lose 5% of their Community Development Block Grant allocation for each year of non-compliance.
TAXN-FSUB-0001
Proposal
Repeal the Intangible Drilling Cost Tax Deduction for Oil and Gas Companies
Oil and gas companies can currently deduct the cost of drilling as a business expense immediately — this special tax break must be repealed so fossil fuel companies pay taxes like other businesses.
Section 263(c) of the Internal Revenue Code, which allows oil and gas companies to immediately deduct up to 100% of intangible drilling costs (labor, chemicals, mud, grease) in the year incurred rather than capitalizing them, must be repealed for all companies with gross revenues exceeding $10 million annually; small independent producers may retain a 50% immediate deduction with the remainder capitalized and depreciated over the life of the well. The Congressional Budget Office must score the full 10-year revenue impact of this repeal annually; revenue recaptured must be directed to the Clean Energy Transition Fund.
The intangible drilling cost deduction costs the federal Treasury an estimated $1.3–2.7 billion annually. It has been available to the oil and gas industry since 1913.
TAXN-FSUB-0002
Proposal
Repeal Percentage Depletion Tax Preference for Fossil Fuel Extraction
Oil and gas companies can currently deduct a percentage of revenue from wells as they deplete — this 'percentage depletion' tax preference must be eliminated since it has no equivalent in other industries.
The percentage depletion allowance — which allows oil, gas, and coal companies to deduct a fixed percentage of gross income (currently 15% for oil/gas, 10% for coal) each year regardless of actual capital recovery — must be repealed for all fossil fuel extraction; only cost depletion (deduction of actual unrecovered capital investment) may be used. This provision, unavailable to virtually all other industries, must be eliminated as a market-distorting preference that subsidizes continued fossil fuel extraction. Revenue recovered must be directed to the Abandoned Mine Lands Fund and the Just Transition workforce program.
Percentage depletion allows fossil fuel companies to deduct more than 100% of their original investment over time — a benefit unavailable to other industries.
TAXN-FSUB-0003
Proposal
Repeal Last-In-First-Out Inventory Accounting for Fossil Fuel Companies
Fossil fuel companies use a special accounting method called 'last-in, first-out' that lets them reduce their taxable profits — this tax advantage must be repealed for the oil and gas sector.
Oil, gas, and coal companies may no longer use Last-In-First-Out (LIFO) inventory accounting, which allows them to report lower taxable profits during periods of rising commodity prices by treating the most recently (and expensively) acquired inventory as the first sold; all fossil fuel companies must transition to First-In-First-Out (FIFO) or average cost accounting within two tax years. The IRS must publish guidance on the one-time LIFO recapture tax treatment to prevent gaming of the transition; installment payment over four years is permitted. This provision alone is estimated to raise tens of billions in deferred tax payments from major integrated oil companies.
Major oil companies have accumulated billions in LIFO reserves — deferred tax liabilities that will never be collected unless LIFO is repealed.
TAXN-FSUB-0004
Proposal
Fossil Fuel Capital Equipment May Not Use Accelerated Depreciation Schedules
Fossil fuel companies cannot claim accelerated tax depreciation on their capital equipment — this special advantage over other industries must end.
Oil, gas, and coal extraction and processing equipment may no longer qualify for bonus depreciation (Section 168(k)) or Section 179 expensing; all fossil fuel capital assets must be depreciated over their actual useful economic life using straight-line depreciation. Clean energy equipment — solar panels, wind turbines, battery storage, transmission infrastructure — must remain eligible for accelerated depreciation and bonus expensing. The Tax Code must not provide more favorable capital recovery treatment for fossil fuel assets than for clean energy assets; any provision that creates a net tax preference for fossil fuels over equivalent clean energy investments is prohibited.
Fossil fuel companies have received an estimated $20 billion per year in accelerated depreciation benefits.
TAXN-FSUB-0005
Proposal
Oil Company Payments to Foreign Governments May Not Be Claimed as Foreign Tax Credits
Oil companies cannot claim credit for payments to foreign governments as if those payments were taxes — this foreign tax credit rule must be eliminated for the fossil fuel industry.
Royalty payments and extraction fees paid by U.S. oil and gas companies to foreign governments may not be treated as foreign tax credits under Section 901 of the Internal Revenue Code; they must be treated as ordinary business deductions. This provision — which allows oil companies to use payments to foreign sovereigns to offset U.S. tax liability dollar-for-dollar — is repealed. The IRS must issue regulations prohibiting the structuring of production-sharing agreements to convert royalties into "taxes" for credit purposes. Revenue recovered must be directed to the Green Energy Infrastructure Fund.
This loophole was estimated to reduce U.S. corporate tax revenue by $850 million annually. It effectively subsidizes U.S. oil company extraction operations in foreign countries.
TAXN-FSUB-0006
Proposal
Federal Carbon Pricing Must Apply to All Fossil Fuel Combustion
A federal carbon price must apply to all fossil fuel combustion — making the environmental cost of carbon pollution visible in the price of oil, gas, and coal.
Congress must enact a federal carbon fee of no less than $50 per metric ton of CO₂-equivalent emissions beginning in 2026, rising by $15 per year until U.S. greenhouse gas emissions reach 50% below 2005 levels; the fee applies upstream at the point of extraction or import. At least 60% of carbon fee revenue must be returned to households as a monthly per-capita dividend, with the remainder directed to the Just Transition Fund, clean energy infrastructure, and climate adaptation in frontline communities. No carbon fee may be used to offset or replace EPA's authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air Act; both mechanisms apply concurrently.
A carbon price of $50/ton is estimated to reduce U.S. emissions by 26–47% relative to business as usual by 2030. A household carbon dividend of ~$1,000/year would make the bottom 60% of earners net financial winners under carbon pricing.
TAXN-FSUB-0007
Proposal
All Revenue from Fossil Fuel Subsidy Repeal Must Fund the Clean Energy Transition
All revenue recovered by repealing fossil fuel tax subsidies must go directly to funding the clean energy transition — not to other uses.
The Internal Revenue Code must establish a Clean Energy Transition Fund as a dedicated account within the U.S. Treasury; all revenue increases resulting from repeal of fossil fuel tax preferences (IDC deduction, percentage depletion, LIFO, accelerated depreciation, foreign tax credits) must be credited to this fund by statute. Fund expenditures must be limited to: clean energy manufacturing incentives, rural and tribal electrification, grid modernization, just transition workforce programs in fossil fuel-dependent communities, and climate adaptation grants to frontline communities. The fund may not be used for carbon capture and storage projects at active fossil fuel facilities.
TAXN-RLEG-0001
Proposal
Religious Organizations That Endorse or Oppose Candidates Must Lose Tax-Exempt Status
Religious organizations that publicly endorse or oppose political candidates must lose their tax-exempt status — using charitable status to influence elections is prohibited for all nonprofits.
The Johnson Amendment — which prohibits 501(c)(3) organizations including churches from endorsing or opposing political candidates — must be codified in statute (not merely IRS regulation) to prevent executive-order circumvention; penalties for violation must be strengthened from discretionary revocation to mandatory automatic revocation of tax-exempt status for any organization that makes or funds a candidate endorsement, explicitly or implicitly, from the pulpit or in organizational communications. The IRS must publish annual reports on Johnson Amendment enforcement actions, including the number of complaints received, investigated, and resolved. Religious leaders may speak on policy issues but may not direct congregants to vote for or against specific candidates using organizational resources. Criminal penalties must apply to organization officials who make or authorize candidate endorsements in violation of this section while claiming tax-exempt status; any taxpayer may bring a private right of action to compel IRS enforcement of mandatory revocation under this section.
The Trump administration issued an executive order in 2017 directing the IRS not to enforce the Johnson Amendment, effectively nullifying it. Churches that endorse candidates from the pulpit have faced almost zero IRS enforcement for decades.
TAXN-RLEG-0002
Proposal
All Religious Organizations With Over $500,000 Annual Revenue Must File Public Financial Disclosures
All religious organizations with over $500,000 in annual revenue must file public financial disclosures — large organizations that receive public tax benefits must be publicly accountable.
Any religious organization — including churches, mosques, synagogues, temples, televangelism ministries, and religious broadcasting networks — with annual gross revenue exceeding $500,000 must file an annual public financial disclosure (Form 990 or equivalent) with the IRS reporting: total revenue by source; total expenditures by category; compensation of the five highest-paid employees; real estate holdings; investment income; and any related-party transactions. Disclosures must be publicly available on the IRS website within 90 days of filing. Currently, churches are the only category of 501(c)(3) organization exempt from filing Form 990; this exemption is repealed. Failure to file is subject to a $100/day penalty up to $50,000. Criminal penalties must apply to any officer who knowingly files false or materially misleading financial disclosures under this section; any person may bring a private right of action to compel an organization to file required disclosures or to make filed disclosures publicly available.
Unlike every other type of nonprofit, churches are currently entirely exempt from filing IRS Form 990 financial disclosures. Major megachurches and televangelism empires generate hundreds of millions of dollars annually with zero public financial accountability.
TAXN-RLEG-0003
Proposal
IRS Must Audit All Religious Organizations With Over $25 Million Annual Revenue Every Three Years
The IRS must audit all religious organizations with over $25 million in annual revenue at least once every three years to ensure compliance with tax laws.
The IRS must establish a mandatory audit cycle for religious organizations with annual gross revenue exceeding $25 million, requiring a full financial audit every three years covering: compliance with 501(c)(3) restrictions on political activity; private benefit and self-dealing transactions; unrelated business income tax (UBIT) obligations; compensation reasonableness for executives and clergy; and accuracy of revenue and expenditure reporting. Audit findings must be summarized in annual public reports (without identifying individual taxpayers) showing aggregate compliance rates. The IRS must be appropriated dedicated staffing for religious organization audits; this funding may not be reduced below 2024 levels by executive action. Criminal penalties must apply to organization officials who obstruct, impede, or provide false information in an IRS audit conducted under this section; any aggrieved party may bring a private right of action for failure to comply with audit subpoenas or documentary requests issued under this section.
The IRS audited only three churches between 2010 and 2016. The Church Audit Procedures Act imposes unique procedural barriers that make IRS audits of churches extraordinarily difficult.
TAXN-RLEG-0004
Proposal
Religious Organizations Must Pay UBIT on All Commercial Income Unrelated to Religious Mission
Religious organizations must pay standard business taxes on commercial income that is unrelated to their actual religious mission — tax-exempt status is not a blanket business subsidy.
The IRS must enforce unrelated business income tax (UBIT) obligations against religious organizations on all revenue from activities not substantially related to their religious mission, including: commercial real estate rental income above $250,000 annually; for-profit broadcasting and media revenue; investment income from for-profit business ownership; licensing of intellectual property for commercial purposes; and revenue from for-profit subsidiaries. Religious organizations may not use related-party transactions to shift UBIT-generating income to tax-exempt categories; the IRS must promulgate rules defining "substantially related to religious mission" with clear safe harbors and clear prohibitions. Criminal penalties must apply to officers and tax professionals who structure related-party transactions specifically to evade UBIT obligations under this section; any taxpayer may bring a private right of action against the IRS to compel enforcement of UBIT requirements against a specific organization.
TAXN-RLEG-0005
Proposal
Tax Exemption Must Be Revoked for Any Organization That Uses Religious Status to Coerce Members
Tax-exempt status must be revoked for any organization that uses its religious status as a tool to coerce, control, or financially exploit its members.
The IRS must establish criteria for revocation of 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status for organizations that: use religious doctrine to compel members to donate under threat of spiritual harm or shunning; use confidential "pastoral" communications as evidence in internal disciplinary proceedings against members; operate for-profit businesses through religious subsidiaries while claiming full exemption; or systematically prevent members from accessing government benefits, legal counsel, or family contact. The IRS must publish criteria publicly; affected organizations must have an opportunity to cure violations before revocation. Tax exemption is a public subsidy, not a constitutional right; organizations that use religious status to coerce or exploit members are not entitled to public subsidy. Criminal penalties must apply to organization officials who submit fraudulent certifications of compliance with this section or who use organizational legal resources to suppress member rights claims; former members who have suffered documented financial harm from coercive donation practices must have a private right of action against the organization and its principals.
The Church of Scientology negotiated its tax-exempt status in a 1993 secret agreement with the IRS, the terms of which have never been fully disclosed to the public. Former members have documented practices including forced "donations" and financial coercion.
TAXN-RLEG-0006
Proposal
Religious Property Tax Exemptions Must Be Limited to Property Actually Used for Religious Purposes
Religious property tax exemptions must apply only to property actually used for religious purposes — not to commercial real estate, investments, or other assets held under a religious name.
Federal tax law must condition the deductibility of state and local property tax payments on property used for religious purposes only when the property is regularly and primarily used for religious services, religious education, or direct ministry to the community; commercial real estate owned by religious organizations that is leased to for-profit tenants, used for investment purposes, or held vacant must be subject to property taxation at the same rate as equivalent secular commercial property. States that grant property tax exemptions to religious organizations must apply the same "primarily used for religious purposes" standard as a condition of receiving federal religious freedom deference. Religious organizations must annually certify to state tax authorities the square footage and use of each exempt property. Criminal penalties must apply to organization officers who knowingly certify false property use data under this section; any property taxpayer in the relevant taxing jurisdiction may bring a private right of action challenging the exempt status of property not primarily used for religious purposes.
Religious organizations in the U.S. own an estimated $600 billion in property, much of which is exempt from property taxes, representing a significant annual subsidy from local governments and public schools funded by property taxes.
TAXN-WLTH-0001
Proposal
The United States Must Impose an Annual Wealth Tax on Net Worth Above $50 Million
The U.S. must impose an annual wealth tax on net worth above $50 million — a small percentage tax each year on the total assets of the ultra-wealthy to begin addressing extreme inequality.
Congress must enact an annual progressive wealth tax that: (1) levies a 2% annual tax on household and trust net worth above $50 million and a 3% annual tax on net worth above $1 billion; (2) applies to all assets including financial instruments, real estate, closely held businesses, art, and other tangible property; (3) establishes a mark-to-market valuation process with IRS authority to require independent appraisals; (4) imposes an "exit tax" equal to the present value of all future wealth taxes for any individual who renounces citizenship; (5) is enforced by a dedicated IRS ultra-high-net-worth division with annual audit rates of 30% for billionaires and 15% for households above $50M; and (6) includes criminal penalties for valuation fraud and willful underreporting, with a private whistleblower reward of up to 30% of the amount collected.
The top 0.1% of U.S. households own more wealth than the bottom 80% combined. An annual wealth tax on fortunes above $50M was estimated to raise approximately $3.75 trillion over 10 years. Eleven countries in the OECD have operated wealth taxes; capital flight fears have not materialized in countries with strong enforcement.
TAXN-WLTH-0002
Proposal
Dynastic Wealth Transfers Must Be Taxed at Rates That Meaningfully Reduce Intergenerational Concentration
When large amounts of wealth pass between generations through gifts or inheritance, the transfers must be taxed at rates high enough to actually reduce dynastic concentration — not just on paper.
Congress must restore and strengthen the estate tax by: (1) reducing the exemption from $12.92 million to $3.5 million per individual ($7 million for married couples), restoring the 2009 exemption level; (2) establishing a graduated rate structure — 45% on taxable estates $3.5–10M, 55% on estates $10–50M, 65% on estates $50–500M, and 77% on the portion above $1 billion; (3) eliminating the "grantor retained annuity trust" (GRAT) abuse that allows billionaires to transfer wealth to heirs virtually tax-free; (4) capping valuation discounts for illiquid assets (LLCs, family limited partnerships) at 15%; (5) requiring annual inflation adjustment for the exemption; and (6) imposing criminal penalties on estate planners who knowingly facilitate abusive avoidance schemes, with IRS authority to claw back improperly discounted transfers within 10 years.
The effective estate tax rate for the wealthiest Americans has fallen dramatically since the 1970s due to exemption increases and planning strategies. GRAT transactions alone are estimated to transfer hundreds of billions annually to heirs without estate tax.
TAXN-WLTH-0003
Proposal
The Stepped-Up Basis Loophole That Allows Unrealized Gains to Escape Taxation at Death Must Be Eliminated
The stepped-up basis loophole — which allows investment gains to completely escape taxation when an heir inherits assets — must be permanently eliminated.
Congress must eliminate the "stepped-up basis" provision (26 U.S.C. § 1014) that allows unrealized capital gains to permanently escape taxation by: (1) treating death and gift transfers as a recognition event triggering capital gains taxation on all unrealized appreciation; (2) providing an exclusion of $1 million per individual ($2 million per married couple) on unrealized gains recognized at death to protect family farms and small businesses; (3) allowing a 15-year installment payment option for illiquid assets including family businesses and farms to prevent forced sales; (4) applying a valuation process with independent appraisals for private assets; and (5) using proceeds exclusively for the earned income tax credit, child tax credit, and housing assistance. This provision must be coordinated with the estate tax so that gains taxed at death are credited against any estate tax owed on the same assets.
The "buy, borrow, die" strategy allows ultra-wealthy individuals to permanently avoid capital gains taxes on appreciated assets by borrowing against them during their lifetime and having the gains erased at death. Eliminating stepped-up basis was estimated to raise $505 billion over 10 years.
TAXN-WLTH-0004
Proposal
The United States Must Aggressively Enforce and Expand International Tax Compliance to End Offshore Tax Evasion
The U.S. must aggressively enforce existing international tax compliance laws and expand them to end offshore tax evasion by the ultra-wealthy.
The United States must act to eliminate offshore tax evasion and corporate profit-shifting by: (1) fully implementing the OECD Pillar Two 15% global corporate minimum tax, with the U.S. minimum set at 21% to exceed the international floor and deny deductions to corporations headquartered in tax haven jurisdictions; (2) requiring country-by-country public reporting of revenues, profits, taxes paid, employees, and assets for all multinational corporations operating in the U.S.; (3) increasing FATCA penalties and enforcement budget by $2 billion annually, with mandatory referral to DOJ of all willful offshore evasion above $1 million; (4) requiring all U.S. citizens and permanent residents with foreign financial accounts above $10,000 to use a modernized digital FBAR reporting system with enhanced whistleblower protections and rewards; (5) imposing a financial transaction tax of 0.1% on stocks, 0.05% on bonds, and 0.005% on derivatives to fund enforcement; and (6) establishing a private right of action for states harmed by offshore tax evasion by corporations doing business within their borders.
Tax evasion and offshore profit-shifting by corporations and the ultra-wealthy cost the U.S. an estimated $600 billion annually in lost revenue. The Panama Papers and Pandora Papers revealed the scale of offshore wealth concealment by U.S. citizens and multinationals.
TAXN-ENFO-0001
Proposal
The IRS Must Be Fully Funded to Audit Wealthy Taxpayers at Pre-2010 Rates, the $600 Billion Annual Tax Gap Must Be Closed, and Criminal Tax Fraud by High-Income Filers Must Be Prosecuted With the Same Rigor as Street Crime
The IRS must be fully funded to audit wealthy taxpayers at the rates seen before 2010, the $600 billion annual gap between taxes owed and taxes paid must be closed, and criminal tax fraud by high-income filers must be prosecuted just as seriously as other crimes.
Congress must: (1) fully fund the IRS at the level authorized by the Inflation Reduction Act — restoring and hiring no fewer than 87,000 additional agents over 10 years, with a mandate to direct at least 60% of new audit capacity toward taxpayers with incomes above $400,000; (2) require the IRS to restore audit rates for taxpayers earning over $1 million to no less than 8% annually — reversing the decline from 8.4% in 2010 to less than 0.7% in recent years; (3) establish a Billionaire Tax Compliance Unit within IRS Criminal Investigation — dedicated exclusively to investigating criminal tax fraud, abusive partnership structures, and unreported offshore income among taxpayers with net worth above $30 million, funded at $1 billion annually; (4) require the IRS to publish annual Tax Gap Reports disaggregated by income level — identifying the amount of taxes owed but unpaid by the top 1%, top 0.1%, and top 0.01% of earners; (5) increase criminal penalties for willful tax fraud to: (a) fines of up to $5 million per count for individuals; (b) fines of up to $25 million per count for corporations; (c) imprisonment up to 10 years; (6) prohibit any future rescission of IRS enforcement funding without a separate, standalone vote — preventing IRS defunding from being attached to unrelated legislation; and (7) establish a private right of action allowing any U.S. taxpayer or state attorney general to seek a declaratory judgment in the U.S. Tax Court that a Treasury or OMB directive has unlawfully reduced IRS enforcement capacity below the level mandated by this section, with mandatory restoration within 180 days of a final judgment.
The IRS estimates the annual "tax gap" — taxes owed but not paid — at approximately $600 billion per year, with the vast majority attributable to high-income taxpayers, pass-through businesses, and corporations. IRS audit rates for millionaires have fallen by more than 90% since 2010 due to budget cuts.
TAXN-CARR-0001
Proposal
The Carried Interest Loophole Must Be Permanently Closed — All Compensation Paid to Investment Fund Managers Must Be Taxed as Ordinary Income, and the Holding Period Gimmick Must Be Repealed Immediately
The 'carried interest loophole' — which lets hedge fund and private equity managers pay lower tax rates than their assistants — must be permanently closed. All compensation for managing other people's money must be taxed as ordinary income.
Congress must: (1) permanently close the carried interest loophole — amending the Internal Revenue Code to require that all "carried interest" compensation received by fund managers (including general partners of private equity, hedge fund, venture capital, and real estate investment partnerships) be treated as ordinary income, taxed at the manager's applicable marginal rate, regardless of the holding period of the underlying assets; (2) repeal the 3-year holding period requirement enacted in the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, which created the appearance of reform while leaving the core loophole intact; (3) extend the reclassification to all "profits interest" arrangements — preventing avoidance through restructured partnership agreements that achieve the same economic effect as carried interest; (4) require all investment partnerships to report carried interest compensation on Form W-2 rather than Schedule K-1 — ensuring ordinary income tax withholding and FICA obligations apply; (5) direct the IRS to audit 100% of all fund manager tax returns claiming capital gains treatment on performance fees for 3 years following enactment to ensure compliance; (6) use revenues from closing the carried interest loophole — estimated at $14 billion over 10 years — to fund affordable housing, childcare, or climate programs; and (7) establish a private right of action allowing any whistleblower with direct knowledge of a fund partnership misclassifying carried interest compensation as capital gains to report the violation to the IRS and receive a whistleblower award of up to 30% of taxes, penalties, and interest recovered, with anti-retaliation protections and a private cause of action for retaliation damages in federal district court.
The carried interest loophole allows private equity and hedge fund managers — among the highest-paid individuals in the economy — to pay a 20% capital gains rate on their labor income instead of the 37% ordinary income rate that applies to other high earners. The loophole costs an estimated $1.4 billion per year in federal revenue.
TAXN-OFSH-0001
Proposal
U.S. Corporations Must Pay a Minimum 21% Tax on All Profits Regardless of Where They Are Booked, Country-by-Country Tax Reporting Must Be Made Public, and All Tax Haven Arrangements Must Be Presumed Abusive Unless Proven Otherwise
U.S. corporations must pay a minimum 21% tax on all profits regardless of where they are booked — country-by-country tax reporting must be made public — and all tax haven arrangements must be presumed abusive unless the company can prove they reflect genuine economic activity.
Congress must: (1) enact a strong domestic Global Minimum Tax (GMT) — applying a 21% minimum effective tax rate on all profits earned by U.S. multinational corporations in every country, regardless of where profits are booked, consistent with the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework; (2) adopt and strengthen the Global Anti-Base Erosion (GloBE) rules — applying a top-up tax to bring any U.S. multinational's effective rate in any jurisdiction to at least 21%; (3) require public country-by-country reporting — mandating that all U.S. corporations with annual revenues above $850 million publicly disclose, on a country-by-country basis: (a) revenue; (b) profits; (c) taxes paid; (d) employees; (e) tangible assets — in a standardized, machine-readable format on the IRS website; (4) establish a rebuttable presumption of tax abuse for any arrangement that shifts more than 10% of a company's global profits to a jurisdiction where the company has fewer than 1% of its global employees or assets — placing the burden on the company to demonstrate a legitimate business purpose; (5) eliminate the GILTI (Global Intangible Low-Taxed Income) "substance-based income exclusion" that allows corporations to avoid minimum tax on returns from offshore intellectual property; (6) direct Treasury to automatically identify and sanction any jurisdiction on the OECD list of non-cooperative tax jurisdictions by denying treaty benefits to companies routing profits through those jurisdictions; and (7) establish a private right of action allowing any state that demonstrates revenue harm from corporate offshore profit-shifting to bring a civil enforcement action in federal district court against the responsible corporation, with mandatory disgorgement of the tax savings attributable to the abusive arrangement and criminal referral to the Department of Justice where the conduct is found to be willful.
U.S. corporations shift an estimated $300–$700 billion in profits offshore annually to avoid U.S. taxes. The OECD's global minimum tax framework, agreed to by 140+ countries, set a floor of 15% — the U.S. should lead by adopting a 21% standard.
TAXN-RLGT-0001
Proposal
All Religious Organizations With Annual Revenue Exceeding $1 Million Must File Public Financial Disclosures Equivalent to Form 990 — And Any Religious Organization That Engages in Partisan Political Activity, Endorses Candidates, or Directs Political Spending Must Immediately Lose Its Tax-Exempt Status
All religious organizations with over $1 million in annual revenue must file public financial disclosures like other nonprofits — and any religious organization that engages in partisan politics or endorses candidates must immediately lose its tax-exempt status.
Congress must: (1) require financial transparency — all religious organizations with annual gross revenue exceeding $1 million must file an annual public Form 990 (or equivalent) with the IRS, disclosing: (a) total revenue, including all donations, tithes, investment income, and business revenue; (b) executive compensation for all officers earning above $100,000; (c) all real property owned and its estimated market value; (d) all political contributions or independent expenditures made by the organization or any affiliated entity; (e) all foreign financial transactions above $10,000; (2) enforce the Johnson Amendment — establishing that any religious organization that: (a) endorses or opposes any candidate for public office; (b) makes any expenditure to influence any election; (c) directs its congregation to vote for or against any candidate — shall have its tax-exempt status automatically revoked for a period of 5 years, with criminal penalties for organizational leaders who knowingly authorize such activity; (3) close the parsonage allowance abuse — limiting the tax-free housing allowance for religious leaders to the lesser of: (a) the fair market rental value of the home; (b) $150,000 per year — prohibiting the allowance from applying to multiple residences, vacation homes, or luxury properties; (4) require the IRS to conduct annual audits of at least 5% of all religious organizations with revenue above $10 million; (5) criminal penalties — fines up to $10 million and imprisonment up to 10 years — for any religious organization leader who files false financial disclosures or knowingly directs prohibited political activity; and (6) a private right of action for any taxpayer to petition the IRS to investigate a religious organization for prohibited political activity, with standing to sue if the IRS fails to act within 180 days.
Religious organizations in the United States receive an estimated $71 billion in tax benefits annually. The parsonage allowance has been used by some megachurch pastors to exempt millions of dollars in housing costs — including multiple mansions — from taxation.
TAXN-TVNG-0001
Proposal
Any Religious Organization That Solicits Donations by Promising Miraculous Financial Returns, Physical Healing, or Supernatural Benefits in Exchange for Contributions Must Comply With Federal Consumer Protection Laws — And All Faith-Based Fundraising Targeting People Over 65 or in Financial Distress Must Be Subject to FTC Oversight
Religious organizations that promise miraculous financial returns, healing, or supernatural benefits in exchange for donations must comply with consumer protection laws — and faith-based fundraising targeting elderly or financially vulnerable people must be subject to FTC oversight.
Congress must: (1) establish the Faith-Based Fundraising Consumer Protection Act — defining "prosperity gospel solicitation" as any fundraising communication that: (a) explicitly or implicitly promises that a donation will result in miraculous financial returns, healing, or supernatural benefits to the donor; (b) uses testimonials claiming recipients received financial windfalls, health recoveries, or other benefits in direct exchange for donations — and requiring all such solicitations to: (i) include a clear disclaimer stating that no financial or health return is guaranteed; (ii) disclose the organization's executive compensation and financial disclosures in the same communication; (iii) comply with the FTC's telemarketing sales rule including the right to cancel; (2) prohibit targeting of vulnerable populations — making it an unfair and deceptive practice under the FTC Act for any religious fundraising organization to: (a) specifically target direct mail, broadcast, or digital advertising to individuals over 65 or identified as in financial distress; (b) solicit emergency "seed faith" donations from individuals who have disclosed financial hardship; (c) use high-pressure tactics including countdown timers, exclusive divine opportunity framing, or artificial urgency; (3) establish FTC jurisdiction over all faith-based consumer financial transactions — making clear that the FTC Act applies to financial solicitations regardless of religious framing; (4) criminal penalties — fines up to $50 million and imprisonment up to 20 years — for any person who operates a faith-based fundraising scheme constituting wire fraud; and (5) a private right of action for any donor who was defrauded through prosperity gospel solicitation, with damages equal to all amounts donated plus punitive damages plus attorney's fees.
Televangelist organizations collectively raise billions of dollars annually, often from elderly and low-income donors. Multiple televangelists have faced investigations by the Senate Finance Committee for misuse of donor funds for private jets, luxury homes, and personal expenses.
TAXN-GENL-0001
Tax systems must be progressive overall and may not shift disproportionate burden onto lower-income or middle-income hou
The overall tax system must be progressive — meaning those with higher incomes pay higher rates — and cannot shift a disproportionate share of the burden onto lower- and middle-income households.
Tax systems must be progressive overall and may not shift disproportionate burden onto lower-income or middle-income households
The concentration of wealth in the United States has reached levels not seen since the Gilded Age. The top 1% control over 30% of national wealth, while the bottom 50% control less than 2%.[1][2] This concentration is not merely an economic statistic—it is a structural threat to democratic governance. When individuals have resources measured in hundreds of billions of dollars, they can fund political movements, shape media narratives, influence policy directly, and operate largely above the law through legal resources and political connections.
The brainstorm branch materials emphasize reframing wealth taxation from a specific rate proposal ("70% on top 1%") to a constitutional principle: taxation must be progressive, wealth concentration threatening democratic self-government may be regulated, and Congress has authority to tax extreme concentrations through wealth taxes, inheritance taxes, progressive income taxation, and land value capture. This framing is politically durable because it establishes a principle without prescribing specific mechanisms, leaving room for statutory evolution while preventing the system from drifting toward plutocracy.
The automation tax concept has gained prominence as AI capabilities advance. Recent reporting indicates that OpenAI's policy proposals include shifting taxation away from labor toward automation-driven capital, including a "robot tax" on automated labor displacement. This aligns with the project's ECO-AUT rules. The economic logic is straightforward: if productivity gains from automation flow entirely to capital owners while workers lose jobs and bargaining power, inequality accelerates and consumption-based economies face demand problems. An automation tax captures a portion of those gains for public benefit, supporting displaced workers and funding public goods.
The challenge is implementation: how to measure labor displacement, how to distinguish between augmentation (making workers more productive) and replacement (eliminating positions), and how to prevent gaming through offshore automation or contractor structures. The framework establishes the principle—companies that replace labor with automation should share the gains—while leaving technical implementation to regulatory process.
Small business support is politically essential. Progressive policies that impose costs on employers—healthcare mandates, paid leave, benefits requirements—can be framed as anti-small-business even when they support workers. The solution is to provide government subsidies, carveouts, or direct support so small businesses can meet social obligations without being driven out of business. This is particularly important for paid parental leave, which small businesses struggle to fund on their own. Government subsidy or direct provision (paid leave insurance fund) makes the policy viable.
The insurance and AI decision-making rules address a growing problem: algorithmic systems are used to deny claims, reduce coverage, restrict access, and make consequential economic decisions without meaningful human oversight. Humans in the loop often become rubber-stamps because they face pressure to process high volumes, lack information to challenge algorithmic recommendations, and develop automation bias (assuming the computer is right). The requirement for independent human judgment—with accountability if that judgment is merely deference to the algorithm—is essential to prevent AI-driven denial systems.
Economic equality provisions extend beyond employment discrimination to structural opportunity. "Equal pay for equal work" is insufficient if hiring, promotion, networking, education, and access are discriminatory. The pillar requires genuine equality of economic opportunity, recognizing that formal legal equality can coexist with systematic structural disadvantage.
Industrial policy is included because economic structure cannot be left entirely to market forces when those markets have been shaped by decades of policy favoring financialization over production. Rebuilding domestic manufacturing capacity, securing critical supply chains, and supporting strategic industries requires affirmative government action — as demonstrated by the CHIPS and Science Act (2022) and the Inflation Reduction Act's domestic manufacturing provisions.[6] The United States is heavily import-dependent across a wide range of critical minerals essential to defense, clean energy, and advanced manufacturing, with China controlling the dominant share of global rare earth processing capacity.[7] Federal R&D investment as a share of GDP has declined substantially from its mid-20th-century peak — a structural disinvestment in future economic and technological capacity.[8] The goods trade deficit reflects four decades of trade policy that treated offshoring as neutral economic optimization rather than strategic vulnerability accumulation.[9] Meanwhile, corporate tax avoidance remains widespread: major corporations routinely pay zero federal taxes on substantial profits, underscoring that the current tax system fails to fund the public investments industrial strategy requires.[3] The ECO-IND framework addresses these failures through a comprehensive, operationally specific industrial strategy that is more institutionally durable than broad public ownership proposals — achieving strategic goals through investment, standards, and market shaping rather than nationalization.
The Georgist land value taxation concept appears in source materials as part of the wealth taxation framework. The logic is that land value is largely unearned (created by community development and public investment) and therefore a particularly appropriate target for taxation. Taxing land value also discourages speculative holding and encourages productive use, addressing housing affordability and economic concentration. The Lincoln Institute of Land Policy has documented that split-rate property taxes reduce speculative vacancy and encourage productive development.[4]
A financial transaction tax (FTT) on securities transactions is supported by both revenue and anti-speculation arguments. The Congressional Budget Office analyzed a 0.01% rate and projected approximately $26 billion per year in revenue.[5] More than 40 countries maintain FTTs including the UK's 0.5% stamp duty.[18] The primary burden falls on high-frequency algorithmic trading rather than long-term retail investors.
Tax transparency for candidates and officeholders connects taxation and democracy directly. The norm of presidential tax disclosure was maintained voluntarily from 1976 until 2016—demonstrating both parties considered it reasonable for four decades. Codifying it as law closes the gap created when that norm collapsed.